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A COMPANION TO GREEK RHETORIC

Edited by

Ian Worthington



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Publishing

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Preface: For Readers – and Reviewers

The aim of the *Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World* series, according to its blurb, is to ‘provide an international audience of students, scholars, and general readers with sophisticated, one-volume companions to classical and near eastern civilizations, classical literature, and ancient history’. The chapters in each volume are to be written primarily for those approaching the topic for the first time (be they undergraduates, graduates, or members of the public) and for scholars operating in adjacent fields of study, but at the same time those working in the particular field should also find them stimulating. Writing for these different types of reader at the same time is difficult, and so I should say at the outset that the chapters in this Companion are ultimately written for its primary audience, but I hope specialists in the field will find them beneficial. Each chapter provides an overview of the main issues of its topic, at times raises new questions or adopts a fresh approach to its subject matter, and has a bibliographical essay that acts as a guide to further reading. All quotations from ancient sources are translated into English. An introductory chapter (1) discusses the idea of rhetoric, the status of rhetoric studies (present and future), and summarises the various chapters of this volume.

There has been much work undertaken on rhetoric in recent years, as will be obvious from the discussions in the following chapters and references in their notes. More than that, translations of ancient works dealing with rhetoric, speeches by orators, and so forth, are appearing with welcome regularity these days, thus making these works available to a wider reading audience. One recent venture that should be singled out is the University of Texas Press’ Oratory of Classical Greece series. Under the general editorship of Michael Gagarin, the series will consist of translations of all of the speeches and major fragments of the Attic orators, and several volumes have already been published.

We seem to be living in an era of Companions and ‘Introductions to’ as even a cursory glance at the number of publishers producing such books, often on the same subject, shows, and one can question why there is a need for this one. Put simply, the

aim of this book is to be the most comprehensive treatment of Greek rhetoric within one set of covers. It is a mixture of narrative and thematic analysis that traces the history of rhetoric from Homer to Byzantium and through a variety of approaches considers rhetoric in a number of historical, social, political, intellectual, and literary contexts. Included are the usual ‘staple’ chapters such as rhetoric and politics, rhetoric and law, rhetoric and philosophy, rhetoric and various literary genres, along with topics that are deserving of more attention, such as rhetoric and emotion, rhetoric and logic, rhetoric and ethics, rhetoric and knowledge, rhetoric and religion. All contribute to give us different insights into how the Greeks saw and used rhetoric, and how it was as fundamentally at the heart of their society as law, politics and religion – and by extension, how it influenced, and became part of, many of the things that we take for granted today. This book also partners Blackwell’s *Companion to Roman Rhetoric*, edited by W.J. Dominik and J. Hall (Oxford: 2007), which, on the Roman side, covers a broad range of topics and involves a variety of modern approaches.

An editor’s job is not an easy one given the quickness of reviewers to criticise Companions if their chapters are uneven in content and style or if the book lacks coherency because contributors did not discuss their work with each other. The editor usually bears the brunt of criticism, and in many cases rightly so. Since I have no desire to be lambasted in reviews any more than I usually am, I asked the contributors to write for the book’s primary audience while appealing to specialists, not to argue some narrow angle or to grind a particular axe, and where possible to ask new questions. I also asked them to communicate with those whose chapters overlapped with, or had some bearing on, their own, rather than writing in a vacuum (many did so, either in email exchanges or by exchanging drafts). Thus, the chapters are written in as uniform a manner as one can get with three dozen different people, for the most part take the work of others into account, and are approximately the same length (with the exception of Chapter 11 on Rome: see its first note for explanation). I hope that the book will appeal to even critical reviewers.

I have a number of people to thank. I was delighted when Al Bertrand at Blackwell invited me to edit this Companion, and my thanks go to him, as they do to Sophie Gibson and Angela Cohen at Blackwell for their support. I am very grateful to Annette Abel, whose keen eye at the copy-editing stage saved this book from many errors and inconsistencies. I am indebted to the contributors to this book, not only for agreeing to write on their topics in the first place (and doing such a first-class job) but also for putting up with a demanding editor who tried to be diplomatic and more than a few times failed. Years from now, some of us may look back on this project and laugh. My long-suffering family has also my heartfelt thanks for continuing to put up with me, despite knowing that as one project ends another begins.

Ian Worthington
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 January 2006

Notes

References in the text and notes to a scholar's name followed by a chapter number (e.g., M. Gagarin, Chapter 3) refer of course to the contributor and his/her chapter in this book.

All dates are BC except where indicated and in Professor Elizabeth Jeffreys' chapter on Byzantium (12).

In deference to the fact that the majority of contributors live in North America and England, I have allowed both English and American spellings.

I have also allowed contributors to cite works such as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in one of two (sometimes both) ways and to transliterate Greek words using a 'y' or 'u' (e.g., *hubris*, *hybris*) depending on their inclination. Greek names are anglicised, but some terms and technical words are transliterated, and these will be obvious when they appear.

Abbreviations

Names of journals are abbreviated as in *L'Année Philologique* (less well-known or common ones to classicists are given in full), although consistent with English practice the 'h' is dropped (thus, *CP* not *CPh*).

Titles of ancient works are given in full except in the case of speeches by the Attic orators (see p. xiv) and in the following two frequently cited works:

<i>Rhet.</i>	<i>Rhetoric</i> (of Aristotle)
<i>Rhet. Alex.</i>	<i>Rhetoric to Alexander</i> (attributed to Anaximenes)

Frequently cited ancient authors are abbreviated as follows:

Aes.	Aeschines
Andoc.	Andocides
Ant.	Antiphon
<i>AP</i>	<i>Athēnaiōn Politeia</i> (attributed to Aristotle)
Arist.	Aristotle
Aristoph.	Aristophanes
Cic.	Cicero
Dem.	Demosthenes
[Dem.]	Pseudo-Demosthenes
Din.	Dinarchus
Diod.	Diodorus
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Hyp.	Hyperides
Is.	Isaeus
Isoc.	Isocrates
Lyc.	Lycurgus
Lys.	Lysias
Pl.	Plato
Plut.	Plutarch
[Plut.]	Pseudo-Plutarch
Quint.	Quintilian
Thuc.	Thucydides

Speeches of the Attic Orators

References to speeches by all Attic orators are by their number only. The following is a list of the numbers and titles of the speeches cited in this book for ease of reference (speeches believed to be spurious but which have survived under the name of a particular orator are listed under that name and cited as such in the chapters).

Aeschines

- 1 *Against Timarchus*
- 2 *On the False Embassy*
- 3 *Against Ctesiphon*

Andocides

- 1 *On the Mysteries*
- 2 *On His Return*
- 3 *On the Peace with Sparta*

Antiphon

- 1 *Against the Stepmother*
- 3 *Second Tetralogy*
- 4 *Third Tetralogy*
- 5 *On the Murder of Herodes*
- 6 *On the Chorus Boy*

Demosthenes

- 1 *Olynthiac 1*

- 2 *Olynthiac 2*
- 3 *Olynthiac 3*
- 4 *Philippic 1*
- 5 *On the Peace*
- 6 *Philippic 2*
- 8 *On the Chersonese*
- 9 *Philippic 3*
- 10 *Philippic 4*
- 13 *On Organisation*
- 14 *On the Navy-boards*
- 15 *For the Liberty of the Rhodians*
- 16 *For the People of Megalopolis*
- 18 *On the Crown*
- 19 *On the False Embassy*
- 20 *Against Leptines*
- 21 *Against Meidias*
- 22 *Against Androtion*
- 23 *Against Aristocrates*
- 24 *Against Timocrates*
- 25 *Against Aristogeiton 1*
- 27 *Against Aphobus 1*
- 29 *Against Aphobus for Phanus*
- 30 *Against Onetor 1*

- 32 *Against Zenothemis*
- 33 *Against Apaturius*
- 34 *Against Phormion*
- 35 *Against Lacritus*
- 36 *For Phormion*
- 37 *Against Pantænætus*
- 38 *Against Nausimachus and Xenopeithes*
- 39 *Against Boeotus 1*
- 40 *Against Boeotus 2*
- 41 *Against Spudias*
- 42 *Against Phaenippus*
- 43 *Against Macartatus*
- 44 *Against Leochares*
- 45 *Against Stephanus 1*
- 46 *Against Stephanus 2*
- 47 *Against Evergus*
- 48 *Against Olympiodorus*
- 49 *Against Timotheus*
- 50 *Against Polyycles*
- 51 *On the Trierarchic Crown*
- 52 *Against Callippus*
- 53 *Against Nicostratus*
- 54 *Against Conon*
- 55 *Against Callicles*
- 56 *Against Dionysodorus*
- 57 *Against Eubulides*
- 58 *Against Theocrines*
- 59 *Against Neæra*
- 60 *Funeral Speech*
- 61 *Erotic Essay*

Dinarchus

- 1 *Against Demosthenes*

Hyperides

- 1 *In Defence of Lycophron*
- 3 *Against Athenogenes*
- 4 *In Defence of Euxenippus*
- 6 *Funeral Speech*

Isæus

- 1 *On the Estate of Cleonymus*
- 2 *On the Estate of Menecles*

- 3 *On the Estate of Pyrrhus*
- 5 *On the Estate of Dicaeogenes*
- 7 *On the Estate of Apollodorus*
- 8 *On the Estate of Ciron*
- 9 *On the Estate of Astyphilus*
- 10 *On the Estate of Aristarchus*
- 11 *On the Estate of Hagnias*
- 12 *On the Estate of Euphiletus*

Isocrates

- 2 *To Nicocles*
- 3 *Nicocles*
- 4 *Panegyricus*
- 5 *To Philip*
- 6 *Archidamus*
- 7 *Areopagiticus*
- 8 *On the Peace*
- 9 *Evagoras*
- 10 *Helen*
- 11 *Busiris*
- 12 *Panathenaicus*
- 13 *Against the Sophists*
- 14 *Plataicus*
- 15 *Antidosis*
- 16 *Concerning the Team of Horses*
- 17 *Trapeziticus*
- 18 *Against Callimachus*
- 19 *Aegineticus*
- 21 *Against Euthynus*

Lycurgus

- 1 *Against Leocrates*

Lysias

- 1 *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*
- 2 *Funeral Speech*
- 3 *Against Simon*
- 4 *On a Premeditated Wounding*
- 6 *Against Andocides*
- 7 *Concerning the Sēkos*
- 10 *Against Theomnestus 1*
- 11 *Against Theomnestus 2*
- 12 *Against Eratosthenes*
- 13 *Against Agoratus*

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|----|--|----|---|
| 14 | <i>Against Alcibiades 1</i> | 24 | <i>For the Disabled Man</i> |
| 15 | <i>Against Alcibiades 2</i> | 25 | <i>Defence Against a Charge of</i>
<i>Subverting the Democracy</i> |
| 16 | <i>For Mantitheus</i> | 27 | <i>Against Epicrates</i> |
| 17 | <i>On the Property of Eraton</i> | 28 | <i>Against Ergocles</i> |
| 18 | <i>On the Property of Nicias'</i>
<i>Brother</i> | 29 | <i>Against Philocrates</i> |
| 19 | <i>On the Property of Aristophanes</i> | 30 | <i>Against Nicomachus</i> |
| 20 | <i>For Polystratus</i> | 31 | <i>Against Philon</i> |
| 21 | <i>Defence against a Charge of Taking</i>
<i>Bribes</i> | 32 | <i>Against Diogeiton</i> |
| 22 | <i>Against the Corn Dealers</i> | 33 | <i>Olympic Speech</i> |
| 23 | <i>Against Panceleon</i> | 34 | <i>Against the Subversion of the</i>
<i>Ancestral Constitution</i> |

PART I

Setting the Scene

CHAPTER ONE

Rhetorical Questions

Edward Schiappa and Jim Hamm

1 Why Study Greek Rhetoric?

We pose such a question for readers of this *Companion* to consider because *what* one studies and *how* one goes about the study of Greek rhetoric ultimately are decisions fueled by the values, interests, and purposes one brings to the table. The extant texts of classical Greece are mute until read, but how they are read and the purposes to which such readings are put are contingent matters. The point worth stressing at the very outset is that all accounts of classical Greek rhetoric are necessarily *partial*; that is, no single account can exhaust the limitless interpretive possibilities of the relevant texts, and all accounts are guided by the scholar's sense of what is important and noteworthy about the texts. Because what is 'rhetorically salient' about Greek texts varies from scholar to scholar, discipline to discipline, time period to time period, the interpretive possibilities are limited only by human imagination.¹

Scholarship on Greek rhetoric may be usefully described as motivated by two basic purposes: historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation.² Described most simply, historical reconstruction engages classical texts to describe the intellectual, aesthetic, economic, or political work that such texts performed in their own time or what such texts might have meant to those living in the classical era. Contemporary appropriation is typically motivated by a desire to draw inspiration from classical texts to meet current theoretical, political, or pedagogical needs. For example, a historical reconstruction may try to describe what '*enthymēmē*' meant to fourth century audiences while a contemporary appropriation might ask: 'How ought we teach the *enthymēmē* today?' A historian may ask: 'What intellectual and political work did Gorgias' *Encomium to Helen* do in the late fifth and early fourth centuries?' while a contemporary theorist may draw from Gorgias' texts reinforcement for contemporary anti-foundationalist approaches to epistemology.³ One way to distinguish between the two activities is to note that anachronism is considered a

mistake for historians but not for those who wish to reinterpret classical texts to inform a contemporary theory or pedagogy.

Such a distinction does not imply, of course, that historians do their work in a vacuum. As Chapter 2 of this *Companion*, written by T. Poulakos, nicely documents, historians are guided by current needs, values, and interests that arguably complicate the distinction between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation. To acknowledge that historians are influenced by current theories and interests does not imply, however, that the distinction between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation collapses. Indeed, as the subsequent chapters of the *Companion* illustrate, historical reconstruction is alive and well. Fidelity to the methods of classical philology, a preference for argument by example, and sensitivity to the features that make Greek texts/authors distinctive and *different* from us still help to distinguish the purposes and methods of the historian from those who are more interested in argument by analogy and who are attracted to features that make Greek texts/authors *similar* to us. Of course, *both* sorts of intellectual projects are valuable, but keeping in mind the different purposes of historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation may help readers navigate and assess the amazingly diverse interpretations generated by scholars in classics, philosophy, history, literary studies, communication studies, and English.

2 What is Rhetoric?

Interestingly enough, only a few contributors to the *Companion* explicitly define ‘rhetoric’. Indeed, implicit in the chapters that follow one can discern the word ‘rhetoric’ or ‘rhetorical’ being used to denote a wide range of phenomena, including oratory, parts of speech, prose genres, figurative language, performance, pedagogical practices, discourse, the strategic use of language, persuasion, and various *theories* of discourse, language, or persuasion. Indeed, as Poulakos notes in Chapter 2, rhetoric designates ‘many ways of being and performing in the world’ (p. 20). The result is that just about anything and everything could be studied as rhetoric or as rhetorical. Is this a problem?

It has sometimes been argued that failing to limit the denotative range of the word ‘rhetoric’ threatens to render the term so global and universal as to make ‘rhetoric’ meaningless; *si omnia, nulla*. Notably, there are a goodly number of other disciplinary terms that are just as broad in scope, including anthropology, sociology, psychology, and politics. Arguably, once one takes the position that a term such as rhetoric or psychology represents a socially-constructed category or *perspective* rather than a ‘thing’, then just about any discipline can study anything under the sign of ‘the rhetoric of X’, ‘the politics of X’, the sociology of X’, and so forth.

To answer the question of whether such a broad scope is a problem, consider an analogy with the terms ‘physics’ and ‘physical’. One of the most important moments in Western intellectual history is when a group we now call presocratic philosophers broke from the tradition of understanding and describing the world in purely religious terms and started to describe the world as *physis*, nature. Their explanations were monistic: Everything has a ‘physical’ basis that can be understood. Not everyone chose to follow such a route, of course, just as not every scholar in academia today claims to study

rhetoric. The scope of these physicists' claims were global and universal. Now, 2,600 years later, most of the sciences are still informed by the general notion that almost everything can be described as 'physical'. Where is the problem? Similarly it is not self-evident that there is a problem with the fact that almost any phenomena today could be described in rhetorical terms. The fact that we could do so does not mean we necessarily will bother to do so, just as the fact that anything could be described using the language of physics does not automatically mean we will bother.

Arguably, the popularity of the 'rhetorical turn' is fueled by the fact that a rhetorical perspective emphasizes two attributes of human beings as a species that are unquestionably important: Humans must communicate to survive and such communication always takes place under contingent circumstances. The birth of the systematic study of using language to influence others in classical Greece recognized these attributes explicitly. The emergence of New Rhetorics in the twentieth century was predicated on two similar theses, one linguistic and one epistemological, that were in direct opposition to the rise of positivism earlier in the century: The linguistic thesis, which stresses the partial and persuasive function of all language-use, can be described by the following syllogism:

All persuasive actions are rhetorical.
All symbol/language-use is persuasive, therefore:
All symbol/language-use is rhetorical.

The epistemological rationale is fueled by the argument that the philosophical criteria used traditionally to separate 'higher' ways of knowing, such as Science (as *epistēmē*) from Rhetoric (as *doxa*), have been critiqued persuasively. Since the 'certain' or 'absolute' side of binaries such as certain/contingent, absolute/probable are unavailable, we are left to dwell in the historicized land of contingency and probability, which means that all cultural knowledge is the product of rhetorical activity.

Whether one gets to what some have called 'Big Rhetoric' via the linguistic rationale or the epistemological rationale, the point is that such routes lead to the conclusion that the human condition is coterminous to the rhetorical condition. Thus, it is not surprising that scholars have described such a wide variety of phenomena with the terms rhetoric and rhetorical.

Nonetheless, it is understandable that some readers will be unsatisfied with the notion that rhetoric denotes 'many ways of being and performing in the world' and will want to know what the word means in a particular scholar's chapter or sentence. Indeed, since some chapters are concerned with the very origins of 'rhetoric', greater clarity is needed. The Greek word *rhētorikē* is formed by adding *-ikē* (meaning art or skill) to *rhētōr*—a term that was used most typically to refer to politicians who put forth motions in the courts or Assembly. Most scholars agree that the earliest surviving use of the term *rhētorikē* is in Plato's *Gorgias*, dating from the early fourth century, and its absence in important texts of the period concerning education and public speaking is striking.⁴ Obviously the practice of persuasive speech-making dates back to our earliest records of Greek history; indeed, speech-making is an important activity in Homer's epics. Thus, the practice of 'rhetoric' in the sense of 'persuasive speech' is as old as history. Perhaps a clearer designator would be the word 'oratory', though in Greek this term (*rhētoresia*) appears surprisingly late and is used infrequently in the classical period.

Though the practice of persuasive speech-making was taught prior to Plato, the scope and purpose of such instruction remains a matter of scholarly dispute. The education offered by the older sophists is often summed up with the word ‘rhetoric’, but it does not appear that any of them actually used the word and M. Gagarin has argued that persuasion was not the focus of their educational training.⁵ Precisely when ‘rhetoric’ emerged as a recognized, discrete, and identifiable educational activity need not be resolved at the moment. But emerge it did, and over the centuries the term has been used to denote a variety of practices and functions of discourse.

The main point is for readers to recognize that we now can identify at least five ways of using the word ‘rhetoric’ that are informed by classical or contemporary scholarship: 1) rhetoric as an instance of speech-making (or oratory); 2) rhetoric as persuasive technique; 3) rhetoric as a tactical function of language use (rhetoricity); 4) rhetoric as an educational agenda or program that inculcates the art or skill of the rhetor; and 5) rhetoric as a theory about human communication. The scope of rhetorical scholarship is broadened considerably if we note that in addition to texts that *explicitly* identify themselves with the rhetorical tradition we may add those that we believe *implicitly* participate in that tradition. Then, once we turn ‘rhetoric’ into the adjectival form ‘rhetorical’ and think of it not as a thing but as a perspective or point of view, these various explicit and implicit senses of rhetoric could describe just about anything. For that reason, the scope of the *Companion* is large and touches on many aspects of Greek culture. However, the reader might have to pause from time to time to consider precisely *which* sense of rhetoric a particular author may have in mind in any given passage.

3 What are Rhetoric Scholars Investigating?

Given the range of phenomena that could be studied under the sign of ‘rhetoric’, readers may have an interest in what active rhetoric scholars have been investigating. In one sense, of course, the *Companion* represents a comprehensive answer to just such a question. The tremendous range of authors, genres, texts, and issues discussed in the *Companion* is a good reflection of the enormous scholarly effort that has been put into the study of Greek rhetoric over the past century. The bibliographical essays in the *Companion* provide an excellent resource for students and scholars interested in surveying the rich secondary literature available. Recent scholarship in Greek rhetoric appears in three forms. First, as the *Companion* illustrates, there has been substantial interest in recent years in producing comprehensive syntheses of what we know about rhetoric, including Greek rhetoric. *The Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, edited by T.O. Sloane for Oxford University Press (2001), has a strong emphasis on classical rhetoric, as does the multi-volume *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* project, published in Tübingen by M. Neimeyer. Second, each year a number of books are published by scholars in classics, philosophy, communication studies, and English, that focus on Greek rhetoric in whole or in part.

Third, a number of scholarly journals publish articles about Greek rhetoric. Because such journals are typically published by discipline-specific academic organizations, it is possible to gain a sense of how disciplines engage Greek rhetoric differently. To that end, we surveyed the contents of eighteen academic periodicals published between

2000 and 2005: *Rhetorica*, *Rhetoric Review*, *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, *American Journal of Philology*, *Classical Quarterly*, *Classical Antiquity*, *Classical and Modern Literature*, *Classical Journal*, *Classical Philology*, *Greece and Rome*, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies*, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, *Hermes*, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, and *Yale Classical Studies*. The results were somewhat surprising. Articles appearing in classics venues that were explicitly concerned with Greek rhetoric were sparse in this time period (fewer than ten). The oratory of Demosthenes and Aeschines was the subject of three and none directly engaged the rhetorical texts of Plato, Aristotle, or Isocrates. Since we searched for articles in which the word ‘rhetoric’ appeared in the title, it is possible that many more works address relevant issues but under a different rubric, and it should be noted that a great deal of work on Greek rhetoric by classicists is published in book form.

By contrast, we found nearly sixty articles on Greek rhetoric in journals produced primarily by scholars in English and communication studies. Nearly half were devoted in whole or in part to Aristotle and the *Rhetoric*. Three of the seventeen books published between 2000 and 2005 explicitly relevant to classical Greek rhetoric also have Aristotle, either in whole or in part, as their subject. A prominent theme in these discussions is the need to devote closer attention to the editorial and transmission history of the text in order to separate the interpolated chaff from the genuine Aristotelian wheat. Work also has been directed toward clarifying and explaining particular concepts employed in the *Rhetoric*, such as the *enthymēmē*, how passive or active Aristotle viewed audiences of rhetoric, *ēthos* and style (*lexis*) in the *Rhetoric*, the *paradeigma* and its relationship to the notion of induction, and Aristotle’s literate classifications of *endoxa* and *pistis*. There has also been an attempt to interpret Aristotle and his discussion of rhetoric more broadly, particularly by using his other works as a point of reference. Thus, scholars have examined the relationship between Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and his logical works, arguing that his theory of persuasion is in part derived from his theory of proofs. Other scholars recently have shown interest in Aristotle’s *De Anima* as a way of understanding what Aristotle writes about memory and perception. As may be apparent from this summary, the vast majority of this scholarship is framed as historical reconstruction.

In our survey of recent journals, Plato and Isocrates were the next most widely cited authors; Plato’s texts engaged in twelve articles, and Isocrates in nine. Some of these articles revisit the longstanding controversies over Plato’s relationship to and use of rhetoric. Though generalizations are risky, our sense is that scholars in English departments are the mostly like to revisit Plato’s texts from the standpoint of contemporary appropriation and sometimes are quite candid about having no fear of anachronism. The point is to open up the dialogues of Plato to new readings that speak to contemporary concerns, and such values as creativity, theoretical relevance, and pedagogical usefulness trump the norms of traditional philology. Some scholars are quite candid in their desire to combine traditional historical reconstruction with contemporary appropriation in the belief that ancient texts and practices are viewed as shedding light on modern pedagogical or political problems.

Scholars of Greek rhetoric who work on Isocrates appear to be either establishing or resuscitating his reputation as a serious thinker. He is often defined in terms of what other, more-celebrated thinkers are or are not; for example, Isocrates’ conception of

learning is defined in part by not being Platonic or Aristotelian. Several articles contend that Isocrates' ideas of rhetoric are intimately tied to his theories of politics in a way that Aristotle's allegedly are not. Though the issues involved in recent work on Isocrates are too complex to do justice to here, it is clear that his texts have become a fecund source for scholars interested in fourth-century Greek culture, politics, and education, made all the more interesting since he describes his educational program as *philosophia* rather than as *rhētorikē*.

There is a recognizable body of recent work devoted to the issue of what constitutes the proper limits of the discipline of rhetoric, or how rhetoric has been 'disciplined'. Some scholars seek to blunt the oppositional forces that have played their part in separating philosophy and rhetoric from each other, and in particular argue that various disciplinary and historiographical habits and ideologies have proved to be obstacles in reading an author such as Plato rhetorically, for instance, or Gorgias philosophically. Recent book-length scholarship on the sophists is particularly relevant to such concerns.⁶

The preceding paragraphs are not intended to provide a systematic and thorough guide to recent scholarship in Greek rhetoric, but rather to offer a brief snapshot of what issues appear to be engaging scholars as the twenty-first century begins. It should be clear from even this limited discussion that Greek rhetorical studies is a healthy field of endeavor involving work that engages a wide variety of texts and concerns. Whether the claims advanced are as narrow as who the author of a particular classical text was, or as broad as what lessons we should learn from the Greeks about contemporary cultural and political matters, it is apparent that Greek rhetoric will continue to command the attention of scholars in multiple disciplines.

4 What is the Future of Greek Rhetoric Studies?

To prognosticate about the interests of future scholarship is difficult, of course, but we thought readers might be interested in what scholars of Greek rhetoric believe to be the important questions that *ought* to be pursued in future research. To that end, we surveyed over fifty scholars with a self-declared interest in Greek rhetoric from several academic disciplines. Before embarking on our survey, we hypothesized that classicists and historians would be more interested in historical reconstruction and scholars in other disciplines would tend toward issues of contemporary appropriation. While generally supported by our responses, there were numerous exceptions that make it clear that the interests and purposes guiding scholars are not discipline-specific. Accordingly, our summary of the responses we received is organized thematically rather than by discipline.

Predictably, a number of the important questions identified by scholars are explicitly historical. For example, though such questions have been explored for many years, the authorship, compilation, and transmission of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* continue to challenge scholars. The educational and historical role of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (see Chapter 8 of the *Companion*) remains a puzzle to be solved. There are texts in the *Rhetores Graeci* collections, compiled by C. Walz, L. Spengel and H. Rabe, which have yet to be translated into modern languages and have not been fully mined for their historical value.⁷

Several scholars noted that Greek rhetoric scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the role of women in Greek culture. They ask: By what criteria may it be said that women taught or practiced rhetoric in the classical period? What role did women have in the education process informally? How closely do the rhetorical portrayals of women in Greek literature match other historical evidence? How do we interpret the evidence about women provided by Greek rhetoric and literature?

A number of historical questions offered by our respondents concerned the performance of rhetorical practices. For example: What is the relationship between writings devoted to rhetorical theory and actual rhetorical practices? What do we know about the verbal and nonverbal aspects of rhetorical delivery in the classical era? What was the role of the immediate audience for spoken rhetoric? Were the masses really wowed by Gorgias? Did public speeches truly persuade audiences or were there ‘inartistic’ factors, such as familial, tribal, or political relationships, that better account for decisions made in courts and the Assembly?

The majority of scholarship has focused on rhetorical theories and practices in or near Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, but there are centuries of later Greek rhetorical theory, pedagogy, and practice that remain under-explored. ‘Greek rhetoric’ need not be defined in such a limited fashion. Comparative work, not only between Greek and Latin but also between Greek rhetoric and conceptualizations of persuasive discourse in other cultures, has increased significantly in the last three decades but our respondents suggest that much more work remains to be done. Such work not only engages in cross-cultural comparisons, such as between Asian and Greek rhetoric, but also traces the influence of Greek contact with other cultures (Egyptian and Aramaic, for example).

Some respondents expressed speculative interest in *origins*. For example: How did the ancient Greeks discover the rhetoricity of language, and what does the rhetoricity of language consist of? Another respondent asked: What would classical rhetoric look like if we rejected Plato’s division of *logos* into the art of the mind (*philosophia*) and the art of speech (*rhētorikē*)? What would have happened had the word ‘rhetoric’ never been coined?

Issues of methodology continue to challenge scholars. Though scholars obviously produce readings and interpretations of Greek texts explicitly and implicitly concerned with rhetorical theory, pedagogy, and practice, how such interpretations are produced and performed, why there are so many conflicting (even contradictory) readings of the ‘same’ text, and how we are to adjudicate competing interpretations, remain open questions.

Also predictably, many scholars are interested in the relevance of Greek rhetoric for contemporary theoretical, pedagogical, and political concerns. First and foremost, scholars are deeply concerned with the relationships between rhetoric and civic education in Greece and what those relationships might tell us about the present. As one respondent put it: What is the relationship between eloquence and citizenship, where ‘eloquence’ would signify fluency in critique and ‘citizenship’ would signify an active participation in public culture? Another respondent asked: What do *rhētōrs* such as Isocrates and Demosthenes offer as resources, inspirational or cautionary, for theorists and teachers interested in a broader view of public deliberation? Yet another respondent suggested that in Athens rhetorical education was primarily a ‘private good’, and wondered if we cast Athenian rhetorical theory in a way that reveals our own desire for a discipline that encourages civic participation.

In general, a number of scholars expressed interest in continuing exploration of how we interpret and integrate Greek rhetoric within our own thinking and teaching of classical and modern rhetoric. More specific questions were raised in terms of whether Greek rhetorical studies can offer insights into how to understand, develop, or theorize writing instruction and the phenomena of visual rhetorics. Not all such questions were based on the optimistic assumption that contemporary practices can be enhanced through the study of Greek rhetoric. One respondent asked: Why teach a model of persuasion and argument based on classical principles when what passes as effective argumentation in public discourse consistently subverts and mocks these principles? Another respondent left the question open: To what extent can classical texts provide exemplars or theory that can aid us in our efforts to transform the critical rhetorical vocabularies and attitudes that we attempt to foster in our students into a propensity for enriching, disrupting, and engaging contemporary democratic public culture?

It should be evident from this sampling of responses to our survey that the future of Greek rhetorical studies will be exciting and provocative. Regardless of one's values, interests, and intellectual purposes (or, put differently, regardless of one's tastes), there are ample important questions that will occupy those willing to engage them.

5 What is this *Blackwell Companion to Greek Rhetoric* about?

The aim of this book is to provide readers with a comprehensive introduction to the many ways in which rhetoric was conceptualized, practiced, and functioned in Greek culture. Quite deliberately, some chapters are necessarily introductory and are accessible to readers with little prior knowledge of Greek rhetoric, while others advance claims that will be of interest primarily to specialists. The reader will get a clear sense, we suspect, of those matters that historians consider mostly settled and matters that are still contested. Each chapter ends with a brief bibliographical essay that provides an orientation to key literature pertinent to the chapter's subject. The volume can be read straight through or can be mined selectively to suit the reader's individual needs and interests.

Part I includes this introductory chapter as well as Chapter 2, a useful overview by T. Poulakos of the competing interpretive approaches to Greek rhetoric, with a particular emphasis on the classical era. Poulakos provides a sophisticated charting of different modes of interpretation and their theoretical and ideological commitments that makes sense of an otherwise bewilderingly diverse body of literature.

Part II presents an excellent introductory overview to the history of Greek rhetoric – rhetoric understood here primarily in terms of traditional Greek oratory and the beginnings of Greek rhetorical theory. In Chapter 3, M. Gagarin begins his account of the origins of Greek rhetoric by insisting that we first try to understand what we mean when we use the word 'rhetoric'. A review of early Greek literature suggests that while importance is placed upon 'speaking well' as a corollary of effective political action, there is no evidence to suggest that anything like a systematic analysis of public speaking occurred until the fifth century at the earliest. J.A.E. Bons assesses the contribution of Gorgias to speech theory in Chapter 4. According to Bons, Gorgias

was developing in his *Helen* and *Palamedes* an awareness of the principles that will form the basis of what will come to be known as epideictic and forensic oratory. In a more philosophical strain, Bons points to Gorgias' thoughts on deception (*apatē*); specifically, how the function of speech to deceive, best exemplified in the fiction of the theatre, is relevant to *all* speech acts. Gorgias' possible student Alcidas is the subject of M. Edwards' Chapter 5. A survey of Alcidas' principal works, *On Sophists* and *Odysseus*, leads Edwards to conclude that the former is likely a prospectus for his teaching methods, while the latter is an example of an epideictic couched in the form of a forensic speech. Edwards also addresses the style of Alcidas and what evidence this may or may not provide for current interpretive controversies involving his works.

In Chapter 6, T.L. Papillon divides Isocrates' extant body of work into three major categories: educational, political, and epistolary. He emphasizes how Isocrates weds educational and political ideas, and how his interest in contemporary political affairs became extraordinarily influential in late antiquity and beyond. In Chapter 7, H. Yunis shows that a close inspection of the several Platonic dialogues upsets the traditional view of Plato as an inveterate opponent of rhetoric. While the *Gorgias* argues that the 'rhetor's art' results in political flattery and not instruction, dialogues such as the *Phaedrus* and *Republic* attempt to establish the legitimacy, both in theory and practice, of an art of persuasion tied to philosophical education. P. Chiron, in Chapter 8, discusses the influence of classical Athenian sophists and philosophers on the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. While much of the substance of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was crafted with the practicing fourth-century orator in mind, the philosophical aspects of the treatise, particularly its echoing of Plato and certain similarities to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, assure its importance for those interested in the intersection of rhetoric, sophistic, and philosophy. In Chapter 9, W.W. Fortenbaugh illustrates the 'concise, yet comprehensive' idea of rhetoric found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. By focusing on key aspects of Aristotle's rhetorical doctrine, such as the importance of rational argument, the arrangement of material within an oration, and a speaker's delivery and style, Fortenbaugh reveals Aristotle's individuated approach to deliberative, judicial, and epideictic rhetoric.

In Chapter 10, 'Hellenistic Rhetoric in Theory and Practice', J. Vanderspoel explains how the conquests of Alexander and his eastern Mediterranean successors led to an educational revolution. It was here, Vanderspoel suggests, that the study and practice of Greek rhetoric in the Hellenistic world came of age. As schools proliferated to accommodate the increasing demand among local elites for a Greek education, the numbers of those trained in the technical aspects of Greek rhetoric also rose. Vanderspoel shows how rhetorical scholarship proceeded apace in this period, its study and practice becoming ever more technical. In Chapter 11 on Greek rhetoric in Rome, J. Connolly argues that it was the political character of Greek rhetoric that captivated Roman culture. She illustrates that the evolution of the Roman state from Republic to Empire developed certain internal social and political pressures, creating a challenge for which rhetoric is offered as a means to ensure stable government. Rounding out Part II, E. Jeffreys in Chapter 12 examines the influence of the ancient Greek intellectual heritage on the Byzantine world. She centers much of her discussion on the application of various genres, such as *ekphrasis*, the *epithalamios logos*, and the *epitaphios logos*, to oral (such as speeches given in the imperial court) and literary (such as hagiography) contexts.

In Part III, the focus is on Greek oratory. Contributors take a closer look at the major components of formal oratory as well as Aristotle's highly influential, three-fold functional division of oratory. In Chapter 13, M. de Brauw describes the four traditional parts of Greek and Roman speech with the goal of determining whether fifth- and fourth-century oratorical practice vindicates the views set out in theoretical treatises such as the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. He suggests that while practice does on occasion confirm theory, in a majority of instances Attic oratory in fact strays from the traditional four-part arrangement. In Chapter 14, C. Cooper defends the practice of forensic oratory against Plato and Aristotle, who perceive it as an activity inferior to deliberative oratory. Cooper claims that the focus of most late fifth- and early fourth-century works written on oratory, whether theoretical discussion about speech structure or model speeches, was directed toward forensic oratory. This claim is illustrated with a discussion of Lysias' famous defense of Euphiletus, whereby it is argued that Athenians of the classical period were quite justified in devoting much of their intellectual energy towards cultivating this particular oratorical practice. S. Usher addresses the topic of deliberative or symbouleutic oratory in Chapter 15. He discerns two phases of symbouleutic oratory in the classical period. The first takes place in the fifth century, when historians such as Thucydides describe speakers engaged in a deliberative context primarily to explain the reasoning behind their own (i.e., the speakers') decisions. The second, newer phase can be seen best in the person of Demosthenes who, it is argued, solicited sympathy and aroused patriotism in the Athenian *Boulē* to justify personal political initiatives. In Chapter 16, C. Carey discusses the various manifestations of speech-making traditionally categorized as epideictic, that is, speeches meant for 'display' (*epideiktikos logos*). Carey points out that far from being mere showpieces, epideictic speeches were often generated in highly competitive environments; for example, as 'self-advertising' for students of rhetoric, or for profit if they were demonstrations of a teacher's method of argumentation. The funeral oration (*epitaphios logos*) and speeches of praise and blame are further examples of epideictic speech cultivated in the classical period to such a high level that they would become standard genres for imitation throughout the rest of antiquity.

Part IV is an ambitious overview of the role of rhetoric in key political, social, and intellectual contexts. In Chapter 17, Ian Worthington provides a succinct narrative of what he calls the 'rise of the *rhētores*' to argue that the rise of a class of identifiable and highly influential orators was due to changes in Athenian democracy, but notes that political and even physical constraints of public speaking situations arguably diminished the quality of discourse and decision-making. A. Erskine, in Chapter 18, notes that our study of Greek rhetoric too often begins and ends with the classical era and contends that rhetoric grew to become an essential element of Greek education and continued to be an important force in politics throughout the Hellenistic era, notably in diplomatic exchanges in settings where the *polis* still retained an important political identity. Chapter 19, by J.P. Sickinger, describes how Athenian law was but one of many potential resources drawn upon by rhetors in forensic settings to advance their case and describes the passages from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that provide advice to *rhētores* on how to deal with the law in their speeches. The chapter provides a summary of the tactics utilized in a number of preserved forensic texts and is particularly useful in reminding us how different Greek legal

rhetoric was from contemporary legal discourse. In Chapter 20, T. Morgan traces the history of place of rhetoric in Greek education. She provides what Schiappa has described (and critiqued) elsewhere as the standard account of early Greek rhetorical education, but such a narrative is valuable, particularly for students, since no complete counter narrative has yet been generated.⁸ Furthermore, Morgan's narrative extends through the time of Quintilian.

Up to this point in Part IV, the term *rhetoric* is used by *Companion* chapter authors primarily to denote traditional oratory. In Chapter 21, K. Dowden describes public prayer as a fictional speech of persuasion to expand the scope of rhetoric to include religious ritual. His chapter demonstrates the applicability of the vocabulary of rhetorical criticism to Greek religious verbal and nonverbal religious practices. A. López Eire, in Chapter 22, mines the texts of a variety of early Greek thinkers to argue that 'rhetoricity' is an unavoidable characteristic of all language. Challenging the view that language is basically referential and representational, Eire defines rhetoricity as the quality or capacity of language that persuades listeners primarily with psychological and aesthetic strategies. In so doing, he provides a classical precursor to the twentieth century argument that all language use has an inescapable rhetorical function. In Chapter 23, J. Allen is less interested in rhetoric *per se* than he is in charting the origins of the discipline of Logic. His account illustrates that what we consider the study of logic has its origins in the practice of dialectic and becomes the formal analysis of propositional form in Aristotle and subsequent philosophers.

T. Reinhardt, in Chapter 24, provides an introduction to an important issue that came to occupy many rhetorical theorists in the late twentieth century; namely, what can be called rhetorical epistemology. To what extent is rhetoric, understood here as the art of the *rhētōr*, based on, or capable of producing, knowledge? Reinhardt provides a narrative of the debate over such issues that appear in the texts of the classical era that will be particularly of value to those unfamiliar with the classical antecedents to twentieth century texts devoted to such matters. J.M. Day in Chapter 25 offers an introductory overview to the relationship between rhetoric and ethics from the older sophists to Plato. Day makes the important point that oratory provides key historical evidence about the ethical norms and values advanced in the discourse of elites in Greek society. Moreover, such discourse can itself become the subject of critical ethical appraisal by other elites.

In Chapter 26, J. Roisman illustrates the ways in which Greek rhetorical theory and practice were gendered in a manner he describes as agonistic masculinity. Noting the close association between Greek military warfare (which was almost continuous throughout the classical era) and the war of words between speakers, Roisman shows how the discourse and performance of orators reflects, reinforces, and performs dominant Greek norms of masculine identity. D. Konstan, in Chapter 27, rounds out Part IV with an erudite discussion of rhetoric and emotion. His focus is on two kinds of evidence: The accounts of emotion in technical treatises devoted to rhetoric (with an appropriately strong emphasis on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*) and an analysis of emotional appeals found in the texts of Attic orators. Noting that multiple disciplines still analyze the role of emotion in human cognition and behaviour, Konstan rightly points out that the classical antecedents to such studies are rightly located in the arena of rhetoric, where the importance of emotion first became the object of systematic analysis.

Part V contains a series of studies of rhetoric and Greek literature. 'Rhetoric' is used in these chapters to denote a particular *function* of literature (the rhetoricity of literature), a subject of discussion within such literature, a set of specific strategic techniques employed by authors to gain a desired effect, and in some cases, even to describe an implicit theory of discourse and persuasion that can be abduced from literary texts. In Chapter 28, H.M. Roisman observes that, given the centrality of speech-making in Homer's *Iliad*, the text can be interpreted as a meditation on persuasion. Roisman provides a close reading of the opposing speeches by Theristes and Odysseus over whether the troops should leave the battle for home or stay on and fight until Troy is defeated. From her reading, Roisman constructs an interesting implicit Homeric theory of right rhetoric that is described primarily in Aristotelian terms. Similarly, in Chapter 29, J. Strauss Clay reconstructs an account of the power and efficacy of speech based on her interpretation of the poems of Hesiod. Like Roisman in the previous chapter, she draws from Aristotle's vocabulary to explicate rhetorical concepts from Hesiod's poems. The result is an account that demonstrates Hesiod's use of rhetoric (in the sense of strategic devices) as well as reconstructs what could be called an implicit theory of rhetoric (understood broadly as persuasive discourse). A. Mori, in Chapter 30, does not attempt to reconstruct a coherent theory of rhetoric in Apollonius' epic *Argonautica*, but instead provides a close reading to illustrate how important communicative practices are to the story and character development, in particular Jason's demonstration of persuasive skill and various characters' truthful and deceptive language use. Mori identifies interesting points of contrast with similar themes in Homer that suggest such texts can be mined to track changes over time in cultural assumptions and practices concerning persuasion and the use of force.

M. McDonald, in Chapter 31, provides a thorough account of the deployment of rhetoric in the tragedy of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and fourth-century tragedians. 'Rhetoric' is used by McDonald to describe a range of phenomena including rhetorical techniques of language use, speech-making, and oratorical training. Even if one disagrees with McDonald's acceptance of the standard account of the emergence of rhetoric as a discipline in the fifth century, her cataloguing of rhetorical materials in Greek tragedy amply demonstrates how one characteristic of the Greek Enlightenment was growing reflexivity about the process of persuasion as manifested in all language arts. Aristophanes' comedy is the focus of Chapter 32 by T.K. Hubbard. Aristophanes' plays amply document speakers employing self-conscious linguistic strategies to persuade others, which Hubbard appropriately labels as 'rhetoric'. Setting aside his disagreement with scholars he describes as 'sceptics' about the status of rhetorical theory and pedagogy in the fifth century, Hubbard provides compelling evidence that Aristophanes was an insightful observer and skilled critic of educational practices of the late fifth century that included argumentation, persuasion, and oratory.⁹

W.H. Race, in Chapter 33, accomplishes two useful goals. First, he provides an interesting history of the evolution of scholarship on the rhetorical aspects of the lyric poetry of Pindar. Second, through close analysis of a diverse sampling of verse, Race presses home the contention that poetry often uses rhetorical arguments; put another way, lyric poetry advances claims supported by forms of inference that would later be described and codified in treatises on rhetoric. In Chapter 34, R. Webb examines prose fiction in post-classical Greek literature to explicate the cultural significance of speeches and narratives within the world depicted by early novels. Such novels

appeared at roughly the same time as the Second Sophistic, a fact that Webb believes has led some literary critics to judge the rhetorical passages of the novels harshly. Webb analyzes a series of interesting examples to argue that the practical techniques of rhetoric are crucial to the success of the novels in general, and in particular provide the novelist with a ‘code’ with which to develop specific characters through the discourse those characters speak.

Last but far from least, M. Fox and N. Livingstone, in Chapter 35, point out the distinctly rhetorical tasks of Greek ‘historians’ by noting that they had to re-create important speeches as well as provide compelling narratives (narrative being an important component in forensic rhetoric). The authors analyze a variety of writers – from Homer to Isocrates to Lucian – to track the variations among historical writers’ attitudes towards, and use of, rhetoric in order to gain insight into how Greeks thought about their past and about the best way of writing about it. In more contemporary parlance we might say that a Greek author’s historiographical commitments necessarily entail at least an implicit rhetorical theory.

The last chapter is an appropriate one to conclude this *Companion*, for we have come full circle, given that all the authors of these texts have written as *rhētores*, necessarily committed to a host of theoretical beliefs about rhetoric and historiographical commitments.

Notes

- 1 On the concept of rhetorical salience, see E. Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos*² (Columbia, SC: 2003), pp. 206–12.
- 2 Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos*, pp. 64–69.
- 3 Contrast the accounts of Gorgias that can be found in E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999) with S. Consigny, *Gorgias: Sophist and Artist* (Columbia, SC: 2001).
- 4 For a discussion of the origins of the word *rhētorikē*, see Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos*, pp. 39–58 and Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, pp. 14–29.
- 5 M. Gagarin, ‘Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?’, *Rhetorica* 19 (2001), pp. 275–291. See also Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* and M. Gagarin, *Antiphon The Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists* (Austin: 2002).
- 6 See, for example, Consigny, *Gorgias. Sophist and Artist*, Gagarin, *Antiphon the Athenian*, B. McComiskey, *Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* (Carbondale, Ill: 2002), Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* and *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*.
- 7 G.A. Kennedy, ‘Some Recent Controversies in the Study of Later Greek Rhetoric,’ *AJP* 124 (2003), pp. 295–301.
- 8 For a critique of the standard account, see Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, Part I.
- 9 Hubbard treats the ‘sceptical’ positions of T. Cole (*The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* [Baltimore: 1991]) and E. Schiappa as identical, despite Schiappa’s explicit disagreement with Cole’s conflation of rhetorical theory and practice (*Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, p. 22). We have it on good authority that Schiappa agrees with almost everything Hubbard advances in this chapter, but would still insist that Hubbard overestimates the status of a technical vocabulary of rhetorical theory in the fifth century and underestimates the intellectual consequences of the development of that vocabulary in the fourth. But this disagreement will have to be settled at another time and place.

CHAPTER TWO

Modern Interpretations of Classical Greek Rhetoric

Takis Poulakos

As with other areas of study, approaches to classical Greek rhetoric have typically followed larger interpretive trends, along with numerous smaller strands, traversing our times. Of these, two broadly-ranging trends guiding interpretation of classical rhetoric in our moment stand out most prominently: ideological critique and human agency. For the most part, the two approaches are closely intertwined and, indeed for many scholars, each is taken to be one leg of the same dialectic – the former exploring the various social, economic, and cultural forces shaping rhetorical texts and practices, the latter exploring possible ways in which rhetorical texts and practices themselves turn against the very forces that have shaped them. Naturally, there are exceptions, as some scholars have placed the emphasis on one of the two approaches without concerning themselves with the other.

Indeed, during the heyday of ideological critique, classical Greek rhetoric was approached as a site for exploring and discerning the operations of mystification that the ruling class needed in order to sustain its social and cultural norms and to legitimate its economic interests. Rhetorical treatises along with the education they promoted, previously celebrated for their competitive spirit and their potentially egalitarian effects, came to be interrogated for their collusion with aristocracy and their complicity with elitism; see M.I. Finley, *The Use and Abuse of History* (New York: 1975). Public speeches – long exalted as testaments of individual power, signs of open competition for excellence, and reliable indicators of a healthy public sphere – became fertile ground for an analysis and a critique of the subtle ways in which social structures of inequality and the powers sustaining them could be masked, maintained, and perpetuated (cf. N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* [Cambridge, MA: 1986]). The interpretive strategies of ideological critique were especially endorsed by scholars who, holding on to Plato's distinction between the apparent and the real, understood rhetoric as deliberate manipulation of truth. Presuming to possess the necessary know-how in order to distinguish the objectively true from the ideologically constructed, these scholars posited themselves as knowing

subjects, able to occupy an ideologically-free space, and approached rhetorical texts as ideological representations whose mystificatory character had to be exposed and whose falsehood needed to be brought to light. The most influential work exemplifying this approach to classical rhetoric is Loraux's *The Invention of Athens*, a study in which fourth-century orators are presented as aristocracy's mouthpieces and 'specialists of half-truths' (p. 138), deliberately seeking to create a false image of Athens and to 'give Athenians an aristocratic image of themselves' (pp. 150–151).

In time, it became evident that ideological critique had run its course. For the premises of ideological critique, urging judgments about the past on the basis of our valuations in the present, led scholars to reach the same conclusion time and again: that the values promoted by classical Greek rhetoric paled by comparison to our own values and that, as a vehicle for aristocratic, sexist, elitist, and racist valuations, classical Greek rhetoric had nothing of substance to offer to our own preoccupations at present. Following the same fate that the entire Greek culture suffered in the hands of an ideological critique that fervently challenged the long-standing tradition of ancient Greece as the origin of civilization, democracy, and liberal education, classical rhetoric and its ancient-long links with democratic practices in the public sphere were also ardently undermined. In effect, the notion that the tradition of rhetoric was a meaningful part of our intellectual tradition and, as such, held some important relevance to our present concerns, was vehemently dismissed.

The excessive contestations of ideological critique, and especially the failure to come to terms with our intellectual tradition in any way other than suggest its complete obliteration, prompted scholars to recast the premises of ideological critique as so many givens on the basis of which the relevance of classical rhetoric to our contemporary concerns could be pursued. Rather than conducting inquiries that ended at the point of exposing non-egalitarian valuations in the Greek culture, scholars approached these same valuations as formations of structures against which possible workings of human agency could be discerned and rendered visible. While taking for granted rhetoric's collusion with non-egalitarian valuations, inquiries into human agency turned the spotlight onto terrains in which rhetoric could be shown to contest, challenge, or render questionable the very valuations that informed its uses and practices. In *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of the People* (Princeton: 1989), J. Ober, for instance, found – in the same aristocratic valuations that Loraux had taken to fashion entirely the rhetoric of fourth-century orators – a space from within which the orators' criticisms of the Athenian *dēmos* and the Athenian democracy could in fact be understood as so many gestures that wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the strengthening of democracy. Ober's thesis, that by allowing its critics free speech the *dēmos* found ways to display its power and solidarity, and that by engaging in free speech the critics of the *dēmos* performed democratic practices in spite of themselves, points to critics of democracy in fourth-century Greece as occupying a subject position whose discursive effects are not reducible to the single function of serving the interests of aristocracy. Such a space – also explored by J.P. Euben in his *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy* (Ithaca: 1994) – issues a number of challenges against assumptions made by ideological critique, namely, that political rhetoric must be addressed from a stable perspective, and that discourses on rhetorical education and their relation to civic norms can only ensue from a single angle.

The first challenge was taken up by H. Yunis in *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: 1996), who examines the discourse of political deliberation in Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes. Yunis recasts the familiar attacks against rhetoric for flattering and pandering to mass audiences as cultural givens alongside which a deeper vision of political deliberation thrives which, tying together a historian, a philosopher, and an orator, aims not only to mediate political conflicts and unify the various factions of the city but also to educate the citizenry into the kind of political deliberation that promises to turn the *polis* into a community.

The second challenge was taken up by a number of scholars seeking to rethink classical rhetorical education in relation to modern civic and pedagogical practices characterizing our democratic commitments today. Without attempting to make orators and rhetoricians appear less dismal on issues of gender, class, and race than they were shown to be, the following works comprise so many efforts to discern in classical rhetoric and rhetorical education openings and possibilities that would enable us to fashion areas of compatibility with and relevance to our own civic and educational activities. These include S. Jarratt's *Rereading the Sophists* (Carbondale, Ill: 1991), C. Glenn's *Rhetoric Retold* (Carbondale, Ill: 1997), J. Atwill's *Rhetoric Reclaimed* (Ithaca: 1998), J. Kastely's *Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition* (New Haven: 1997), V. Vitanza's *Writing Histories of Rhetoric* (Carbondale, Ill: 1994), and my *Rethinking the History of Rhetoric* (Boulder, CO: 1993). Some of these efforts were carried out by means of rhetoric's function to persuade: its philosophical alliance with principles of relativity, its communicative proclivity to reach multiple (and therefore diverse) audiences, and its aesthetic propensity to move auditors toward alternative directions if possible. Others were carried out by means of the constitutive function of rhetoric: its productive capacity to create social bonds and unify audiences through identification.

While the studies above found new ways to reconnect classical rhetoric with our times and to extend in multiple directions the range of its relevance to our contemporary concerns, they nevertheless failed to disassociate themselves from the set of assumptions that plagued the logic of ideological critique: that rhetorical texts and practices in classical Greece are to be appropriated for present purposes and current stakes. Like their ideological counterparts, studies in human agency treated rhetoric as a symptom of something else. Even as both approaches illuminated profoundly classical rhetoric's connections to our present viewpoints, they did not also elucidate ways in which rhetoric could differ from ideological discourses or discourses of empowerment. Nor did they reveal any additional ways in which rhetoric could manifest itself other than as a symptom of power structures or as a source of investing individuals with human agency. In short, both approaches shed less light on classical rhetoric than on the scholarly agendas circulating in and being endorsed by the academy today.

The scholarly appropriation of classical rhetoric for present purposes raised an issue for several scholars as to the responsibility interpreters had to explore classical rhetoric in itself rather than to appropriate it for contemporary concerns. The issue became especially heated in the case of the sophists whose fragmentary texts and incomplete character of their rhetoric could hardly offer any material resistance to the degree of interpretive freedom scholars could exert. At stake were such works as B. McComiskey's

Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric (Carbondale, Ill: 2002), Jarratt's *Rereading the Sophists*, and J. Neel's *Plato, Derrida, and Writing* (Carbondale, Ill: 1988), which were seen as having created too great a disjuncture between, on the one hand, understanding sophistic rhetoric on its own terms and, on the other hand, appropriating sophistic rhetoric for contemporary concerns. The ensuing debate, mostly captured in S. Consigny's *Gorgias, Sophist and Artist* (Columbia, SC: 2001), V. Vitanza's *Negation, Subjectivity and the History of Rhetoric* (Albany, NY: 1997), E. Schiappa's 'Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 23 (1990), pp. 92–217, and J. Poulakos' 'Interpreting Sophistic Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa,' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 23 (1990), pp. 218–228, raised methodological issues about processes of reconstructing fragmentary texts and of recovering their function within past contexts. But other than advancing the tacit agreement that sophistic rhetoric ought to be examined in its own cultural milieu, the debate did very little to advance an understanding of classical rhetoric on its own terms. Perhaps not surprisingly, the debate focused instead on ways of understanding contemporary approaches and of coming to terms with the types of assumptions interpreters deployed in their reading of the sophists. In Consigny's *Gorgias, Sophist and Artist*, the debate has been arranged into methodologically compatible groupings of scholars whose perspectives on the sophists are organized under such labels as objectivist, subjectivist, rhapsodic, empiricist, and anti-foundationalist. Consigny's own approach to sophistic discourse, an expressed blending of a pragmatist and conventionalist or communitarian strategies, attests to a widely accepted notion in the academy today – that the key to reading past works and practices on their own terms lies in the interpreter's selection of the 'right' theoretical lens or combination of lenses among the repertoire of current theories available at present.

One way some scholars sought to understand classical rhetoric in its original setting was to consider its disciplinary status in classical Greece. T. Cole's *The Origin of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991) and E. Schiappa's *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999) approached classical rhetoric by stressing the boundaries Plato and Aristotle had placed around it as they attempted to distinguish it from other areas of study. According to Cole, who regards rhetoric as a fourth-century phenomenon, it was Plato and Aristotle who first recognized rhetoric and gave it the kind of self-conscious awareness it needed in order to develop as an art. The two 'had to invent rhetoric' because the 'assumption of an essentially transparent medium that neither impedes nor facilitates the transmission of information, emotions, and ideas' was suddenly contested by 'a body of prose texts which might be read or delivered verbatim and still suggest the excitement, atmosphere, and commitment of a spontaneous oral performance or debate' (p. 29). Schiappa similarly argues that rhetoric became a discipline when Plato coined the word *rhētorikē* in order to differentiate rhetorical practices from philosophy and to define the latter through a negative description of the former.

By associating classical rhetoric with the disciplinary identity it was granted by Plato and Aristotle, Cole and Schiappa privilege the kind of rational self-consciousness and literacy characteristic of fourth-century disciplines at the expense of rhetoric's association with orality and myth characteristic of rhetorical practices in previous centuries. Partly shaped by needs created by contemporary disciplinary formations, Cole's and Schiappa's project was also prepared by several lines of inquiry that, situating

rhetoric's beginnings in an oral, poetic, and mythic culture, traced the development of rhetoric along the transition from poetry to prose, myth to reason, and orality to literacy. These lines of inquiry include Eric Havelock's *The Muse Learns to Write* (New Haven: 1986), J. de Romilly's *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, MA: 1975), M. Detienne's *The Masters of Truth in Ancient Greece* (New York: 1996) and A. Lentz's *Orality and Literacy in Hellenic Greece* (Carbondale, Ill: 1989). By assuming a development model, according to which rhetoric was initially a sub-genre of poetry, be it poetic eloquence or protorhetoric, on its way to a more fully developed phase, the logic characterizing these studies paved the way for Cole and Schiappa to argue that rhetoric could only be considered fully developed at the point when it was first self-consciously recognized as a discipline.

While the disciplinary status of rhetoric illuminates aspects of the cultural context within which rhetoric first came to be thought as a unique area of study, it also poses severe limits on the kinds of investigations that can be conducted about rhetoric's relation to the Greek culture. What cultural practices fostered rhetoric and shaped it, how rhetoric provided different responses to different historical developments, or what rhetorical practices shaped intellectual currents and social activities in Greece are questions that require both an open-ended understanding of rhetoric and an unrestricted view of the range of meaningful contacts made between rhetorical and cultural practices. These are also questions that interdisciplinary approaches to classical rhetoric raise. Works like J. Walker's *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* (Oxford: 2000), Yunis' *Taming Democracy*, Ian Worthington's edited *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), E. Haskins' *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle* (Columbia, SC: 2004), and T. Poulakos' and D. Depew's edited *Isocrates and Civic Education* (Austin: 2004) explore classical rhetoric in its various rapprochements with other disciplines in order to discern cultural saliency and identify that which emerges as significant for the Greek culture in particular moments. Approaching rhetoric as a form of signification that draws its energy from and simultaneously gives meaning to cultural practices, authors of the works and collections above refuse to circumscribe rhetoric around the logic of a discipline. In raising questions about rhetoric's relation to culture, in other words, these scholars do not frame questions in accordance to a disciplinary understanding of rhetoric: they do not say, 'now, let's reframe the question posed in a manner that would eliminate its philosophical components, purge its poetic features, remove its historical dimensions, so that the question could only be addressed by a genuinely disciplinary understanding of rhetoric'. By allowing the questions themselves to determine the scope and the terrain of the inquiry, the works above identify rhetoric with so many ways of being and performing in the world.

A Case Study of an Interdisciplinary Approach to Classical Rhetoric

Isocrates' decision to label his rhetorical education as education in philosophy presents us with an interesting case to explore classical rhetoric in his day (on Isocrates, see further, T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6). It is interesting because the label *philosophia* defies our disciplinary assumptions. Indeed, from a disciplinary viewpoint, his choice of the term *philosophia* can only be understood either as a misnomer or, as several

scholars have already pointed out, a public relations ploy on his part, a way for him to distance his rhetorical education from the disreputable sophists and to associate himself with the more respected intellectual activity of philosophy. Yet, if we suspend our disciplinary understanding of rhetoric and philosophy, it may be possible to provide some other explanation that will in turn also shed light back on alternative ways of understanding rhetoric's relation to the Greek culture.

To begin with, let us keep in mind that the kind of question Isocrates addresses is not rhetorical but pedagogical and, from all indications, a question that many intellectuals in his day were also raising with an utmost sense of urgency: can education in any way help bring the city out of its near-crisis situation? Isocrates' general claim, that he can teach people how to discover the right course of action for the city in any given situation, shows that the pedagogy he was practicing had been designed to provide a response to the intellectual concerns of his day. His specific claim, that he can help students improve their judgments and, as he puts it, enable an orator 'by his powers of conjecture (*doxa*) arrive generally at the best course of action' (15.271) or reach 'a judgment (*doxa*) which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action' (12.30), shows that he framed the question in political and philosophical terms. For *doxa* (opinion, belief, judgment, conjecture) invited both sets of problems. Politically, *doxa* determines the fate of the community, and human lives often hang on a single opinion that dominates deliberation in the Assembly and binds Athenians to a particular course of action. Isocrates' contemporaries knew too well that the rise and fall of the Athenian empire had been a story of good and poor judgments made by orators/politicians.

Philosophically, *doxa* posed the vexing problem of standards. On what basis could one *doxa* be said to be better than another? What certainty could we have that even the best judgment reached was anything more than a lucky guess? Plato had already addressed in the *Meno* the problem of arriving at the correct solution for the city as a problem of *doxa*. Even though the good statesman in the *Meno* wants to make the right decision for his people every time, he is inevitably caught up in a situation where, with mere opinion as his guide, he sometimes hits and sometimes misses the mark. Plato's proposed solution, that one must reach a level of knowledge (*epistēmē*) that would provide a standard for judging false and correct opinions alike, was expressed as follows: 'He who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not' (97c). It was a solution Isocrates could easily dismiss by redirecting the issue back to the political realm: unless someone has the ability to predict the future, he reasoned, there can be no certainty about the outcome of political decisions. This reasoning gave Isocrates the authority to expose Plato's philosophy as being out of touch with Athenian politics – 'no system of knowledge can possibly cover these occasions, since in all cases they elude our science' (15.184) – and plenty of opportunities to remind his audience that, in the political realm, *doxa* is all there is: 'In dealing with matters about which they take counsel, [people] ought not to think that they have exact knowledge of what the result will be, but to be minded towards these contingencies as men who indeed exercise their best judgment (*doxa*) but are not sure what the future may hold in store' (8.8).

The question Isocrates raised about *doxa*, then, led to a philosophical problem that philosophy, as practiced at the time, was not equipped to resolve. The importance of the question he raised, self-evident to his contemporaries, provided him with an angle

from which to critique the existing practices of philosophy: 'I hold that what some people call philosophy is not entitled to that name' (15.270). But if Isocrates criticized the discipline of philosophy for not being able to resolve the problem of *doxa* in the context of political deliberation, he also criticized the discipline of rhetoric for not even addressing *doxa* as a problem. For the field of rhetoric had thus far placed all its energy on eloquence and persuasion, *eu legein*. The plethora of sophistic teachings on rhetoric made it fairly easy for someone to learn how to defend his *doxa* or undermine his opponent's *doxa* eloquently and persuasively. However much improved in the areas of pleasing discourses and techniques with persuasion, the discipline of rhetoric had thus far nothing to say about the process of formulating sound judgments.

Isocrates addressed the lacuna he had identified in the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric, as they were practiced at the time, by resorting to history. Athenian history, with its plentiful examples of sound decision making and good judgments in political deliberation, offered countless opportunities to witness *doxa* in its best possible renderings. Isocrates points to Solon, Cleisthenes, and Pericles as men in the distant past who had repeatedly reached sound decisions, had spoken eloquently and persuasively, and had advocated courses of action that conferred the greatest benefits on their fellow Athenians. These men, he remarks, were 'the best statesmen ever to have come before the rostrum', 'the most reputable orators among the ancients', and 'the cause of most blessings for the city' (15.231).

Isocrates' move to history enabled him to offer a pragmatic solution to the problem of *doxa*. If we have no criteria for distinguishing one *doxa* from another, we can at least look to the past and identify examples of wise people having made sound decisions. Furthermore, we can study these examples at present. Under his guidance, he remarks, a student will select from the past 'those examples which are the most illustrious and the most edifying; and, habituating himself to contemplate and appraise such examples, he will feel their influence not only in the preparation of a given discourse but in all the actions of his life' (15.277). By invoking the great statesmen of the past, Solon, Cleisthenes, and Pericles, who were still celebrated in his day for their practical wisdom in strengthening the city as well as for their persuasive eloquence, Isocrates succeeded in creating a space where rhetoric and philosophy could first be reconfigured and then be blended together into an indissolubly single practice. It is the space of *sophia*, an old cultural activity, still being understood by his contemporaries as practical wisdom in action.

Isocrates ends his inquiry into *doxa* by bringing philosophy to the service of *sophia*, contemplation to action. The distinction between the two, as the following passage demonstrates, is the difference between wise decisions made in the past and the preparation necessary to develop the ability to make sound decisions in the present (15.270–271):

I hold those men to be wise (*sophous*) who are able by the power of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and philosophers those occupying themselves with the studies from which they gain most quickly that kind of insight (*phronēsis*).

Wise people are men of action, blessed with practical wisdom and the power to make correct conjectures or, translated more literally, to arrive at successful opinions, as much as that is humanly possible. Philosophers are those who study the decisions of

wise men, who turn wise decisions of the past into an object of study, and who contemplate manifestations of wisdom in order to cultivate their own ability with making sound judgments.

By tapping into a traditional understanding of *sophia*, Isocrates could make the case to his contemporaries that oratory could still be practiced under him as it once had been by men of practical wisdom, provided that orators-to-be would study the decision-making practices of these men. He could also make the case that, by taking for its subject matter the ways wise people had acted in deliberative situations, philosophy could help demystify practical wisdom and make sound *doxai* subject to training and education rather than to innate talent.

Isocrates' treatment of rhetoric is instructive if only because it exemplifies how an intellectual inquiry can oftentimes lead to paths beyond the pressures of ideological commitments and disciplinary formations at present. True, Isocrates was concerned with the identity of rhetoric and its distinction from philosophy, sophistic, or eristic. But for him, shaping this identity was not an end in itself. The disciplinary refiguration of rhetoric he arrived at – a strengthening of political deliberation by means of deliberative discourses from the history of the community as well as by means of the reflective rigor that philosophy could bring to the study of these discourses – was the result of his commitment to the question he raised, not to the field he served. Equally true, Isocrates worked from within the ideological framework of his day and looked to fashion an educational program fit for leaders and suited for members of the upper class. But rather than privilege this framework and the moral egocentricity that goes with it, he infused his rhetorical education with the city's pressing political needs at the time. As a result, the identity he created for the orator who would serve the city best – one who would worry less about making his proposals for action eloquent and persuasive and more about scrutinizing his proposals from the perspective of the community's history and would reflect on the potential benefits and consequences of his proposals as much as wise people are expected to – ended up being more a potential space, open to any member of the *polis* committed to the life of politics, and less a fixed identity to be taken up exclusively by an aristocrat. Isocrates' example illustrates that the possibility to learn unique aspects of classical rhetoric depends entirely on the open-ended nature of the questions we raise about it.

Bibliographical Essay

There are numerous works employing new approaches to classical rhetoric or discussing theoretical issues about modern approaches to classical rhetoric. Of the former, the best by far is J. Walker's *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* (Oxford: 2000). Challenging the prevalent assumption that rhetoric became a field of its own by divorcing itself from poetry, Walker traces the various transformations that the inextricable link between rhetoric and poetry – most visible in works of epideictic rhetoric – underwent over the ages. Of the latter, most instructive and engaging are the various debates that have periodically formed around issues of interpreting classical rhetoric or more generally the history of rhetoric. A special issue of the journal *Pre/Text* 8 (1987), devoted to historiography and the history of rhetoric, raises a variety of theoretical issues concerning the ideological nature of modern approaches to classical rhetoric as well

as the historiography of rhetoric. The debate is extended further in two edited collections, one by T. Poulakos, *Rethinking the History of Rhetoric* (Boulder, CO: 1993), and the other by V. Vitanza, *Writing Histories of Rhetoric* (Carbondale, Ill: 1994). Another debate was formed around issues of gender and their importance in approaching classical rhetoric, as well as the history of rhetoric, from contemporary perspectives. Two special issues of the journal *Rhetoric Society Quarterly* are devoted to feminist readings and feminist historiography of rhetoric, Vol. 22, edited by S. Jarratt (1992), and Vol. 32, edited by P. Bizzell (2002).

PART II

Rhetoric: A Brief History

CHAPTER THREE

Background and Origins: Oratory and Rhetoric before the Sophists

Michael Gagarin

Before we can trace the origins of rhetoric we must first determine just what it is we are looking for. If by ‘rhetoric’ we mean an analysis of the art of making speech persuasive such as we find in Plato, Aristotle and their successors – which they called *hē rhētorikē technē* (‘the rhetorical art’) or *hē rhētorikē* (‘rhetoric’) for short – a strong case has been made¹ that this sort of work did not exist before the fourth century. This position has not won universal acceptance² and the tradition of early rhetorical *technai* or handbooks that were forerunners of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is still common in writing about early rhetoric. I should declare from the start that I am sympathetic to those who have challenged the traditional account, which locates the birth of rhetoric in fifth-century Sicily,³ but in what follows I want to consider the evidence afresh in its own terms, looking first at what we can determine from contemporary sources (i.e. up to about 450) and only then at what we find in the later tradition.

Whatever we might say about rhetoric or rhetorical theory, speech was clearly important in Greek culture from the beginning. We think of a Homeric hero like Achilles as the greatest of Greek fighters, but Achilles’ tutor Phoenix was charged with teaching him about public speaking (*agorai*) as well as about fighting – ‘to teach you to be both a speaker (*rhētōr*) of words (*mythoi*) and a doer of deeds’ (*Iliad* 9.442–443). Instruction in speaking, like instruction in fighting, probably took the form of supervised learning by experience, though some general rules presumably were known. Achilles learned his lessons well, and he is the first to rise and speak to the assembled Greeks at the beginning of the *Iliad* (1.53–67), giving them the correct advice when they are at a loss how to remove the plague Apollo has sent. All the other Homeric leaders also speak in public, with varying degrees of effectiveness. Clearly no Greek could be a leader without devoting some attention to effective speech.

The effectiveness of a speech in Homer is represented in language that does not seem to distinguish between content and style. A good speaker like Nestor is portrayed as a ‘sweet-voiced, clear speaker (*ligys agorētēs*); and from his honeyed tongue

his voice flowed sweetly' (*Iliad* 1.248–249); and after his speech Agamemnon, though rejecting his advice, comments, 'indeed, old man, you spoke all that fittingly' (*kata moiran*).⁴ On the other side, although Thersites is also a 'clear speaker', he is described by the poet as 'speaking without measure' (*ametroepēs*) and 'knowing many indecorous (*akosma*) words', and in a sharp rebuke by Odysseus as 'speaking without judgment (*akritomythos*)'.⁵

These descriptions, which include both manner of speaking ('clear', 'sweet-voiced', 'speaking without measure') and the quality of advice ('fittingly', 'without judgment'), suggest that the Greeks did not distinguish sharply between these two areas. But they did distinguish different speakers by their manner of speaking and the content of their words. All Nestor's fellow Greeks, for example, would surely be aware of his tendency to use his own past endeavors (narrated at some length) as models for present behavior. Traits like these of Nestor and others would be well known, and even though all Homeric figures speak in the same hexameter verses, readers can easily appreciate Antenor's well-known descriptions of Greek speakers, as he points them out to Helen looking down from the walls of Troy. He recalls how he once entertained Menelaus and Odysseus (*Iliad* 3.212–223):

When it came time for each to speak in public
And weave a spell of wisdom with their words,
Menelaus spoke fluently enough, to the point
And very clearly, but briefly, since he is not
A man of many words. Being older, he spoke first.
Then Odysseus, the master strategist, rose quickly,
But just stood there, his eyes fixed on the ground.
He did not move his staff forward or backward
But held it steady. You would have thought him
A dull, surly lout without any wit. But when he
Opened his mouth and projected his voice
The words fell down like snowflakes in a blizzard.
No mortal could have vied with Odysseus then,
And we no longer held his looks against him.⁶

Clearly Odysseus' powerful manner of speaking is an important part of his leadership ability, and indeed, all these passages imply that effective leadership is tied to effective speaking.

This is nowhere more true than in the area of law, or more broadly the peaceful settlement of disputes. The quasi-judicial scenes of dispute settlement we find in Homer and Hesiod all reveal that perhaps the most important quality of a good 'judge' – whether he is referred to as an elder, a king (*basileus*), or something else – is that he be a good speaker. This explains why Hesiod (*Theogony* 83–87) describes a king, in his capacity as judge, as (like a poet) having the gift of the Muses:⁷

On his tongue they pour sweet dew,
And soothing words flow from his mouth. All the people
behold him, sorting out the rules (*diakrinein themistes*)
in straight settlements (*itheiai dikai*). And he, speaking surely,
quickly and skillfully puts an end to even a great dispute.

Here in the context of settling disputes, the king's ability to use speech to persuade the disputants and others to accept his settlement is crucial to his success in judging.⁸ There are echoes here of Nestor and other good speakers, and a survey of all scenes of judging in the epics, including the famous trial scene on Achilles' shield (*Iliad* 18.497–508), shows that speaking ability is required of judges and litigants. Rhetoric is thus tied to effective leadership in forensic as well as deliberative settings from the earliest time.⁹

Even epideictic oratory has its place in the epics, most notably in the three eulogies delivered at Hector's funeral by the three most important Trojan women – Andromache, Hecuba, and Helen (*Iliad* 24.723–776). Each woman addresses her own relationship with Hector, and Helen's praise is particularly moving, as she ends with a tribute to Hector's 'gentle spirit and gentle words'.¹⁰ None of these funeral speeches rises to the level of generality found in the classical funeral oration, but given the fact that women in general have relatively little visibility in the *Iliad*, it is interesting that Homer chooses to end his great poem with three examples of female public oratory.

In the centuries following Homer and Hesiod, the same three types of oratory must have continued to play an important role in public life. In Athens, the only city for which we have sufficient evidence, the gradual trend toward greater citizen participation in government, interrupted only by the Pisistratid tyranny in the sixth century,¹¹ would inevitably have increased the importance of deliberative oratory. Direct evidence for such oratory in the archaic period is mostly lacking, but we do have Solon's report that he addressed the Athenians on the subject of Salamis, 'composing an adornment of words, a song, instead of a speech.'¹² Solon's words imply that speech, not song, was the normal way of addressing the people of Athens, and many of the leading public figures after Solon were renowned public speakers. As far as we know, no fifth-century Athenian wrote down his deliberative speeches, with the result that memory preserved only the general themes of these speeches and an occasional vivid expression. But Herodotus reports (8.83), for example, that when Themistocles addressed the other ship captains before the Battle of Salamis in 480, 'his whole speech presented a contrast between the better and the worse features of human nature and the human condition; and he urged them to choose the better of these.'¹³ And the three speeches that Thucydides puts in the mouth of Pericles, though composed by the historian, may give some sense of Pericles' brilliance as a public speaker.¹⁴ Indeed, throughout his work Thucydides makes clear that political leadership in the fifth century was primarily dependent on rhetorical ability.¹⁵

Forensic oratory too must have continued to be practiced after Homer, though the oratorical role of judges diminished while that of litigants increased correspondingly. Even during the period of Pisistratus' tyranny the courts continued to function, and after the reforms of Cleisthenes at the end of the sixth century, and especially after those of Ephialtes in 462, use of the courts increased rapidly and occasions for forensic oratory increased as well. We do not have good evidence for the history of Athenian law in this period, but Pericles' institution of jury pay, probably before 450, was presumably a response to this growth in court activity.

As for funeral oratory, we are told that Solon introduced legislative restrictions on displays at funerals, which may have restrained the delivery of private eulogies on these occasions, but some time before Pericles delivered his famous speech in 430, the city of Athens created the occasion of the public funeral oration. Women continued to

participate in public funerals during this period, but their role as speakers was entirely usurped by male citizens,¹⁶ and in his own funeral oration Pericles notoriously confines women to a brief comment at the end.

All the material I have discussed thus far is evidence for early oratory (not rhetoric). But it indicates that not only in Homer and Hesiod but throughout the archaic period, Greeks put a high value on effective speaking and thought about ways of making speeches effective. On the other hand, there is no evidence to suggest the systematic study or analysis of the practice of public speaking beyond the simple observation of individuals' manners of speaking. Rhetoric in the fourth-century sense is still lacking. As mentioned above, however, traditional accounts of rhetoric locate its origin in the early or mid fifth century. The earliest evidence we have for this tradition are remarks of Socrates and Phaedrus in their discussion near the end of Plato's *Phaedrus* (probably written 470–450), when they mention several earlier figures who have written about 'the art of words' (*hē logōn technē*, 266e–267e). There are also scattered references in Aristotle to earlier writers of rhetorical *technai*. Almost all of those mentioned by either author are generally considered sophists, and these will be treated in the chapter on the sophists that follows.¹⁷ The exceptions are two Sicilians, Corax and Tisias, who according to later tradition were active in the years before 450.

Hard facts about Corax and Tisias are almost entirely (some would say entirely) lacking.¹⁸ The former is first mentioned by Aristotle, the latter by Plato, and the fact that a similar argument from likelihood (*eikos*) is attributed to Corax in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and to Tisias in the *Phaedrus* does not inspire confidence. These and other references to the two 'inventors of rhetoric' have led to what E. Schiappa calls 'the standard account':¹⁹ after the overthrow of the tyrants in Sicily (probably in Syracuse in 467), citizens suddenly needed to learn how to speak in assemblies and/or law courts (for example, to recover property that had been appropriated by the tyrants). Corax, and later his pupil Tisias, met this need by inventing rhetoric, the art of persuasive speech, and teaching it for a fee. One or the other or both produced a written *Technē*, a manual or handbook that treated the division of speeches, the argument from likelihood, and perhaps other subjects. Their achievements were later made known in Athens, either by their fellow Sicilian Gorgias, who visited Athens in 427, or by Tisias himself, who is said to have taught Lysias and Isocrates among others. Their book (or books) was known to Aristotle (or to one of his pupils), who summarized the contents of all the early handbooks in his now lost *Synagōgē Technōn* (Collection of Arts). For later scholars this work then became the main source for the writings of Corax and Tisias, which were themselves soon lost.

The inconsistencies in our sources and the many problems that arise in trying to produce a coherent account of these two figures have been thoroughly examined by T. Cole, who concludes that if Corax really existed and was not just an alternative name for Tisias, all we know about him is that he was preoccupied with arguments from likelihood.²⁰ The historical existence of Tisias is more likely; he may have devised the division of forensic speeches into four parts – prologue, narrative, argument, epilogue – which represents a natural arrangement for a forensic speech; and he seems to have devoted most of his attention to the third part, argument. If he wrote a *Technē*, it probably consisted of 'a collection of model pieces, analogous to the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon and based on the principle of *eikos*: pleadings pro and con

(or, more likely, compressed summary versions of such pleadings) on topics likely to come up in court cases – not an analytic set of precepts.²¹

In general I share Cole's skepticism about the value of our sources for Corax and Tisias. It seems to me an open question whether Corax really existed. Even if he did, since our sources often confuse or merge him with Tisias, and since Tisias is the better attested, the following discussion will not try to distinguish between the two but will discuss all the material about which I feel reasonably certain as the work of Tisias.²² As we shall see, his work has little or no practical value, but must be understood as an intellectual contribution to ideas about *logos* or argument rather than a practical contribution to the training of litigants or politicians. This is just one reason why I am skeptical of the historical context in which the later tradition set Tisias' work – the rise of democracy after the overthrow of tyranny – for he could just as easily have carried out his intellectual work under any form of government.²³

The argument that can most securely be attributed to Tisias is the one attested in our earliest sources for his work, Plato's *Phaedrus*. In Socrates' initial discussion of those earlier and contemporary figures who allegedly wrote on 'the art of words' (266e–267e), he ridicules several of these figures, including Tisias: 'We will let Tisias and Gorgias rest in peace, who saw that probabilities (or likelihoods – *eikota*) should be more honored than truths, and who make small things appear great and great things small by the power of speech.' I have elsewhere challenged the notion that Tisias or any of the sophists actually considered likelihood more important than truth.²⁴ Rather, the sophists and forensic orators saw likelihood as an alternative type of argument that could, and often had to be used in situations where the truth was impossible to determine. But Plato's starkly negative view of rhetoric, as it is elaborated in the *Gorgias*, postulates that rhetoric has no concern with truth, and it follows for him, therefore, that if rhetoric is concerned with likelihood, then likelihood will be more honored than truth by theorists and practitioners of rhetoric.

Shortly after this survey of earlier thinkers, the discussion in *Phaedrus* turns to the question, whether someone who wants to be 'competent in rhetoric' (*hikanōs rhētorikos*, literally 'sufficiently rhetorical') needs to be concerned with truth (272d–e). In language that again recalls the *Gorgias*, Socrates asserts that in the law courts no one cares at all about truth, only about what is persuasive (*pithanos*), and this is equivalent to what is likely (*eikos*). This in turn leads to a discussion of Tisias: 'does he say that the likely (*to eikos*) is anything other than what most people think is the case?' After *Phaedrus* assents to this, Socrates presents a well-known example of the argument from likelihood (273a–c):

He [Tisias] wrote that if a weak but brave man beats a strong but cowardly man and steals his cloak or something else, and the man brings him to court, neither man must speak the truth. The coward must deny that he was beaten by a single brave man, whereas the other must contend that they were alone and must use that well-known argument, 'How could someone like me [i.e. a weak man] have assaulted someone like him [i.e. a strong man]?' He will certainly not admit his own cowardice but will try some other lie, perhaps giving his opponent some opportunity to refute him.

Each man, on this account, is concealing a crucial truth: the strong man conceals his cowardice by claiming to have been assaulted by more than one man, and the weak man conceals his bravery, arguing that a weak man like himself would not attack a strong man.

If this is all that Tisias' teaching about likelihood amounted to, he would surely never have gained recognition for originality, since similar arguments from likelihood had long been known and used (see below). But I think we can find evidence for a more original twist to the argument if we examine the version of this case provided by Aristotle. Even though he attributes the argument to Corax, it clearly belongs to the same case and arguably reflects the original version of Tisias (or Corax). In the course of a discussion of the *enthymēmē* and likelihood (*eikota*), Aristotle considers cases where the likely is in fact not likely and cites as an example the *Technē* of Corax. He continues (*Rhet.* 2.24.11):

If someone is not open to the charge, as for instance a weak man who is accused of assault, he argues that this was not likely. And if he is open to the charge, as would be the case if he were strong, he also argues that this was not likely, because it would seem likely [sc. and therefore he would refrain from doing it]. And the same holds in other cases, for a person must either be open to the charge or not. Thus both positions appear likely, but the one is likely while the other is not likely in a straightforward sense (*haplōs*) but in the way we have explained.

Although there can be no doubt that this is a version of the same case that Plato presents in the *Phaedrus*, there are important differences between the two versions. First, since Plato cites this argument to illustrate his point that rhetoric essentially requires lying, it is hardly surprising that his version has both parties telling lies: the first conceals his cowardice and claims that the weak man had help; the other conceals his bravery. Aristotle's version, on the other hand, does not require either side to lie. Unlike Plato, he never tells us which party in fact assaulted the other, only that one man was accused of assault. This leaves each man free to give an argument from likelihood which may in fact be true. Thus, the first man does not mention bravery or cowardice but simply argues that he, a weak man, is unlikely to have assaulted a strong man. This is a straightforward, traditional argument from likelihood. The second man's argument is more complex – and this is the second important difference between the versions in Plato and Aristotle, namely that Aristotle's second speaker reverses the obvious argument that he, a strong man, was likely to assault a weaker man, arguing instead that the fact that, being stronger, he was likely to assault the other man actually makes it unlikely that he would have assaulted him, because everyone would think him the likely suspect. He thus produces a complex, reverse argument from likelihood to the effect that he did not assault the weak man, an argument that perfectly illustrates Aristotle's point in this passage that sometimes the probable is not probable.

Not surprisingly, then, each philosopher gives a version of this case that supports the more general point he is making. How then can we know which version (if either) is authentic? One factor seems to me decisive, namely that only in Aristotle's version do we have an argument that is original and striking enough to establish someone's reputation as an inventor of rhetoric, or even an important figure in its early development. This is what I have called the reverse-probability argument,²⁵ which is used by the strong man – the likelihood that a person did something wrong in itself makes it unlikely that he acted so. No other argument in either version of the case is original or surprising; indeed they are all variations of what the day-old Hermes says when

accused of stealing Apollo's cattle. He defends himself against the charge (which is in fact true) by arguing that 'I am not like (*ou* ... *eoika*) a cattle thief, a strong man' (*Hymn to Hermes* 265). This *Hymn* is usually thought to have been composed about 500 or earlier,²⁶ but even if we did not have such an early version, it would be hard to imagine that someone would be noted for inventing this fairly obvious argument. We can conclude, therefore, that since the reverse-probability argument in Aristotle's version of this case is the only truly innovative argument, Aristotle's version is closer to Tisias' original version than Plato's.

On the other hand, both Plato's and Aristotle's versions of this case illustrate a related development in the early history of rhetoric that Tisias may have had a hand in, though he probably did not invent it, namely the practice of speaking on both sides of a case. This practice is generally attributed to Protagoras, who is reported as saying that 'there are two *logoi* on every subject opposed to one another.'²⁷ Both versions of the case of the weak man and strong man present a pair of opposed arguments (*logoi*), and it is evident especially in the version in Aristotle that Tisias has attributed to the second side a clever reversal of the first side's argument. Another even more clever reversal – in fact a double reversal – is found in a story told about Corax and Tisias in many later sources.²⁸ The story is that when Tisias went to study with Corax, he promised to pay the fee if he won his first case. Then when Tisias had learned his lessons, Corax asked for his fee but Tisias refused. They went to court and Corax argued that he should receive the fee whether he won or lost the case: if he won because he had won, and if he lost, then according to the terms of the agreement (because Tisias would have won his first case). In response, Tisias 'used the same argument, altering nothing'. Whether he won or lost, he argued, he should not have to pay: if he won because he had won, and if he lost, then according to the terms of the agreement (because he would have lost his first case).

The lateness of our sources for this story and the fact that the same story is also told about Protagoras and a pupil (Diog. Laert. 9.56) make its authenticity suspect, but it may have originated with Corax or Tisias and later been applied to others, and it is quite consistent with the better attested case of the weak and strong man. Like that case, the dispute about the fee could be said to teach skill in forensic argument by means of arguments on both sides of a case. More specifically, like Aristotle's version of the weak man and strong man, the arguments about the fee take the form of a pair of opposed speeches in which the second neatly reverses the argument of the first.

None of the *logoi* in the two cases we have just examined would be of direct practical use to a pupil. The situation portrayed in the fee dispute is clearly artificial and would probably never arise. And although assault cases were undoubtedly common, the argument that the strong man is likely and the weak man is unlikely to have been the assailant would hardly need to be taught, and the reverse-probability argument – that the strong man, as the likely assailant, would not have assaulted the weak man – would have been unlikely to succeed in a real case. It is significant that, to my knowledge, the reverse-probability argument was never used by an actual litigant in classical Athens, although a form of it is used by the defendant in Antiphon's fictional *First Tetralogy* (2.2.6). On the basis of this evidence, then, it appears that Tisias did not aim to give fellow Syracusans practical instruction in how to be successful litigants in court. He did, however, develop intellectually interesting arguments, often concerned with likelihood, and he may have specialized

in techniques for reversing the arguments of the other side. Among his methods for demonstrating these techniques was the writing of pairs of model speeches, a method that was also used by later sophists such as Antiphon (in his *Tetralogies*) and others. And the sorts of arguments illustrated in these model speeches would not have been completely useless to actual litigants, since any training in general methods of argument could improve their practice of argumentation.

In conclusion, if we take 450 to mark the start of the sophistic period, what was the state of rhetoric by this time? First, Homer, Hesiod, and the epic tradition had made public speaking in deliberative and forensic settings a necessity for all the leaders of the community and also established a tradition of public eulogies in which women participated as well as men. In the centuries that followed, at least in Athens with the growth of democracy, deliberative oratory flourished and continued to be a requirement of leadership.²⁹ During this period the sphere of epideictic oratory, first portrayed in Homer, was enlarged in importance in the form of public funeral orations and set in a full ritual context controlled by men, who would make the funeral oration an integral part of the political ideology of the city.³⁰ Finally, as legal procedure became more regulated, it was no longer important for judges to speak well in order to resolve disputes and by the fifth century their role was reduced to the silent casting of a vote. But forensic oratory flourished in the form of litigants' speeches, and to judge from the evidence for the work of Corax and Tisias, this was the sphere that particularly attracted their attention.³¹ And one specific interest of theirs was the creation of pairs of opposed speeches on a particular subject, especially where the second speech neatly reverses the argument of the first. To be sure, this is a small part of rhetorical theory, but this is the beginning of a story taken up by the sophists and then Plato and Aristotle after them.

Bibliographical Essay

For those who wish to read more about early oratory and rhetoric, I recommend starting with the traditional view as presented by G.A. Kennedy in *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 58–61, then read E. Schiappa's challenge to this account in *The Beginnings of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (New Haven: 1999). T. Cole's similarly revisionist book *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991) is also interesting, though much of it deals with the second half of the fifth century. More specialized studies are cited in my notes. Some passages from early Greek literature that are relevant to the subject are collected in M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff (eds.), *Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists* (Cambridge: 1995).

Notes

- 1 See T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991), E. Schiappa, 'Did Plato Coin *Rhētorikē*?', *AJP* 111 (1990), pp. 457–470 and *The Beginnings of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (New Haven: 1999).

- 2 A.J. Karp, 'Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric', *Arethusa* 10 (1977), pp. 237–258, goes so far as to maintain that 'elements of an implicit if sketchy theory of persuasion can be drawn from the Homeric poems' (p. 237). Karp may find such elements to his satisfaction, but he gives no evidence that Homer or any of his characters were aware of or could have expressed such a theory.
- 3 See M. Gagarin, 'Did the sophists Aim to Persuade?', *Rhetorica* 19 (2001), pp. 275–291. For the traditional account, see the works cited below, n. 19.
- 4 Nestor's speeches in the *Iliad* are discussed by P.G. Toohey, 'Epic and Rhetoric', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 153–175 (especially pp. 154–162). See also H.M. Roisman, 'Nestor the Good Counsellor', *CQ*² 55 (2005), pp. 17–38.
- 5 *Iliad* 2.212–213, 246. Besides Nestor and Thersites, only Telemachus is described as a 'clear speaker' (*Odyssey* 20.274). See also H.M. Roisman's analysis of Thersites' speech, Chapter 28, which differs somewhat from mine.
- 6 Translation from S. Lombardo, *Homer, Iliad* (Indianapolis: 1997).
- 7 For more on Hesiod's complex rhetorical art, see J. Strauss Clay, Chapter 29.
- 8 See further, M. Gagarin, 'The Poetry of Justice: Hesiod and the Origins of Greek Law', *Ramus* 21 (1992), pp. 61–78.
- 9 The categories 'deliberative', 'forensic', and 'epideictic' were first formally recognized by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.3) and they have their limitations, especially in discussing pre-classical oratory. I use them for convenience and to suggest some areas of continuity between this period and the fourth century.
- 10 Here again we see speech cited in order to exemplify character.
- 11 Pisistratus first gained control of Athens c. 560, was removed shortly afterwards, then regained power but was removed again, and then finally c. 546 established himself firmly as tyrant. After his death in 528, his sons Hippias and Hipparchus continued the tyranny; Hipparchus was murdered in 514 and Hippias was expelled from Athens in 510.
- 12 Solon, fr. 1 West = M.L. West (ed.), *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* 2 (Oxford: 1971), p. 140. West thinks *ōidēn* ('song') is a gloss, but that would not affect my point.
- 13 We may wish to consider Themistocles' speech at Salamis as more epideictic than deliberative, but he must have given many effective deliberative speeches before this episode, as, for instance, when he persuaded the Athenians not to take refuge in the 'wooden walls' of the Acropolis (Herodotus 7.141–143).
- 14 Thuc. 1.140–144, 2.35–46, 2.60–64. The second of these is the famous Funeral Oration; the other two are speeches to the Assembly.
- 15 See especially H. Yunis, *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: 1996).
- 16 Pericles' mistress Aspasia is said to have written the funeral oration in Plato's *Menexenus*, but even if she did write it, neither as a metic nor as a woman would she have been able to deliver it.
- 17 See J.A.E. Bons, Chapter 4. Among the sophists I include Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus, and Thrasymachus. Theodorus and Polus, though not generally treated as sophists, belong to the end of the fifth century and could be included in this group. We cannot take literally Socrates' reference (*Phaedrus* 261b) to 'manuals on rhetoric (*technai peri logōn*)' by Nestor and Odysseus.
- 18 The references are collected by L. Radermacher, *Artium scriptores: Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik* (Vienna: 1951), pp. 28–35 (see also pp. 11–18). Best known is the brief account by Cicero (*Brutus* 46), who attributes his information to Aristotle. Among the skeptics, see especially T. Cole, 'Who was Corax?', *ICS* 16 (1991), pp. 65–84.
- 19 Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetoric*, especially pp. 4–6, 30–47. For different versions of the standard account see C.G. Kuebler, *The Argument from Probability in Early Attic Oratory*

- (Diss. Chicago: 1944), pp. 1–19, D.A. Hinks, ‘Tisias and Corax and the Invention of Rhetoric’, *CQ* 34 (1940), pp. 61–69, G.A. Kennedy, ‘The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks’, *AJP* 80 (1959), pp. 169–178 and *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 58–61.
- 20 Cole, ‘Who was Corax?’; cf. Hinks, ‘Tisias and Corax’.
- 21 Cole, ‘Who was Corax?’, p. 73; cf. S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), pp. 2–4. If there is any historical truth to Pausanias’ report (6.17.8 = Radermacher, *Artium scriptores*, p. 28) that Tisias wrote a most persuasive dispute-speech (*amphisbētēsis*) about money for a Syracusan woman, it may have been a demonstration speech of this sort.
- 22 Some of the following discussion can be found in a different form (and mostly attributed to Corax) in Gagarin, ‘Did the sophists Aim to Persuade?’, *passim*.
- 23 The sophists in the second half of the fifth century, who engaged in similar sorts of intellectual pursuits, came from and worked in many different cities with various forms of government.
- 24 M. Gagarin, ‘Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 46–68. For a modern defense of the argument from probability, see B. Smith, ‘Corax and Probability’, *Quarterly Journal of Speech Education* 7 (1921), pp. 13–42.
- 25 Gagarin, ‘Probability and Persuasion’, p. 51.
- 26 See R. Janko, *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns* (Cambridge: 1982), pp. 140–143.
- 27 Protagoras, fr. 6a D-K = H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶ (Berlin: 1951) = fr. 24 in M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff (eds.), *Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists* (Cambridge: 1995), p. 187. For more on this argument, see Gagarin, ‘Did the sophists Aim to Persuade?’, *passim*.
- 28 I give the earliest version we have of the story, which is in Sextus Empiricus (second century AD), *Adversus Mathematicos* 2.96–99. Sextus does not name Tisias but speaks only of Corax and a pupil.
- 29 See further, Ian Worthington, Chapter 17.
- 30 See C. Carey, Chapter 16 and J. Roisman, Chapter 26.
- 31 Several earlier scholars who write on Corax and Tisias (see above, n. 19) debate whether they were primarily interested in forensic or deliberative oratory. All we can say is that the work for which we have the best evidence all relates to forensic cases.

CHAPTER FOUR

Gorgias the Sophist and Early Rhetoric

Jeroen A.E. Bons

1

In antiquity the name Gorgias has specific connotations: it refers to an important representative of rhetoric who played a crucial role in the earliest development of that cultural phenomenon so fundamental to public life and literature. In many cases he is portrayed as the *eminence grise* of Greek rhetoric, responsible for the first attempts at theorizing about eloquence. Regularly notions from later rhetorical theory are ascribed to him. Already during his lifetime Gorgias is a figure of authority, and it is reported that he made a fortune by teaching his students to speak persuasively. At national gatherings like the Games at Olympia he is invited as the main speaker to address the audience with a panegyric on Hellas and the Hellenes. His notions on the practice and theory of rhetoric were developed further by students such as Isocrates and Alcidas.¹

Gorgias' reputation as a pivotal figure in the history of rhetoric is confirmed when Plato directs his criticisms on judicial and political rhetoric in a dialogue named after him: the *Gorgias*. Plato portrays him as an eminent *rhētōr*, one of those men who with their art of eloquence claim to be able to provide a competence of speaking persuasively crucial to the life of a citizen, active in public life. Plato seems to direct his attack especially against those rhetoricians who in the practice of their art ignore the criteria of truth and justice. To make Gorgias one of the main interlocutors of the dialogue indicates that his name was associated with this kind of rhetoric.

Only two complete speeches of Gorgias survive: the *Helen* and the *Palamedes*. Most probably these are model speeches of defense; with their subject-matter derived from mythology they seem to be applications of Gorgias' views on persuasive speech and argumentation to a fictional case (see below, 3). Furthermore, there exist two paraphrases of what seems to be a more philosophical work entitled *On Not-Being, or On Nature*. Here, Gorgias seems to have argued that 'nothing exists'; further, that if something would 'exist', it is not knowable, and finally that if it would be knowable, it

could not be communicated. Finally there are fragments from other works by him, and collections of opinions and tenets attributed to him.²

Gorgias is a figure not only relevant to the history of rhetoric and philosophy. His speeches belong to the earliest examples of a new literary form that arises in the fifth century: prose. Even if his style shows a strong influence from poetry, Gorgias is laying the groundwork for the genre of artistic or rhetorical prose, which will prove to be a decisive factor in the development of Greek prose in general.

In the following I will concentrate on the significance of Gorgias for the history of rhetoric. I will place him in the general context of the sophistic movement (4.2), discuss his contribution to the development of reflection on argumentation (4.3), and suggest the relevance of his notion of *apatē* (deceit/seduction) for the process of persuasion (4.4).

2

From the seventh century, important changes take place in the Greek world. First there is the gradual rise of the *polis* or (inadequately translated) ‘city-state’. A *polis* is a community of citizens, based on a shared way of life that expresses itself in the mode of political self-regulation, and in the communal cults and festivals that make up that community’s religious life. Different levels of political emancipation accompany the rise of the *polis*, and with it one can observe changes in mentality. Room for types of thinking that are less tied up with traditional mythology is opening up. Questions about the reasons why the state of affairs in the cosmos, and man’s role within it, is what it is were previously, as e.g., in Hesiod’s works, answered with a reference to the gods as factors of explanation. Now in certain quarters a more naturalistic mode of thinking presents itself. Perhaps supported by the confrontation with ideas and notions of trade-partners in the East (Persians, Egyptians, Phoenicians), Greek thinkers developed a new approach to these questions. They look for answers based on a more rationalistic investigation of the world around them. Observation of natural phenomena and rational speculation based on these observations lead them to point to natural processes as the explanation for the cosmos. This leads to what has been called ‘The Greek Enlightenment’ and the emergence of the Pre-Socratic thinkers that constitute the beginning of scientific thought and autonomous philosophy in the Western tradition.

This development leads to new attempts at giving man his place in the cosmos. Traditional myth no longer suffices: the interest shifts from the relation god–man to the relationships between humans themselves. Life in the *polis* means more freedom and independence, but simultaneously requires rules and cooperation to maintain it. A growing sense of individuality combined with a strong sense of honor and personal excellence (the well-known Greek competitiveness) constitute a centrifugal force for life in the *polis*. This is countered by the centripetal forces of imparting the feeling of communality and ways of regulation of communal life, such as good manners and conventional modes of civic action, sometimes developed into laws. Life in the *polis* requires participation, especially in Athens where, eventually, both in the political arena of the citizens’ Assembly and in the lawcourts with their large-sized jury-committees, citizens exercise their democratic rights of participation. In both domains it is up to the

individual citizen to persuade others, in the Assembly that his proposed policy is advantageous, or in the lawcourts that their case is just. There is a very practical side to this: given the fact that oral exchange is the dominant mode of communication, speaking, and particularly speaking persuasively is crucial. One could say that a person's failure or success as a citizen in public life depends to a large extent on his linguistic and verbal capacities.

The phenomenon of man as a member of his *polis* and what it required of him in that capacity was one of the main interests of a group of thinkers known as the sophists. They were, to use an anachronistic term, intellectuals who pursued practical wisdom (*sophia*) on a specific domain. Of these the skillful and persuasive use of speech was the most important. As representatives of the rational mode of thinking they studied language and the effectiveness of the spoken word. As did the natural philosophers, they started from observing effective speakers and effective modes of speaking. On the basis of these observations, which were compiled in collections of examples (e.g., Protagoras' *Kataballontes* or Throws: strategies to floor your opponent), they were providing the basis for analysis and theorizing, which would later develop in rhetoric as the 'art of persuasion'. The sophists were interested in all aspects of the domain of *logos*, a word that can refer to 'the word', and also to collections of words in an 'argument', 'reasoning', 'speech' or 'treatise'. Grammar, style and the argumentative structures in a text are of interest to them. Protagoras, for example, is reported to have criticized the opening line of Homer's *Iliad*: 'Sing, Muse ...' because the poet makes the mistake of giving an order (imperative) while he means to ask for a favour (polite request). With this Protagoras exhibits an awareness of formal qualities of statements that can serve as criteria for grammatical classification.³ Furthermore, in the Platonic dialogue named after him Protagoras is presented as giving an analysis of a poem on Scopas by Simonides. He shows how the poet contradicts himself, which exemplifies how the sophist is concerned with the 'correctness' of the poem as a unified whole: it needs to have coherence and logical consistency (Pl. *Protagoras* 339 a–d).

Sophists can use these shows of ingenuity and competence to attract paying pupils for their kind of training in speech. Plato describes how members of Protagoras' audience applaud his insightful analysis, and Socrates is also impressed. In his own words, he feels like a boxer after being punched: he is dazed by Protagoras' exhibition. While unmistakably ironic, Socrates' reaction testifies to the impact of Protagoras' analysis. From other sources one gets confirmation that sophists gave proof of their competence and virtuosity by presenting sample artistic speeches on a paradoxical theme, such as an encomium on salt or on the bumble-bee. The surprising and unexpected subject-matter and its effective treatment are meant to impress the public and aspiring pupils.⁴ Such an exercise in cleverness and competence also has a serious intention. Protagoras' analysis of Simonides' poem leads up, and is an introduction, to an investigation of 'virtue', and the virtuoso encomia on salt or the bumble-bee can serve as an exercise in argumentation (valid and invalid) and thus acquire a philosophical dimension.⁵

Gorgias, too, was a sophist. Not much is known about his life. He was born in Leontinoi on Sicily between 490 and 460, and is supposed to have lived for more than 100 years. He traveled through the Greek-speaking world, teaching and giving speeches, especially in Athens, where he became a well-known figure. While other

sophists promised their pupils success and excellence in public life (*politikē aretē*), Gorgias seems to have claimed he could make his pupils ‘good at speaking’ (Pl. *Meno* 95c). He is credited with the definition of the art of speaking (*rhētorikē technē*) as ‘producer of conviction’ (*peithous dēmiourgos*), capable of influencing ‘the souls of the hearer’ (Pl. *Gorgias* 453a). His art is superior to all other arts, because ‘everything submits to it, not by force but voluntarily’ (Pl. *Philebus* 58a–b). As will become clear below, however, he was more than an observer and teacher of persuasive speech. The object of his investigation was skillful speech in general: besides persuasion, he was interested in the mechanics of arguments and argumentation. His teaching probably was conducted in the form of demonstrations: he presented a model speech to his pupils for them to observe, memorize, study and imitate. These speeches contain arguments on a fictional, mythical theme and are as such potentially applicable in a general way: in other, more concrete contexts than the purely mythical. Two types of arguments can be discerned: generally accepted opinions on moral or political issues as the basis of reasoning, and argument-schemata or -structures. It remains unclear whether Gorgias composed a handbook, but given the early stage of the development of rhetoric and the predominantly oral modes of instruction, this seems improbable. Rather, one can envisage his model speeches as material for study.

His self-proclaimed ability to provide, at request, either a short or long speech on any given subject made him famous (Pl. *Phaedrus* 267a, *Protagoras* 334d–335a). Aristotle provides a short impression of his art in practice: ‘He was never at a loss for words: when he speaks about Achilles, he will praise Peleus, then Aiacus, then the god; and likewise on courage: that courage is productive of this or that, or what kind of thing it is’ (Aristotle, *Rhet* 1418a 4–37).⁶ When Achilles is the topic, the speaker can refer to his father Peleus, his grandfather Aiacus, and Father Zeus, the mythic originator of his family. Courage can be approached from the perspective of what it can effect or what definition one can give of it. These subtopics are the common places (sources of arguments) connected with each main topic.

3

Gorgias’ speeches, the *Helen* and the *Palamedes*, are illustrative of the growing awareness of the rules and regulations that form the basis of an effective speech and that will later develop into the system of rhetoric. Each discourse as a whole displays a clear structure. Beginning and end are marked off by an introduction and an epilogue. The main theme is clearly defined and developed into a number of subthemes, each dealt with in a separate section.

The *Palamedes* contains Palamedes’ defense against a charge of high treason and is structured as follows:

- 1–5 introduction and statement of main theme
- 6–21 arguments based on the issue itself
- 22–27 arguments directed towards the accuser (Odysseus)
- 28–32 arguments addressed at the judges
- 33–37 epilogue

Each section is functional in the overall speech. Introduction and epilogue serve to create the desired emotional state in the audience (the judges) and to underline the significance of the case at hand. In Sections 6–21, the argumentation in the strict sense, one finds the speaker (Palamedes) dealing with the facts of the case. Sections 22–27 and 28–33 are directed *ad hominem*: Odysseus is attacked on the basis of his personality, and the judges are appealed to on the basis of their personal interest. The *Palamedes* is tailored to the concrete situation of an accused called upon to defend himself before a panel of judges, and is thus an example of a judicial speech. All the elements present in it belong to the basic style of the *genos dikanikon* or judicial genre of later rhetoric.

The *Helen*, although also a speech of defense, differs from the *Palamedes* in that this speech explicitly has the intention of praise (3–5, 21). The speech has the following structure:

1–2	introduction
3–5	descent and beauty of Helen
6–19	arguments based on the issue itself
20–21	epilogue

The focus of the speech is to provide all possible explanations for Helen's behaviour. She is held responsible (unjustifiably, according to the speaker) for the Trojan War with all its horrors. Most emphasis is given to the persuasive power of speech (*logos*, 8–14) and love (*erōs*, 15–19) as exculpating factors. The speech seems to be a mixture of rhetorical types: one finds elements typical of the defense speech, but Sections 3–5 clearly derive from the tradition of speeches of praise with the mention of noble descent and beauty of Helen.

The development of the reasoning in both speeches seems to be consciously methodical. In both speeches Gorgias makes use of a central method or strategy that subdivides the main issue into a number of hypothetical subthemes. Each of these is tested for their tenability by means of logic and considerations of probability. If they appear to be (un)tenable, it can be concluded that the main theme is (un)tenable. Thus Palamedes' guilt and Helen's responsibility can be refuted. This method, known as *apagōgē*, is applied by Gorgias in such a way that the speaker begins by enumerating all possible arguments of the case, and subsequently demonstrates the untenability of each and every one. The attractiveness of this strategy lies not only in the fact that in using (quasi-)logical compulsion the main charge is refuted but also that by the enumeration and systematical treatment of all of the potential arguments a sense of completeness can be achieved that reinforces the final conclusion.

The use of argument in this way reflects the acknowledgment that in deciding an issue the role of *doxa* or opinion is crucial. Humankind lives in a contingent world, in which the state of affairs or (lack of) facts alone more often than not is not sufficient to reach a clear decision on an issue. Given these circumstances Gorgias introduces two major features of argumentation in his speeches. First, there is the reasoning on the basis of probability (*eikos*). If decisive proof is lacking, the question of fact or the interpretation of fact depends on criteria of comparison with what the person or persons called upon to judge take to be the case or the state of affairs generally. Their criteria are based on experience and commonly accepted knowledge about human

behaviour, and the expectations they have on the basis of this. Secondly, the unclarity of the issue at hand demands the application of distinctions that can serve as points of departure in the speech. In later rhetoric, four legal defense-strategies were developed, known as *staseis* ('basic positions'): did the accused factually perpetrate the act he is charged with or not, if the act is confessed, how should it be legally defined (e.g., murder, manslaughter, etc.), how should the act be morally estimated (killing a tyrant differs from killing a good king), and are the judges or the court competent to judge the case? Distinctions such as these are, to a certain extent, implied in Gorgias' speeches. They can be viewed as model speeches for two of these basic positions: the mythological *causes célèbres* Palamedes and Helen serve as exemplary cases.

The *Palamedes* deals with the issue of whether or not Palamedes is guilty of high treason. According to myth and literary tradition he was falsely accused by Odysseus and unjustly condemned. Gorgias follows the tradition, but does not allow the judges certainty about the facts: did Palamedes in fact commit the act he is accused of (first *stasis*)? This lack of clarity enables Palamedes to make abundant use of probability. He refutes the argument of financial advantage by pointing out that he is a rich man (15). Similarly he deals with the motifs of honour, self-preservation, friendship and self-interest (16–19). The sequence of arguments seems to be based on a generally accepted view of motifs for human behaviour and an interest in the psychological factors behind them. Gorgias makes use of the existing patterns of expectation with respect to human behaviour in the application of probability.⁷ Furthermore, the didactic purpose of the speech seems reflected by passages such as Section 4, where as part of the introduction Palamedes asks himself questions on how to proceed with his speech: 'Where shall I start? What shall I say first? To what section shall I turn first?' Thus stages of invention (*heuresis*) seem to be understood, such as the need for an effective opening, the selection of potential subject-matter, and an awareness of the different parts of a speech and their functionality.

The *Helen* takes its point of departure from mythological tradition as well. It seems that Helen's responsibility for the Trojan War was part of that tradition: already in the *Iliad* that question is raised (3.164; cf. Euripides, *Troades* 914–1032). It is precisely on this issue, Helen's responsibility (second *stasis*), that Gorgias focuses. The fact itself of Helen being unfaithful to her husband and of sailing to Troy is a given. In the refutation section (6–19) four possible explanations are offered for Helen's departure with the Trojan prince Paris. It was the will of the gods or of fate, she was physically overpowered and abducted, she succumbed to the power of speech, or she was rendered defenseless by the power of love. The latter argument resumes the topic of Helen's beauty in the eulogy section of 3–5, where it is described how it created strong desire in many men and thus became the cause of great things performed by many. The effect of beauty in the strong emotion of *erōs* or desire is now applied to Helen herself, and she becomes exemplary for the irresistible power of beauty and its concomitant effect of desire. Overall the defense is based on the notion of *force majeure*: in all cases Helen was overcome by a superior force and therefore cannot be held responsible for her actions. She does not deserve the bad reputation she has acquired. Finally, at the close of the speech (21) Gorgias seems to suggest that it is not to be taken seriously: 'It was my intention to write the speech as an *encomium* of Helen, and an amusement for myself'. Here Gorgias proves himself to be a true sophist. This ambivalence, in providing the speech with an open end, is typical of the playful intelligence practiced

by the sophists. The mixture of seriousness and playfulness, and the open ending, remind one of Socrates in his aporetic dialogues as portrayed by Plato. Mentioning playfulness does not imply that the speech is reduced to meaningless wordplay. If this game is played earnestly, the fictional case of Helen becomes a valuable exemplary realisation of Gorgias' views on the power of speech. The closing sentence, therefore, is saying that (almost as a prefiguration of postmodern philosophy) the speech is to be taken both seriously and not.⁸

4

One of the four arguments exonerating Helen is that she was persuaded and her mind deceived by speech (*logos*). The spoken word aiming at persuasion switches off the free will of the hearer by aiming at and manipulating his emotions. Persuasion takes the form of deceit: the word used is *apatē*, etymologically 'leading astray'. The term refers to the phenomenon that the hearer, himself notwithstanding, is diverted from his way of thinking and his mind is changed.⁹ In describing the power of speech, which is 'a mighty ruler' (8), Gorgias first points at poetry (*poiēsis*) and its comparable capability of affecting the emotions of an audience because 'into those who hear (poetry) comes fearful fright and tearful pity and mournful longing, and at the successes and failures of the affairs of others and of other persons the mind is affected, through words (*dia tōn logōn*), by a suffering of its own' (9). Furthermore, he compares the healing power of incantations (10), the impact of arguments by astronomers, the contest of speeches as regulated in court, and the suggestive and quick-minded debates of philosophers as instances of the power of speech. The explanation for this extraordinary power lies in the fact that, according to Gorgias, humankind necessarily in most cases has recourse only to belief (*doxa*) to make up its mind (11).¹⁰ But belief or opinion is 'slippery and unreliable' (11) and therefore easily manipulated by speech. It can exercise compulsion on the mind by manipulating the emotions and thus constitutes a superior power.

It seems that in his observations of the power of speech Gorgias also looked at the theatre, where persuasive speech is present and where its emotional effects are obvious. He recognized in dramatic performances, and probably especially in the interactions between characters, a rhetorical situation (to use a modern term) similar to the arena of the lawcourts and the Assembly. His observation is quoted by Pseudo-Plutarch: 'Gorgias said that tragedy is deceit (*apatē*), wherein the one who deceives is more correct than the one who does not deceive, and the one who is deceived is more wise than the one who is not deceived' (*On Listening to the Poets* 15c–d). In another passage, Pseudo-Plutarch uses the same quotation, and adds an explanation, which runs as follows: '... and indeed the one who deceives is more correct, because he does what he promises; and the one who is deceived is more wise, because that which is not insensible is easily carried away by the pleasure of words' (*On the Glory of the Athenians* 348c). The point Gorgias is making, according to Pseudo-Plutarch (probably correctly), is that the audience should hold the illusionary reality of the stage for the time of the performance for a kind of truth. This does not amount to falseness, because both parties involved, poet and audience, voluntarily and consciously partake in the mechanics of the dramatic illusion. The poet produces an illusory reality in which the audience can 'believe'.¹¹

The connecting element between tragedy and rhetoric is *apatē* ('deceit'). The power of speech is irresistible and audiences will submit to it, even if this process does not develop by force. Rather, an audience will succumb to that power willingly, as if under a kind of spell. It is relevant to note that from Homer onwards the enchanting power of rhetoric, as represented by the goddess Peithō, is connected with the power of love. One of the *thelktēria* or charms in the brassière of Aphrodite, the goddess of love, is *oaristus parphasis* or the capacity of gently talking the partner's head off. This capacity of love to 'take over', its irresistible force, receives ambivalent qualifications.¹² To be overcome by love has its positive sides, but the take-over will more often than not result in a deterioration of the person thus affected. At most, being in love is a mixed blessing: in the words of Sappho, *glukupikron* 'bittersweet'.

The magical and enchanting aspect of persuasive speech obviously interested Gorgias a great deal. It seems reasonable to assume that his decision to formulate his doctrine of *apatē* in an *encomium* on Helen, the most beautiful of women and the embodiment of seduction and desire, was a very conscious one. Even though the keyword *apatē* seems to be borrowed from Parmenides in a conscious polemic with his epistemology, it also belongs to the verbal domain of *erōs*. In Sophocles' *Antigone* we encounter the phrase *apata kouphonoōn erōtōn* ('the deceit of blithe and careless desires'), which refers to the cheating of men by desire. Thus, *apatē* also carries a connotation of seduction, and therefore the argument drawn from its power is all the more appropriately exemplified in an apology of Helen.¹³

In search of an illustrative example of *apatē* in the sphere of skillful speech as envisaged by Gorgias, one can refer to the famous speech by Sinon at the gates of Troy, as recounted by Vergil (*Aeneid* 2.57–198).¹⁴ Aeneas tells the story of how the Trojans, after the Greeks have besieged their city for ten years, one day discovered that they had gone. The evident facts as they present themselves to the Trojans are as follows: the Greek ships have departed, there is a giant wooden horse left on the beach, and a Greek, by the name of Sinon, is captured. After being brought before the Trojans, Sinon addresses the Trojans, skillfully using speech. He interprets the obvious facts on behalf of the Trojans. On the basis of the evidence he constructs a plausible whole that plays on the feelings of pity and piety of the Trojans and which will capture their minds, taking over their capacity for judgment. In fact, the ships have not retreated but are in hiding; the horse is a concealed personnel-carrier and not an offering; and Sinon is a Greek operative and not a pitiable refugee. Sinon offers the Trojans an alternative reality, a plausible whole based on skillful speech – cf. Gorgias, *Helen*, 13, 'a single speech pleases and persuades a large crowd because written with skill, not spoken with truth'. Sinon's speech has created an illusion, a separate reality which appeals to the Trojans. As spectators in the theatre, but in this case to their fatal detriment, they believe in this illusion, because their emotions and feelings make them to want to believe. The story of Sinon can be taken to exemplify Gorgias' words that 'speech is a powerful ruler' (*Helen* 8).¹⁵

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Notes

- 1 On whom, see T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6 and M. Edwards, Chapter 5, respectively.
- 2 For references to editions of Gorgias' works, see the Bibliographical Essay at the end of this chapter.
- 3 Arist. *Poetics* 1456 b15; see K.M. Dietz, *Protagoras von Abdera. Untersuchungen zu seinem Denken* (Bonn 1974), pp. 67–69.
- 4 Isoc. *Helen* 12; see T.C. Burgess, 'Epideictic Literature', *Studies in Classical Philology* 3 (1902), pp. 157–166 and R.L. Colie, 'Literary Paradox', in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* 3 (New York: 1973–74), pp. 76–81.

- 5 J.M. Robinson, 'On Gorgias', in E.N. Lee, A.P.D. Mourelatos, and R.M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to Gregory Vlastos* (Assen: 1973), pp. 49–60, especially p. 53.
- 6 Cf. the opening of Plato's *Meno* (71e–72a6) for a similar method, meant as a reference to Gorgias, on the topic of *arête* (excellence); see also Isoc. 9.13–17 for a further example of this heuristic method.
- 7 See also Isoc. 15.217–218 with a motif list for committing injustice and Arist. *Rhet.* 1368 b 26 ff. on motives for criminal behaviour.
- 8 See H.G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode*³ (Tübingen: 1972), pp. 97–105 and J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens. A Study of the Play-Element in Culture* (London: 2000), pp. 146–157.
- 9 W.J. Verdenius, 'Gorgias' Doctrine of Deception', in G.B. Kerferd (ed.), *The Sophists and Their Legacy* (Wiesbaden: 1981), pp. 116–128.
- 10 The notion that opinion (*doxa*) and not knowledge (*epistēmē*) constitutes the highest epistemological level attainable for humankind is more elaborately, and very probably in polemical opposition to the theorizing on knowledge in relation to Being by Parmenides, argued in Gorgias' *On Nature, or On what is not*.
- 11 For a full treatment of Gorgias' notion of dramatic 'deceit' see J.A.E. Bons, 'Plutarch as Source for Early Greek Rhetoric: The Case of Gorgias FRG. 23 DK', in L. de Blois, J.A.E. Bons, T. Kessels and Dirk M. Schenkeveld (eds.), *The Statesman in Plutarch's Works. Proceedings of the 6th Conference of the International Plutarch Society 1* (Leiden: 2004), pp. 237–248.
- 12 A. Carson, *Eros the Bittersweet* (Princeton: 1986), pp. 48–49, 147–150.
- 13 See Bons, 'Plutarch as Source for Early Greek Rhetoric', pp. 247–248 with n. 14; cf. J. Porter, 'The Seductions of Gorgias', *Cl.Antiq.* 12 (1993), pp. 267–299.
- 14 The following analysis is based on R. Moss, 'The Case for sophistry', in B. Vickers (ed.), *Rhetoric Revalued. Papers from the International Society for the History of Rhetoric* (Binghamton: 1982), pp. 207–224, especially p. 210.
- 15 I am grateful to Rice University (Houston, Texas), where, as the Autry Visiting Professor of Classics for the Fall Semester 2005, I had the opportunity to work on this chapter. I have taken my 'Gorgias en de Retorica', published in *Gorgias. Het woord is een Machtig Heerser. Vertaald door Vincent Hunink, ingeleid door Jeroen Bons, nawoord van Jaap Mansfeld* (Groningen: 1996), pp. 7–38, as the basis for my contribution.

CHAPTER FIVE

Alcidamas

Michael Edwards

Few details of the life of Alcidamas survive, and those that do are found in much later sources.¹ Alcidamas, son of Diocles, was born in Elaea in Asia Minor and studied under Gorgias. He became a sophist himself and will have been active in this capacity in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, perhaps down until c. 369 (the apparent date of his *Messenian Speech*). His works indicate an intense rivalry with another of Gorgias' pupils, Isocrates, and this, together with the questionable report that he taught Aeschines,² suggests that he was no different from the many other sophists who found themselves a lucrative source of income in Athens. But if the man himself had little impact on the historical record of ancient Greece, his writings and teachings certainly did.

Two works survive under the name of Alcidamas, *On Those who Write Written Speeches*, or *On Sophists* and *Odysseus, Against the Treachery of Palamedes*. Of these *On Sophists* is by far the more important – and controversial. Written in c. 390, it is difficult to categorise, but seems to be a kind of prospectus for his teaching methods.³ The basic argument is that speeches, whether in the Assembly or the law-court, are far more effective if delivered extemporaneously rather than from a prepared text (*On Sophists* 9):

I also think that in human life speaking is always useful in every matter, whereas only occasionally does the ability to write prove opportune. For who does not know that public speakers and litigants in court and those engaged in private discussions must necessarily speak extemporaneously? Often events unexpectedly present opportunities, and at these times those who are silent will appear contemptible, whereas we observe that those who speak are held in honor by others for having a god-like intelligence.⁴

This passage and the work as a whole need to be read with various contextual factors in mind. Athens in the early fourth century remained predominantly an oral society, and the ability to read and write was generally far less valued than the ability to speak:

Plato famously criticises writing in the *Phaedrus* (274b–277a).⁵ Alcidas' teacher Gorgias was renowned for never being at a loss for something to say (Arist. *Rhet.* 3.17.11), and various facets of Gorgias' teaching are evident in Alcidas: the doctrines of the 'opportune' (*kairos*; cf. in the passage above 'often events unexpectedly present opportunities') and the 'fitting' (*prepon*; cf. *On Sophists* 3, 'using appropriate language'⁶), and techniques of speaking at length (*makrologia*) or briefly (*brachylogia*; cf. *On Sophists* 23). The reference to 'god-like intelligence' further recalls Gorgias' 'speech achieves the most divine feats' (*Helen* 8). But Gorgias, who takes balanced antithesis to its extremes in his writing, also therein reflects another development in public speaking from the second half of the fifth century, the use of written speeches, often composed by a professional logographer. Usually, it seems, these were memorised, and to what extent (and in what form) written texts would have been taken into a courtroom or the Assembly as an *aide-mémoire* is very unclear.⁷ Alcidas naturally makes fun of the whole idea (*On Sophists* 11):

And surely it would be ridiculous if, when the herald calls out, 'what citizen wishes to address the meeting?' or when the water-clock is running in court, the speaker should turn to his writing tablet (*grammateion*), intending to compose and then memorize his speech!

Either way, it is the mere fact of close preparation in advance that Alcidas rejects, because men with the ability of a Gorgias both to prepare carefully and to speak extemporaneously were rare (*On Sophists* 16):

For when someone is accustomed to crafting every detail of his speeches, and composing every phrase with precision and attention to rhythm, and perfecting his expression with slow and deliberate thought, it is inevitable that, when he turns to extemporaneous speeches and does the opposite of what he is accustomed to do, his mind will be filled with uncertainty and confusion, he will be annoyed at everything, he will speak like someone with an impairment, and will never regain the easy use of his native wit or speak with fluent and engaging speeches.

While the first part of this sentence, itself quite long and carefully crafted, might be taken to refer to the highly intricate and artificial style of Gorgias,⁸ there is another candidate that Alcidas may have in mind and on whom the second half equally seems to be an oblique attack. Alcidas' rival Isocrates repeatedly admits to having neither the voice nor the self-confidence to make a career from public speaking himself,⁹ and it is Isocrates in particular that Alcidas seems to be attacking in *On Sophists*, right from the start (*On Sophists* 1):

Some of those who are called sophists are not concerned with inquiry (*historia*) or general education (*paideia*), and they are just as inexperienced in the practice of speaking as ordinary men; but they are proud and boastful about their practice of writing speeches and displaying their own intelligence through their books. Though they possess only a small degree of rhetorical ability, they lay claim to the whole profession (*technē*).

It should be noted at once that Alcidas does not name Isocrates, and the same is true in reverse of Isocrates in his *Against the Sophists*. Nevertheless, there are too many overlaps between the two works for there to be any real doubt that they are rival

manifestos. Whether one is an answer to the other, or whether there was a sequence of Isocrates' works (the *Helen* and *Panegyricus* in addition to the *Against the Sophists*) into which Alcidamas' pamphlet can be fitted, has been the subject of much inconclusive scholarship.¹⁰

There is, of course, a certain amount of irony in the fact that Alcidamas promotes extemporaneous speaking in a written pamphlet. He was well aware of this (*On Sophists* 29–32) and in Thucydidean fashion candidly admits to writing speeches 'because I am eager to leave behind a memorial of myself and wish to gratify this ambition' (*On Sophists* 32; cf. Thuc. 1.22.4). By the end of the pamphlet his position on writing seems to have softened a little, partly because he must have known (or at least feared) that the trend towards written composition was irreversible, partly because he needed to advertise his skills, and partly because he wrote epideictic speeches himself (*On Sophists* 31).¹¹ The one that survives (though it is couched in the form of a forensic speech) is the *Odysseus*. Alcidamas' teacher Gorgias had demonstrated his skills at argument by writing imaginary defences of two notorious figures from Greek mythology, Helen of Troy and Palamedes. Palamedes was renowned for his intelligence and like other clever figures in myth (notably Odysseus himself) brought trouble on himself, in his case by seeing through Odysseus' ruse of feigning insanity to avoid joining the Trojan expedition. In revenge Odysseus planted a sum of gold in Palamedes' tent and accused him of treason, and Palamedes was tried and executed. Alcidamas' imaginary prosecution speech for Odysseus will doubtless have been written as a response to his master's defence of Palamedes, and he perhaps demonstrates his own ingenuity by changing the story: the main evidence against the alleged traitor is now a Trojan arrow bearing a message from Paris with the promise of Cassandra as his wife (*Odysseus* 7).¹² The argumentation of the two speeches is also very different.

Gorgias' method in both the *Helen* and the *Palamedes* is to test a series of hypotheses from every angle, thereby demonstrating that they are unsustainable. He makes extensive use of rhetorical questions and probability (*eikos*) argument, and the style is heavily antithetical. Alcidamas concentrates on character assassination (*diabolē*). This reflects a trend in the oratory of the fourth century which becomes far more noticeable in the speeches of Isaeus, and which reached its peak (or trough) in the hands of orators such as Demosthenes and Dinarchus. In the absence of the non-technical proof (*atechnos pistis*) that would clinch his case, i.e., the arrow, Odysseus is first made to produce witnesses to the suspiciously long message that the arrow was alleged to bear (*Odysseus* 7–8):

I was astounded at this development, and calling Sthenelus and Diomedes I showed them the contents. The writing read as follows: 'Alexander to Palamedes. You shall have everything you and Telephus agreed on, and my father will give you Cassandra for your wife, just as you asked. But see to it that you fulfill your part of the bargain quickly.' That is what was written. Now those who handled the bow should come forth and testify.

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I would have also shown you the arrow itself, just as it really was, but in the confusion Teucer unknowingly shot it.

But most of his speech is devoted to an attack on Palamedes' family background (which explains his connection with Telephus mentioned in the passage above) and his own treacherous nature (*Odysseus* 20–21):

Palamedes persuaded Cinyras not to join our expedition, and sailed off with the many gifts Cinyras had given him. He gave Agamemnon only a bronze breastplate, worth nothing, but kept the rest of the money himself. In his report he said Cinyras would send a hundred ships, but you yourselves have seen that not a single ship has arrived from him. I think this too would be sufficient justification for putting him to death – if it is right to punish this sophist, who has clearly been plotting the most disgraceful acts against his friends.

Odysseus goes on to demolish Palamedes' claims to have invented military strategy, the letters of the alphabet, music, numbers and coinage; but at *Odysseus* 27 he allows him credit for inventing

weights and measures, which let store-keepers and traders cheat and swear false oaths, and draughts so that idle men could quarrel and bicker; and he showed people how to play dice, the greatest evil, which results in pain and punishment for those who lose and ridicule and criticism for those who win; for the winnings from dice games bring no benefit, since most of the proceeds are spent immediately. And he also contrived fire-beacons, but these worked to our detriment (as he intended) and to the advantage of the enemy.¹³

The attack reaches a climax with the clever reversal of a standard expectation of Greek social behaviour (*Odysseus* 28):

Now, for a man to have *aretē* he must pay attention to his leaders, follow orders, serve the whole community, conduct himself as a good man in every respect, and help his friends and harm his enemies. This man's abilities are the opposite of all these: he helps the enemy and harms his friends.¹⁴

Alcidamas, it has been suggested, will have written the *Odysseus*, like *On Sophists*, at least in part to advertise his skills. But, with reference to the later five-part division of rhetoric, whereas *On Sophists* is concerned primarily with delivery (*hypokrisis*) and presupposes the importance of memory (*mnēmē*), the *Odysseus*, being modelled on a forensic speech, demonstrates a much greater awareness in its author of the need for proper arrangement (*taxis*). Alcidamas does not, however, adhere to a simple four-part structure, but displays the versatility in his arrangement that is also a feature in the first half of the fourth century of the speeches of Isaeus.¹⁵ The *Odysseus* may be schematised as follows:

1–4	proem
5–7	first narrative
8–12	confirmatory proofs
12–21	second narrative
22–28	refutatory proofs
29	epilogue

With regard to a fourth part of rhetoric, invention (*heuresis*), Alcidamas also displays his acquaintance with what was expected in each of these major sections of the speech. Commonplace elements of proems visible here include the claim to be acting for the common good rather than from private enmity (a vital declaration for a prosecutor in order to avoid the accusation of sykophancy); a statement of the charge; a preliminary

warning to the jurors of the opponent's cleverness, in contrast to the speaker's being 'a good and just man' (*Odysseus* 3); and a request for the jurors to listen attentively and without prejudice. The narrative is told in a clear, straightforward manner and is followed in regular fashion by witnesses, leading into a first section of proofs. Odysseus' evidence is, in truth, largely circumstantial, and he covers over its weaknesses by making bold, unsubstantiated claims ('before ... no one noticed any sign on Palamedes' shield; but when we had sailed to this place, he inscribed a trident on it'; 'my claim is that it [his spear] too had writing on it, stating the precise time when he would betray us'; 'everyone else abided by this decision, but ...'). These are backed up (as in Gorgias) by probability argument ('a likely explanation', *Odysseus* 10) and rhetorical questions. His main weapon, as noted above, is an attack on Palamedes' character, and a standard method of impugning a man's reputation in oratory was to attack him indirectly over his parentage, hence the second narrative begins with the story of Palamedes' unreliable father Nauplius (*Odysseus* 12–16). This explains Palamedes' connection with his Trojan contact Telephus, but Odysseus, true to form, is perhaps starting to wander off course, and he brings himself back to the point with an aside to the jurors in the form of a question, 'All right, so what happens then?' (*Odysseus* 18). The allegation of Palamedes' treachery on his mission to Cinyras is the starting-point for Odysseus' direct character-assassination, and it leads immediately in the second set of proofs to the accusation that Palamedes' reputation for cleverness was based on false claims about both the number and the benefits of his inventions. The epilogue, finally, is a standard one in its brevity and content – the plea that the jurors not be swayed by pity for the defendant, and that it was in their own best interests to condemn Palamedes because an acquittal would encourage others to act in the same way.

The *Odysseus* is a reasonably competent example of how to make the best out of what (at least in the version of the story selected or invented by Alcidamas) seems a weak case. It has not, however, found many admirers, and one of the reasons for this is doubtless connected with that other very important part of rhetoric, its style (*lexis*). It is also the style of the piece that has led many scholars to conclude that the *Odysseus* was not written by Alcidamas, and it is certainly the case that the style of the *Odysseus* is very different from that of the *On Sophists*. We shall return to this presently, but for now, on the question of authenticity, it is worth noting the point made by Muir that the two works do not belong to the same genre and have very different characters.¹⁶ In addition, as Muir observes, the *Odysseus* was apparently accepted as being genuine by Quintilian when he writes (even though in error) 'Alcidamas of Elaea, whom Plato calls Palamedes' (Quint. 3.1.10);¹⁷ the extended description of Palamedes' family background includes stories that would have been familiar to inhabitants of Elaea, and the inclusion of Menestheus at *Odysseus* 23, who is not elsewhere mentioned in connection with military tactics, may be significant, because he was the legendary founder of Elaea;¹⁸ and, perhaps more tenuously, the author's technical knowledge of minting coins (*Odysseus* 26) may be reflected in the use of the metaphor *antitypos* ('the other side of the coin') in *On Sophists* 6,¹⁹ while there are musical metaphors in both pieces.²⁰

On Sophists and *Odysseus* clearly reflect only a small proportion of Alcidamas' output. Much of this, one would expect, will have been concerned with rhetoric: Dionysius of Halicarnassus names Alcidamas among a list of contemporary writers of rhetorical handbooks (*First Letter to Ammaeus* 2), and Quintilian (3.1.10) likewise

claims that Alcidamas composed such a work. If they are correct, it may be that the handbook was the source of Alcidamas' fourfold classification of language into assertion, denial, question and address,²¹ and also of his definition of dialectic as 'the capacity for persuasion'.²² Speeches will have featured prominently among his works, mostly we may presume (given Alcidamas' promotion of extemporaneous speaking in the Assembly and law-courts) display pieces along the lines of the *Odysseus*. In late antiquity John Tzetzes had speeches written by him (*Chiliades* 11.740–742), and we know the titles of some. The *Messenian Speech* has already been mentioned, of which we have two notices in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. At *Rhetoric* 1.13.2 Aristotle merely mentions the speech, and the relevant quotation is supplied by the Scholiast ('God has left all men free; nature has made no one a slave');²³ but at *Rhetoric* 2.23.1 Aristotle himself gives the quotation, 'for if war is the cause of the present troubles, with peace they must be righted'. The speech may have been a real one, delivered after the liberation of Messenia from the Spartans in 369, but it could just as well be an exercise composed some time later. Alcidamas likewise exhibited his talents for virtuoso display in four other known speeches: there was an *Encomium of Death* (Cic. *Tusculan Disputations* 1.48.116), as well as encomia *On Proteus the Dog* and *On Poverty* (Menander Rhetor, *Division of Epideictic Speeches* 3.346.9–18), and *On Nais*, a well-known courtesan (Athenaeus 13.592c).²⁴

Speeches on paradoxical topics such as these were the forerunners of later rhetorical exercises. But the *Mouseion*, from its title,²⁵ shows that Alcidamas had other strings to his bow. The precise nature of the book remains controversial,²⁶ and scholars have split into two camps since Nietzsche advanced the proposition that another work, the *Contest between Homer and Hesiod*, was originally by Alcidamas and part of the *Mouseion*.²⁷ The version of the *Contest* that we have dates to the second century AD,²⁸ but support for Nietzsche's thesis came when a papyrus fragment of the work dating to the third century BC was published in 1891, which contains two lines that are in the Hadrianic version and were quoted by Stobaeus (4.52.22):

To begin, it is best not to be born with those upon the earth,
But, being born, to pass the gates of Hades as swiftly as you may (trans. Muir).

It also has lines 70–101, but these are not identical to those in the later version. A second papyrus from the second or early third century AD and published in 1925 offers further support.²⁹ This contains lines that are similar (but again not identical) to the end of the Hadrianic *Contest* (lines 1–14 of this Michigan papyrus correspond to *Contest* 327–338 Allen), and it ends with an adscript and a subscription with most of Alcidamas' name preserved:³⁰

On this subject, then, we shall try to make our reputation,³¹ especially since we see the admiration given to writers of history. Homer, at least, because of this, both in life and death has been honoured by all men. So, publishing this to thank him for his entertainment, let us with precise recollection hand down the story of his birth and the rest of his poetry to those Greeks who aspire to cultivated taste. Alcidamas, *On Homer* (trans. Muir).

A further argument is that the Hadrianic text quotes Alcidamas as the source for a version of the death of Hesiod's murderers (*Contest* 239–240 Allen). But, as Muir observes,³² the lines quoted by Stobaeus are found in Theognis and the same

sentiments occur in other texts, therefore Alcidamas' authorship is uncertain and the fact that they are found in the *Contest* does not prove that the *Contest* was part of the *Mouseion*. Again with Muir, the very citation of Alcidamas as the source of one version of the death of Hesiod's murderers may in fact suggest that he was *not* the author of the *Contest*; and (as with the differences in the wording of the endings of the second papyrus and the Hadrianic *Contest*) the linking sections in the earlier papyrus between the quotations from Homer and Hesiod are by no means identical with those in the Hadrianic *Contest*. It is therefore possible, with Muir, that the compiler/re-writer of the Hadrianic *Contest* did use Alcidamas as a source, found in the *Mouseion* the couplet quoted by Stobaeus, and also found either in the *Mouseion* or in another work the material on Homer – and that that is as far as we can go. But adherents to the principle of Occam's razor will doubtless wish to go much farther.

Whether or not the *Contest* formed part of the *Mouseion*, the question remains open as to the overall character of the work. If, as is likely from its title, it was a collection of some kind, the *Mouseion* may have contained biographies of literary giants such as Homer and Hesiod. Alcidamas also wrote a treatise on *Physics*, and this too may have contained biographies of eminent pre-Socratic philosophers (Diogenes Laertius 8.56, where Zeno and Empedocles are named).³³ His later followers supposedly debated Stoic philosophy.³⁴ The *Mouseion* and the *Physics* are indicators of Alcidamas' versatility, such as we might expect of a sophist, and the fact that Aristotle in the third book of the *Rhetoric* repeatedly criticises Alcidamas' style is an indicator of his influence as a writer (see below). Later readers of Alcidamas included Cicero and Quintilian (see above),³⁵ and the image of prisoners being released from chains (*On Sophists* 17), which may in part have been inspired by the allegory of the Cave in Plato's *Republic* (514a–517a), was adopted by the author of the pseudo-Plutarchan *On the Education of Children* ([Plut.], *Moralia* 6c–f).

At *Rhetoric* 3.3 Aristotle quotes some nineteen phrases of Alcidamas to illustrate his 'frigidity' of style, which was caused by the use of compound words, such as 'fire-coloured'; strange or foreign words, such as 'whetted with the unmitigated rage of his intellect'; epithets, such as 'the laws, the kings of states'; and inappropriate metaphor, such as the *Odyssey* being 'a beautiful mirror of human life'. Aristotle's criticisms essentially concern the use of overly poetic and artificial language; a more thorough survey of Alcidamas' style in *On Sophists* was undertaken by O'Sullivan.³⁶ He rightly emphasises the striking use of abstract nouns, which appear at every turn. These are employed in periphrastic expressions, such as in the very first section of the piece: 'make a criticism of' (*katēgorian poiēsasthai*) written speeches, rather than simply 'criticise' (*katēgorēsai*) them. Such substantival periphrases are characteristic of early Greek prose (they are common in Herodotus, Antiphon and Thucydides), but they are far more concentrated in *On Sophists* and contribute to the 'poetic' effect of the writing. Frequently the abstract noun is the subject of a verb of action, and this further feature of poetry and early prose writing is especially common in Gorgias. Again, the abstract noun is often used in conjunction with a word denoting mental activity of some kind, as in the quotation above from the *Rhetoric* ('whetted with the unmitigated rage of his intellect'). All these features contribute to the feeling of redundancy that Aristotle criticised, a trait which Alcidamas shares with Gorgias.³⁷ The use of double and rare words is also a Gorgianic feature, but it is noticeable that there are fewer of these in *On Sophists* than Aristotle's criticism would lead us to

expect.³⁸ There are, on the other hand, plenty of metaphorical expressions, another Gorgianic feature: for example, the mirror imagery noted above in Aristotle recurs in *On Sophists* 32.³⁹ Finally, O'Sullivan detects 'a pervasive sententiousness' in the speech, which its abstract style helps to highlight, but which is a feature of sophistic literature, including Gorgias. It is unfortunate that O'Sullivan largely ignores the *Odysseus*,⁴⁰ since the stylistic differences between the two works might be given other explanations than different authorship: possibly the generic difference between the two pieces noted above might serve as a basis for a comparison along the lines of 'written' and 'spoken' styles that O'Sullivan himself discusses at length.⁴¹ But briefly, Muir points out that there are certain stylistic features that are far more frequent in *On Sophists* than the *Odysseus*, such as unusual words, clumsy sentence construction, double-negated adjectives and adverbs, and a tendency to avoid hiatus and asyndeton.⁴² This last tendency, Muir observes, 'actually seems to go against the general tendency for the *Odysseus* to appear more carefully composed' than *On Sophists*. Yet it may just be another reflection of the Alcidas–Isocrates rivalry. There was no more careful composer of speeches than Demosthenes, but the finest of all the orators does not go to the extremes of avoiding hiatus that Isocrates does: perhaps Alcidas' *Odysseus* was, after all, a model not to be sneered at by the practising orator.

Bibliographical Essay

The Greek text of Alcidas is available in various editions, including F. Blass, *Antiphontis Orationes et Fragmenta* (Leipzig: 1881), L. Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores* (Vienna: 1951), G. Avezzi, *Alcidamante: Orazioni e Frammenti* (Rome: 1982), and J.V. Muir, *Alcidas: The Works and Fragments* (London: 2001). Translations into English of both speeches may be found in M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff (eds.), *Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists* (Cambridge: 1995), pp. 276–289. For the fragments, J.V. Muir, *Alcidas* (cited above), is essential; his translation of the speeches is more literal than that of Gagarin and Woodruff, and better reflects some of the stylistic features of Alcidas' Greek. Translations of *On Sophists* are also available in P. Matson, R. Rollinson and M. Sousa (eds.), *Readings from Classical Rhetoric* (Carbondale, Ill: 1990), pp. 38–42 and (less accessible) L. van Hook, 'Alcidas Versus Isocrates', *Classical Weekly* 12 (1919), pp. 89–94. Avezzi's edition has an Italian translation, and there is a fine translation into Dutch of, with brief commentary on, *On Sophists* by J.A.E. Bons, 'Schrijven is Silver, Spreken is Goud', *Lampas* 31 (1998), pp. 219–241. The main commentary in English on Alcidas is that of J.V. Muir, *Alcidas* (cited above). Another essential discussion, though with its focus on Alcidas' style it requires a good knowledge of Greek (which is not translated), is N. O'Sullivan, *Alcidas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory* (Stuttgart: 1992). Various other studies are mentioned in my notes, and in English see in addition H.L. Hudson-Williams, 'Political Speeches in Athens', *CQ*² 1 (1951), pp. 68–73, D.M. MacDowell, 'Gorgias, Alcidas and the Cripps and Palatine Manuscripts', *CQ*² 11 (1961), pp. 113–124 and M.J. Milne, *A Study in Alcidas and his Relation to Contemporary Sophistic* (Diss. Bryn Mawr: 1924). There are various important studies which require knowledge of other languages, most notably the recent commentary on *On Sophists* by R. Mariss,

Alcidamas: über diejenigen, die schriftliche Reden schreiben, oder über die sophisten (Münster: 2002). See also H. Auer, *De Alcidamantis declamatione quae inscribitur Odysseus kata Palamēdēs prodosias* (Diss. Münster: 1913), K. Barwick, 'Die "Rhetorik ad Alexandrum"' und Anaximenes, Alcidamas, Isokrates, Aristoteles und die Theodekteia', *Philologus* 110 (1966), pp. 212–245, M. Lavency, *Aspects de la Logographie Judiciaire Attique* (Louvain: 1964), F. Solmsen, 'Drei Rekonstruktionen zur antiken Rhetorik und Poetik', *Hermes* 67 (1932), pp. 133–144, and G. Walberer, *Isokrates und Alcidamas* (Diss. Hamburg: 1938).

Notes

- 1 Cf. Dion. Hal. *Isaeus* 19, Athenaeus 13.592c, *Suda* 1.117, 535.
- 2 *Suda* 2.184, Photius, *Bibliotheca*, cod. 61, p. 20a40–42 (Photius' text actually reads 'Antalcidas' rather than 'Alcidamas', but this looks like a corruption). Among those who doubt that Aeschines studied rhetoric is G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), p. 237.
- 3 See, e.g., J.V. Muir, *Alcidamas: The Works and Fragments* (London: 2001), p. xiii. For a full discussion of *On Sophists* as a form of critique (*katēgoria*, *On Sophists* 1) against written speeches, see Y.Z. Liebersohn, 'Alcidamas' *On the Sophists*: A Reappraisal', *Eranos* 97 (1999), pp. 108–124. Liebersohn offers a complex arrangement (*taxis*) of the speech, and proposes that Alcidamas was writing for two different categories of reader: the ordinary reader, who would simply read the work as a *katēgoria*, and the educated reader, who would not fall into the trap of believing that the work was spontaneous, but would detect the methodical thinking that lay behind its composition.
- 4 I give the translations of M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff (eds.), *Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists* (Cambridge: 1995), pp. 276–289, for both works, though they do not always fully reflect the nuances of Alcidamas' Greek.
- 5 There seem to be clear echoes of Plato in *On Sophists* 27–28.
- 6 But note that the Greek here has *ton prosēkonta* ('appropriate') rather than *to prepon* ('fitting').
- 7 Pericles was supposedly the first to give a written speech in court (*Suda* 4.100), but this tradition is suspect and probably confused with that concerning Antiphon.
- 8 As Muir, *Alcidamas*, p. 53.
- 9 Cf. Isoc. 5.81, 12.9–11, *Letter* 8.7. The Greek word *ischnophōnōn*, translated in *On Sophists* 16 as 'with an impairment' by Gagarin and Woodruff, can also mean 'with a weak voice'.
- 10 For a full discussion see N. O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory* (Stuttgart: 1992), pp. 23–31. He later concludes (p. 79) that their rivalry 'was as much stylistic as anything else'.
- 11 Further on this change in Alcidamas' stance, see Muir, *Alcidamas*, p. 66.
- 12 This version may, of course, have derived from another source now lost, such as a play: see Muir, *Alcidamas*, p. xvi, with n. 51.
- 13 In Gorgias, *Palamedes* 30, Palamedes claims to have invented military tactics, written laws, writing, weights and measures, numbers, beacons and draughts.
- 14 Alcidamas perhaps responds to Gorgias, *Palamedes* 18.
- 15 Note this second interesting parallel with Isaeus, after the character assassination discussed above.
- 16 Muir, *Alcidamas*, p. xvii.
- 17 Plato (*Phaedrus* 261d) was referring to the 'Eleatic Palamedes', i.e., Zeno of Elea.

- 18 Cf. Strabo 13.3.5, Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. *Elaia*.
- 19 The translation of Gagarin and Woodruff ('a severe obstacle') does not bring out this metaphor.
- 20 'Being at full stretch' (*syntonian*, *On Sophists* 24) and 'discordant' (*diaphōnon*, *On Sophists* 25); 'sows discord', literally 'makes a false note' (*plēmmelei*, *Odysseus* 2). Again, the first and last of these metaphorical usages are not brought out in the Gagarin and Woodruff translation.
- 21 Cf. Diog. Laert. 9.54, *Suda* 4.247, Tzetzes, *Chiliades* 12.561–562.
- 22 Cf. H. Rabe (ed.), *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig: 1931), p. 192, lines 10–11. Strictly, this definition is attributed to his followers (see below).
- 23 Cf. H. Rabe (ed.), *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin: 1896), xxi.2 p. 74.
- 24 This discussion assumes that Menander does actually refer to separate speeches *On Proteus* and *On Poverty* written by Alcidas. The text may, however, refer to a treatise *On Poverty* by Proteus the Cynic.
- 25 Literally, 'shrine of the Muses', i.e., connected with art and letters.
- 26 Various suggestions have been made, such as that it was a philosophical work and the *On Sophists* formed its preface: see, e.g., N.J. Richardson, 'The Contest of Homer and Hesiod and Alcidas' *Mouseion*', *CQ* 31 (1981), pp. 1–10 and Muir, *Alcidas*, p. xix.
- 27 See F. Nietzsche, 'Der Florentinische Tractat über Homer und Hesiod, ihr Geschlecht und ihren Wettkampf', *RhM* 25 (1870), pp. 528–540 and 28 (1873), pp. 211–249, O'Sullivan, *Alcidas*, pp. 63–105, and Muir, *Alcidas*, pp. xix–xx.
- 28 It contains a reference to the emperor Hadrian at line 33: T.W. Allen (ed.), *Homeri Opera* 5 (Oxford: 1946) – hereafter Allen.
- 29 For the two papyri, see J.P. Mahaffy (ed.), *Flinders Petrie Papyri* (Dublin: 1891), 1.70 no. 25, J.G. Winter, 'A New Fragment on the Life of Homer', *TAPA* 56 (1925), pp. 120–129 (Univ. Michigan Pap. 2754). Winter assumes that the *Mouseion* was a collection of rhetorical exercises for school purposes, the source of the passages criticised by Aristotle in *Rhetoric* 3.
- 30 Against the linguistic arguments that the end of the *Contest* on the second papyrus militates against Alcidas' authorship, see the thorough stylistic analyses of R. Renehan, 'The Michigan Alcidas-Papyrus: A Problem in Methodology', *HSCP* 75 (1971), pp. 85–105 and his *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen: 1975), pp. 144–159; *contra* Muir, *Alcidas*, p. xx. For the earlier position that Lines 1–14 and 15–25 of the papyrus were originally separate texts, see G.S. Kirk, 'The Michigan Alcidas-Papyrus; Heraclitus Fr. 56D; the Riddle of the Lice', *CQ* 44 (1950), pp. 149–167, E.R. Dodds, 'The Alcidas-Papyrus Again', *CQ* 2 (1952), pp. 187–188, G.L. Koniaris, 'Michigan Papyrus 2754 and the *Certamen*', *HSCP* 75 (1971), pp. 107–129; before Renehan, doubts were raised by M.L. West, 'The Contest of Homer and Hesiod', *CQ* 17 (1967), pp. 433–450.
- 31 Recalling *On Sophists* 32 (see above).
- 32 Muir, *Alcidas*, pp. xix–xx.
- 33 See D. O'Brien, 'The Relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles', *JHS* 88 (1968), pp. 93–113, at pp. 94–96.
- 34 See Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, p. 192.
- 35 Cicero (*Tusculan Disputations* 1.48.116) praises Alcidas as being 'an ancient rhetorician of the first distinction' (*rhetor antiquus in primis nobilis*).
- 36 *Alcidas*, pp. 32–42.
- 37 But pleonasm is to be expected in an orator, especially one claiming that written texts 'are like images or outlines or representations of speeches' (*On Sophists* 27). Note in this expression the grouping into three that is very common in oratory.

- 38 For example, in *On Sophists* 7 *homodramein* ('to keep pace with'), which is both a double word and a *hapax legomenon*.
- 39 Given that Alcidamas was promoting extemporaneous speaking, it is hardly surprising that he should make extensive use of metaphor: as S. Usher points out in his review of O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas*, striking imagery was a key feature of the deliberative oratory of Pericles: *CR* 43 (1993), pp. 436–437.
- 40 It is dismissed in a footnote as 'attributed to Alcidamas' (p. 90 n. 161).
- 41 *Alcidamas*, pp. 42–62.
- 42 See Muir, *Alcidamas*, p. xxi. An example of double-negated adjectives may be found in *On Sophists* 8, 'it is not hard to demonstrate (*ouk adēlon*) ... it is not hard to see (*ouk aphanēs*)'. Again, the Gagarin and Woodruff translation does not reflect this stylistic feature.

CHAPTER SIX

Isocrates

Terry L. Papillon

Toward the end of his life, Isocrates wrote a letter to Alexander, son of Philip II of Macedon. Isocrates speaks to Alexander, fourteen years old at the time, concerning the boy's education (under Aristotle), his values, and his future prospects (*Letter 5*):

When I was writing a letter to your father, I thought that it would be odd if I did not address you – since you are in the same region as he – or greet you, or write something to you that might make those who read it think that I have not already passed my mental prime because of my old age, or that I ramble a lot, but rather that the part of my ability that remains is quite worthy of the power I had when I was young. I hear everyone saying that you are kind toward others (*philanthropos*), a friend to Athens (*philathenaios*), and a man of learning (*philosophos*), not thoughtlessly but reasonably. Moreover, you do not receive any of our citizens who neglect their affairs and pursue base goals, but only those with whom you would not regret spending time and who would not cause you any harm or do you wrong, should you join together with them and share in their activities – just the sort of people with whom those who are sensible should associate. As regards philosophies, you do not reject eristic, but think that it gives you an advantage in private discussions; nonetheless you do not think it is appropriate for the leaders in a democracy or for those who hold a monarchy, since it is not advantageous or proper for people of superior intelligence to engage in eristic with fellow citizens, or to allow others to contradict them. And so you do not embrace this activity (*diatribē*), but prefer an education (*paideia*) involved with discourses (*logoi*) that we use to conduct our daily affairs and deliberate about public matters. Through this education you will know (*epistēsei*) how to make reasonable judgments (*doxazein*) about the future and direct your subjects intelligently about what each should do. You will know how to make the right decision about what is noble and just and their opposites and in addition reward or punish each group as it is fitting. Therefore you are wise to be practicing this (*meletōn*), for you give your father and the others hope that should you continue this education as you become older, you will surpass others in practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) in the future as much as your father has thus far surpassed all others.¹

This letter, though quite brief, presents many of the ideas characteristic of Isocrates: his connection to great persons of the period (Philip, Alexander, Demosthenes, Plato, Aristotle), his interest in education, his questioning of the teachers of his day, his interest in current political questions, his self-consciousness, his philosophical ideas, and his interest in an appropriately elaborate and Gorgianic prose.

Of the many works ascribed to Isocrates in antiquity, thirty are extant: six law court speeches, fifteen public discourses² (*politikoi logoi*),³ and nine letters. The six judicial speeches include *Against Euthynus* (21, of 403), *Against Callimachus* (18, of 402), *On the Team of Horses*, interesting because of its connection with Alcibiades and his family (16, of 397), *Against Lochites* (20, of 394), *Trapeziticus* (17, of 393), and finally the *Aegineticus* (19, of 391). These speeches show the normal range of judicial questions: inheritance (19), ownership (16), counter-suits (18), banking (17, 21), and assault (20).

The *Aegineticus* spurs interest because the opponent is a woman, though males near her bring the accusation on her behalf as is normal in a Greek court. It has a vivid narrative about non-aristocratic Greeks being forced to wander from city to city, island to island, coping with rebellions, disease, death, and a femme fatale. The story engages our imagination. It is sometimes considered the best Isocratean example of judicial oratory. This speech shows the parts of an oration: a clever opening use of conventions, a double narrative (introduced clearly with the phrase ‘I will begin to make a narrative’), strong argumentation using both logical points and evidence from legal texts as well as ethical argument based on his longstanding relationship with the deceased, refutation of his opponent, and a compelling peroration that sums up the arguments and inspires the jury. Usher points out that the speech is a model of judicial argumentation.⁴

Thus we have six judicial speeches (16–21), but Isocrates claimed in the *Antidosis* that he never practiced the profession of logography (15.36–38). His claim can be taken as evidence for two possibilities: first, that he was embarrassed by his earlier profession and lied about it (or downplayed it) and second that he never worked as a logographer, in spite of the evidence of the speeches. No one thinks that Isocrates presented the *Antidosis* in a court for a real case; must we think that Isocrates wrote the six speeches for actual clients? Though he speaks ill of law court speeches, teaching it may have been part of his early career, for the kind of activity that Demosthenes ascribes to Isocrates’ pupil Lacritus indicates his school’s curriculum included topics such as loans (35.15). Could they have been example speeches as many of his other speeches might have been? *Against Euthynus*, for example, could be an example of how to argue with *eikota* or probability. *On the Team of Horses* might show how to use *ethos* as an argument. Many of these speeches are fragmentary and may be partial specifically because they were used to show a particular type of argumentation or organization.

Isocrates wrote most of his discourses, however, for occasions outside of the law court, claiming in the *Panathenaicus*, for example, that he focused more on issues of importance to the whole of Greece (12.1–2). Categorizing these other 15 discourses more specifically, however, is difficult and controversial. Attempting to break them into Aristotelian categories of deliberative and epideictic is unfruitful since those categories post-date Isocrates’ work and he seemed only to distinguish between discourses in law courts and discourses outside of law courts.⁵ I will sort these fifteen into three

categories, but only in order to discuss representative examples: Isocrates wrote educational treatises (13, 15); he wrote celebratory discourses in honor of people or Athens (4, 9, 10, 11, 12); and finally, he wrote discourses offering advice (1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14).

Discourses that present Isocrates' educational ideas most fully are *Against the Sophists* (13, of 390) and the *Antidosis* (15, of 354–353).⁶ He wrote *Against the Sophists* near the time when he began teaching, but he was already 46 years old. He says that he will set out his own educational ideas after presenting his criticisms of other teachers. We only have the section criticizing others, but this section offers some glimpse of his own ideas (13.16–18):

I contend that it is not all that difficult to gain a knowledge of the forms that we use in speaking and composing all speeches, if a person surrenders himself not to those who make easy promises but to those who know something about them. But to choose from these the necessary forms for each subject, to mix them with each other and arrange them suitably, and then, not to mistake the circumstances (*kairoi*) but to embellish the entire speech properly with considerations and to speak the words rhythmically and musically, these things require much study and are the work of a brave and imaginative (*doxastikes*) soul. In addition to having the requisite natural ability (*physis*), the student must learn (*mathein*) the forms of speeches and practice (*gymnasthēnai*) their uses. The teacher must go through these aspects as precisely as possible, so that nothing teachable is left out, but as for the rest, he must offer himself as a model, so that those who are modeled by him and can imitate him will immediately appear more florid and graceful than others. When all these conditions occur together, then those who practice philosophy will achieve success. But if any of the points mentioned is left out, the students will necessarily be worse off in this regard.

Isocrates says here that the good student can react to the moment (*kairos*), attends to issues of style, and has a mind that uses reasoned experience (*doxa*). He presents his educational triad; the student must have natural ability, the teacher must set out what is teachable and must set himself as an example for what is not (and presumably know the difference between these two categories), and then the student must practice. In this passage he emphasizes what the teacher does to assist the student.

The *Antidosis* presents further ideas on education. He opens this fictive defense by asserting the importance of his occupation as a teacher in comparison with the triviality of those who write law court speeches, equating himself in the quality of his art with the great sculptor Phidias (15.2). He must defend himself and his educational career because of attacks that he says come from ignorance of what he does and envy for his skill and success. He can do little about the latter, but he can clarify his situation and try to dispel the former. This discourse falls into two parts: in the first half he defends himself against the fictive charges through argumentation and the use of witnesses. Through an interesting variation of procedure, here the witnesses are not persons, but portions of prior discourses. To have his discourses 'defend' him seems entirely appropriate and in character for him. He quotes a portion of the *Panegyricus* to show his advocacy of Athens, a portion of *On The Peace* to show that he can admonish the Athenians when they go astray, and a portion of the *To Nicocles* to show that he writes with virtue and justice as his goal (15.52–70). In this half, he sounds very much like Socrates, after whose *Apology*

Isocrates models this discourse. Even while he models himself on the great questioner, however, he calls into question the training that Socrates' other follower Plato offers (15.84–86):

It should be evident that I am more truthful and useful than those who claim to turn people toward self-restraint and justice. For they exhort people to a virtue and to a wisdom unrecognized by others and debated over by themselves, whereas I exhort them to one acknowledged by everyone. They are pleased with themselves if they can attract pupils into their company by their reputations, whereas I shall never be seen inviting anyone to follow me; instead, I try to persuade the whole city to undertake activities which will lead to their own happiness and will free the rest of the Greeks from their present evils. How is it reasonable that an individual who exhorts all citizens to better and more just leadership of Greece could corrupt his students?

He spends the second half of the discourse in full defense of his *philosophia*. His educational program rises from two pillars: his educational triad and his notions of *doxa*. First, he describes the process of education, which parallels physical training (15.183–185):

When they take on pupils, physical trainers instruct their students in the positions that have been discovered for competitions, and those whose concern is philosophy pass on to their pupils all the structures which speech employs. When they have given them experience and detailed knowledge of these, they again exercise the students and make them accustomed to hard work, and then force them to synthesize everything they have learned in order that they may have a more secure understanding and their views (*doxai*) may be better adapted to the right moments (*kairoi*). It is not possible to learn this through study, since in all activities, these opportune moments elude exact knowledge (*epistēmē*), but in general those who are particularly attentive and can understand the consequences most often apprehend them. Watching over their pupils and educating them in this way, both kinds of teachers can lead them to become better and more capable, whether in their intellect or their physical conditions. But neither has that knowledge by which he could make anyone he wished an adequate athlete or orator. He may contribute some share, but as a rule, real ability is found only in those who excel both in native talent and in training.

He makes clear the importance of the teacher, but here he focuses on the natural ability and dedication of the student. The triad of ability, teaching, and practice are a unified whole, but not an equally balanced whole. Isocrates' emphasis on the triadic structure of education rises from his conviction that natural talent makes the largest contribution (cf. 15.189).

His teaching method rises from a second important notion as well. He claims that absolute knowledge (*epistēmē*) is not available, and so education enables the student to recognize a moment (*kairos*) and take advantage of it through reasoned experience (*doxa*) (15.271):

Since human nature cannot attain knowledge (*epistēmē*) that would enable us to know what we must say or do, after this I think that the wise are those who have the ability to reach the best opinions (*doxai*) most of the time, and philosophers are those who spend time acquiring such an intelligence as quickly as possible.

His skeptical approach to knowledge, and his awareness that rhetorical situations arise at precise moments with individuated requirements, make him emphasize the need to have his students respond in a flexible and artful way to given situations based on reasoned experience, as *Against the Sophists* 12–13 shows:⁷

I am amazed when I see these men claiming students for themselves; they fail to notice that they are using an ordered art (*tetragmenē technē*) as a model for a creative activity (*poiētikon pragma*). Who – besides them – has not seen that while the function of letters is unchanging and remains the same, so that we always keep using the same letters for the same sounds, the function of words is entirely opposite. What is said by one person is not useful in a similar way for the next speaker, but that man seems most artful who both speaks worthily of the subject matter and can discover things to say that are entirely different from what others have said. The greatest indication of the difference is that speeches cannot be good unless they reflect the circumstances (*kairoi*), propriety (*to prepon*), and originality, but none of these requirements extends to letters. So those who use such models would much more rightly pay than receive money, because they attempt to teach others although they themselves need much instruction.

One must be able to deal with the moment, in a moment. Only training in basic patterns, habituated by continual practice, will prepare the *rhētōr* for this.

Such an education will have morally beneficial effects on those who already have a moral aptitude. His training with models gives the students ample time to read works with great themes and this will have a salutary effect, as Isocrates says in *To Nicocles*: ‘Practice speaking about fine pursuits, so that your thoughts may be conditioned to resemble your words’ (2.38). He can make a good student better, but he cannot make a morally blank student moral: ‘Let no one think that I mean that a sense of justice is teachable; I contend that there is no sort of art that can convert those who by nature lack virtue to soundness of mind and a sense of justice. But I certainly do think that the study of political speeches can assist in encouraging and training these faculties’ (13.21).

Thus, Isocrates sets out a view of education that combines rigor, flexibility, and focus on the individual student’s progress. He is the first to have opened a school in Athens. Plato is said to have opened his school in response, offering a philosophical system more based on *epistēmē* and less politically engaged. Isocrates was opposed by Aristotle too, who claimed, when he was giving lectures at the Academy, that it would be wrong ‘to stay silent and let Isocrates speak’. Aristotle’s lectures will form the core of his later treatise on rhetoric, and show him to have a much more systematic approach to rhetoric than Isocrates. The latter’s school also differed from those teachers who emphasized the creation of legal speeches, a field Isocrates often disparaged.

Praise discourses fall into two sub-categories: discourses that praise individuals include *Evagoras* (9, of 370), *Helen* (10, of 370), and *Busiris* (11, of 391); those praising Athens are the *Panegyricus* (4, of 380) and *Panathenaicus* (12, of 342). All three discourses show a similar treatment of a character, using topics based on ancestry, birth, and youth, then activities of adulthood, connections through marriage, influence on others, death, and the implications from their deaths. This will become more standardized later in the tradition for the sub-genre of epideictic known as encomium. In the *Helen*, for example, Isocrates begins the *encomium*

proper with Helen's lineage, particularly her connection to Zeus (10.16), her connection to Zeus' other prominent child, Heracles, and then her allure as the most beautiful woman of Greece. This leads to Theseus (the first of the Greek males to be attracted to her), on whose greatness Isocrates digresses at some length (10.18–38). Theseus works as a foil for Helen and an extended and implied syllogism. Because Theseus, the greatest Athenian hero, judged her the most desirable, then she is the most desirable: Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.23.12) points out this logical connection. Isocrates uses such digressions elsewhere to elevate the person being considered (Agamemnon in the *Panathenaicus*, Timotheus in the *Antidosis*, and Conon in the *Evagoras*) just as Pindar used myth to accentuate the greatness of his athletic victors. The rest of the *encomium* (10.39–69) recounts the effect she has on those around her, and the benefits she brought to Greece from the war.

Isocrates prefaces the encomium with an extensive commentary on the need for better treatment of the question. He often includes such a critical comparison. He does this in *Against the Sophists* and the *Busiris*, as well as the *Panegyricus*.⁸ In the *Busiris*, he criticizes Polycrates' version of the speech, and then presents his own version of an encomium of Busiris. In the *Helen*, Isocrates begins the same way, mentioning a specific treatment of Helen, but he does not mention the author's name; many scholars believe that he refers to Gorgias' encomium of Helen. Rather than address Gorgias personally, Isocrates uses the introduction to criticize contemporary authors who do not understand how to praise; he then gives his own example. He does a similar thing in *Against The Sophists*, criticizing teachers and promising to set out his own ideas (see above).

Isocrates wrote two discourses in praise of Athens, the *Panegyricus* (4, of 380) and the *Panathenaicus* (12, of 342). In both he praises Athens and presents his idea that Greece must unite in an expedition against Persia. He presents his most famous and characteristic work, the *Panegyricus*, as an address to the Greeks gathered at a national festival, which was a natural opportunity for oratory stressing Greek unity. Isocrates himself calls the present discourse a panegyric (*panēgyrikos logos*), a discourse bringing all together, and follows a tradition that includes the Olympic orations of Gorgias and Lysias. When Isocrates published the *Panegyricus*, Sparta was still powerful from its victory in the Peloponnesian War and Athens was still in the process of recreating itself as a viable force in Greece. But things were uncertain at this point, because Thebes was becoming as suspicious of Sparta as Sparta had been of Athens earlier. Tensions between city-states left many questions. Isocrates seized this opportunity to propose a solution: the way to relieve the stresses on the Greek city-states is to induce them to give up their animosity toward each other and to join in a unified campaign against Persia. Thus the discourse models a festival discourse, but it has the problems of the period clearly in mind. The discourse combines the epideictic function of praise with the deliberative function of advice.⁹ Tradition says that Isocrates did not present the discourse himself; as with most of his discourses, the *Panegyricus* was probably written and circulated for a wider reading audience.

Isocrates tells us that he published this discourse when he was 56 years old, about 380, after working for ten years. We are to imagine that Isocrates began work at about the time he opened his own school in 390, and he would have planned for it to serve as an advertisement for his educational program against contemporary teachers. Parallel to *Against the Sophists*, then, he meant to set his own ideas – especially the

ubiquitous idea of the unity of the Greeks in a common expedition against Persia – against other writers of the day. In *Against the Sophists*, he discussed education in contrast to contemporary educators; in the *Panegyricus*, Isocrates discusses his notion of proper political thought (and how his education would lead to that, presumably) in contrast to political speakers of the day.

This discourse, like the letter to Alexander with which this chapter began, presents many major Isocratean notions. It opens with Isocrates presenting himself, and presenting his argument for the priority of *logos* in the life of the *polis* (4.1–3):

I have often marveled that those who established panegyric festivals and set up athletic contests considered athletic success worthy of such great prizes, but established no such prize for those who work hard as private citizens for the public good and prepare their own lives so that they can benefit others. They should have given more thought to the latter, for even if the athletes acquired twice their current strength, there would be no greater benefit for the people, while if one person has good ideas, all who wish to share in those ideas would benefit. Nonetheless I have not lost heart about these things or chosen to give up. Rather, I think that there is sufficient reward for me in the glory this discourse will bring, and so I have come to advise you about the war against the barbarians and the need for unity among ourselves.

Isocrates always presents himself in his discourses, confident, pedagogical, and critical.¹⁰ He also consistently presents the idea that the most important task is to work for the good of the *polis*. And he will often argue that the way out of troubles for the *poleis* is to have a united Greece in an expedition against Persia. All of these ideas appear at the beginning. Here, as in the *Antidosis*, he sets the mind and the body next to each other.

Isocrates presents two ideas in the partition (4.15–20): Greece must unite and Greece must march against Persia. When Greece unites, Athens and Sparta should lead. The first half of the discourse focuses on this, but because of the current political situation, he must present it carefully. Sparta leads because of its current prominence and this explains why he does not mention Athens specifically in the opening sections quoted above. As the discourse develops, however, Isocrates advances Athens' claim to leadership. This he states in the partition and will develop in the first half of the discourse (4.15–20):

Now, some of the Greeks follow us, others follow the Spartans, and the governments by which they manage their cities have divided most of them along these lines. Thus, whoever thinks that the others will accomplish anything good before the two leading cities are reconciled is quite naive and out of touch with the situation. But someone who is not only seeking to make a display, but also wishes to accomplish something, must look for the kind of arguments that will persuade these two cities to share equally with each other, to take up joint leadership, and to gain advantages from the Persian king that they currently want to get from the other Greeks. It would be easy to get our city to take this approach, but the Spartans are still hard to persuade, since they have accepted the false argument that it is their ancestral right to lead. Nevertheless, if someone should point out to them that this right is ours rather than theirs, they might perhaps give up arguing and consider their own advantage. Others should have started with this topic and should not have given recommendations about matters already agreed upon before they taught us about controversial ones.

Here again, Isocrates criticizes the treatment by others and turns to his own example of how it should be done.

The discourse falls into two sections that show the epideictic nature and the deliberative focus of the discourse respectively. Isocrates argues for the greatness of Athens and its rightful position as a leader of the unification of Greece in the first section (4.21–128). He presents Athens through topics such as the city's gifts to the world, its actions in war, and its stature in relation to Sparta (a most important and complicated subject at this point in Greece's history). In the second part (4.133–169), Isocrates turns to the deliberative idea of a campaign against Persia. Having an external enemy will help to bring the city-states together and alleviate the tension currently present (4.133):

Now, I think that if a person came from somewhere else and saw our current situation, he would judge both of our cities mad, since we risk so much on small matters when it is possible to get many things safely, and when we destroy our own land, while we ignore the fertility of Asia.

Isocrates points out that Greece has much to gain from marching against Persia and that it can accomplish it easily when one considers the king's position realistically.

Isocrates' *Panegyricus* stands as the best example of his ideas of political leadership and his role as a teacher of such leadership. But it also stands as the most prominent example of the Isocratean smooth style. He is often cited as a fine example of the middle style in between the simplicity of Lysias' plain style and the vigorous energy of Demosthenes' grand style. This characterization comes from three things: the complex nature of his periods, the smoothness of the prose, and finally the consistency of his style over large discourses.

Isocratean periods show an elaborate use of subordinate clauses and participial phrases to emphasize the main thoughts. The complexity of the sentence represents the complexity of the thought where everything in a subordinate position combines to make the main thought more vivid, more understandable, and more acceptable. These periods can be fairly short or can build to a dizzying length.¹¹ Usher has pointed out, however, that Isocrates saves his most elaborate periods for his major ideas.¹² For example, when praising Athens' major contribution to the Greek world, a notion that throughout the Isocratean corpus modulates between the terms *philosophia* and *logos*, Isocrates brings these terms together in the *Panegyricus* in one of his most famous periods, highlighting the importance of Athens in the main clause which is italicized here (4.47–50):¹³

Love of wisdom (*philosophia*), then, which has helped us to discover and helped to establish all that makes Athens great, which has educated us for practical affairs and made gentle our relations with each other, which has distinguished misfortunes of ignorance from those of necessity and taught us to guard against the former and bear up against the latter, [*this love of wisdom*] *our city made manifest, and honored Speech (logos)*, which all desire and envy those who know, recognizing, on the one hand, that this is the natural feature distinguishing us from all animals, and that through the advantage it gives us we excel them in all other things, and seeing, on the other hand, that in other areas fortune is troublesome so that in those areas the wise fail and the ignorant succeed, and that there is not share of noble and artistic speech to the wicked,

but it is the produce of a well-knowing soul, and that the wise and those seemingly unlearned most differ from each other in this, and that those educated liberally, from the start, are not recognized by courage and wealth and such benefits, but most by what has been said, and that those who use speech well are not only powerful in their own cities, but also honored among other men; and to such an extent has our city outstripped the rest of mankind in wisdom and speech that her students have become the teachers of others, and she has made the name of the Hellenes seem no longer that of a people, but that of an intelligence, and that those rather are called Greeks who share our education than those who share our blood.

Isocrates wants to emphasize that Athens discovered and first valued *philosophia/logos*. In order to make this claim, and to make it more powerful, he prepares the reader with certain thoughts and then confirms the main idea with others afterward. He clearly marks the topic with the first word, *philosophia*, but leaves it as the direct object of a clause, thus forcing us to wait for the main subject and verb. Before he fulfills that expectation, however, he moves into subordinate clauses that show how valuable *philosophia* is. Once he demonstrates its value, Isocrates tells us in the main clause that Athens revealed it to the world. He makes two claims in the main clause, that Athens established *philosophia* and that it honors *logos*. Using the main clause to join these two, he then goes on in subsequent subordinate clauses and phrases to show how *logos* uses *philosophia* to create many benefits for humans. He can argue the superiority of Athens in Section 50 with great confidence because of the overwhelming presentation of Sections 47–49.

A second aspect of Isocrates' style is the smoothness of the prose. This comes from the use of parallelism in his structure, his avoidance of hiatus, and his attention to rhythm. The parallelism of structure rises from the influence of Gorgias and the Gorgianic figures of antithesis, parison, and isocolon. We see an example of antithesis in his letter to Alexander with which this chapter began. This letter shows the common Isocratean organizational pattern of 'not A, but B' to expand his thought and contrast points: 'Moreover, you do not receive any of our citizens who neglect their affairs and pursue base goals, but only those with whom you would not regret spending time' (*Letter* 5.2). This structure runs throughout the letter, gives it balance, and encourages the notion that there are two and only two options for Aristotle, his current education (under Aristotle) or the method he already values (which sounds amazing like Isocrates' approach). We can also note in Section 2 the clever assonance of Isocrates' Greek with the contrast of the three adjectives *philanthropos*, *philathenaios*, *philosophos* ('friend of men', 'friend of Athens', 'friend of learning').

Isocrates achieves his famous smoothness also through avoidance of hiatus (the clashing vowels at the end of one word and the beginning of the next). Isocrates strives to avoid the harshness this creates and often plans his word order to avoid it. His attention to this is both a blessing and a curse; his prose flows smoothly, and one can easily present it orally, which has given him a deserved fame. On the other hand, his style often lacks variety within a discourse; at times such a clash can be rhetorically and stylistically effective, as Demosthenes knew. In addition, Isocrates' reputation for avoiding hiatus helped mold later reality in one famous case: when Benseler created his Teubner text of Isocrates in 1851, he was so devoted to the notion of Isocrates' distaste for hiatus that he intervened and edited the Greek text significantly in order

to make this be the case in all situations.¹⁴ Later editors have not been so unilateral in their approach to editing the manuscripts.

The third and final aspect of his smoothness of style is his use of prose rhythm to lead the reader from place to place. No doubt his sense of dependence on the poetic tradition inspired this. His awareness of the advantages poets had with meter would give him a desire to achieve the same kinds of effects in his prose encomia, for example. He says in *Against the Sophists* (13.16–17):

But to choose from these the necessary forms for each subject, to mix them with each other and arrange them suitably, and then, not to mistake the circumstances (*kairoi*) but to embellish the entire speech properly with considerations and to speak the words rhythmically and musically, these things require much study and are the work of a brave and imaginative (*doxastikēs*) soul.

The notion of rhythm and music cited here compelled later scholars to describe him as an early advocate of a theory of prose rhythm.¹⁵

The final aspect of Isocrates' style, and one that has brought him under some criticism, is the consistency of his style over large discourses. For example, he does not show the vigorous variety in the *Panegyricus* that Demosthenes shows in *On the Crown* (18). There is an evenness, a sameness, in his discourses which helps readers follow and feel comfortable with him, but at the same time can be sedating. For variety, one must go to different discourses that serve very different functions such as the judicial works or the discourses of general advice.

The last category of political discourse is advice oratory, which falls into two categories: those that offer advice on specific situations and those that offer general advice. Isocrates never presented these as speeches; later scholars give the name *suasoriae* to school exercises offering specific advice. They call those offering general advice *paraineseis*. Discourses about specific situations include *To Philip* (5, of 346), *Archidamus* (6, of 366), *Areopagiticus* (7, of 357), *On the Peace* (8, of 355), and *Plataicus* (14, of 373–371). Those offering general advice are *To Demonius* (1, of 374), *To Nicocles* (2, of 374), and *Nicocles (The Cyprians)* (3, of 372). Let us look at one example of each category.

One of Isocrates' most celebrated discourses is the *To Philip* of 346. It promotes the same interest in Greek unity and a campaign against Persia seen in the *Panegyricus*, but Athens' political situation is very different at this point. Isocrates has changed his focus from Athens to any individual who can assume a leadership role. He turns to Philip: 'I claim that you should not ignore any of your own personal interests but should also try to reconcile the cities of Argos, Sparta, and Thebes and our own city, Athens. If you can bring these together, you can easily make other cities agree to work together' (5.30). He spends the first half of the discourse on this topic of unity. He then turns to the question of a campaign against Persia: 'I have composed a beginning for the whole discourse that is fitting for those who argue for a campaign against Asia' (5.86). The discourse draws interest from the point of view of Isocrates' political ideas and political development. It is also interesting from the point of view of his contrast with Demosthenes, the great Greek orator who opposed Philip in the *Philippics* (4, 6, 9) and the *Olynthiacs* (1–3). Where Demosthenes sees Philip as a barbarian and a threat, Isocrates sees him as a man of Greek

heritage – indeed the best Greek heritage, coming from the line of Heracles – and the one who can bring the Greeks together (5.111–113):

When Heracles saw that Greece was beset by wars and factional strife and many other evils, he put an end to these and reconciled the cities with one another and then, as an example to future generations, revealed which cities one should have as allies and which as enemies when making war. For he launched an expedition against Troy, which at that time had the greatest force in all of Asia, and as a military strategist he was so superior to those who later made the same campaign that, although it was difficult for them with a Greek army to capture the city in ten years, he, with just a few men, easily took it by force in less than ten days. After this he killed all the kings of the peoples who lived on the shore of either continent, and could never have done this if he had not also overcome their armies. After these successes, he built the so-called Pillars of Heracles, a sign of victory over the Barbarians, a monument to his own excellence and the dangers he undertook and a marker of the limit of the Greek world. I have related these events so that you might know that I am urging you by this discourse to undertake great deeds like those that your ancestors by their actions clearly judged the best. Therefore, although all men of good sense must set for themselves the finest example and then try to become like it, this is especially fitting for you. You do not need to use external examples, but have one in your own family, so how can you not naturally be inspired by Heracles with the ambition to show yourself equal to your ancestor?

It is unclear whether Isocrates or Demosthenes was correct about Philip, but Philip's leadership at Delphi in the Third Sacred War (of 355–346) probably indicates that most Greeks saw him as a Greek, and the number of Demosthenes' speeches, the length of time he devoted to this issue (he delivered the *First Philippic* in 351 and the third in 341), and Demosthenes' level of frustration with the men of Athens in his speeches, indicates that he had a very difficult time convincing them of his picture of Philip.¹⁶ Isocrates' views may have been more popular than our Demosthenic history of the period would lead us to believe.

Discourses that offer general advice are *To Demonicus*, *To Nicocles*, and *Nicocles (The Cyprians)*. They show a different type of style than Isocrates' other discourses. Sentence length is considerably shorter, and the logical use of *gar* ('for') is much more frequent, though he shows an equal use of antithesis in these discourses.¹⁷ These adjustments fit the topic; Isocrates offers short, pithy sayings that crystallize moral maxims and he then gives a reason why the maxim has force (1.42):

Recognize that nothing in human affairs is certain, for in this way you will not be overly happy during good times or overly grieved during misfortune. Rejoice at the occurrence of good things, but grieve in moderation at the occurrence of bad things, and in either case do not be obvious to others, for it is absurd to conceal your belongings in your house but to walk about with your thoughts open for all to see.

The most popular example from the discourses with general advice is the *To Demonicus*. It was a standard school text in the west from antiquity, through the Renaissance, and into the nineteenth century. Usher points out that this discourse differs from the other general advice discourses *To Nicocles* and *Nicocles (The Cyprians)* because he did not write it to a king and it has more general categories.¹⁸ This more general focus explains why it became one of the most often used texts in

Western education. It offered to young boys in schools a simpler Greek style and useful thoughts on how to organize one's life (1.32):

Take special caution against drinking parties, but if the occasion arises, get up and leave before you are drunk. Whenever the mind is impaired by wine, it experiences the same things chariots do that have thrown their drivers. Just as they are borne along without order when their guides are missing, so the soul makes many mistakes when its thinking is impaired.

This advice parallels the famous charioteer passage in Plato's *Symposium*. Isocrates version has the virtues of brevity and simplicity, but it lacks the memorable vigor of Plato's *mythos*.

The other two discourses in this category, *To Nicocles* and *Nicocles*, show two sides of one situation. Isocrates gives advice to his student Nicocles on how to be a benevolent king as he took the kingship of Cyprus from his recently deceased father Evagoras. He then writes another speech for Nicocles to give to his new subjects on how to live properly under a king. These two, along with the encomium of Evagoras, comprise what readers refer to as the Cyprian Orations.

Isocrates also wrote letters to a variety of recipients that have been catalogued traditionally as a separate group from the other discourses. Their structures, goals, and audience are akin to the major discourses, however, such as the discourse *To Philip* (5).¹⁹ They are treated separately only because of the traditional separation, not because of any inherent uniqueness. The letters range in date from 368 to 338. Chronologically ordered, they address: Dionysius of Syracuse (1, 368), the children of Jason of Pherae (6, of 359), Archidamus (9, of 356), the rulers of Mytilene (8, of 350), Timotheus (7, of 345), Philip II (2, of 342), Alexander (5, of 342), Antipater (4, of 340), and Philip II (3, of 338).

This chapter began with the letter to Alexander about his education. It sets out Isocrates' sense of education, in much the same way that *Against the Sophists* and *Antidosis* did. *Letter 4* is a letter of introduction to Antipater for Isocrates' friend Diodotus and shows an example of what would become a very common sub-genre of letter writing. The second letter to Philip (3) is the last extant writing of Isocrates, dating to the year of his death, shortly after the Battle of Chaeronea. Isocrates states explicitly in it that he hopes that Philip can now lead the Greeks forward (3.6):

some of what I was thinking and tried to write about as a youth in my discourse *Panegyricus* and the discourse to you has already happened through your actions. I am hopeful that the rest will follow.

Thus, this letter shows a similar spirit to the discourse *To Philip*. Tradition says that Isocrates then took his life in despair over the loss of Greek freedom, but this letter does not express the sort of regret that would lead to Isocrates' suicide. Perhaps the cause of his death may have less to do with Philip's control than with Greece's inability to see the need for the king.²⁰

This survey shows Isocrates and his work in the context of other major figures of fifth and fourth century Greece. He is well aware of his need to present himself and his ideas in comparison to others when he published his programmatic treatise

Against The Sophists in 390. Many years later, Isocrates will return to educational (and political) questions in the *Antidosis*. Though the positive statement of his approach at the end of *Against the Sophists* is lost (or deliberately left off, according to Too),²¹ he sets out the ideas of others. Isocrates uses the term sophist here in a pejorative sense, and does not see himself among that group. The sophists, he says, make greater promises than they can deliver by offering to produce happiness, are inconsistent with their own claims in their approach to tuition, and do not recognize the value of experience (*doxa*). He also criticizes those who teach about writing political discourses because they see their profession as a dissemination of rules, without due attention to the native ability of the student nor the student's need to be flexible.

Isocrates was a follower of Socrates and would have been 37 years old when Socrates drank the hemlock in 399, but we do not know precisely in what way he followed or admired him. Plato had Socrates pay a compliment to the young Isocrates at the end of the *Phaedrus* (278–279) when Socrates says that Isocrates has ‘something of philosophy’ in him and may well surpass those treating rhetoric. It is unclear, and controversial, however, if the compliment was sincere or ironic; if it represents a real comment by Socrates, it may be sincere on the part of Socrates, but ironic from Plato's viewpoint, who wrote the words when Isocrates was no longer young.

Ancient evidence says that Plato opened his school in response to the success of Isocrates' school, and there is little question that Isocrates taught more, and more prominent, Athenians than did Plato. As Cicero would later say, ‘from the school of Isocrates, like from the Trojan horse, none but leaders came forth’ (*De Oratore* 2.94.1).²² These two speeches, *Against the Sophists* (13) and *Antidosis* (15), give us some notion of Isocrates' educational methods and goals. In doing so they present a stark contrast to Platonic ideas of knowledge, the end of philosophy, and how the young should be educated (see H. Yunis, Chapter 7). Isocrates certainly advocated ideas in opposition to many Platonic notions. The most vivid example we have seen is the contrast between *epistēmē* and *doxa*. Plato's advocacy of *epistēmē* led him to discount *doxa*, by which he means something like ‘mere opinion’ and contrasts it with the absolute knowledge implied by *epistēmē*. For Isocrates, however, since *epistēmē* is not reachable (15.271), one must rely on *doxa*, which for him means something closer to ‘judgment based on reason and experience.’²³

Isocrates also worked in the same city as Aristotle and differed from him as well. The letter to Alexander cited above gives a sense of Isocrates' educational goals in contrast to those of Aristotle. Isocrates felt that Aristotle's approach of categorization and systematization was not a useful method for advanced study, though he saw its value as a preliminary stage (15.261–269, 12.26–29). As the difficulty in categorizing Isocrates' discourses shows, Isocrates did not subscribe to the clinical approach of Aristotle to the analysis of discourse as demonstrated in book one of the *Rhetoric*.²⁴ The two men worked in a time of intellectual transition. Aristotle looked to the scientific systematic treatment of questions before him. Isocrates fought against such systematization; perhaps he targets Aristotle and his lectures when he criticized those who treat rhetoric as an ‘ordered art’ (13.12–13).

Scholars disagree about whether Isocrates influenced the political thinking of his day. The Second Athenian League promoted ideas seen in the discourses, and Isocrates had influence on its leaders, Timotheus and Callistratus. Others deny Isocrates this kind of influence, claiming that his proposals were too idealistic for

most Athenians. Thus his influence on public issues is unclear. In an interesting pair of articles, G. Rowe argued that Isocrates' political influence was quite widespread but came through law court cases.²⁵ He argues that the Isocrateans, as he called them, were active in many realms and that Demosthenes belonged to a group that opposed them. Rowe is able to bring together a vivid account of many of the characters of mid-fourth century politics, Demosthenes against Onetor and Aphobus, Callistratus against Timotheus, but mostly Demosthenes (and Plato) against Isocrates in a philosophic, political, and economic struggle of democrats against aristocrats. Nonetheless, regardless of whether he influenced contemporary politics, by championing the greatness of Athens, Isocrates presented an influential form of intellectual inquiry and education that continues into present times.

Isocrates influenced later periods in three ways. First, he was a model for the middle style, achieved with elaborate periods, smoothness, and consistency as described above. Second, he influenced the educational tradition of the West; his ideas on education contributed to Western notions of liberal arts education and he is considered among its founding members. This is ascribed more commonly to Cicero, but Cicero himself was aware of his debt to Isocrates, and this tradition finds its beginnings in Isocrates and his awareness of the educational function of his own sources.²⁶ Isocrates advocated broad learning for background knowledge and the ability to use this training for arguing the important point of the moment effectively. We might now call this the use of critical thinking skills. In spite of the ability of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy to overshadow his notions of reality, his notions of how to educate were influential. As Marrou described it, 'it is to Isocrates more than to any other person that the honour and responsibility belong of having inspired in our Western traditional education a predominantly literary tone'.²⁷ Isocrates gave to the tradition an organized sense of the need for physical and mental training, for attention to the individual student through his educational triad, for background information acquired from a broad education, and for the need to call that information forth at the appropriate moment to meet the needs of the occasion. Finally, his Cyprian orations (especially *To Demonicus*) had a large influence on the moral education of the West because of their collection of moral precepts that could be used easily as educational texts for young boys and especially future leaders (and subjects) of the British Empire and beyond. We can see this from the example in Libanius' progymnasmata where Isocrates says that the root of education is bitter, but the fruit sweet.

Bibliographical Essay

The most convenient place to access bibliography concerning Isocrates is the Teubner edition of B. Mandilaras, *Isocrates Opera Omnia*, 3 vols. (Leipzig: 2003). The first volume contains all manuscripts and testimonia, a comprehensive list of editions and translations, and a comprehensive bibliography. The bibliography is not without errors, but it is quite complete up to the time of publication.²⁸ The best English translation is now in the University of Texas Press' Oratory of Classical Greece series (see Note 1 and also this volume's preface), but the three-volume one of G. Norlin and L. van Hook, *Isocrates* (Cambridge, MA: 1928–45) is still useful. There is also a

good translation of the *Panegyricus* and *To Nicocles* in S. Usher, *Greek Orators III: Isocrates* (Warminster: 1990). Useful commentaries on the *Panegyricus* include those by S. Usher, *Greek Orators III* (cited above) and J.E. Sandys, *Isocrates Ad Demonium and Panegyricus* (London: 1872), on *To Demonium* by J.E. Sandys, *Isocrates* (cited above), on *Helen* by J.A.E. Bons, *Poietikon Pragma* (Nijmegen: 1996) and S. Zajons, *Isocrates' Enkomion auf Helena. Ein Kommentar* (Göttingen: 2002), on the Cyprian Orations by E.S. Forster, *Isocrates. Cyprian Orations* (Oxford: 1912), on *To Philip* by M.L.W. Laistner, *Isocrates. De Pace and Philippus* (London: 1967), on *On the Peace* by M.L.W. Laistner, *Isocrates* (cited above), and on *Busiris* by N. Livingstone, *A Commentary on Isocrates' Busiris* (Leiden: 2001). W. Jaeger, *Paideia* 3 (Oxford: 1961), is still worth reading. Though categorization is difficult, and there is much overlap, representative examples of work on Isocrates fall into four areas. Scholarship focusing on educational and philosophical issues includes G.A. Kennedy, 'The Shadow of Isocrates', *Colorado Journal of Educational Research* 2 (1972), pp. 16–23, C. Eucken, *Isokrates: Seine Positionen in der Auseinandersetzung mit den Zeitgenössischen Philosophen* (Berlin: 1983), and S. Usener, *Isokrates, Platon und ihr Publikum* (Tübingen: 1994). Scholarship focusing on politics includes P. Cloché, *Isocrate et son Temps* (Paris: 1963) and G. Rowe, 'Anti-Isocratean Sentiment in Demosthenes' *Against Androtion*', *Historia* 49 (2000), pp. 278–302 and 'Two Responses by Isocrates to Demosthenes', *Historia* 51 (2002), pp. 149–162. Scholarship focusing on literary and rhetorical approaches includes S. Usher, 'The Style of Isocrates', *BICS* 20 (1973), pp. 39–67, T.L. Papillon, 'Isocrates and the Use of Myth', *Hermathena* 161 (1996), pp. 9–21 and 'Isocrates and the Greek Poetic Tradition', *Scholia* 7 (1998), pp. 41–61, and W. Orth, *Isokrates: Neue Ansätze zur Bewertung Eines Politischen Schriftstellers* (Trier: 2003). Scholarship exemplifying modern cultural approaches includes Y.L. Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates* (Cambridge: 1995), T. Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis* (Columbia, SC: 1997), E. Haskins, *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle* (Columbia, SC: 2004), and T. Poulakos and D. Depew, (eds.), *Isocrates and Civic Education* (Austin: 2004).

Notes

- 1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations are taken from D.C. Mirhady and Y.L. Too, *Isocrates* 1 (Austin: 2000) and T.L. Papillon, *Isocrates* 2 (Austin: 2004).
- 2 I prefer to translate the term *logos* as 'discourse' rather than 'speech' since Isocrates very likely never presented any of them orally.
- 3 The term is Isocrates' own, but it has been popularized by T. Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis* (Columbia, SC: 1997).
- 4 S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), p. 125.
- 5 See T.L. Papillon, 'Rhetoric, Art, and Myth: Isocrates and Busiris', in C. Wooten (ed.), *The Orator in Action and Theory in Greece and Rome: Essays in Honor of George A. Kennedy* (Leiden: 2001), pp. 73–76.
- 6 See T. Morgan, Chapter 20, for a more thorough development of the notion of education at this period.
- 7 It is interesting that Isocrates centers his educational scheme on this need for training for the moment since he was, himself, not able to accomplish this, attending to a specific

- moment with the specific discourse appropriate to that moment. That is to say, what Alcidas criticizes about those who write speeches (and one usually includes Isocrates among those Alcidas attacks), would also seem to be a concern of Isocrates as well. Alcidas's criticisms may apply to Isocrates' writings, but not necessarily to the work of his pupils: see further, M. Edwards, Chapter 5.
- 8 Aristotle criticized Isocrates' preface to the *Helen* on the grounds that it was not connected to the body of the speech (*Rhet.* 3.14.1). On the unity of Isocrates' introductions, see T.L. Papillon, 'Isocrates on Gorgias and Helen: The Unity of the *Helen*', *CJ* 91 (1996), pp. 377–391.
 - 9 On deliberative rhetoric in Isocrates, see S. Usher, Chapter 15, pp. 228–229, 234.
 - 10 Isocrates uses the athletic contest as a metaphor throughout this work. This motif is akin to how Pindar sets himself against his rivals: see T.L. Papillon, 'Isocrates and the Greek Poetic Tradition', *Scholía* 7 (1998), pp. 41–61 and W.H. Race, Chapter 33.
 - 11 Some of Isocrates' periods are longer than Aristotle would prescribe in the *Rhetoric* (3.9.3–5), and Aristotle's comment may be pointed toward Isocrates (he actually quotes the opening of the *Panegyricus* here), but Isocrates is not interested in the systematic control of style that Aristotle presents.
 - 12 S. Usher, *Greek Oratory III: Isocrates* (Warminster: 1990), p. 111.
 - 13 For good treatments of this particular period, see G.A. Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric in its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times* (Chapel Hill, NC: 1990), p. 44, where the period is set out in a visually helpful chart, and Usher, *Greek Oratory III: Isocrates*, p. 111. The following translation is that of Kennedy.
 - 14 G.E. Benseler, *Isocratis Orationes*, 2 vols. (Leipzig: 1851).
 - 15 Both Isocrates and Thrasymachus are mentioned on the topic of prose rhythm: G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 68–74.
 - 16 For more on Philip and Demosthenes, see R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time: A Study in Defeat* (Oxford: 1993) and T.T.B. Ryder, 'Demosthenes and Philip II', in Ian Worthington (ed), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 45–89.
 - 17 Cf. S. Usher, 'The Style of Isocrates', *BICS* 20 (1973), pp. 39–67 and his *Greek Oratory*, p. 312.
 - 18 Usher, *Greek Oratory*, p. 312.
 - 19 See R. Sullivan, 'Classical Epistolary Theory and the Letters of Isocrates', in C. Poster and L. Mitchell (eds.), *Letter Writing Manuals from Antiquity to the Present* (Columbia, SC: 2006), pp. 8–22.
 - 20 See M. Edwards, *The Attic Orators* (London: 1994), p. 27.
 - 21 Y.L. Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates* (Cambridge: 1995), pp. 75–81.
 - 22 In his school at Athens, Isocrates taught what he called *philosophia* (4.47–50) to prominent students from Athens and abroad, about 100 students total. He had only a few pupils at a time and he gave them individual attention based on their abilities and interests. This approach may account for the variety of paths his students followed and the success or prominence of many of them. He taught the historians Ephorus, Theopompus, and Androtion, the orators Isaeus and Hyperides, and the general Timotheus. The story of Demosthenes being rebuffed from Isocrates' school for lack of payment is problematic since sources also say that Isocrates did not require payment from Athenian citizens ([Plut.] *Moralia* 838f); we cannot tell which side of this contradiction to believe. He taught and/or influenced many influential men outside of Athens as well: Nicocles of Cyprus, Philip of Macedon, Archidamas of Sparta, and Dionysius of Syracuse.
 - 23 On Isocrates' debt to Protagoras for his skepticism, see T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24, pp. 367, 370–371.
 - 24 See D.M. Timmerman, 'Isocrates' Competing Conceptualization of Philosophy', *Philosophy & Rhetoric* 31 (1998), pp. 145–159.

- 25 G. Rowe, 'Anti-Isocratean Sentiment in Demosthenes' *Against Androtion*, *Historia* 49 (2000), pp. 278–302 and 'Two Responses by Isocrates to Demosthenes', *Historia* 51 (2002), pp. 149–162.
- 26 On Isocrates' awareness of the traditions he was modifying, see Papillon 'Greek Poetic Tradition', *passim*.
- 27 H. Marrou, *Histoire de l'Éducation dans l'Antiquité*⁷ (Paris: 1975), p. 120.
- 28 Mandilaras incorrectly ascribes T. Poulakos, 'Isocrates' Use of Narrative in the Evagoras. Epideictic Rhetoric and Moral Action', *QJS* 73 (1987), pp. 317–328 and *Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates' Rhetorical Education* (Columbia, SC: 1997) to his brother John Poulakos. He duplicates the listing for G.A. Kennedy, 'The Shadow of Isocrates', *Colorado Journal of Educational Research* 2 (1972), pp. 16–23. He does not cite J.A.E. Bons' dissertation '*Poietikon Pragma*: Isocrates' Theory of Rhetorical Composition with a Rhetorical Commentary on the *Helen*' (Catholic University, Nijmegen: 1996).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Plato's Rhetoric

Harvey Yunis

Any account of Plato's contribution to rhetoric must overcome the traditional view of Plato as the unyielding partisan of philosophy and inveterate opponent of rhetoric in the foundational dispute between the two domains. Plato himself is viewed as the author of that dispute, which he is thought to have ignited in response to philosophy's illegitimate exclusion, as he saw it, from its rightful place of political supremacy. The common view is a distortion, however much responsibility for it may be ascribed to Plato. Indeed, Plato criticized sophistic rhetoric and the rhetorical practices of Athenian democracy vehemently and uncompromisingly; and he argued that mankind had no hope of political progress until and unless politics came under the guidance of philosophy (*Republic* 473c–d). But rhetoric should not be identified just with sophistic or democratic rhetoric, which are particular kinds or styles of rhetoric. And rhetoric is not opposed to philosophy, at least not for Plato, who built a concern with rhetoric into the very conception of his philosophy.¹

Rhetoric entails the conscious distinction between form and content in the transmission of a message, and the manipulation of form for effect in a conscious or artistic manner. Plato condemns sophistic rhetoric not because it is rhetorical but because in his view it is destructive: like flattery, it caters to irrational desires. Plato considered rhetoric, criticized it, and sought to perfect it precisely because philosophy needs rhetoric if philosophy is to have any chance of achieving its political and educational mission. And Plato's legacy of philosophical dialogues, unprecedented in Greece and decisive for the development of rhetoric as a literary phenomenon (to say nothing of the development of philosophy), constitutes a display of rhetorical art that was also unprecedented in its creativity and imagination.

1 Plato's Criticism of Sophistic and Democratic Rhetoric

Plato (c. 429–347) did not write treatises and never speaks in his own voice in his written work. Rather, his philosophical dialogues, written over the course of the first

half of the fourth century, mostly represent Socrates (469–399) in dialogue with interlocutors of his generation. For scholars interested in a historically accurate appraisal of Socrates and contemporary sophists such as Gorgias and Protagoras, it is frustrating that few primary sources survive. Plato's work, just one generation removed, is a rich target for the recovery of lost information. But the lifelike atmosphere that pervades Plato's dialogues is the result of an artistic technique intended to engage readers, not an invitation to scholars of later generations to use the dialogues for historical reconstruction. The dialogues do not, and were not intended to, present historically accurate accounts of Socrates or any of the other characters; nor were they intended to rehash the intellectual conflicts of Socrates' generation. Plato's dialogues are vehicles for advancing his own philosophical and educational agenda. In the following account of Plato's critique of sophistic rhetoric, no attempt is made to reconcile Plato's critique with the primary sources of sophistic rhetoric. That critique is merely one element in Plato's presentation of his own views on political discourse.

As the mass institutions of direct democracy grew in Athens during the fifth century, so too grew the importance of persuasive public speaking and the opportunity for experts, teachers, and techniques in that emerging field. Yet the oral-based popular culture remained suspicious of the elitism and expertise associated with rhetorical instruction. The sophists who taught rhetoric were mostly non-Athenian and their influence was seldom acknowledged openly in the democratic institutions. In the early decades of the fourth century, following the Peloponnesian War and the reestablishment of democratic government in Athens, the city's democratic institutions achieved a new level of stability and legitimacy, and the institutional presence of rhetoric in Athens grew deeper. Schools of rhetoric with sophistic lineage were established and politicians and litigants more openly relied on rhetorical training in their public activity. Plato's *Gorgias*, composed around 380, responds to this advancement of sophistic rhetoric into the general democratic culture by challenging the merit of the democratic regime and the role of sophistic rhetoric in supporting that regime.²

There is no historical evidence to suggest that Gorgias of Leontini (c. 485–c. 380), one of the most famous sophists, espoused the cynical political and moral views attributed in the dialogue to Callicles, who is portrayed as an ambitious Athenian politician and practitioner of sophistic rhetoric. Gorgias' presence in the dialogue is to be explained by Plato's intention to establish a connection between Gorgianic rhetorical teaching and Callicles' cynicism. In the dialogue Gorgias asserts that rhetoric is 'the greatest good because it brings men freedom for themselves and rule over others in their own *polis*' (452d). Gorgias justifies this assertion by specifying rhetoric as 'the ability to persuade by speech the judges in court, the councilmen in the Council, the assemblymen in the Assembly, and those in any gathering which is a political gathering' (452e). Thus according to Gorgias, political rhetoric of the type used in Athenian democracy is potentially the source of enormous power for any individual who can use it with skill; therein lies its value – 'the greatest good'. Polus, a student and associate of Gorgias, praises rhetoric, as Gorgias teaches it, because it makes the skilled rhetorician potentially comparable to a tyrant (466b–c), that is, in the ability to secure his own desires without limit. Socrates accepts that sophistic rhetoric has acquired a dominant position in the democratic political institutions, and that there is a functional equivalent between successful rhetorician and tyrant (467d, 468d). What

Socrates will not accept is that the rhetorician, like the tyrant, truly has any power, 'if by power is meant something good for the possessor' (466b).

It is at the point at which the questions of power and utility converge that Plato's critique becomes complicated by the full range of his philosophical activity. From his treatment of two fundamental questions – what is the nature of objective reality? and how is knowledge of objective reality possible? – Plato drew two distinctions: that between being and seeming, and that between knowledge and belief. The distinctions are important because Plato saw the only possibility for useful or advantageous action in establishing a connection between objective reality and human intelligence. He developed the concept of *technē*, or art, as a framework for understanding how knowledge of objective reality could reliably be brought to bear in the human world. In Plato's sense a *technē* is a practical task carried out by the systematic application of scientifically verifiable knowledge so as to achieve the highest degree of excellence in that task. The ends of any *technē* are defined by the nature of the task itself, such that houses that provide shelter are the proper product of house building, physical health is the proper product of the art of medicine, and a thriving *polis* is the proper product of the art of politics. A *technē* is a domain in which the expert deserves authority precisely because of his expertise, and within the domain of a *technē* only the expert deserves authority. For Plato, medicine is the paradigmatic *technē*; like medicine, politics is an enterprise in which success depends on the expert's ability to transmit his knowledge to the recipients who need that knowledge for their welfare.³

When Socrates asks in which *technē* Gorgias claims to be an expert (448e), he is eliciting a response that by its very form plays into Plato's argument. Gorgias answers that he is an expert in rhetoric, using the word *rhētorikē*, which is an adjective that, like other adjectives of the same formation, implies the word *technē* as its noun. *Rhētorikē technē*, normally translated as the 'art of rhetoric', more properly means the '*rhētōr's* art'. *Rhētōr* literally means 'speaker', but in Athens it was the usual term for 'politician', since it was the particular task of Athenian politicians to speak in the Assembly and courts (see Ian Worthington, Chapter 17). By claiming expertise in *rhētorikē technē*, not only has Gorgias claimed expertise in the strong sense of expertise defined by Plato's notion of *technē* but also he has done so specifically in the field of political discourse. Expertise in political discourse accords with the assertion of power that is a source of pride to Gorgias and Polus. Yet it is precisely the rhetorician's expertise in the political domain that Socrates will contest.

Upon questioning, Gorgias admits that his expertise covers not the particular matters that concern political communities and affect them for good or ill, but only the ability to persuade audiences, regardless of the topic or occasion (457a–b). Socrates proceeds to offer an account of sophistic rhetoric and Athenian democracy which shows that the rhetorician usurps the role of the political expert and makes it impossible for the political expert to transmit his knowledge to the *polis*. In Plato's view, Athenian democracy is not a rational enterprise where informed citizens prudentially deliberate about and vote on the community's best interests. Rather, Athenian democracy is a setting where politicians compete for the favor of ignorant, mass audiences, who are subject to no authority and decide matters simply as they wish on the spur of the moment. Those who win the competition do so by being the best at flattering the mass audiences. (Aristophanes' *Knights*, produced in 424, is a scathing satire of this phenomenon.) Sophistic rhetoric fuels this scenario because while it

bears a superficial resemblance to the *technē* of political expertise, it actually does nothing more than gratify the political audience by manipulating the audience's own inclinations and prejudices (463d–465e). Plato summarizes this phenomenon in the *Republic* (493b–c; cf. *Gorgias* 516a–d):

[The *rhētōr*] knows not in the least which of the beliefs and desires [of the people] is honorable or base, good or bad, just or unjust, but he employs all these terms in accordance with the beliefs of the great beast [i.e., the people], calling the things that please it good and the things that vex it bad.

The *rhētōr* produces pleasure for his audience by advising it to make the decision that will please it, not the one that is in its best interests. But the production of pleasure is not a rational operation, pleasure being the innate response to the satisfaction of irrational instincts. Like the production of pleasure in a field such as cookery, so in the political domain there is no rational account that underlies the operation of sophistic rhetoric and could serve to distinguish an expert. Sophistic rhetoric is not a *technē* but just a form of flattery, a knack that can be enhanced by experience but not a subject for scientific theory (*Gorgias* 462c–d).

While the *rhētōr* seeks to gratify the audience for personal gain, the true political expert offers honest advice based on knowledge of the audience's true interests. No wonder that the true political expert is chased from the field in Athenian democracy, for he has neither the ability nor the desire to flatter. Consider an example offered by Socrates in the *Gorgias* (522a): a physician who was prosecuted by a pastry cook before a jury of children would be unable to defend the harsh medical treatment he prescribed in preference to the pastry cook's sweet cakes and cookies. So too the political expert is relegated to silence in the face of democratic competition. The *polis* is thereby deprived of the political knowledge it needs in order to prosper.

In Socrates' conversation with Callicles later in the *Gorgias*, it is made clear that Plato is doing more than just criticizing democratic practices; rather, he is advocating a reversal of the traditional norms of Greek culture. Callicles is a hard-nosed political realist, willing to use any means to advance his own interests in the political domain. For him, the rhetoric taught by Gorgias is a wonderful tool to be exploited in the pursuit of self-interest. Socrates extends his critique of Callicles to include Callicles' models, the great leaders of Athens' recent past, among them Pericles, who led the Athenians to a position of wealth and military dominance abroad while using sophistic rhetoric to achieve dominance at home (502d–503d, 515c–519b). Socrates defends the notion that the Athenians' true interests lie in the pursuit of justice and other virtues such as wisdom, moderation, and courage, not in the gratification of their desires, however natural and refined those desires may be. Thus sophistic rhetoric is part and parcel of the entire system of conventional values that Plato wishes to uproot and replace with better ones.

2 Plato's Political Rhetoric

In several passages of the *Gorgias*, Plato speaks of a rhetoric that is better than the flattering rhetoric taught by Gorgias and practiced by Callicles and Athens' leaders.

Called 'true rhetoric' (517a) or the discourse of 'the expert and virtuous *rhētōr*' (504d), this rhetoric does not flatter, but instructs. It is imagined that if it could flow without obstruction from the beneficent, authoritative political expert to the citizens who need it and would heed it, they would prosper. Rhetoric of this kind has not been realized and is unlikely ever to be realized in democratic Athens, but it is an essential part of Plato's political theory.

In one sense it is precisely Socrates' own discourse that represents the true political rhetoric proposed in the *Gorgias*. This is evident from Socrates' comment on the pastry cook's imagined prosecution of a physician before a jury of children (521d): 'I think that I am one of very few Athenians', says Socrates, 'not to say the only one, engaged in the true political *technē*, and that of the men of today I alone practice statesmanship. When I speak on any occasion it is not with a view to winning favor, but I aim at what is best, not what is most pleasant'. Likewise in the *Apology*, Socrates distinguishes between the deceptive, false plea of his prosecutors, which is intended to secure a conviction only to advance their own interests, and his own frank plea, which aims at the truth, justice, and the advancement of the interests of the Athenian audience (17a–18a). Socrates claims that his discourse in court is the same as that which he uses to converse privately with fellow citizens outside the political institutions (18a). Admonishing his interlocutors, in court and elsewhere, to value their souls above physical, worldly goods, Socrates claims to benefit his fellow citizens by means of the method and the message of his discourse (29d–31c, 36c–37a). But this is a unique kind of political discourse and is properly distinguished from rhetoric. Socrates is forced out of Athens' political institutions because when uttered in the competitive democratic institutions, his frank discourse would be at best inconsequential and at worst dangerous to himself and his friends (31c–32e). Thus is the philosopher in a democracy silenced and left to pursue philosophy in private and without political effect (*Gorgias* 522a, *Republic* 496c–e).

An argument from the *Statesman* indicates why Plato developed a structural role for rhetoric as a tool of philosophy. Plato acknowledges that rhetoric possesses a certain utility with regard to persuasion, and on that basis he grants rhetoric a limited and dependent claim to the status of *technē* (303e–304e). The limit is set by philosophy: rhetoric is turned into a tool to be used for the advancement of the social and political ends that are determined strictly by philosophy. In this respect rhetoric becomes precisely parallel to the other tools that are at the disposal of the benevolent, philosophically enlightened ruler, such as mythological tales, civic cult, noble lies, and, when appropriate, the use of force. Plato's efforts to develop a form of rhetoric that would serve proper political ends become evident in his two large-scale attempts – the *Republic* and the *Laws* – to imagine political communities under the control of philosophy. In both dialogues the purpose of the state is to enhance knowledge and virtue among the citizens individually and the community as a whole; all are benefited by philosophical rule (*Republic* 590c–d). The rhetorical issue that arises is indistinguishable from the issue of mass political education, namely, how can philosophical knowledge and the willingness to accept philosophical guidance be transmitted from ruling philosopher to the citizens at large.

Two rhetorical innovations are evident in the *Republic*. The first concerns a unique rhetorical situation prior to and necessary for the creation of the just *polis*. As part of Socrates' demonstration of the feasibility of this *polis* (473b–502c), he considers the

problem of finding people who would be willing to entrust themselves to philosophical rule. These people will become the initial population of the *polis* and only after they have signed on, so to speak, will they and especially their children become subject to the educational measures of the just *polis* (501a, 540e–541a). Socrates imagines addressing this audience, and though he does not present a full speech, he outlines what such a speech would contain if it were to persuade these people to join the nascent state and acquiesce in philosophical rule for their own good (499d–502a). The rhetorical task resembles Socrates' task in the *Apology*, namely, to defend the authority and utility of philosophy against long-standing misconceptions and current slander before an unsympathetic, autonomous audience. But the speech sketched in the *Republic* contains nothing like the blunt, unsettling challenge to convention presented by Socrates in the *Apology*. Of course, Socrates failed to persuade the Athenian jury, though he did not regret that fact. In the *Republic*, Plato wants the speech to succeed because it is necessary for establishing the feasibility of the just *polis*. The speech sketched in the *Republic* steers clear of flattery, but it consists entirely of conventional attempts to soften, persuade, cajole, and convince. It must be conventional: the people to whom it is addressed are themselves conventional and as yet untouched by philosophical education.

The second and very different rhetorical innovation of the *Republic* is evident in the early education of the guardians, out of whom will emerge the ruling philosophers. The philosophers rule by virtue of their expertise in the political *technē*, and that expertise, the product of natural talent and long, arduous training, entails an incorruptible character. Political power is to be concentrated in the hands of the philosophers, yet it is to be safe in the hands of the philosophers. The childhood education of the guardians is designed to give their character the decisive imprint it will bear throughout their lives, namely, utter confidence in the goodness of the gods and the order of the cosmos, in the value of justice and the other virtues, and in the priority of the *polis* over the wants and interests of individuals. As made evident in the *Gorgias*, such beliefs depart from the norms of Athenian culture, which were shaped by Homer, tragic poetry, and the conventional pursuits of glory, wealth, and power.

Plato's idea is, first, to insulate the young future guardians from Homer and the other traditional sources of Greek childhood education, thus eliminating any exposure to the baleful, corrupting ideas; this is Plato's famous censorship of the poets. But equally important is the complementary step, less often remarked, of inundating the young guardians with messages and media that inculcate the values that are to shape their character for the rest of their lives. This is a massive rhetorical endeavor in which Plato recognizes, and seeks to control, a vast range of influences on his captive audience (376c–402c): not only the staples of childhood education such as mythological tales and narrative and dramatic poetry, but also particular rhythms, songs, and diction, and even household furnishings and objects. Plato aims to shape every possible facet of the young guardians' environment in order to influence their propensity for adopting philosophical values.⁴ The *Republic's* famous 'noble lie' (414c–415d) is likewise an example of rhetoric in the service of social education under the guidance of philosophy. According to the noble lie, the citizens of the *polis* are all children of their mother, the earth, but their status in the *polis* is determined by the metal which god has implanted in them, gold, silver, bronze, or iron, corresponding to the rulers, the auxiliary guardians, and the lower classes. The noble lie reflects

the true capabilities of the respective portions of the population; it is not a lie with respect to its underlying content. It is a lie with respect to its mythological form, and it is precisely that form which Socrates expects will help to convince the citizens, especially the lower classes, to accept their position in the *polis* by tying that position to divine necessity.

In the *Laws*, the philosopher produces a comprehensive law code that permanently enshrines his political wisdom and is intended to shape the populace into a just society. As the vehicle for communication between the political expert and the citizenry at large, law becomes a tool of mass education, and Plato undertakes two rhetorical innovations focused on the law. First, he utilizes the language of the law as an instrument of mass communication. The laws' directives are clear, comprehensive, and readily applicable to the lives of the citizens. Punishments are clearly specified and carefully calibrated to indicate the degree of culpability and the relative importance of the various crimes and offenses. Yet Plato also wants the citizens, who are to aspire to nobility and freedom, to obey the law willingly because they understand it rather than comply meekly out of fear of punishment. Hence, the *Laws*' second rhetorical innovation: the lawgiver is a master rhetorician who composes preambles to the law code as a whole and to individual laws within the law code.⁵

The preambles are brief deliberative speeches, designed, as Plato says, to add persuasion to the compulsion contained in the law proper (718b–723d). The preambles manifest a variety of rhetorical strategies: some explain the purpose of the law; some offer high-minded reasons for obeying the law; others simply exhort the citizens to obey in the name of a lofty purpose. They are all composed in a grand style that in itself suggests authority and inspires obedience. Yet in accord with Plato's political-philosophical principles, the lawgiver has a monopoly on rhetoric in the *polis* of the *Laws*. To prevent the kind of abuse that in Plato's view regularly takes place in Athenian courts, Plato outlaws schools of rhetoric, the learning of rhetoric by ordinary citizens, and the use of rhetoric by litigants pleading their cases in court (937d–938c). The justification is the same as the view Socrates expressed in the opening of his plea in the *Apology*: popular courts can deliver justice and enforce the laws properly if litigants are prevented from using rhetoric and compelled to declare their arguments openly.

3 Rhetoric and Education

One of Plato's most complex dialogues, the *Phaedrus* offers further criticism of sophistic rhetoric, presents a new, philosophically coherent art of rhetoric, and demonstrates the new rhetorical art in a challenging, unexpected way. In the first half of the dialogue, a chance encounter between Socrates and Phaedrus, who is an admirer of Lysias, Athens' foremost speechwriter, leads to an impromptu, privately staged epideictic contest between Lysias and Socrates on the theme of *erōs*, or desire. The contest culminates in what is known as Socrates' Great Speech (244a–257b). The epithet is due to the speech's sustained brilliance, expansiveness, imagination, and intensity, and also to the fact that within the dialogue it is presented as both a *tour de force* of rhetorical display and, in a challenge to the genre of rhetorical display, a deadly serious discourse on desire and the pursuit of knowledge. In the second half of the

dialogue, Socrates analyzes the speeches of the first half and describes what a true art of rhetoric would be like. Rejecting the rhetorical theories of contemporary sophists, Socrates proposes instead a vast, new art of discourse that includes dialectic and psychology and pretends to an effectiveness only dreamt of by contemporary rhetoricians. What is the nature of this Platonic art of rhetoric and what is the purpose of Socrates' Great Speech?⁶

Like other Platonic dialogues, the main concern of the *Phaedrus* is to vindicate Plato's conception of the philosophical life against rival pursuits, and the *Phaedrus* is no less emphatic in advocating a complete and fundamental revolution in values than are such dialogues as the *Apology*, *Gorgias*, and *Republic*. But the *Phaedrus* does not contain an argument to establish the priority of philosophical values and rhetoric's dependence on philosophy. Even the claim that dialectic, or philosophical reasoning, is necessary for rhetoric does not establish the priority of philosophy: dialectic is introduced into rhetoric for the purely instrumental reason that it is effective for persuasion (261a–266c). Rather, the burden of establishing the priority of philosophy falls entirely on the one place in the dialogue where the case is made for philosophy's absolute priority for ordering human affairs, and that is Socrates' Great Speech on desire.

Uniquely in the Platonic corpus, the *Phaedrus* places at the center of the inquiry the very question that lies at the heart of the rhetoricians' own enterprise, namely, how discourse persuades and how an understanding of persuasion can be implemented by art. Plato rejects sophistic rhetoric in this dialogue not because it interferes with philosophy – although it does – but because it fails at its own task of composing persuasive speeches (266c–270e). Focusing on what happens in the soul when persuasion takes place, Plato outlines an art of persuasion based on arousing desire in the auditor's soul. By composing Socrates' Great Speech and assigning to rhetoric, as it were, the task of demonstrating the priority of philosophy, Plato demonstrates both the seriousness of his rhetorical endeavor and the efficacy of his new rhetorical art.⁷ The *Phaedrus* thus looks at rhetoric as more than just a tool of mass political communication, useful to the ruling philosopher in his dealings with the citizens under his care. Understood as the art of arousing and directing desire (*erōtikē technē*), which in fact is Socrates' particular expertise (227c, 257a), rhetoric becomes 'a kind of soul-moving power (*psychagōgia*) of discourse' (261a), that is, an art of awakening in souls their natural desire for the good and the beautiful, of educating souls and turning them towards philosophy.

The first half of the dialogue demonstrates *psychagōgia* in action. Phaedrus is a connoisseur of rhetoric, but he is misguided, since he sees in Lysias a polished but entirely conventional speechwriter, the height of rhetorical perfection. Socrates elicits from Phaedrus a reading of a speech by Lysias (230e–234b). The speech, composed by Plato for the dialogue, plays on the conventions of Athenian pederasty: an older man propositions a young man, arguing that the young man should have sex not with a man who desires him, but with the speaker precisely because he does not desire him.⁸ Lysias' speech is pure fluff, intended to impress Athens' smart set with the author's wit and rhetorical flair, and as such it is not without interest. Yet what might have been appropriate as a rhetorical bagatelle is out of place, and egregiously exposed, in Plato's world. The speech is barely coherent (235a, 263d–264e), to say nothing of its crass cynicism presented as enlightened self-interest. Drawing Phaedrus

under his educational sway, Socrates piques Phaedrus with a speech of his own that aims to improve on Lysias' (237a–241d). Though Socrates' speech makes the same paradoxical plea for sex without desire as did Lysias', Socrates' speech is a better one: much clearer, better organized, and far more coherently argued. But Socrates' purpose becomes evident when he suddenly detains Phaedrus by pleading the necessity for yet another speech, a recantation of the one he just gave, since, like Lysias' speech, it slandered the god Eros by portraying *erōs* as something bad and to be avoided. Like all the gods, Eros is good and the source of only good things.

Lysias' speech and Socrates' first speech are meant for rhetorical display, where the purpose is to entertain the audience and win admiration for the author. Socrates' Great Speech (244a–257b) incorporates rhetorical display but also endeavors to benefit the imagined young man with informed, honest advice. This is rhetoric with serious purpose: the god must be appeased and the young man must be helped to make the right decision about a partner and desire. Now Socrates describes the blessings of *erōs* and advises the young man to accept the attention of an older man who genuinely desires him. The Great Speech departs from the previous speeches also with respect to the means of persuasion. It does not argue from expediency or calculate advantage by weighing alternatives. Rather, it consists mostly of a narrative that describes the harrowing, arduous journey of the soul towards its proper goal, the overcoming of mortality through the knowledge of Being. The soul is likened to the 'combined force of a team of winged horses and their winged charioteer' (246a). Striving to reach the rim of heaven and in the company of the gods to gaze directly upon Being, the most beautiful sight there is, the charioteer struggles to control his team of one obedient horse and one recalcitrant one. The travails of the journey are intense, as is the joy upon success. The narrative moves back to earth and to the struggle to establish an erotic-philosophical relationship that will lead to a life in pursuit of wisdom and ultimately to the immortality achieved through knowledge of Being. Throughout the narrative both the charioteer in pursuit of Being and the lover in pursuit of a beautiful beloved are driven by the divine desire that alone can bring them to their goals.

The portrayal of *erōs* in the Great Speech is so vivid, the narrative tension so intense, and the vision of transcendence so triumphant (250b–c) that the auditor himself acquires a desire for the very experience that is portrayed. *Erōs*, vividly portrayed, arouses *erōs*.⁹ In the moment when such intense *erōs* is fixed on its goal, all thought of the conventional goods that belong to everyday life is obliterated; *erōs* knows only the object it desires. Socrates aims to make the auditor feel the attractions of divine *erōs* so intensely that he will desire that *erōs* himself and move towards it on his own. This is the means of persuasion that gives the Great Speech its compelling quality and departs from anything implemented or even imagined by contemporary sophists and speechwriters.

As the Great Speech comes to a close and the power of erotic rhetoric has been demonstrated, Phaedrus has progressed in his education. He has had his attention turned from Lysias to Socrates, from the thin amusement and weak persuasion of conventional rhetoric to the riveting and potentially transcendent pursuit of wisdom, knowledge, and beauty. Now engaging Phaedrus in a discursive argument more suited to overt instruction, Socrates looks back at the earlier speeches and takes up the question of what it is that makes discourse persuasive (259e–260e), in answer to

which Socrates produces an account of what a true art of rhetoric would consist in (260e–274b). This portion of the dialogue contains Plato's most important theoretical innovations to the art of rhetoric.

First, Plato enlarges the scope of rhetoric. From its political orientation as taught by the sophists and discussed in the *Gorgias*, it becomes a universal art of discourse, embracing 'all things that are said' (261a–e), that is, discourse which is public and private, extemporaneous and prepared, spoken and written, epideictic and dialectical. The underlying properties that make discourse educational in any setting are, from the perspective of the art, fundamentally the same. Second, when Socrates says that 'the art of rhetoric is a kind of soul-moving power (*psychagōgia*) of discourse' (261a), he prefigures psychology as an essential part of rhetoric. The soul is the material on which the art of rhetoric operates – it is souls that are to be moved – so rhetoric must have a comprehensive understanding of the soul and the ways in which discourse affects souls (268b–272b). Socrates envisages a vast elaborate network of souls, persuasive tasks, and speeches, arrayed systematically to enable the trained *rhētōr* to reliably convince anyone of anything by responding to the natural qualities of the auditor's soul (271b–272b). Persuasion is not a matter of words, phrases, forms of argument, and all the other linguistic phenomena that are catalogued in the sophists' rejected rhetoric books (266c–267e), but the methodical creation of desire in the auditor's soul.

Third, Socrates argues that the proficient *rhētōr* must have knowledge of the subject matter of his discourse, not because he needs that knowledge in order to benefit the auditor (which is true and was argued in the *Gorgias*), but because his ability to persuade (regardless of the purpose of persuasion) is enhanced by such knowledge (259e–262c). Rhetoric's persuasiveness lies at least partly in the coherent demonstration of a case, no matter what the case is: rhetoric is an art that 'enables [the *rhētōr*] to make out everything to be like everything else, within the limits of possible comparison' (261e). To this end, Socrates introduces dialectic, which is a systematic way of thinking, arguing, and acquiring knowledge. Dialectic takes many forms in Plato, but it always constitutes for him the primary form of philosophical argument. The claims made for dialectic in the *Phaedrus* are general and go well beyond the requirements of advanced philosophical reasoning. A speaker uses dialectic 'in order to define each thing and make clear whatever it is that one wishes to instruct [one's audience] about on any occasion' (265d). Socrates asserts that dialectic imparts clarity and consistency to his speeches on desire (265d) and gives rise to his ability to speak and to think: 'I am myself a lover of these divisions and collections [i.e., the basic procedures of dialectic], that I may gain the power to speak and to think' (266b). Speaking and thinking are common to all human beings. Clarity and consistency are as much rhetorical virtues as they are logical ones. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates opposed his dialectic to Gorgianic epideictic rhetoric (447a–c, 448c–d). In the *Phaedrus*, however, Socrates brings dialectic into alliance with the true art of rhetoric. The new rhetorical *technē* is thus not a replacement for the politically convenient, flattery-like persuasiveness offered by the sophists, but is useful only to the knowledgeable speaker. The new *technē* requires the speaker to use his knowledge to shape the medium in which the message is delivered, enabling him to persuade by means of instruction, and thus avoid flattery.

The scientific rigor and comprehensiveness of the art of rhetoric contemplated in the *Phaedrus* go far beyond anything that had been attempted or even conceived by

previous and contemporary sophists. When mastered, the entire scheme of using discourse to manipulate desire is claimed to be necessarily effective in producing persuasion (271b). It is this guarantee of effectiveness, tied to its use in philosophical education, that allows Plato to claim for his project the status of *technē* that he denies to the feeble and fallible rhetorical project of sophistic contemporaries. In view of the scale of the endeavor, Phaedrus wonders whether there might be a shorter, easier route to an art of this kind; Socrates shows that there is none (272b–274b).

4 The *Republic*: Rhetoric and Philosophical Literature

Plato departed from philosophical tradition, in which experts treated arcane subjects in technical treatises that had no appeal outside small circles of fellow experts. Joining the burgeoning trend of artistic prose composed for a literate public and treating ethical problems of universal relevance, Plato devised a literary medium and a literary style that demonstrated to the reading public what philosophy was and sought to convert readers to philosophical values. In accord with the argument of the *Phaedrus*, Plato's dialogues are rhetorical compositions in the service of philosophy, aimed at readers whose reception of philosophy would be enhanced by discourse shaped to their needs and abilities.¹⁰ The literary qualities evident across the corpus – vividness, unpredictability, the dramatic interplay of complex characters who care strongly about their views and provoke strong reactions in the reader – contribute to basic educational goals: contesting conventional values, inculcating philosophical method, and establishing Socrates as a model.¹¹

In the *Republic*, Plato's most ambitious work, Socrates attempts to convince his interlocutors, Glaucon and Adimantus, that it always pays to be just under all conditions. Plato is making the same case to his readers, urging them too to adopt a just way of life under the guidance of philosophy. As a work of philosophical literature disseminated in the public realm, the *Republic* constitutes an attempt – an improbable one, but nevertheless a serious one – to foster the very situation that would enable the just city to come into being, namely, the situation in which the public understood, and therefore accepted, that its welfare depends on handing political power over to philosophers like Plato. Beyond the argument on justice that constitutes the foundation of the work, the *Republic* contains the most concentrated use of rhetorical art in Plato's corpus.¹²

The artistic assault begins with the *Republic*'s justly famed opening line: 'I went down yesterday to Piraeus with Glaucon, the son of Ariston' (327a). The line is utterly innocent and shockingly offhand. The effect of this line and the opening scene (327a–328e) is to lull the reader into accepting the momentous conversation on justice that follows as arising naturally in consequence of a chance, everyday encounter. Disarmed by the naturalness of the conversation and intrigued by its unfolding drama, the reader is tricked into following closely the very argument that may ultimately change his values. Over the course of the work a variety of rhetorical devices are used: the just city that makes it possible to see the justice of the soul 'writ large' (368c–e); the similes of the sun (506e–509c) and the divided line (509d–511e); the images of the ship of state

(487e–488e), the cave (514a–517b), and the soul as conjoined man, lion, and many-headed beast (588b–589b); the vivid descriptions of the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical men (Book 8), which by contrast palpably demonstrate the superiority of the just man; and the myth of Er (614b–621b).

These devices are a shortcut for readers who are not up to the rigors of unadulterated argument on abstract concepts. The simile of the sun, for instance, substitutes for an argument on the good that Socrates cannot give now, but hopes to give on another occasion (506e–507a). These devices utilize the affective potential of rhetorical art to inculcate not philosophical knowledge but philosophical values. They correspond to the sanitized myths, graceful rhythms, and noble lies that inculcate not philosophical knowledge but philosophical values in the young, future guardians of the just city (discussed above). While these devices lack the necessity bestowed by reason, to compensate for that lack they are vivid, novel, and memorable, and possess narrative resonance, qualities that do more to persuade non-philosophical readers than the tedium of an argument they could not comprehend. These devices are also not without effect on philosophically sophisticated readers, who are presumably not immune to rhetorical art.

One rhetorical feature of the *Republic* goes beyond these conspicuous devices. In Book 5 Socrates speaks of three ‘waves’ that he fears will overwhelm the interlocutors (457a–c, 472a, 473c–d): the common training of men and women, the holding of wives and children in common, and philosopher-kings. These features of the just city are entailed by the argument, but they are ‘waves’ because they are so ‘deeply contrary to belief’ (473e) that the interlocutors will likely find them ridiculous and impossible to accept. If the just city is merely a fantasy that bears no resemblance to life (450d), how can one find in justice the good that outweighs all the other goods that clearly are available in this life? No matter how compelling Socrates’ argument is considered on its own, if the interlocutors and readers are reluctant to accept it because it strikes them as impossibly far-fetched (450c–d, 457d, 473c), how can the interlocutors and readers be encouraged to overcome their reluctance and accept the argument anyway? After all, the point of the entire endeavor is not merely to know the truth about justice, but to know it and to live it (621c). This is a problem of the will and is properly attacked by rhetoric.¹³

Socrates’ demonstration that the just city is not a fantasy, but a real if necessarily remote possibility (473b–502c), is part of the answer to this problem. But only part: what threatens the argument is a feeling, or perhaps an intuition, that philosopher-kings are simply preposterous. Among Plato’s readers, that feeling would be tenacious and not entirely allayed by yet another argument (473e–474a, 487b–d). Plato’s task was to convey not just a counter-argument, but also a counter-feeling, that philosopher-kings are, or at least could be, natural. The image of the cave (514a–521a) contributes to this task. The cave image depicts conventional values as unnatural, and it explains the fact that the unnaturalness of these values has generally gone unnoticed. The cave image also portrays the acquisition of philosophical values as a natural process, akin to the healthy physical process of rising to the light and air, of gaining mobility and sharpening the powers of perception.

But this rhetorical moment has another dimension, which is directed not at the interlocutors, but just at the reader. The very spectacle of these Athenian gentlemen coming to accept the naturalness of philosopher-kings (along with the rest of

philosophy's unconventional values) allows the reader to feel, or at least imagine, that perhaps he too can withstand the 'waves' and come to accept philosopher-kings as natural. The ground is prepared when Plato creates all the literary fuss – the wave metaphor, the raised tensions, the calculated delay – that precedes the announcement of philosopher-kings. The fuss assures the non-philosophical reader that his own highly skeptical reaction is not inappropriate and not being ignored. Yet after Glaucon admits that many people will react violently to the notion of philosopher-kings (473e–474a), it comes as a mild surprise that he and Adimantus calmly listen to Socrates, follow the argument, and ultimately embrace it with little difficulty.

Philosophically sophisticated readers of the *Republic* have often found Glaucon and Adimantus too deficient in critical faculties, too ready to accede to Socrates' argument, and therefore ineffectual as partners in dialectic. But Glaucon and Adimantus serve a different purpose. Though they are interested in philosophy, they are not philosophers themselves. They are sufficiently conventional in their values that Socrates has reason to worry about how they will react to the 'waves'. They display conventional attitudes on luxury (372d) and happiness (419a). After Socrates has completed his argument that justice always pays in and of itself (end of Book 9), he adds a demonstration of the good consequences of justice (608c–614a), a line of reasoning that appeals to Glaucon and Adimantus not as philosophers but as men of the world. Glaucon and Adimantus are sufficiently critical to make Socrates work to convert them and to give readers the impression that their conversion is a significant accomplishment. But they are neither so critical nor so recalcitrant that they will not be won over to Socrates' view of things.

Contrast Plato's earlier, shorter dialogues, in which Socrates' interlocutors are left uncertain what, if anything, has been established with regard to whatever question is at hand. And in the *Gorgias*, for instance, though Callicles wavers for a moment (513c–d), he refuses to accept Socrates' radical views on justice even though those views have been secured, as Socrates says, 'with arguments of iron and adamant' (508e–509a). These dialogues demonstrate the critical faculty at work and nurture it in the reader, a clear philosophical priority. But it is not clear in these dialogues whether the gulf between philosophy and non-philosophers can possibly be bridged. Some characters in these dialogues are intrigued by philosophy; some are repelled; none is, so to speak, converted. Whereas the sympathy for Socrates' project evinced by Glaucon and Adimantus in the *Republic* hinders their critical faculties, it allows Plato to demonstrate that his endeavor is, like the just state itself, not a fantasy but entirely possible, however remote it may seem. Glaucon and Adimantus are not and do not become philosophers in the course of the *Republic*. But they submit themselves to philosophy's rule, and they do so for the right reasons, thereby becoming exemplary for Plato's readers in the public domain.

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Notes

- 1 The traditional view is argued by B. Vickers, *In Defence of Rhetoric* (Oxford: 1988). On Plato's role in the development of rhetoric, see T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991). On the mutual contestation of rhetoric and philosophy, see A. Nightingale, *Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy* (Cambridge: 1995).
- 2 See R.W. Wallace, 'The sophists in Athens', in D. Boedeker and K.A. Raafaub (eds.), *Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens* (Cambridge, MA: 1998), pp. 203–222. The advance of rhetoric into the institutions of Athenian democracy is best attested by the corpus of Attic oratory: see S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999). On Plato's argument against sophistic rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, see H. Yunis, *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: 1996), pp. 117–171.
- 3 On Plato's metaphysics and theory of knowledge, see A. Silverman, *The Dialectic of Essence: A Study of Plato's Metaphysics* (Princeton: 2003). On his concept of *technē*, see D. Roochnik, *Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Technē* (University Park, PA: 1996).
- 4 See M. Burnyeat, 'Culture and Society in Plato's *Republic*', *The Tanner Lectures in Human Values* 20 (1999), pp. 215–324, especially pp. 217–222 and 236–263.
- 5 On the preambles of the *Laws*, see Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 211–236.
- 6 On rhetoric in the *Phaedrus*, see Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 172–210 and H. Yunis, 'Erōs in Plato's *Phaedrus* and the Shape of Greek Rhetoric', *Arion* 13 (2005), pp. 101–125.
- 7 Socrates compares medicine, poetry, and music, as arts that must demonstrate their potency in practice as well as theory (268a–269c).
- 8 On Athenian pederasty, see K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*² (Cambridge, MA: 1989) and D. Cohen, *Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: 1991), pp. 171–202.
- 9 This psychagogic, or soul-moving, phenomenon, which is the hallmark of erotic art, was familiar to Plato and his contemporaries through the profusion of erotic art and poetry produced in Athens and Greece generally: see C. Calame, *The Poetics of Eros in Ancient*

Greece, trans. J. Lloyd (Princeton: 1999) and J. Boardman and E. La Rocca, *Eros in Greece* (London: 1978).

- 10 The dialogues of Plato's late period (*Theaetetus*, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*) are exempt from this statement; they are mostly technical and aimed at experts in philosophy.
- 11 On philosophical writing before Plato, see C.H. Kahn, 'Writing Philosophy: Prose and Poetry from Thales to Plato', in H. Yunis (ed.), *Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: 2003), pp. 139–161. On Plato's Socratic discourses, see C.H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (Cambridge: 1996). On the rise of artistic prose, see S. Goldhill, *The Invention of Prose* (Oxford: 2002). On Plato's use of character, see R. Blondell, *The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge: 2002). On the rhetorical techniques and educational goals of Plato's dialogues, see M. Frede, 'Plato's Arguments and the Dialogue Form', in J.C. Klagge and N.D. Smith (eds.), *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*. Suppl. Vol.: *Methods of Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues* (Oxford: 1992), pp. 201–219, H. Yunis, 'Writing for Reading: Thucydides, Plato, and the Emergence of the Critical Reader', in Yunis (ed.), *Written Texts and the Rise of Literate Culture in Ancient Greece* (cited this note), pp. 189–212, and A.N. Michelini (ed.), *Plato as Author: The Rhetoric of Philosophy* (Leiden: 2003).
- 12 See H. Yunis, 'The Protreptic Rhetoric of the *Republic*', in G.R.F. Ferrari (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic* (Cambridge: 2007).
- 13 Doubting the argument is a common problem in Plato's dialogues, in response to which he has a number of strategies: see K. Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon* (Stuttgart: 1959).

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Rhetoric to Alexander

P. Chiron

For the Greeks, the fourth century is the golden age of rhetoric in both its practical and theoretical dimensions. Besides the corpus of Attic orators, two complete technical treatises have been preserved: Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, which is traditionally included among the works of Aristotle, but now generally ascribed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus.

At first glance, the two works are markedly different, most obviously in terms of their quality and interest. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* relates rhetoric to dialectic, ethics and politics. In it one finds recurrent explicit or implicit references to many of Aristotle's important concepts. Therefore its scope is very ambitious as it re-appraises certain well-established concepts of traditional rhetoric, innovates and pursues the discussion initiated by Plato at the same level of proficiency, while strongly qualifying the condemnation of rhetoric as stated in the *Gorgias* and attempting to bring to completion, on different bases, the agenda for an ideal rhetoric as elaborated in the *Phaedrus*. The *Rhetoric to Alexander* on the other hand is a treatise with very practical ambitions. It is written for professional orators and is almost devoid of reflection on the definition of the discipline itself, its justification or even its function in the society of the time.

However, it would be wrong to go no further than a mere statement of its inferiority. For, prompted by a pragmatic attitude, the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* relies on the practices of his time and has recourse to a vast number of technical devices elaborated since the fifth century, not only by the first Sicilian rhetoricians but also by the sophists, by Socrates' eristic alumni, by Isocrates, and perhaps also by the early Aristotle for indeed there are many convergent points between the two treatises.¹

Thus, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is of considerable interest even though it cannot be regarded, like Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, as a founding text. The reasons for its importance are twofold. On the one hand, it is a rhetorical code close to the orators' most ancient practices and as a result may shed light on them. On the other hand, it is an

application of a great number of doctrines of which it is sometimes the only or most faithful witness.

After first introducing the content of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, I shall – second – examine to what extent the treatise mirrors and throws light on oratorical practices. Third, I shall give examples of influences inherited from the most ancient empirico-sophistical tradition. Fourth, I will try to show the rather puzzling links between the treatise and what we call philosophy now. Fifth and last, I shall give a brief account of the enigma that the dating and ascription of the treatise still present today in so far as this issue is inseparable from the history of the text through the centuries.

1 The Content of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*

As well as the treatise itself, the manuscript tradition has preserved a letter penned in the hand of Aristotle that is supposed to have been sent alongside the work itself to Alexander the Great (1420a5–1421b6). In all probability the letter is a forged document intended to substantiate the ascription of the text to Aristotle. At the end of the treatise, an unknown author randomly jotted down some notes that reformulate a few passages from the first chapters (1446a36–1447b7).

Apart from these added elements, the overall composition of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is quite clear. It is based on a division of ‘political’ discourse (*politikos logos*, from *polis*, the city) into three genres (*genē*): demegoric – which originated in popular and political assemblies –, epideictic, and judicial, and seven species (*eidē*): exhortation and dissuasion, praise and condemnation, prosecution and defence, and examination. This division is given as universal and understood to cover all situations of communication, including private ones.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* is further divided into three parts. The first describes models of argumentation specific to genres and species (chaps. 1–5), the second (chaps. 6–28) describes some devices of persuasion and stylistic recommendations without any reference to genres and species, and the third (chaps. 29–37) takes up again the reference to genres and species in order that the construction of a speech may follow the previously established division of its different parts: *prooimion*, narration, etc. In conclusion, the final chapter (38) advises one to put into practice the precepts that have been recommended, insisting that the speaker who is going to persuade his audience should supplement his technical preparation with a moral preparation effected in practical life, applying the same method.

In the initial section, the first species examined are exhortation and persuasion. Exhortation consists in urging the hearers to decide on options (*proaireseis*, in other words principles likely to influence a certain number of choices), or actions (*praxeis*) or to make speeches (*logoi*). The basis of the argumentation (chap. 1) is a series of predicates that can be applied to these options, speeches, etc. These predicates are that which is fair, legal, useful, beautiful, pleasant, easy (when someone is invited to perform something difficult, the orator will endeavour to show that it is either possible or necessary).

The basic principle here is quite simple. The hearer will be persuaded to undertake such and such a course of action, for example, through the characterisation of this action with the predicates mentioned above according to the following schema: It is

necessary to perform a certain action because it is fair, or legal, etc. Then the rhetorician attempts to describe these predicates while showing how to use them, either directly or by proceeding with a series of extensions of their field of application whose sophistic character it is fairly easy to see.

For example, an action is fair either 1) by virtue of its definition (that which is regarded by everybody as fair is said to be fair as, for instance, for a son to obey his father), or 2) by virtue of its resemblance to a fair action (for if a son to obey his father is accepted as fair, then a similar action such as to imitate one's father's actions will be fair too), or 3) by dint of a contrary action (it is fair to punish those who have behaved badly, therefore it is fair to express gratitude to those who have acted well), or 4) because there are prestigious guarantors of this justice (such action is fair because so-and-so has declared that it was fair). This is the authority argument.

This argumentation, which is particularly well adapted to demegoric oratory but can nonetheless be applied elsewhere, is not new. It is possible to trace it as far back as the fifth century with Antiphon and Thucydides. It survived in various guises up to the late rhetoric of Hermogenes. However, it is in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that one can find one of its best descriptions.

In the second chapter, the diverse demegoric arguments that may be used are presented in connection with the seven major issues that constitute the agenda of the debates in the Assembly (*Ekklēsia*) or Council (*Bouleutērion*): forms of worship, legislation, the constitution, diplomacy, war, peace, and finances. The argumentation is explained in a more practical way. For example, regarding the religious issue, three different cases are considered: an increase in the expenses, a decrease, or their renewal. For each of these cases the rhetorician goes as far as offering pre-written models, ready for use, for example: 'When [...] cuts in religious worship expenditure are sought, it is necessary to relate speech to circumstances first by saying that "the conjuncture has become worse for the citizens than it used to be"; secondly, by adding that "what pleases the gods is not the expense caused by the sacrifices but most certainly the piety of those who offer them"' (1423b24–28).

These models of argumentation, which are related to circumstances, are followed by a list of criteria that, in the absolute, define the proper proposals for laws concerning worship. These proposals are those that guarantee piety (which is understood as respect for ancestral customs), minimal cost, the usefulness of military activity (the sacrifices are the opportunity for the soldiers, equipped at their own expense, to parade in front of the crowd, thus providing both a financial and psychological advantage) as well as the beauty of the spectacle (1423b36–1424b5).

In this extremely rich chapter, the point of view of the author is perceptible. His viewpoint is definitely that of a Greek man living in the city of Athens or teaching in Athens, and whose political horizon is limited to two kinds of regimes, either democracy or oligarchy. The two political regimes are described through the principles that ensure their durability, without any marked preference for either of the two: 'All in all, in democracies, the laws must prevent the majority from plotting to get hold of the belongings of the rich and, in oligarchies, their role is to dissuade those who share in political power from outraging the weaker among them' (1424b10–13).

From Chapter 3 to the end of the first part, the treatise loses its clear line of thought and a certain degree of confusion becomes apparent. This chapter is devoted to praise and condemnation which are defined as the amplification or disparaging of options,

actions, or speeches that can be honourable or base. In other words the orator is urged to exaggerate a quality intrinsic to that which is talked about. However, the rhetorician adds that praise also consists in 'appending such qualities where they do not exist' (1425b37–38), which means that fictitious qualities may be attributed to that which is praised. This part of the sentence, which is queried by some editors (among them M. Fuhrmann, the editor of the 1966 Teubner Text) without any valid textual reason, is not the only example of candid admission of duplicity and reflects common practices in ceremonial speeches, as is shown by Plato's *Menexenus* (234c–235a) or Isocrates' *Busiris* (11.4). The values used for the encomium are precisely the predicates that characterise the demegoric genre (that which is fair, legal, useful, etc.).

However, the chapter introduces a new topic related to the possible links between praised objects (whether animate or inanimate) and predicates. I shall examine this topic at a later stage because of its likely connections not only with the sophistic practices of paradoxical praise but also with the philosophical theories of causality.

The final part of the chapter is a kind of catch-all section including the description of devices as can be expected at this stage such as the amplification by comparison, or competition (which, for example, consists in placing side by side the victory that is the object of praise and another one acknowledged as being a great victory, by highlighting the merits of the former in relation to the latter); the amplification by contrast (which consists in enhancing something of medium importance by contrasting it with something similar but of lesser importance); and the amplification by opposition (which consists in showing something good at an advantage by setting it against its contrary evil).

The rhetorician immediately goes on with devices originating in the judicial oratory such as, for example, praising the object of the encomium because of the intention behind the action, or on account of a long preparation, or of the exceptional character of the action itself, etc. This mixture of elements from sophistic-philosophical topics and from judicial oratory may reflect a certain hesitation in the arrangement of the subject-matter but reveals no inconsistency in the argument. Indeed, the rhetorician underscores the possibility for the argumentative strategies to 'circulate' between the various oratory species. The strategies, which seem proper for demegoric (or deliberative) oratory, may be used for demonstrative oratory, and the same applies to judicial oratory etc. (see for example 1427b30–34).

The mixture of devices that seem to belong to argumentation with more formal devices may also appear surprising, and I have already mentioned the devices of comparison and contrast. In this chapter the rhetorician also examines the *mode of presentation* of the thing or act concerned (the Greek word for act is *pragma*), a presentation which can be synthetic or analytical with the possibility for each mode to favour amplification depending on the subjects concerned (1426b8–11). Such lack of clear-cut distinction between the two is to be related to the thought of Isocrates who, in the same way, does not separate form and content and calls *ideai*, or *eidē*, rhetorical devices that, for us, concern either one or the other.²

Chapter 4 deals with prosecution and defence. Prosecution is defined as the presentation of offences or *errors* while defence is presented as the refutation of accusations or *suspensions* of offences or errors. In this section too, the content is not well organised and the method of presentation lacks consistency. For example, model clauses are mixed with abstract principles.

In spite of that, this chapter is also extremely rich with room provided for accusation of foolishness (*abelteria*), which probably corresponds to the legal procedure against the magistrates themselves (see below). Furthermore, the very words, *offence*, *error* and *accident*, are carefully defined, in the spirit of Prodicus, and the advice given changes according to whether the offence can be matched with a corresponding law.

Concerning trials in which the punishments were determined by statute (*agōnes timētoi*), the argumentation focuses on the question of fact whereas it focuses on the *charge* itself if the jurors themselves decide on the punishment. These are among the first discernible indications of further distinctions that will prove fundamental in Hermagoras' doctrine of *staseis*³. It should also be noted that despite the rambling presentation, some major themes are clearly highlighted. Both in the prosecution and defence, the following sequence can be recognised: deed (either committed or not), charge (either serious or not), and remission (forgivable misdeed or not).

A very short chapter on examination (*exetasis*, chap. 5) concludes the first part. It will be presented at greater length in the third part (chap. 37). This species of oratory aims at bringing out an internal contradiction between a person's choices, actions or speeches or else a discrepancy between these choices, and the norm represented by the behaviour of good men.

In the second part (chaps. 7–28), the division of species of oratory is set aside. In actual fact, it is not completely abandoned and according to the author himself, the first significant development devoted to means of persuasion (*pisteis*, chaps. 7–17) takes on a markedly judicial tone. For today's readers, this series is mainly characterised by an organisation and terminology that are misleadingly close to Aristotle's own organisation and terminology.⁴ The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* distinguishes between the means of persuasion 'stemming from the spoken words, actions and men' and the means of persuasion which are 'added' (1428a18) more or less in the same way as Aristotle makes a difference between *pisteis entekhmōi* and *pisteis atekhmōi* (*Rhet.* 1.2 1355b35–36).

The first series comprises the plausible (*eikos*), the paradigm (*paradeigma*), the evidence (*tekmērion*), the enthymeme (*enthymēmē*), the maxim (*gnōmē*), the sign (*sēmeion*) and the proof (*elegkhos*). However, these words, which are also found in Aristotle, have altogether different meanings. For example, in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* the word *tekmērion* does not mean 'irrefutable piece of evidence' as in Aristotle (*sēmeion aluton*, *Rhet.* 1.2 1357b16–17), but refers to the recognition of an internal contradiction in the opponent's discourse or of a contradiction between his discourse and the stated facts from which a radical criticism will be drawn, based on the following schema: so-and-so has not done what he said he would do, therefore he is an unworthy politician (chap. 9).

To take another example, the *enthymēmē*, which in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a dialectical syllogism adapted to rhetoric (see *Rhet.* 1.1 1355a8 ff.), refers to the highlighting of inconsistencies in the opponent's discourse in very much the same way as with the *tekmērion* but resulting in the criticism of a momentary behaviour instead of a global condemnation (chap. 10), along the following schema: is it not absurd to have come to this place to take part in the political debate and create uproar instead of listening to the speeches of the different orators? (*Rhet. Alex.* 1432b26–29).

I shall return later to the conceptions underlying such definitions. It is nonetheless necessary to insist on the risks of misinterpretation that might arise from the misleadingly common terminology used by both rhetoricians.

The second series (1431b9–1432b4) includes four ‘added’ means of persuasion corresponding, *mutatis mutandis*, to Aristotle’s non-technical means of persuasion: the opinion of the orator (*doxa tou legontos*), testimony (*marturia*), testimony obtained under torture (*basanos*), and oath (*horkos*).

Taking into account common documentary and institutional resources,⁵ it is worth noting some striking differences with Aristotle. For example, the *doxa tou legontos* consists for the orator in upholding what he says by speaking in his own name and saying ‘I’. The point is not developed at length (1431b9–19) but it is nonetheless interesting. Indeed, from this short section, it can be inferred that the ‘normal’ speech of an orator is impersonal. His opinion is supposed to adjust beforehand to his role of *nomos*, that is to say to the expression of general opinion, should a vote take place. Thus the expression of personal opinion is exceptional, and when it does occur it should be endowed with authority.

Authority seems to have its origin in two different things: within ‘discourse’ and in that case it is the outcome of speech itself, and in an external origin (good repute). This, at least, is what can be understood from a sentence like the following: ‘You should bring out your own practical experience on the subjects treated and show that it is your interest to tell the truth about them’ (1431b10–12). Here, practical experience partly relates to the self-image the orator has formed in the course of his life, as could already be guessed from the meaning of the word *doxa*, referring to *opinion* and *reputation* at the same time. And furthermore, the refutation will consist in saying that ‘quite often, even experienced men may make mistakes’ (15–16). However, this experience should also be manifested in and through discourse itself (‘bring out’, ‘show’) whereas in Aristotle, *ēthos* is only discursive, hence its classification among the technical means of persuasion (*Rhet.* 1.2 1356a1–2).

Following the means of persuasion (*pisteis*) and preceding the treatment of precepts dealing more specifically on expression, three other all-purpose devices are examined (chaps. 18–21). These are anticipation (*prokatalēpsis*), request (*aitēma*), and recapitulation (*palillogia*).

The section on anticipation is particularly informative as it is for the most part devoted to a development on how to be prepared for facing an uproar in the audience. Another notable point is the addition to the recapitulation section of a development on irony (chap. 21), which is here defined both as *feigned omission* (a form that recapitulation may take), and *antiphrasis*. The archaic character of this twofold definition still coincides with the Socratic value of irony which cannot be reduced to one specific figure in so far as it generally covers *transitory dissembling*, a device capable of causing secondary understanding and philosophical soul-searching.

The chapters on expression are archaic and rather rudimentary too (chaps. 22–28) with a summary of Isocrates’ views on the question but also clear echoes of Aristotle. For instance the novice orator is invited to express himself urbanely (*asteia legein*), which clearly reminds one of *Rhetoric* 3.10–11.

Furthermore, the elegance is the result of the use of varied sentences and enthymemes, whether complete or incomplete, ‘so that the hearers may understand the unsaid half by themselves’ (1434a36–37). Again, in a less sophisticated form, this corresponds to Aristotle’s thoughts on the subject (*Rhet.* 3.10 1410b 10–27), but also to Theophrastus’ views on the pleasure derived from easy, though not immediate,

understanding and on the adhesion of the hearer, full of self-esteem after he has grasped something difficult by himself.⁶

For the rest, the rhetorician gives extremely 'wise' advice on how to limit the length of speeches, express alternatives – the early stage of the doctrine concerning the period (?): see chap. 24 – suggesting clarity, forbidding hiatus, and recommending the use of figures, later called 'gorgianic' (from Gorgias): antitheses, parisoses, and paromoioses.

The third part (chaps. 29–37) is the longest and the most thorough, which contrasts with the *Rhetoric* in which the issues dealt with here are relegated to a sub-section in Book 3 (chaps. 13–19). The way the content of the speeches is arranged is carefully guided step by step, according to the oratory genres.

In the demegoric genre (chap. 29), a speech starts with the *prooimion* (*exordium*) whose three functions are 1) to present the case, 2) to arouse the hearer's attention, 3) to secure the favour of the audience (see further, M. de Brauw, Chapter 13). This third function is particularly well presented with the rhetorician considering all the possible cases in minute detail. The audience may be *a priori* well-disposed, indifferent or hostile. The opening is followed by the narration or statement of the facts covering past, present and future – probably a 'prospective' narration considering the consequences of the political choices under discussion. According to Aristotle, the narration of facts is pointless in the genres other than the judiciary (*Rhet.* 3.13 1414a37–1414b1). A brief development on the diplomatic mission report is included at this stage and offers a mixture of specific advice and general precepts, following the same method as that observed in the first part. The rhetorician explains that the narrations should generally be concise, cogent, and convincing, which is exactly what Isocrates already suggested (see Quint. 4.2.31–32). Conversely, Aristotle believed that the conciseness precept was simply ridiculous and advised that the length of the narration be adjusted to the content (*Rhet.* 3.16 1416b30).

In Chapter 32, proof (or confirmation) is described rapidly in so far as the appropriate arguments have been dealt with in the previous sections. It is followed by the anticipation of the arguments of the other side of the case (chap. 33).

The epilogue involves two main functions: first the summing up of the main points and secondly (chap. 34) the appeal to the feelings of the audience such as kindness, gratitude or pity (the negative corollaries of which are hatred, envy and anger). The way these feelings operate is succinctly broken down. Then the rhetorician looks at the speech of dissuasion destined to interrupt a course of action and at the speech of counter-exhortation, which aims at opposing a project defended by another orator.

In Chapter 35, the panegyric and condemnation speeches are both attributed a specific arrangement. Chapter 36, which is the longest section in the treatise (1441b30–1445a29), examines the judicial genre under the species of prosecution and defence. The organisation is fairly close to that of the demegoric genre (*exordium*, narration, confirmation, anticipation, and epilogue) but several specific elements are added.

For instance, in the part devoted to the anticipation of the opponent's arguments, the rhetorician allows for the refutation of several accusations particularly characteristic of Athens' democratic institutions such as reading a speech written beforehand (provided by a speech-writer-on-hire, or *logographos*), or being trained in eloquence, or speaking as *sunēgoros* in exchange for money (1444a19–1444b7). Indeed all these

practices that violated the principle of non professionalism of the functions for the benefit of the general public were severely condemned. A development on the dialogue with the opponent can also be found in this chapter (1444b7–20), as Greek law made provision for the cross-examination of the opposing party (already in Aeschylus: see *Eumenides* 585–672).

After returning to the examination speech in Chapter 37, in the following chapter the author surprisingly exploits the Isocratic precept that the ability to speak well leads to sound understanding which itself leads to virtue (see notably 15.277–278). He even pursues his logic asserting that *rhetorical precepts* can be used as guides to acquire virtue, which, incidentally, will lead to better persuasion. Let me quote this sample as an illustration: ‘Like the narration which should be concise, cogent, and convincing, you shall give your actions qualities of the same nature. You will complete your actions quickly if you try not to do everything at the same time, etc.’ (1446a8–11).

2 The Rhetoric to Alexander and Contemporary Practices

To a far greater extent than Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is tuned to the practices of its time, as could be seen with the discussion on legislation and worship or diplomatic mission report, or suppression of uproar, etc. This aspect singles out the *Rhetoric to Alexander* as the witness of rhetorical doctrines that are seldom, if not at all, described elsewhere.

More specifically, it is the only treatise to mention the examination speech (*exetastikon eidos*, chaps. 5 and 37). Indeed, however allusive the rhetorician may be and notwithstanding the observation that the examination speech is rarely used alone and the fact that other customs, particularly private ones, are hinted at (chap. 37), several features recall the proceedings of *dokimasia* (examination before taking public office) and *euthunē* (presentation of accounts at the end of a term of office) imposed on magistrates by the rules of democracy in Athens. These features are namely the offensive character of the tactics described, the existence of a ‘civic’ norm evinced in political consistency and in social behaviour accepted as honourable (*epitēdeumata endoxa*, 1427b27), and the fact that the examination includes a prospective dimension (the ‘possibility that the orator may contradict himself’ is considered, 1427b26).

The same proximity to contemporary practices is apparent in the development on request (*aitēma*, chap. 19). This particular technique seems empty of rhetorical content since, for the orator, it simply consists in asking his hearers for what he wishes to obtain from them (attentive listening, leniency, etc.). The comparison of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* with extant judicial exordia and more ancient texts (tragic texts in particular) shows that the request is expressed in a fairly codified way and probably corresponds to a kind of ritual inherited from the ancient supplication practices.⁷

Another striking example of the practical integration of the treatise into the context of Athens in the classical period is a precept that clearly refers to the activity of the sycophant. The rhetorician defines the plausible as the coincidence between what the orator says and ‘that which the hearers have examples of in mind’ (1428a25–26). One of the potential applications of this precept is the *selection of the allegations according to the existing possibilities to substantiate them*: ‘if the person you are accusing is young,

what people of the same age do, say that this person has done it; on account of the similarity between the deeds, credibility will thus be lent to the allegations against him. Likewise, showing that this person's friends are such as you say he is will have the same result. Indeed, because he associates with them, it will be easy to believe that he behaves in like manner' (1428b26–32). And it is extremely surprising that such a sentence should not have drawn the attention of historians.

3 The Influence of the Empirico-Sophistic Tradition on the *Rhetoric to Alexander*

Given that the art of rhetoric was born a little before the middle of the fifth century and considering that the sophists of the fifth and early fourth centuries, concerned with educating the politicians – hence the orators – continued to improve it, then the *Rhetoric to Alexander* also inherited from an empirico-sophistic tradition representing more than a century of study. To make things simpler, it is possible to limit the correspondences of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* with that ancient tradition to six main points.

The first one is the first importance given to plausibility. In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, the *eikos* is the most developed device of persuasion and comes first, a preeminence which probably dates back to Sicilian proto-rhetoric.⁸ In both cases, plausibility is *subjective*⁹ and, as has just been shown, based on the perception by ordinary minds of the repetition of events and of the general truths derived from that repetition ('all young people are violent', 'birds of a feather flock together'), and not, as in Aristotle, on the 'statistical' (long before the practice of statistics was established) and 'objective' observation of the repetition of events.

The second point is the universal reversibility and opposability of the arguments. In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, following another ancient practice,¹⁰ which was later theorised by a sophist like Protagoras¹¹ (see Diog. Laert. 9.51), all the arguments are presented as being both intrinsically reversible and opposable. It is always possible to cancel a plausible argument with another equally plausible argument as, for example, when plausibility is based on the habitual repetition of the deed, the simple fact that on that particular day, the deed was contrary to the interests of the accused reverses the argument. On the other hand, it is always possible to oppose plausibility linked to frequency using paradoxical *paradigms* (*Rhet. Alex.* 1429a36–1429b24).

Another feature, also belonging to that ancient rhetorical tradition but less frequently commented on, is the multivalent applications of the technical terminology related to the fact that terminology itself is part and parcel of the tactics of persuasion and does not automatically correspond to a specific argumentation. It is not neutral for the orator to choose the word *evidence* or the word *proof*, irrespective of the real strength of the argument. This is something one may easily observe, notably in Antiphon, and it is clearly shown in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. For example, the distinction between the sign which entails *knowledge* and the sign which provides *belief*, a fundamental distinction from a logical point of view, is made in the chapter dealing with the *sign* (*sēmeion*), thus including both applications under the same heading of *sign* (1430b35–37). And in both cases, it is a sign. In Chapter 13, proof (*elegkhos*) is defined as 'something that cannot be other *than the thing described*'

(1431a6–7). Then a distinction is made between ‘natural’ necessity or impossibility and between necessity or impossibility ‘according to us’. And so the word ‘proof’ is turned into a kind of slogan, aimed at fallaciously increasing the strength of the argument.

A fourth characteristic feature of that tradition is the importance given to timing, that is to say to the precise moment when such and such piece of information should be disclosed, or such and such argument used. This fact is to be related to institutional factors on the one hand (the members of a popular jury returned a verdict without deliberating after hearing two or four speeches and so the impression made was crucial), and to sophistic thought on the other hand (according to the sophists, persuasion resulted from a momentary coincidence (*kairos*) between a thesis and assent)¹². In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, similarly, though in a more modestly empirical way and less uncertain fashion, time is the core element of the strategy of anticipation (*prokatalepsis*, chap. 18). The strength of an argument very much depends on its novelty. Therefore it is of the utmost importance to be the first (one) to give strong arguments, even including those that contradict the thesis one is supposed to advocate, ‘as even though the points denigrated in anticipation are perfectly sound, they will seem less decisive to those who have heard them mentioned previously’ (1433a38–39).

The fifth specific feature that also ought to be mentioned is the presence of *argumentative complexes*. Pre-Aristotelian rhetoric is often dismissed for its inability to analyse the logical pattern of the arguments and reduce them to simple schemata (induction, deduction). This particular weakness might well be an asset in so far as it is common practice to combine the arguments, thus making it more difficult to counter-attack. Besides, in the later stage of rhetoric, that theme of the amalgamation of arguments is taken up.¹³ What is certain is that a device of persuasion such as evidence (*tekmerion*) is described both as the establishment of a contradiction and the appeal to the spontaneous tendency of the hearer to draw an inadequate conclusion from that contradiction: ‘for most hearers the very contradictions that run through the discourse or the actions themselves are evidence that there is nothing sensible either in the words pronounced or in the actions accomplished’ (1430a16–18). Faced with something that is not just an argument but rather an argumentation strategy, the opposite side of the argument has to split and dispute the establishing of the contradiction and the modalities of the conclusion inferred from it at the same time.

A sixth and last feature inherited from the earliest rhetoric concerns the presentation of the precepts. The best reconstructions – before the invention of the systematic treatise which, in all likelihood, barely pre-dated the *Rhetoric to Alexander*¹⁴ – mention two chief presentations: model discourses, like Antiphon’s *Tetralogies*, or typical argumentations, like those which can be found in *Phaedrus* about the *corax* (273a–c) then taken up by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.24 1402 a 17–24), and adopting a pattern like the following: ‘if a frail but courageous man is accused of attacking a strong but cowardly individual, he shall say ...’. I have already mentioned the presence, in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, of propositions of this type and even sometimes of pre-written arguments, ready for use, alongside more abstract, ‘modern’ topics of argument.

4 The Influence of the Philosophical Tradition on the *Rhetoric to Alexander*

Where the links of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* with this empirico-sophistic tradition are obvious, those with the so-called philosophical tradition are more surprising. Admittedly, there was no sharply-defined borderline between philosophy and rhetoric in the fourth century, contrary to what is often believed today owing to the exaggerated importance given to Plato with the benefit of hindsight. It should not be forgotten that Isocrates claimed to take his inspiration from philosophy. Nevertheless it remains fairly surprising that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* should have kept vestiges of considerations, which, *a priori*, have no obvious relation with the art of persuasion. The links between the examination speech (*exetastikon eidos*) and post-socratic dialectic have already been studied¹⁵ and so I shall return to the subject-matter of Chapter 3 describing the various types of possible connection between the object of praise and the good which is the reason for that praise. The first striking characteristic of this passage is that it considers the human object of the encomium as well as inanimate objects (the crown), or practices (gymnastics), or the condemnation of drunkenness, etc., which reminds one of the sophistic tradition of paradoxical praise (Gorgias, Isocrates, Polycrates).

As regards the topic of argument itself, it comprises five terms. Good can be reached:

- 1) *by himself* (*hup'autou*). The good action is performed by the object of the encomium himself who is therefore responsible for it. One thinks of the agent (*ho poiōn*) who is, according to Plato in *Philebus* (26 e), one and the same with the cause (*to aition*), which obviously entails a distinction between the two;
- 2) *through him* (*di'autou*). This seems to imply that the agent is the intermediary agent, or passive agent, of the good action. For example, it is possible to imagine an encomium of the hand as the instrument that enabled one to act generously (there is no example here because of a lacuna in the text). It is also possible that the text might be concerned here with causality as opposed to the conscious and responsible agent (the use of the preposition *dia* + genitive might be a clue in favour of this interpretation), which sends one back to Plato again;
- 3) *from it* (*ek toutou*). In this case, the object of the encomium is at the source of the good action – probably unintentionally – hence for example the encomium of gymnastics. One may wonder what distinguishes this particular type of causality from the previous one or former ones. As is suggested by the use of the preposition *ek* meaning ‘from’ and indicating origin, or extraction, this might be a faint echo of the opposition between internal cause and external cause, which physicians knew well since Hippocrates’ *Ancient Medicine* (21). However, the example of the encomium of gymnastics does not encourage this interpretation;
- 4) *for it* (*heneka toutou*). This time the object of the encomium is praised as an object of desire or ambition, which explains that an encomium of the crown should be possible. Here one most certainly recognises the final cause, which is the ultimate cause in Plato as well as in Aristotle, no matter its inscription in temporality; and
- 5) *not without it* (*ouk aneu toutou*). The object of the encomium is the condition of a certain good or a certain evil (one), hence, for example, the condemnation of

drunkenness. This fifth term also recalls some philosophical issues such as the prerequisite cause, the *sine qua non* or *sunaitia*, which in Plato's *Timaeus* (46d) does not have the status of a cause but of simple instrument of God's will.

The text is in a bad state and it would probably be wrong to expect a rigorous organisation and precise formulation of this topic but it is clear that the rhetorician had recourse to fairly speculative and philosophical texts on the issue of causality in order to use them for the improvement of rhetoric in its most sophisticated form.

Finally, the question of the links between the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* must be discussed. The problem still remains to be solved as no definite answer has been provided so far.

What can be said for certain is that there exist documentary sources common to both. This was clearly shown with the study of the field of the 'added' techniques of persuasion in particular.¹⁶ Other similarities can be the result of 'aristotelising' amendments to the text following its integration into the *Corpus Aristotelicum* (I shall return to this point later), but they can also be explained by the contacts between the two authors. The ascription of the writing of a certain layer of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (see below) to Anaximenes of Lampsacus would offer a historical justification of those similarities since both Anaximenes and Aristotle were Alexander's private tutors.

It can even be argued that the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was written in between the two great periods of composition of the *Rhetoric* (the academic period, c. 350, and the second stay in Athens, c. 333), perhaps in about 340 (see below). This appealing hypothesis would in the first place offer an explanation for the mark Aristotle left on the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. One remembers the philosopher's diatribe against the authors of previous treatises (*Rhet.* 1.1 1354a11–31), in which Aristotle reproaches them for setting aside the doctrine of proof. According to him, this makes up the essential element of persuasion, a prerequisite of judicial oratory, although in his eyes deliberative oratory is nobler (1354b22–25), and with arranging the precepts following the order of the parts of speech (1354b18–19). None of these reproaches concerns the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, as has been shown.

On the other hand the change of direction of the original project of the *Rhetoric* after the first chapter of the work, that is to say the opening to persuasion through *ēthos* and *pathos*, could be the result of the influence of a treatise of the same type as the *Rhetoric to Alexander*,¹⁷ if not of that work itself. Another sign of the proximity of the two treatises is provided by the patent divergences, expressed by Aristotle in polemical terms, for example on the conciseness of the narration (see above), or on the legitimacy of a section in the speech specifically devoted to the refutation of the opponent (*Rhet.* 3.17 1418b5–6). Finally some correspondences are rather remarkable as, for instance, when Aristotle uses the notion of *tekmērion* in a sense much closer to that of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* than to his own definition (*Rhet.* 3.17 1417b36–38).

5 Dating and Ascription of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*

The dating and ascription of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* present an enigma that still excites the interest of sagacious scholars. Concerning dating, there are two reference points. The first one is the mention in the text of a historical episode situated in

344/343 and the second one is the existence of a papyrus from the third century, known as *Papyrus Hibeh* 26,¹⁸ which gives the *terminus ante quem* of the work's composition at about 300. However, the question of the dating of the treatise cannot be separated from the hypotheses made on its ascription as some of these hypotheses suggest that it should be considered as made up of fragments from different sources.

The name of Aristotle appears in the title of the treatise in all of the manuscripts. However, at the end of the dedicatory letter Aristotle and Corax, the semi-mythic inventor of the art of rhetoric, are named. Since Erasmus (in 1531), the ascription of the treatise to Aristotle is almost unanimously rejected for several reasons, the main one being the difference in quality, which I have already mentioned. Shortly after, in 1548, the Florentine humanist Pier Vettori offered the name of Anaximenes of Lampsacus, historian and rhetorician of the fourth century (380–320),¹⁹ private tutor to Alexander the Great, and in this respect, a 'colleague' of Aristotle. Vettori relied on a passage from Quintilian (3.4.9) lending to Anaximenes a rhetorical system that comprised seven species of oratory. The list of the seven species coincides with that given at the beginning of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, notably including the examination speech, never mentioned in the other treatises. However, this hypothesis is not decisive in so far as Quintilian attributes to Anaximenes a rhetorical system in which the seven species are listed next to only two genres, the demegoric and judicial, whereas in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, in its present state, there are *three* genres.

In spite of this difficulty, the ascription of the treatise to Anaximenes of Lampsacus was passionately supported in the middle of the nineteenth century by L. Spengel who went as far as setting aside the mention of the epideictic genre in the text itself to ensure the exact correspondence between the text which had been handed down and that of Quintilian.

In his edition published by Teubner in 1966, M. Fuhrmann adopted the name of Anaximenes as the author of the treatise and borrowed the title invented by Spengel, *Tekhnē rhētorikē*/*Ars rhetorica*, despite the opposition of scholars like V. Buchheit,²⁰ but without modifying the text. Today the ascription of the text to Anaximenes is widely accepted as settled.

This, to me, seems to be the most likely reconstitution of the history of this text, given the rare sources available. The insertion of a first textual layer of the treatise, which may have been written by Anaximenes, into the period shortly after the middle of the fourth century (c. 340), seems very likely. It is corroborated not only by the objective dating criteria mentioned earlier but also by the elements of proximity with Aristotle listed above. The archaism of a certain number of theoretical points, as well as the convergent opinions on practical issues with the corpus of the Attic orators and with the Athenian institutions at the end of the period of the independence of the Greek cities, cannot be disregarded either. Then the text was circulated and at least one copy was kept in a philosophical library of the Egyptian town of Oxyrhynchus.²¹

This is most probably the first layer of text read by Quintilian at the turn of the first century AD. In the third century, under the name of Aristotle, Athenaeus (11.508a) cited a definition of the law that corresponds *verbatim* to a passage of the apocryphal letter. It seems reasonable to think that by then the *Rhetoric to Alexander* had been integrated into the *Corpus Aristotelicum* owing to the attaching of the letter to the treatise that, according to a few other clues, dates back to the second century.²² This is

confirmed by its mention in a late list of the works by Aristotle.²³ In the fifth century AD, the commentator Syrianus reproduced several passages of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, among them the incipit, which he quoted in an almost identical version as Quintilian's report (seven species, three genres) but which he attributed to Aristotle.

Therefore one may think that it was after Syrianus that the text of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was revised and adapted so that it should match the doctrine of its supposed author. The comparison of *Papyrus Hibeh* 26 with the text inherited from the mediaeval tradition corroborates the hypothesis that the text was amended.²⁴

Such is, in my view, the reconstitution of the circumstances of the origin and transmission of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that seems the simplest and most plausible. And that also accounts for my decision to keep in my edition the traditional title and to prefer Pseudo-Aristotle to Anaximenes on the title page: the ascription of the text to Anaximenes is based on only one testimony which is not entirely decisive while the links with Aristotle, at a textual level too, are strong and ancient.

Other theories, diverging more or less markedly from this scenario, have been offered in recent years. G. La Bua²⁵ made an astute supposition, though a little paradoxical, that the anomaly lay not in the three genres in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* but rather in the testimonies of Quintilian and Syrianus who lent two genres to Anaximenes. The aim of that erroneous doxography could have been to make Aristotle the *protos heuretēs* of the doctrine of the three genres.

Relying on a minute study of the signs of terminological and theoretical discrepancies, M. Patillon²⁶ came to the conclusion that the treatise, in its current state, was the fruit of the work of a late compiler who brought together two fragments (chaps. 1–28 and 29–38). The first piece is close to Aristotle (*Theodecteia*?), the second one is 'Coraxian', in other words, a product of the earliest rhetorical tradition. Though I agree with the idea that, like most rhetorical treatises, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is made up of a combination of different sources, I would hesitate to adhere fully to that reconstruction. Indeed it means the loss of an entire section of the treatise on the parts of speech and its substitution with an adventitious piece on the same subject.

Besides, it underestimates the carefully thought out unifying structure that was imposed onto the text. On several occasions the figure 'seven' was mentioned in the above presentation, and the central section (chaps. 7–28), which leaves aside the reference to the seven species, is constructed like a triptych (as is the entire treatise) of series, each comprising seven headings. It includes a first series of seven different means of persuasion and is followed by another four series. The three following notions of anticipation, request, and recapitulation (chaps. 18–21) further complete another series of seven. The rest of the second part (chaps. 22–28) deals with the refinement of the expression, the length of the speeches, the arrangement of the words, the binary pattern of expression, clarity, antitheses, periphrases and periphrases. If one pays attention to the fact that binary expression and clarity come under the same heading of excellence of the expression (1435a2), then one can observe that there are seven headings altogether. The very stratagem used to reach that figure seems to reveal an extremely well devised organisation (the rhetorician gets seven topics of deliberation only by arbitrarily separating war and peace, and religious legislation from the rest of the question of the laws, while Aristotle has five).

Whatever its meaning, and even if the number of three genres would seem to fit the text better, it remains difficult to imagine that a late compiler would force himself to

give the text such a strong elaborate structure. It should be added that the extant documents on Corax as well as on Aristotle's *Theodecteia* do not definitely confirm M. Patillon's hypothesis.

R. Velardi,²⁷ on the other hand, has imagined a sophisticated scenario following the tradition of the ascription of the text to Anaximenes but aimed at explaining why it was wrongly attributed to Aristotle. According to him, Anaximenes might have determined to sacrifice himself for the sake of his work, pretending Aristotle wrote it in order to ensure that it was more widely circulated.

This hypothesis is based on two main elements: firstly, an allegorical interpretation of the dedicatory letter. In it, Aristotle says that Alexander has requested him not to divulge his work. This passage is followed by a comparison with fathers of illegitimate children who sacrifice their offspring while legitimate parents are prepared to sacrifice themselves. The second element is Anaximenes' reputation as a forger. The story (from Theopompus) goes that he circulated a pamphlet, which was designed to discredit its author, in the three major Greek cities, Athens, Sparta, and Thebes (Pausanias 6.18.5). This hypothesis suffers from its lack of plausibility and, above all, from the fact that it dismisses the numerous signs proving that the dedicatory letter dates back to a much later period than the fourth century.

Despite all those uncertainties, the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is nonetheless an invaluable source for all the historians of ancient rhetoric and among them those who are specifically interested in the links between rhetoric, the sophistic tradition and philosophy. Moreover, for all those interested in the art of eloquence for its own sake, it is a gold mine of techniques,²⁸ which are still relevant today.²⁹

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Notes

- 1 On these topics, see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3 (early theory), J.A.E. Bons, Chapter 4 (Gorgias), T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6 (Isocrates), and W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9 (Aristotle).
- 2 Cf. 15.181 ff., O. Navarre, *Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote* (Paris: 1900), pp. 189–191.
- 3 See J. Vanderspoel, Chapter 10.
- 4 P. Chiron, ‘À Propos d’une Série de Pisteis dans la Rhétorique à Alexandre (Ps.-Aristote, *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, ch. 7–14)’, *Rhetorica* 16 (1998), pp. 349–391.
- 5 D. Mirhady, ‘Non-technical Pisteis in Aristotle and Anaximenes’, *AJP* 112 (1991), pp. 5–28.
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- 10 Cole, ‘Who Was Corax?’ *passim*.
- 11 See A. López Eire, Chapter 22.
- 12 See B. Cassin, ‘Procédures sophistiques pour Construire l’Évidence’, in C. Lévy and L. Pernot (eds.), *Dire l’Évidence* (Paris: 1997), pp. 15–29.
- 13 See, for example, Dion. Hal. pp. 347–349 in H. Usener and L. Radermacher (eds.), *Dionysius Halicarnaseus, Ars rhetorica (Quae exstant, 6, Opuscula 2)* (Leipzig: 1904–1929; repr. 1985).
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- 18 See B.P. Grenfell and A.S. Hunt (eds.), *The Hibeh Papyri* 1 (London: 1906), pp. 114–138.
- 19 Concerning his work as a historian, the documents (fragments and testimonies) were collected by F. Jacoby in *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker IIA* (Berlin/Leiden: 1926), no. 72. On his work as rhetorician, see L. Radermacher, *Artium Scriptores (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik)* (Vienna: 1951), pp. 200–202.
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- 27 R. Velardi, 'La Metafora della Paternità;... Letteraria e la Morte dell'autore: L' "Epistula ad Alexandrum" premessa alla "Rhetorica" di Anassimene di Lampsaco', in his *Retorica, Filosofia, Letteratura: Saggi di Storia della Retorica Greca su Gorgia, Platone e Anassimene di Lampsaco* (Napoli: 2001), pp. 103–130.
- 28 A.C. Braet, 'On the Origin of Normative Argumentation Theory: The Paradoxical Case of the Rhetoric to Alexander', *Argumentation* 10 (1996), pp. 347–359.
- 29 I am most grateful to Maryvonne Boisseau for her translation of this article from French into English, and to W.W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady for their useful remarks.

CHAPTER NINE

Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric

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Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric* – henceforth *Rhetoric* – is fundamental to any study of classical Greek rhetoric; indeed, its importance is not limited to antiquity but extends to the present day. The reason is clear. Aristotle offers us a concise, yet comprehensive view of the art of rhetoric.

Aristotle explains rhetoric in terms of persuasion. He is, however, careful to point out that actually effecting persuasion – e.g., securing a conviction in court or passing legislation in the Assembly – is not required of the art. Much as a skilled doctor may practice his art flawlessly and still fail to cure a hopelessly sick person, so the practitioner of rhetoric, the orator, may speak with consummate skill and nevertheless fail to persuade his audience. Hence, Aristotle defines the art of rhetoric as the capacity to consider in each case the possible means of persuasion. Furthermore, he recognizes that not all persuasion is of one kind and not every kind belongs to the art of rhetoric. Physical torture, for example, may bring forth a confession, but it is not part of the art. Rather, there are three artful modes of persuasion, each of which is accomplished by what the orator says: he persuades his audience by arguing the issue, by presenting himself as a man of good character, and by arousing emotion in the audience. Aristotle also recognizes that orations are spoken aloud before an audience, so that he takes account of delivery, albeit briefly and critically. In addition, he recognizes that rhetorical persuasion proceeds by words, and words must be selected and arranged in order that the orator may express himself clearly, with a certain elevation, and in a suitable manner. Finally, Aristotle considers the fact that an oration divides into discernible parts (introduction, narration, argument, and epilogue), each of which makes special demands on the orator. All of the above takes less than two hundred pages (191 in the Oxford Classical Text), so that the *Rhetoric* has the virtue of being economical as well as comprehensive.

The composition of the *Rhetoric* is, however, problematic. The work, as it has come down to us, contains three books, which do not form a seamless whole. The first two books deal with the artful modes of persuasion, but do so in a surprisingly disjointed

manner. 1.1 begins the work by calling for a rhetoric that restricts itself to arguing the issue. Emotional appeal is viewed as outside the art, even though in 1.2 it is recognized as an artful mode of persuasion. The sections on the character of the orator and the arousal of emotion, 2.1–11, break up the account of rational argument, as do the sections on character tied to age and fortune, 2.12–17. Even the account of rational argument can be puzzling. For example, in 1.2 Aristotle introduces the general lines of argument that we know from his *Topics*, and in 2.23–24 he discusses a selection of these lines of argument. But in between he ignores them and works with a distinction between specific premises and common premises. The third book is not closely tied to what precedes and appears to be composed of two distinct treatises: a discussion of style or expression in 3.2–12, followed by a quite independent account of the parts of an oration in 3.13–19.

These problems of composition cannot be entirely ignored and in what follows I shall offer some reflections that may help remove certain difficulties. But on the whole, I shall be focusing on the doctrine of the *Rhetoric* and not the unity of the treatise.

1 Argument

Among the three artful modes of persuasion the most important is rational argument. Aristotle makes that clear in the very first sentence of his work, where he tells us that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic (1.1 1354a1). The use of ‘counterpart’ recalls Plato’s *Gorgias*, in which Socrates is made to characterize rhetoric as the counterpart of cookery. It is said to be a form of flattery, and as such it is no art but an irrational habitude that aims at what is pleasant apart from what is best (464b–465d). Aristotle rejects this characterization and in doing so refers to dialectic. We are not to think of the dialectic that Plato trumpets in his *Phaedrus*, i.e., the method of collection and division (265d–266c). Rather, we are to think of the dialectic that Aristotle discusses in his work called *Topics*. Baldly stated,¹ Aristotle characterizes dialectic as an exercise that proceeds by question and answer between two opponents. One person is presented with a problem like ‘Is “pedestrian biped animal” a definition of man, or not?’ (1.4 101b32–3). He chooses to defend one side or the other, and his opponent attempts to trap him in inconsistency by putting questions that must be answered by a simple yes or no. Some of the questions will involve necessary truths, so that the answer is automatic (assuming the respondent is not a fool or stubbornly dishonest). But most questions will not be of this kind. Rather they will concern acceptable opinions. That is to say, opinions that are acceptable to everyone or most people or wise men or experts in a given art (1.1 101b21–22, 1.10 104a8–9, 33–37).² That imposes a constraint on the person asking questions. He must take account of what the respondent believes or at least is prepared to concede.³ For only when the questioner elicits the responses that he needs to demonstrate inconsistency, will he be able to achieve his goal.

Exercises of this sort were practiced in Plato’s Academy. As a member of the Academy, the young Aristotle will have participated in them and recognized a connection with rhetorical argument. In saying that, I am not suggesting that Aristotle conceived of rhetorical argument as a school exercise. Clearly he knew the

difference between training within the Academy and real debate within the city-state. Nor am I suggesting that Aristotle conceived of rhetorical argument in terms of question and answer. To be sure, he knew that judicial procedure made room for occasional cross-examination (think of Socrates questioning Meletus in Plato's *Apology* 24c–28a), but he also knew that orators generally put forward their arguments without directly involving an adversary. Rather, what impressed Aristotle is that both dialectical and rhetorical arguments take two distinct forms. They may have the form of a deduction or an induction. The former draws a conclusion from premises, while the latter adduces similar cases. Moreover, in both dialectic and rhetoric, deduction and induction do not rise to the level of a scientific argument. For typically the premises of dialectical and rhetorical deduction are not known truths but acceptable opinions, and the similar cases involved in induction constitute only a selection and therefore do not rule out the possibility of counter-examples.⁴ In addition, what is an acceptable opinion varies from group to group, so that not only the questioner in a dialectical exercise but also the orator in a civic setting needs to know what opinions will in fact be accepted. Otherwise, time will be wasted with misdirected questions and arguments that fail to persuade. And if that continues, the questioner will fail to trap his opponent, and the orator will not persuade his audience.

Aristotle calls rhetorical induction 'example' (1.2 1356b3–5). Two kinds are recognized. One involves past facts that the orator must search out; the other involves illustrative parallels and fables that the orator produces. The former is illustrated by the aggression of previous Persian kings (2.20 1393a31–b3):

We must prepare for war against the (present) king of Persia and not allow him to capture Egypt. For Darius did not cross over (to attack Greece) until he had first captured Egypt; but having captured (Egypt) he crossed over. And again Xerxes did not attack until he captured (Egypt); but having captured Egypt, he crossed over. It follows that the present (king) too, if he has captured (Egypt) will cross over. Therefore we ought not to allow (the present king to capture Egypt).

Here two past facts are adduced to support a conclusion regarding the present king of Persia: he will attack Greece if he first subdues Egypt. There is nothing wrong with this argument by example, but it should be noted that Aristotle begins and ends with a recommendation for future action: the present king must not be allowed to capture Egypt. To establish that recommendation a further argument is needed:

Either we ought not to allow the present king to capture Egypt in order that we may prevent an attack on Greece, or we ought to permit an attack on Greece by the king. But we ought not to permit an attack on Greece; therefore, we ought not to allow the king to capture Egypt.

This argument is not an induction based on past facts. Rather, it is a hypothetical syllogism that proceeds by way of a separative or disjunctive proposition: Either P or Q; but P; therefore not-Q. Aristotle's syllogistic did not take account of such arguments, but that of his pupil Theophrastus seems to have done so.⁵

Illustrative parallels are explained by reference to Socratic comparisons: e.g., we ought not to choose a ruler by lot, for it would be similar to selecting athletes and helmsmen by lot. Fables are illustrated by stories about animals. We are told that

Stesichorus concluded a speech against giving a bodyguard to the dictator Phalaris by relating a story about a horse that permitted a man to bridle and mount him. We also learn that Aesop told the story of a fox that was covered with fleas, in order to defend a demagogue who was on trial for his life (1393b3–1394a2). Such stories are said to be suitable to the popular Assembly and comparatively easy to produce. In contrast, discovering past facts may be difficult, but facts are more useful in deliberation, for future events are most often similar to what has occurred in the past (1394a2–8).

Aristotle tells us that in argument by example the reasoning is from part to part or like to like, when both fall under the same genus, and one is better known than the other. By way of illustration, Aristotle introduces Dionysius of Syracuse, whose motive in asking for a bodyguard is unclear. To establish that he is aiming at a tyranny, two similar cases are adduced – both Peisistratus and Theagenes asked for a bodyguard when they plotted to become a tyrant – and the possibility of other similar cases is indicated, all of which are said to fall under the same general principle: the man who asks for a bodyguard is plotting a tyranny (1.2 1357b25–36). Here Aristotle emphasizes the universal or general principle involved in an argument based on example. The same is true in the *Prior Analytics*, where Aristotle offers a different illustration of argument by example. If we wish to show that making war on Thebes will have bad consequences for the Athenians, then we must first establish the premise ‘Making war on neighbors has bad consequences.’ Aristotle does that by adducing a single example: the Thebans suffered badly when they attacked their neighbor the Phocians. After that, Aristotle argues deductively to the conclusion that making war on Thebes will have bad consequences (2.24 68b41–69a13). What Aristotle does not tell us is how this plays out in practice. Does an orator regularly establish a general principle before drawing a particular conclusion? Or does he proceed directly from the better-known example(s) to the conclusion he wants to reach? Both are, of course, possible, but in emphasizing the need to establish a universal premise, Aristotle is focusing on the logic of argument by example. However, in the courtroom or the Assembly, an orator may omit that step and make a direct comparison between two particular cases. The listener supplies the universal premise and is pleased not to be told what he can easily supply for himself.

Aristotle calls the rhetorical syllogism an ‘enthymeme’ (1356b4). It is said to be concerned with the contingent, i.e., those matters about which men deliberate (1357a1–7, 13–15). Hence, the majority of its premises are not necessary. They hold only for the most part, and the same is true of its conclusions. That marks off the enthymeme from the scientific syllogism that draws necessary conclusions from premises that are themselves necessary (1357a22–32).⁶ A different feature of the enthymeme is that it involves few premises and often less than the primary syllogism, i.e., a logically complete syllogism (1357a16–17). There are two points here. The average citizen cannot follow an elaborate argument that proceeds through many steps, each involving its own premises. Therefore, the orator attempts to keep his arguments short and his premises few. That is a concession to the weakness of the audience (1357a3–4, 11–12), but equally the orator is well advised not to treat his audience as dolts. When a premise is obvious, it may be best left unstated, for to state it not only gives the impression of loquacity (2.22 1395b26) but also denies the audience an opportunity to fill a hole. Much as an audience is pleased with itself when it supplies the universal premise in an argument by example, so an audience takes satisfaction in supplying a premise that is unstated but necessary to an enthymeme.

For the sake of clarity, it should be underlined that the omission of a premise is not a defining mark of the enthymeme. It is only a frequent feature of the enthymeme (1357a17), and its frequency is motivated by audience psychology. A fast moving argument holds the attention of the listener, and when the listener supplies something for himself, he is pleased and likely to be favorably disposed to the orator.

It is one thing to understand the logical form of an enthymeme and another thing to be able to construct arguments that are successful in an Assembly or court of law. The latter requires a stock of premises, some of which are general in the sense that they are not subject-specific, while others are subject-specific. Aristotle understands that and draws a distinction between 'topics' and 'species' (1358a30). The former are illustrated by the topic of the more and the less. It is a general line of argument that can be used in discussing justice, physics, politics and many other subjects. The latter are explained as premises that are specific to each genus (of knowledge). They are the premises that make up most enthymemes and accordingly are discussed at length by Aristotle. The discussion is introduced by a division of rhetoric into three kinds, each of which is distinguished *inter alia* by its end (*telos*). Deliberative rhetoric is concerned with establishing the benefit or harm that may be expected from a future course of action. Judicial rhetoric focuses on proving the justice or injustice of some past action. And epideictic aims at showing the noble or shameful qualities of some person or group of persons (1.3 1358a36–1359a29). What follows is organized around these three kinds of rhetoric (1.4 1359a30–1.14 1375a21).

Among the three kinds, deliberative rhetoric is given pride of place. After telling us that men deliberate about things that they can control, Aristotle lists five subjects of deliberation: finances, war and peace, defense, imports and exports, and legislation (1.4 1359b21–23). Each subject is discussed with an emphasis on knowing the facts. Here is the beginning of Aristotle's discussion of finances:

The man who is going to offer counsel concerning finances must know the number and extent of the city's revenues, in order that if any source of revenue is missing it may be added, and if any source is deficient it may be increased (1359b24–26).

Here we have the beginnings of two enthymemes whose logical form is that of a mixed hypothetical syllogism. To be more specific, we have two arguments that proceed through a continuous proposition (i.e., the major premise, which is an if-then proposition) and an assumption (the minor premise) to a conclusion. Put schematically, the arguments have the form: If P, then Q; but P; therefore Q. Fleshed out they run as follows:

If any source of revenue is missing it may be added; but some source of revenue is missing; therefore it may be added.

If any source of revenue is deficient, it may be increased; but some source of revenue is deficient; therefore it may be increased.

In each of these two enthymemes, the assumptions are particular facts: 'Some source of revenue is missing' and 'Some source is deficient'. Combined with the two continuous propositions, they create two arguments whose conclusions are action-guiding.

Aristotle appears never to have formulated this kind of hypothetical syllogism, but it is clear from *Rhetoric* 1.4 and elsewhere that he regarded enthymemes of this form as valid arguments.

In discussing war and peace, Aristotle continues to emphasize knowing the facts. He tells us to observe the wars of other people and how they ended, for similar results naturally follow from similar causes (1360a3–5). To illustrate Aristotle's point, I refer to a passage (already mentioned above) from *Prior Analytics* 2.24. Aristotle cites Thebes, which came off poorly when it attacked the neighboring city of Phocis. On the basis of this example, Aristotle asserts the universal principle that making war on neighbors has bad consequences. And having gained that principle, he concludes by deduction that Athens should not attack its neighbor Thebes (68b41–69a13). The application to *Rhetoric* 1.4 is clear. Aristotle recognizes that facts about the wars of other cities⁷ can be used to form a general principle, and that principle can be applied to other particular cases. But as already observed the general principle need not be stated. The argument may be presented as a direct comparison.

After discussing the subjects of deliberative oratory and the facts that an orator needs to know, Aristotle turns to more general matters, beginning with the end or 'target' (*skopos*) at which a man individually and all men in common aim in their deliberations. Underlining that he is speaking in summary form, Aristotle tells us that the end is happiness and its parts. He then says that by way of illustration we must ascertain in general what happiness is. That is followed by four definitions of happiness, after which Aristotle adds that everyone would pretty well agree with one or more of these definitions (1.5 1360b4–18). Striking here is the way in which Aristotle dissociates himself from exactitude: we read 'in summary form', 'by way of illustration', 'in general', and we are offered four different definitions of happiness, no one of which is picked out as the correct definition. We should not be surprised, for Aristotle has told us that rhetoric will cease to be rhetoric and become a different art or science if it moves from what is generally acceptable to the first principles of a given art or science (1.2 1358a23–26, 1.4 1359b2–16). Moreover, the orator is concerned with persuading a particular audience and therefore must argue from the beliefs and conceptions actually held by a given audience. One audience may conceive of happiness under one definition, while another has a different idea of happiness. That opens the door to many different definitions of happiness. Aristotle seems to take account of that when he says 'by way of illustration'. He does not aim at an exhaustive list, but instead satisfies himself with four definitions, each of which seems to have had advocates within Plato's Academy.⁸

After discussing happiness, Aristotle takes up the useful or advantageous. He begins by telling us that men do not deliberate about the end but about the means to the end. And the means are what it is useful to do, and what is useful is good (1.6 1362a18–20). Aristotle then lists several ways in which something may be good. It may be something that ought to be chosen for its own sake, something that all creatures possessing sensation or intelligence pursue, that which by its presence creates a good condition, that which is productive or protective of a good condition, and that which prevents or removes the opposite condition (1362a21–29). Aristotle then goes on to draw some general conclusions from this list. For example, pleasure must be something good, for all animals, i.e., creatures possessing sensation, pursue it. And the virtues must be good, for it is by possessing them (by their presence) that

men are in a good condition and prepared to produce good works and do good deeds (1362b2–4). How such propositions relate to deliberative rhetoric is straightforward. I limit myself to the second example. The orator who wishes to support the founding of a military academy will argue that such an academy produces courage and courage is a virtue. In other words, it is a good condition of soul that manifests itself in goods deeds. It is, therefore, something good and advantageous that ought to be promoted by the city-state. And that is best accomplished by a military education. An opponent of such an education might argue that courage is over-rated, and a military education all too often creates a character that is ill-suited for peacetime activities. Here there is a dispute, and Aristotle suggests a way in which the supporter of military education might respond. He might argue that the opposite of what is bad is good, and what is advantageous to one's enemies is bad for the city. And since being cowardly or simply lacking courage is advantageous to one's enemies, being courageous is an advantage to the city (1362b29–33) that should be promoted through military education.

The involvement of virtue in the preceding example is of some interest, for it suggests that the division of species or subject-specific premises into three classes is not absolute. And that is in fact the case. Within the discussion of happiness, which is the goal of deliberative oratory, virtue is recognized as a constituent part of happiness (1.5 1360b23), and as we have just seen, it may play a role in deliberations concerning the city-state. But virtue is also important for epideictic oratory. Indeed, Aristotle thinks that virtue is most at home in epideictic (speeches of praise), so that he refers from his discussion of the parts of happiness to the discussion of epideictic for an account of virtue (1.5 1362a13–14). There is no difficulty here as long as we recognize that Aristotle's division of rhetoric into three genera is not rigorously imposed on the premises from which arguments are constructed. Deliberative and judicial oratory may be distinguished by different goals – the former aims at happiness and the latter at justice – but that does not rule out considerations of justice when deliberating about what is best for the city-state.⁹ A grossly unjust course of action may be rejected even though it would be to the advantage of most citizens and contribute to the long-term happiness of the city-state.

In addition to subject-specific premises, Aristotle recognizes a class of premises that are 'common' to the three kinds of rhetoric. They concern the possible and impossible, whether something has happened or will happen or not, and the great and the small. Aristotle tells us that the deliberative, forensic and epideictic orator must possess premises concerning these three subjects (1.3 1359a11–26), and he discusses them at some length, providing examples, many of which take the form of an if-then mixed hypothetical syllogism (2.19). And much as he speaks of the subject-specific premises as most at home in one kind or another, so with the common premises, he recognizes that each is most at home in one of the three kinds: amplification, i.e., the great (and the small) is said to be most at home in epideictic, past fact, i.e., what has happened (and not happened) in forensic oratory, and what is possible and will happen (or not happen) in deliberative oratory (1.18 1392a4–7). One may wonder whether there really are two distinct classes of premises – perhaps one ought to recognize a single class of common premises – but Aristotle sees a significant difference in emphasis. Some premises are largely though not exclusively tied to a particular kind of rhetoric, while others are less closely tied to one of the three kinds and therefore appropriately spoken of as common.

Aristotle also discusses ‘topics’. They are the lines of argument that he discusses at length in the work entitled *Topics* and more briefly in *Rhetoric* 2.23–24. In the latter place, twenty-eight valid topics and ten fallacious ones are listed. Twice Aristotle makes explicit reference to the *Topics*. The first occurs in regard to the topic ‘from different senses’ (1398a28–29) and the second in regard to that ‘from the parts’ (1399a6–7). If there is a problem here, it concerns the composition of the *Rhetoric*. When Aristotle first introduces the enthymeme and the example in *Rhetoric* 1.2, he recognizes two sources from which enthymemes are constructed: topics and subject-specific premises (1358a1–32). Topics are spoken of as common, but in this use ‘common’ does not refer to the premises that are common to the three kinds of rhetoric and discussed in 2.19. That is clear from the fact that topics are said to be applicable to many different subjects – all subjects (1358a32) – including physics (1358a10–14), which is not an area covered by rhetoric. However, when Aristotle turns in 1.3 to discuss the three kinds of rhetoric, he introduces the subject-specific premises and ignores topics (1359a11–26). That may be intelligible, for topics are not subject-specific. But later in a transitional passage, Aristotle summarizes what he has accomplished and what he needs to do to complete his project. Here again there is no mention of topics. Rather he tells us that he has discussed subject-specific premises and still needs to discuss common premises, the enthymeme and example. After that, he asserts, his project will be completed (2.18 1391b23–1392a4). That is curious not only because he omits any reference to topics but also because his treatment of topics is still to come. The difficulties here are real and most likely the product of two related factors. Different portions of the *Rhetoric* were composed at different times, and whoever combined them into the treatise that we know – whether Aristotle himself or a later editor or both – did less than perfect editing.

2 The Character of the Orator

Among the artful modes of persuasion, Aristotle lists persuasion through character. He introduces it in *Rhetoric* 1.2, where it is presented in terms of uprightness. Aristotle is careful to say that he is not concerned with preexisting reputation. Rather, the orator, through what he says, is to present himself as an upright person who is worthy of trust (1356a2–13). In *Rhetoric* 2.1, Aristotle returns to persuasion through character and explains it in terms of practical wisdom, virtue and goodwill. The credible speaker is said to be one who is believed to have all three of these attributes. For the orator who lacks anyone of these attributes is likely to give bad advice (1378a6–16). At first reading, Aristotle seems simply to have expanded his account of persuasion through character. When he introduces this mode of persuasion in 1.2, he is content to mention a single attribute, but later in 2.1 he gives a fuller account, in which uprightness is represented by virtue and two additional attributes are listed: practical wisdom and goodwill. Together the three attributes make the speaker credible and that is important, for there are occasions when opposing arguments are or seem to be equally strong, so that the listener has little choice but to consider the speakers and to decide in favor of the speaker who appears wise, virtuous and full of goodwill.

There is, however, a difference in orientation between 1.2 and 2.1. In 1.2 Aristotle is focused on judicial oratory and therefore mentions uprightness, i.e., moral goodness, which carries special weight in courtroom cases. We may compare the discussion of non-artful proofs in 1.15, where Aristotle calls attention to testimony concerning character. This testimony may relate to the speaker and serve to establish his uprightness, or it may relate to the adversary with a view to his baseness (1376a23–29). It is taken in advance of the courtroom proceeding, and if needed, it is read out by a clerk of the court. That is not true of persuasion through character, but it does not rule out comparison with persuasion through character as presented in 1.2. In both passages, 1.15 and 1.2, Aristotle is focused on judicial oratory and the persuasive power of upright character.

The persuasiveness of good character is strongly emphasized by the assertion ‘character has almost, so to speak, the greatest authority in winning belief’ (1356a13). Aristotle is not denying the primary importance of arguing the issue – note the qualifying words ‘almost, so to speak’. Rather, he recognizes that exhibitions of cleverness may be detrimental in a courtroom situation. For an obviously clever man is thought to be capable of planning and carrying out a crime. Hence, in discussing narration within judicial oratory, Aristotle advises us to reveal moral choice and to avoid speaking from thought, for the former manifests character and the latter practical wisdom. We should say, for example, ‘I wanted that and made a choice; and if I did not profit so much the better’ (3.16 1417a15–18, 23–27).

In addition, Aristotle’s strong endorsement of persuasion through character appears to be motivated at least in part by dissatisfaction with the writers of rhetorical handbooks. In 1.1 he attacks these writers for ignoring argument in favor of emotional appeal. They are said to pass over deliberative oratory and to write about speaking in the courts, where the arousal of emotions like pity and anger is thought to be especially effective. Aristotle does not want to deny the utility of emotional appeal in judicial oratory, but he does believe that the writers of handbooks have failed to recognize not only the importance of rational argument but also that of persuasion through character.

In 2.1 Aristotle discusses persuasion through character from a different point of view: namely that of deliberative oratory. He first lists three attributes – practical wisdom, virtue and goodwill – that are looked for in a credible speaker. Then he explains that when any one of these attributes is missing, men fail to offer sound advice. For men who lack wisdom err in their beliefs; men who lack virtue do not say what they think; and men who lack goodwill may fail to offer the advice that they know to be best (1378a6–14). It should be emphasized that there is no inconsistency here with what is said in 1.2. Uprightness has not been dropped. It is listed as ‘virtue’ (the adjective ‘upright’ actually occurs at 1378a12) and placed along side two other attributes that render a deliberative orator credible.

In joining the three attributes, Aristotle is not breaking new ground. He is simply giving formal recognition to what political orators had long known. We may compare Thucydides 2.60.5–6, where Pericles, at the end of the second year of the Peloponnesian War, is made to recommend perseverance. He is addressing the Athenian Assembly and presents himself not only as a man who is ‘inferior to no one in knowing and setting forth what needs to be done’ but also as ‘a friend of the city, and superior to money’. Here we have the Aristotelian triad with only slight

modifications. Practical wisdom is divided into knowing what needs to be done and being able to present this knowledge in an intelligible manner. Goodwill becomes being a friend of the city, and virtue is narrowed to incorruptibility in regard to money. Thucydides even has Pericles anticipate Aristotle by commenting on the harmful effects of the opposite attributes. Being unable to present clearly what one knows inhibits counsel, being possessed by ill will toward the city diminishes the loyalty with which counsel is offered, and not being superior to money means that one can be bought.

The triad of attributes set forth in *Rhetoric* 2.1 reappears with little modification in *Politics* 5.9, where Aristotle lists the attributes that qualify a man for high office. Those who are going to hold authority, we are told, ought to be marked by 1) friendship toward the established political arrangement, 2) maximum capacity for the work of high office, and 3) the virtue and justice proper to the political arrangement (1309a33–37). The first of these attributes is equivalent to being a friend of the city (Pericles) and more generally possessing goodwill (*Rhetoric* 2.1). The qualifier ‘established’ is of some interest, for it underlines the fact that not all cities are arranged in the same way. Some have democratic constitutions, while others are oligarchies. The friendship of the person qualified to hold high office must be directed toward the city under its present arrangement, and the goodwill of the deliberative orator must be similarly directed (or at least appear to be so), if his words are going to be persuasive. The second attribute, maximum capacity for high office, is equivalent to possessing knowledge (Pericles) or practical wisdom (*Rhetoric* 2.1). Only in the *Politics* passage there is no mention of the ability to set forth policy (Pericles), perhaps because some high offices do not require speaking in public. The third attribute, virtue and justice, includes incorruptibility (Pericles) and corresponds neatly with the sort of virtue that Aristotle looks for in the deliberative orator (*Rhetoric* 2.1). Here the *Politics* is instructive, for Aristotle adds a reference to the political arrangement. What is just, he tells us, varies with the constitution, so that there are different kinds of justice (1309a37–39). The justice and more generally the virtue that are demanded of candidates for high office are not the same in every city. Aristotle does not have his eye on the virtue of the perfect man as discussed in his *Ethics*. Rather, he is concerned with the qualities that a given city-state values. Its citizens acquire these values through the moral education provided by the city-state, and they exercise them in administering political office. Similarly, the orator who is going to be persuasive in the deliberative Assembly must present a character that reflects the values of his audience. Addressing the citizens of a democratic city-state, the orator will present himself as someone who values freedom. Speaking before an oligarchic audience, he will show respect for wealth, and confronted by aristocrats, he will recognize the importance of education and tradition (cf. 1.8 1366a4–6).

Compared with the two other artful modes of persuasion, rhetorical argument and emotional appeal, persuasion through character is discussed with remarkable brevity. A possible explanation is that Aristotle is not breaking new ground when he discusses persuasion through character. Already in Homer we find anticipations of the Aristotelian triad. Nestor, for example, is presented as someone experienced in counsel, well intentioned, and courageous (*Iliad* 1.250–273, 9.94–104). We have already seen how Thucydides has Pericles lay claim to the triad, and if we consult the *Rhetoric to Alexander* we find the author recommending the same three attributes, when

discussing the introduction of a deliberative speech (29 1436b22–26). Apparently persuasion through character and the triad of attributes cited by Aristotle had become part of the rhetorical tradition, so that brief remarks sufficed.

3 Emotional Appeal

The third of the artful modes of persuasion is emotional appeal. It is introduced in *Rhetoric* 1.2 and discussed in 2.1–11, beginning with the following statement: ‘The emotions are those things on account of which men so change as to differ in their judgments and which are attended by pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear and all other such things and their opposites’ (2.1 1378a19–22). This statement is unsatisfactory, for it opens the door to physiological disturbances, like headaches and stomach-aches, that can affect a person’s judgment. Better are Aristotle’s immediately following remarks. They tell us that each emotion is to be analyzed in three ways: the condition of persons prone to the emotion, the object of the emotion, and the grounds that are the basis of the emotion. The mention of object and grounds is important, for it makes clear that Aristotle conceives of emotions as intelligent responses. When a person becomes angry, his anger is directed at someone, because thoughts have objects (an angry man thinks about someone who seems to have insulted him). And we can ask whether his anger is well-grounded, for not everything a man believes is in fact the case (no insult has occurred or only a trivial one, and that should be obvious to the person who is angry).

Recognizing the involvement of thought in emotional response had important consequences for rhetoric. In particular, emotional appeal could no longer be viewed as an extra-rational force that works on an audience in the manner of a drug or enchantment (cf. Gorgias, *Helen* 10–19). Rather, emotional appeal was seen as a rational process. Through argument, the orator controls what a listener believes, and in this way he arouses an emotional response. To be sure, argument can be misused so that inappropriate emotions are aroused or emotions are intensified in an unreasonable way. But the possibility of misusing emotional appeal does not mean that all emotional appeal must be condemned. An orator of wisdom, virtue and goodwill advances reasonable arguments, and in doing so, he excites emotional responses that are appropriate to the situation.

What then should we say about the criticism of emotional appeal in *Rhetoric* 1.1? The question has occasioned various answers. I mention three. One is that 1.1 introduces an ideal rhetoric that limits itself to arguing the issue. That ideal is put aside in 1.2, where Aristotle turns to real political oratory, which includes emotional appeal.¹⁰ The trouble with this response is that emotional appeal need not be hostile to arguing the issue. Indeed, arguing the issue may arouse an appropriate emotion. A second answer is that the criticism in 1.1 is narrowly directed against contemporaries of Aristotle who were prepared to arouse emotions by non-discursive means like cries and tears and wry faces.¹¹ But nowhere in 1.1 does Aristotle suggest that his criticism has such a restricted target. Indeed, it seems natural to read the text as a sweeping rejection of all forms of emotional appeal.¹² For that reason, I much prefer a third answer: namely, that 1.2 and 2.1–11 reflect a development in Aristotle’s thought. We know from Plato’s *Philebus* and Aristotle’s *Topics* that during Aristotle’s residence in

the Platonic Academy the relation between emotion and thought was a subject of discussion. Aristotle came to see thought as the efficient cause of emotional response, and that encouraged him to adopt a new and friendlier attitude toward emotional appeal. Changing thoughts is what orators do, and when the change is accomplished through reasonable arguments that result in emotional response, then the orator has done nothing wrong. He is performing his task in an artful manner.

It is likely that Aristotle first set forth his analysis of emotional response in a lost treatise like *Divisions* and then transferred it to his course of lectures on rhetoric once he had developed a doctrine of three artful modes of persuasion. The transfer was accomplished with less than complete attention to detail. I mention one instance. The account of hate in 2.4 states explicitly that this emotion occurs without feelings of pain (1382a12–13), yet the initial statement concerning emotion in 2.1 ties emotional response to feelings of pleasure and pain. My guess is that the initial statement belongs to an earlier period when Aristotle viewed emotion as upsetting and incompatible with reasoned judgment. Be that as it may, hate is an emotion of especial importance in judicial oratory. When jurors vote to condemn the accused, they are likely not to be moved by painful anger, for they themselves have not been subjected to outrage. But they may hate the accused, for this emotion is directed toward types of people (adulterers, thieves and the like), whom they would like to see removed from society.

Immediately following the analysis of types of emotion, i.e., in 2.12–17, Aristotle discusses different kinds of character tied to age and fortune. First the attributes that mark young men, old men and men in their prime are surveyed, and then attributes tied to good birth, wealth and power are taken up. Being placed after the chapters on emotion suggests that this discussion of character was intended to supplement the analysis of emotion. If an orator is addressing an audience of older men and knows that old men are cowardly and given to anxiety, i.e., their condition is such that they are prone to fear, then the orator will ask himself whether exciting fear will help his case. And if he thinks that it will, then he will speak of impending dangers that are grounds for fear. So much is clear, but we should not overlook the fact that the discussion of kinds of character is useful in other ways: e.g., it may provide ideas for blackening the character of an opponent and for constructing a convincing narrative. Moreover, the absence of any examples from oratory suggests that the discussion was not originally written for rhetorical instruction. It may have been transferred to rhetoric after the chapters on emotions became part of rhetorical instruction.¹³

4 Delivery and Style

In the opening lines of Book 3, Aristotle tells us that the three technical modes of persuasion have been dealt with and that he will now discuss style or expression. By way of explanation, he adds that it is not sufficient to grasp what ought to be said; it is also necessary to say it in the right way, for that contributes greatly to the impression one has of a speech (3.1 1403b6–18). So much is straightforward, but what follows introduces difficulties. Aristotle distinguishes between how one sets out the facts of a case, the style in which the facts are expressed, and how one delivers an oration. He tells us that delivery is the most powerful of the three, and that it has not been a

subject of rhetorical investigation. In addition, Aristotle characterizes delivery as the management of voice and tells us that delivery owes its power to corrupt political arrangements. What is right is arguing the issue on the basis of the facts. Everything else including delivery should be deemed extraneous, even if it is efficacious in dealing with an audience that is corrupt (1403b18–1404a8). Such a negative attitude toward delivery is intelligible. We need only think of a demagogue like Cleon, whom Aristotle describes as especially responsible for corrupting the people of Athens and the first to shout aloud while on the speaker's platform (*AP* 28.3). Moreover, the emphasis on arguing the issue on the basis of facts – it is just to compete by means of the facts themselves; everything but demonstration is extraneous (1404a5–7) – recalls 1.1, which is likely to reflect an early stage in Aristotle's thinking about rhetoric. His remarks on delivery in 3.1 may be roughly contemporaneous. But whether early or not, the treatment of delivery in 3.1 is disappointing. It ignores gesture and facial expression, even though they are recognized alongside voice elsewhere in the *Rhetoric* (2.8 1386a32, 3.7 1408b6). More satisfactory are Aristotle's remarks in the *Poetics*, where voice is not ignored (19 1456b8–13, 20 1457a21–22), but bodily movement receives the fuller treatment (26 1461b26–1462a14). Aristotle recognizes that tragic actors can overdo the use of gesture, but that does not mean that all gesture is to be avoided. Similarly in oratory, gesture, facial expression and variations in voice are desirable when used in moderation and in conjunction with an appropriate style. For delivery and style ought to work together, and when they do, they assist comprehension and add emphasis. Aristotle touches on this mutual dependence toward the end of the discussion of style (3.12 1413b17–31), but he is not motivated to write at length on delivery. He appears to have left the topic to his pupil Theophrastus, who wrote a separate treatise on the subject.

Despite the dampening remarks of 3.1 – in speaking one ought to strive neither to annoy nor to delight (1404a4–5) – the treatment of style that follows is not dismissive of the subject. In 3.2 we are told that the virtue of style is to be clear in what one says, to avoid meanness and undue elevation, and to express oneself appropriately (1404b1–5). This is a tripartite virtue (cf. 3.12 1414a23–24), in which clarity enjoys pride of place. And rightly so, for oratory is a form of communication. To be sure, expression that is unclear can serve a purpose – e.g., an orator may wish to mislead his audience through equivocal usage or simply leave the audience confused. However, on the whole an orator aims to be clear and toward that end ordinary words used in their everyday sense are recommended. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for elevating style through the introduction of unfamiliar words and phrases and through the use of metaphor. Language of this sort arouses wonder, which in turn is pleasing to the listener. But moderation is necessary, lest the speaker express himself in ways that are inappropriate. When a subject is of no special importance, elevated language will be off-putting. And when elevated language is put in the mouth of a simple man, it will not only be inappropriate but also lack credibility. In any case, a speaker should attempt to disguise his art and to give the impression of speaking naturally (1404b5–25).

In 3.3–4 Aristotle takes up frigidity (bad taste) and the simile, which is presented as an expanded metaphor. In 3.5–7 good Greek, weight, and the appropriate are discussed. The chapters are likely to have been composed before the discussion of virtue in 3.2, but whatever the chronology, a close relationship is obvious. Speaking good Greek relates to clarity, weight to elevation, and the appropriate to the like-named virtue. In

3.8 Aristotle tells us that prose should be rhythmical but not metrical, for then it would be verse. He recommends beginning sentences with the first paean (-uuu) and ending them with the fourth paean (uuu-). A long final syllable makes the ending clear and in this way facilitates comprehension. In 3.9 Aristotle turns to the period, which is analyzed in terms of its internal structure. It can be either simple or divided into cola or members. No connection with prose rhythm is made, and a longer second colon is not recommended.

The subject of 3.10–11 is ‘urbanity’. Aristotle analyzes it in terms of audience psychology. Learning with ease is said to be pleasant and for this reason metaphor is recommended.¹⁴ Like the enthymeme, a metaphor conveys a new idea and therefore promotes learning. And when a metaphor is expressed with brevity, combined with antithesis, and made vivid, it is especially appealing. The discussion of style is concluded in 3.12. Written style is distinguished from that which is appropriate to live debate. The former is said to be more precise, the latter less so. It is especially given to delivery (1413b8–9). In addition, the styles of deliberative, judicial and epideictic oratory are distinguished from one another. Deliberative style is likened to shadow painting; exactness would be wasted before a large crowd. Judicial speeches call for a more exact style, especially when the judge is a single person, for the relevant and the irrelevant are easily discerned. Epideictic style is said to be most like writing, for it is meant to be read (1414a7–18).

5 Arrangement

Aristotle’s discussion of arrangement focuses on the parts of an oration. Four parts receive separate treatment: the proem, narration, proof, and epilogue (3.14, 16, 17, 19). In the case of the first three, the material is organized according to the tripartite division of rhetoric into epideictic, judicial and deliberative. The discussion of the proem is supplemented by remarks on removing slander (3.15), and the account of proof is followed by remarks on interrogation and the utility of jests (3.18). The general impression conveyed is that of a teaching manual. There are numerous directions, some of which are expressed in the second person: pronoun, adjective, or verb including the imperative. We may have here Aristotle’s earliest course of lectures on rhetoric, albeit with revisions and additions of a later date.

Striking is 3.13, i.e., the chapter with which Aristotle begins his discussion of arrangement. Here Aristotle asserts that the necessary parts of an oration are two: statement of the case and proof. The proem is not an essential part of a deliberative oration, narration belongs only to judicial orations, and an epilogue is not always part of a judicial speech (1414a30–b7). Nevertheless, Aristotle does allow a maximum of four parts: proem, statement of the case, proof and epilogue. Narration remains excluded (1414b8–9). 3.13 may be compared with 1.1 and 3.1, where Aristotle emphasizes arguing the case. Temporal proximity is likely. I note only that in the subsequent discussion of the proem Aristotle continues to exhibit a restrictive attitude. He lists techniques for securing and discouraging the attention of the listener, but he includes a reminder that all such techniques are outside the argument and directed toward a worthless auditor who listens to matters that are extraneous to the matter at issue (3.14 1415b5–6).

Bibliographical Essay

There is an enormous bibliography on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. What follows is deliberately selective. The most recent and currently preferred edition is that of R. Kassel, *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica* (Berlin: 1976). Older but still used is the Oxford Classical Text of D. Ross, *Aristoteles, Ars Rhetorica* (1959). Neither edition is accompanied by a translation. The Loeb edition of J. Freese, *Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric* (London: 1926) offers a Greek text with a facing translation in English. For the Greek text with a French translation, there is the Budé edition of M. Dufour and A. Wartelle, *Aristote, Rhétorique*, 3 vols. (Paris: 1960 and 1973). E. Cope and J. Sandys, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: 1877), provide the Greek text with extensive notes conveniently placed below the text. There are several modern translations without Greek text, such as W.R. Roberts, *Aristotle, Rhetoric* (Oxford: 1924), now available in the *Oxford Translation of Aristotle* 2 (Princeton: 1984), pp. 2152–2269, G.A. Kennedy, *Aristotle, On Rhetoric. A Theory of Civic Discourse* (Oxford: 1991) and H. Lawson-Tancred, *Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric* (London: 1991). Several useful commentaries and general studies are available. On Books 1 and 2, there is W. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I and II*, 2 vols. (New York: 1980, 1988), and on the complete work, there is C. Rapp, *Aristoteles, Rhetorik* 2 (Berlin: 2002). E. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London: 1867) remains valuable. G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 82–114, provides an excellent introduction to the whole of the *Rhetoric*. See also I. Düring, *Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg: 1966), pp. 126–159. For collections of essays see K. Erickson (ed.), *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric* (Metuchen: 1974), D. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (Princeton: 1994), and A. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Berkeley: 1996). The collection of R. Stark (ed.), *Rhetorika, Schriften zur aristotelischen und hellenistischen Rhetorik* (Hildesheim: 1968) includes articles on both Aristotelian and Hellenistic rhetoric. Studies of special topics are numerous. On rhetorical argument, see E. Ryan, *Aristotle's Theory of Rhetorical Argumentation* (Montreal: 1984), M. Burnyeat, 'Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion', in D. Furley and A. Nehamas, *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (cited above), pp. 3–55, and D. Hitchcock, 'Aristotle's Theory of Argument Evaluation', *Greek Philosophy of Communication* 1 (2002), pp. 73–91. On non-artful proofs, there is D. Mirhady, 'Non-Technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes', *AJP* 112 (1991), pp. 5–28. For persuasion through the character of the orator, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle on Persuasion through Character', *Rhetorica* 10 (1992), pp. 207–244 and 'Aristotle's Accounts of Persuasion through Character', in C. Johnstone (ed.), *Theory, Text and Context* (Albany: 1996), pp. 147–168, and E. Schütrumpf, 'The Model for the Concept of *Ethos* in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*', *Philologus* 137 (1993), pp. 12–17. For emotional appeal, see F. Solmsen, 'Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator Playing on the Feelings', *CP* 33 (1938), pp. 390–404, P. Aubenque, 'La Définition Aristotélicienne de la Colère', *Revue Philosophique* 147 (1957), pp. 300–317 on anger, and W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions', *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970), pp. 40–70, and *Aristotle on Emotion*² (London: 2002), pp. 9–18, 93–114. On delivery, see R. Sonkowsky, 'An Aspect of Delivery in Ancient

Rhetorical Theory', *TAPA* 90 (1959), pp. 256–274, W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle's Platonic Attitude toward Delivery', *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986) pp. 242–254, and G. Wöhrle, 'Actio, das fünfte *Officium* des antiken Redners', *Gymnasium* 97 (1990), pp. 31–46, and on style see G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (cited above), pp. 103–113, and with special reference to metaphor, see A. Laks, 'Substitution et Connaissance: Une Interprétation Unitaire (ou presque) de la Théorie Aristotélicienne de la Métaphore', in D. Furley and A. Nehamas, *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (cited above), pp. 283–305. Regarding chronology and the composition of the *Rhetoric*, see F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Berlin: 1929), I. Düring, *Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (cited above), pp. 118–125, J. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophic Growth* (Toronto: 1989), pp. 76–86 and 283–287, and W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'On the Composition of Aristotle's Rhetoric', in *Lénaika = Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 89 (Stuttgart: 1996), pp. 165–188. For the influence of Aristotle on later rhetoricians, see F. Solmsen, 'The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric', *AJP* 62 (1941), pp. 35–50 and 167–190, W.W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady (eds.), *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 6 (New Brunswick, NJ: 1994), and with special reference to Theophrastus and Cicero, W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean Doctrine', *Rhetorica* 23 (2005), pp. 37–64.

Notes

- 1 The brief description of dialectic that follows is greatly simplified. It is intended to highlight aspects of dialectic that are especially relevant to rhetoric. For a fuller account of dialectic and its relation to rhetorical argument, see for example D. Hitchcock, 'Aristotle's Theory of Argument Evaluation', *Greek Philosophy of Communication* 1 (2002), pp. 73–91.
- 2 For additional discussion, see T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24, p. 375.
- 3 If the respondent has chosen to defend a thesis of Heraclitus, his responses will reflect positions taken by the philosopher, even if in another context these positions might be rejected: see *Topics* 8.5 159b27–35 with R. Smith *Aristotle, Topics* (Oxford: 1997), p. 132.
- 4 Cf. *Topics* 1.14 105b10–12. In contrast to rhetorical induction, scientific induction establishes a universal premise by considering all possible cases. In *Prior Analytics* 2.23 68b15–37, Aristotle illustrates this kind of induction with a biological example. The premise 'every bileless animal is long-lived' is established by considering each and every kind of long-lived animal.
- 5 See W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Theophrastus of Eresus: Rhetorical Argument and Hypothetical Syllogistic', in *Theophrastean Studies = Philosophie der Antike* 17 (Stuttgart: 2003), pp. 35–50; the example of the Persian king is discussed on p. 42.
- 6 Cf. *Posterior Analytics* 1.4 73a21–25 and 1.30 87b22–26.
- 7 Other cities include neighboring cities; cf. *Rhet.* 1359b38.
- 8 See W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions', *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970), pp. 42–43 with n. 7.
- 9 It is, of course, true that in *Rhetoric* 1.3 Aristotle connects deliberative oratory with the advantageous (1358b22), but he is careful to add that justice and honor may also be considered (1358b24–25). Compare *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3, where Aristotle says that people who deliberate consider what is easiest and what is best (1112b17). In other words, moral considerations are not irrelevant when considering a course of action.

- 10 J. Sprüte, *Die Enthymementheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen: 1982), pp. 36–41.
- 11 J. Brunschwig, 'Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a "Counterpart" to Dialectic', in A. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Berkeley: 1996), pp. 45–51.
- 12 Quite apart from the fact that *Rhetoric* 1.1 makes no mention of cries, tears, wry faces and the like, what we read in 1.1 suggests strongly that Aristotle is thinking of emotions that are aroused by what an orator says. His attack is directed against persons who write 'arts of words or speech (*logoi*)' (1354a12), and his praise is bestowed on city-states and institutions that prevent an orator from speaking (*legein*) outside the issue. For it is not right to pervert a judge by leading (*proagein*) him to anger or pity (1354a18–25, 1355a2). That fits poorly with 1.2, where emotional appeal is introduced in words that recall 1.1: the audience is said to be led (*proagein*) into emotion by the speech (*logos*) of the orator (1356a14–15).
- 13 For additional discussion of emotional response, see D. Konstan, Chapter 27.
- 14 In *Rhetoric* 3.10 Aristotle refers to four kinds of metaphor and tells us that metaphor by analogy is especially well-liked (1410b35–1411a1). The four kinds are distinguished in *Poetics* 21 1457b6–33: from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, and by analogy. In *Rhetoric* 3.11 1413a14–15, proverbs are said to be metaphors from species to species. See W.W. Fortenbaugh, *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence, Commentary Volume 8, Sources on Rhetoric and Poetics* (Leiden: 2005), pp. 377–390, especially pp. 380–383.

CHAPTER TEN

Hellenistic Rhetoric in Theory and Practice

John Vanderspoel

1 Introduction

The empire of Alexander and its Successor kingdoms spread the use of the Greek language far more widely through the eastern Mediterranean world than had been the case previously and engendered the development of a *koinē* (literally ‘common’) Greek that became the *lingua franca* in these newly Greek-speaking areas and in some parts of Asia Minor where Greek had been in use for centuries. Largely for that reason, the period from Alexander’s death (323) to the incorporation of the last independent Greek-speaking kingdom into the Roman empire with the death of Cleopatra VII (30) is known as the Hellenistic period. The proliferation of the Greek language encouraged a simultaneous introduction of other aspects of Greek culture, including the study of rhetoric. In consequence, individuals and communities in the eastern Mediterranean world began to contribute to the development of rhetoric in the areas of both theory and practice. Naturally, the successors to the practitioners of rhetoric in Classical Greece, especially at Athens, continued to think and write about their field of study during the Hellenistic period, but these were no longer the sole proprietors of their craft, either in establishing the rules or in delivering the most important speeches. Of course, even in Classical Greece, some of the best orators had not been of Athenian origin (for example, Gorgias of Leontini).¹ Nevertheless, Athens (to our knowledge) was the focal point for rhetorical theory and practice: most extant classical speeches (as well as most theory) are somehow connected to Athens.

That is not true of the Hellenistic world as is clear despite the lack of solid extant evidence for the rhetoric of this period. Unlike Greek oratory of Classical Greece and the Roman imperial period, not a single complete speech of the Hellenistic period survives, and the large number of Hellenistic works on theory and practice has similarly disappeared. Instead, modern scholars must rely on reports by later authors and fragments of theoretical works and speeches found in a wide variety of writings.

That makes the study of rhetoric in the Hellenistic period difficult; reports and fragments are found out of context or already interpreted, sometimes in a programmatic way, by the writers who cite them. To a considerable degree, the modern scholar must attempt to re-establish contexts, intents, and much else about Hellenistic rhetoric. Inevitably, this results in interpretations without sufficient evidence to prove their validity beyond doubt, and degrees of certainty are often the best that can be achieved. Nevertheless, the situation is not hopeless. The period was fertile in the development of rhetoric into the phenomenon that re-emerges in the Roman period of Greek rhetoric, and it is possible to treat some important writers and to outline the main threads and themes of the development of rhetoric in Hellenistic times. This chapter will treat the most important individuals, trends, and concepts in a survey of rhetoric's development in this period; inescapably, some illustrative material is drawn from Greek rhetoric in the Roman period. For the most part, it will avoid detailed technical discussion of the intricacies of the composition of speeches and the like, but it will refer the reader to places where further information on these topics is available.

2 Theophrastus

The Peripatetic philosopher Theophrastus of Eresus in some ways stands in both the Classical and Hellenistic worlds.² Upon his arrival at Athens, he studied first with Plato, but subsequently transferred to Aristotle's Lyceum, whose headship he assumed on Aristotle's death. He was a prolific writer on a wide range of topics, but most of his work is not extant. For our purposes here, the failure of his writings on rhetoric to survive represents the greatest loss since he composed a considerable body of work on both the theoretical and practical aspects of rhetoric. We know this from references in other authors to his treatises on many issues related to rhetoric.³ Diogenes Laertius credits Theophrastus with about twenty works on rhetoric, in addition to several more on poetry (*Lives of the Greek Philosophers* 5.46–50). Because Theophrastus was a younger contemporary of Aristotle, whose own work on rhetoric does not entirely survive, it is not always clear whether or to what extent he follows Aristotle in his theoretical approach or in his treatments of the composition of speeches; according to Quintilian, he sometimes propounded views different from those of his master (3.8.62). Certainly, he learned much from Aristotle, and his perspective is in broad terms quite consistent with Aristotle's discussions.

It can justifiably be said that the Peripatetic approach to rhetoric was a better response to the sophistic movement than Plato's had been; given that rhetorical training was bound to persist, it was better to establish its rules than to rule out its establishment in the educational curriculum. Thus Aristotle laid down some basic parameters, which first reached posterity through the writings of his students, especially Theophrastus.⁴ Aristotle, for example, is credited with the division of speeches into the three basic types (epideictic, deliberative and judicial) and with the introduction of a training method that taught students to argue both sides of an issue, a technique employed primarily to increase awareness of opposing arguments and not designed to encourage rhetorical dexterity for its own sake, though that was an eventual result. While not ignoring these points, much of Theophrastus' writing on rhetoric dealt with intricacies of technique. His works include treatises *On the Art of*

Rhetoric, On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts, On Example, On the Maxim, On Non-technical Proofs, On Judicial Speeches, On Praise, On Slander, On Statement (of the case) and Narration, On Style, and On Solecism. Consequently, he exercised much influence on the development of rhetoric in the Hellenistic world; with the authority of Aristotle behind him, Theophrastus set the agenda, though the Peripatetics did not always control the discussion or its outcome.

Theophrastus' work is largely concerned with definition, specification, and the practical aspects of this craft. Of all his writings on rhetoric, the most frequently cited is a work *On Style*. In it, Theophrastus defines four 'strengths' (as he calls them) or 'virtues' (as they are later called) of style: correctness, clarity, appropriateness, ornamentation. On these aspects of a speech, which became almost universally accepted among later writers and thus represent his greatest contribution, he naturally adopts a Peripatetic approach, arguing for the desirability of a style that is neither too simple nor too grand.⁵ The target was the sophistic movement, as is clearly evident in the area of ornamentation, where Theophrastus counselled against the excessive use of figures and other techniques that called attention to the rhetoric rather than to the subject and argument of a speech. Instead, ornamentation was to be slight for slight themes, somewhat more grand, but not excessively, for grander themes. Judging from citations by later authors, Theophrastus regularly treated his topics in minute detail. One example will need to suffice: 'The so-called beautiful words too make the style charming. Theophrastus defined them as follows: "Beauty in a word is that which is pleasant in regard to hearing or in regard to sight⁶, or that which suggests in thought great value"' (Demetrius, *On Style* 173). The passage goes on to list examples in each category mentioned, but some or all of these may derive from Demetrius rather than Theophrastus. Nevertheless, we can be sure that the philosopher included lists and discussions of specific words that were 'beautiful' for his different reasons. His practice elsewhere was most likely the same, that is, the statement of a principle or perspective, followed by relevant examples, usually drawn from the works of other authors, for this is the procedure regularly followed by other writers on rhetoric.

We cannot, or should not, leave Theophrastus without brief consideration of his best known work, the *Characters*. In it, the philosopher describes a series of characters, for example, the miser, the coward, the loquacious man, the garrulous man, the lover, the slanderer, and many others. Though the work may be linked in some way to the rise of New Comedy with its stock characters, one purpose, or even merely a partial impetus, might be rhetoric.⁷ An orator could, if he wished to characterize a defendant as a miser, draw upon Theophrastus' description of just such a man, using in his speech some specific points outlined by the philosopher; he could, if circumstances warranted, employ a selection of elements from more than one character, to depict a cowardly, loquacious, slanderous miser, for example. Theophrastus' attention to rhetoric and to the details of composing a speech suggests that his *Characters* was part of the same programme and thus a work intended primarily to aid orators. But the correctness of that view does not really matter (though it would be nice to know): whether composed as a rhetorical aid or not, the *Characters* provided orators with a handy reference guide to the types of human behaviour they might wish to include in their speeches. Thus, even in the composition of a work not addressed to orators, Theophrastus is a precursor to the development of oratory in the Hellenistic period.

Most likely, both his *Characters* and his works specifically on rhetoric were widely read and studied in the schools of the Hellenistic world.

3 New Schools of Rhetoric

As Greek became the most important language of communication between the different parts of the Hellenistic world, instruction in the language became a necessity for those who had not known it previously. Since the rulers and administrations of the Successor kingdoms were, initially, Macedonians and Greeks, the ability to communicate with them in their own language and a familiarity with the concepts they would recognize became a political and civic necessity. Naturally, this was a new development primarily in areas that had recently come under Macedonian and Greek control, but the need to communicate effectively with their political masters was equally important in areas that had been Greek-speaking for centuries. At the same time, in order for élites of different regions to be able to communicate with each other, a common educational system began to develop. The goal was to inculcate, in new generations of students, a familiarity with *paideia*, often defined as the Greek heritage, including its moral, social and political values, and sometimes simply as Greek ‘culture’.

The importance of a shared *paideia* should not be under-estimated. Embassies to rulers, which could be instrumental in achieving favourable treatment on a variety of issues ranging from tax relief to assistance in other areas, were a regular feature of cities’ relationships with their political masters. Ambassadors, who often expressed their desires through speeches, would find it easier to communicate with rulers if both sides shared a heritage. Similarly, expressions of loyalty, regularly offered through orations, needed to be effective, for they could compose a ruler’s anger against a city whose loyalty had been questioned or initiate favourable treatment. To achieve this, training in the techniques of rhetoric provided invaluable assistance. At the same time, rulers had begun, as early as Alexander himself, to adopt positions in relation to their subjects that incorporated elements of a more eastern tradition of kingship, leading to ruler cults⁸ and a consequent need to define the relationship between governor and governed, in language that both parties could understand. Speeches based on a shared *paideia* could establish principles by drawing on the past, but would also remind rulers that they had responsibilities to the governed; indeed, orators could often, usually subtly, inform kings that loyalty depended to a considerable degree upon the fulfillment of the expectations of the governed.

Unfortunately, no speech written or delivered to a ruler in the Hellenistic period is extant.⁹ Since the approach survives into the Roman world, examples can be drawn from that period. Dio Chrysostom’s several speeches on kingship both praise the emperor Trajan as a model ruler and paint a picture of the model ruler for the emperor to emulate.¹⁰ Themistius in the fourth century AD does much the same thing: frequently, he praises a specific action of an emperor in order to extract further similar actions.¹¹ In another vein, the existence of a loyalty dependent on performance emerges from close study of some Latin panegyrics delivered in the late third and early fourth centuries AD.¹²

All this had its foundation in the Hellenistic period. To accomplish these objectives, schools of rhetoric began to spring up all over the Greek-speaking Mediterranean

world,¹³ as élites found it desirable to be able to communicate with their ruling powers in language the latter could understand and at the same time to be able to express themselves more effectively in achieving civic and personal goals. Naturally, instruction in the Greek language and literature was foundational to that study, and grammarians and their schools became a feature in most cities as well. In fact, we might say that grammarians taught the basic elements of Greek *paideia*, while teachers of rhetoric gave instruction in the techniques of employing it most effectively in those circumstances where it mattered.¹⁴

Naturally, schools had existed outside of Athens before the Hellenistic period, and some of these must have provided training in the art of speaking. That is evident simply from the origin of the sophists; Gorgias, for example, was from Leontini in Sicily, Prodicus from Ceos, and Hippias from Elis. From the very fact that their appearance at Athens created a stir, both positively and negatively, it is evident that the art of speaking was taught differently in different places, or at any rate differently outside Athens. In the long run, the interaction of the sophists with the schools of philosophy at Athens had a productive outcome, for it created a form of rhetorical training that would become universal in the Greek-speaking world during the Hellenistic period. In short, schools of rhetoric everywhere adopted the same approach to rhetorical training. This is equally true for schools that had existed for some time already and for new foundations in many more cities during the Hellenistic period. Though the dates for specific schools are not usually known, by the end of the Hellenistic period all major cities had schools where students could study rhetoric to a high level of competence, and many smaller towns could boast of schools where local boys might receive their first training in rhetoric, before travelling elsewhere for further study, if they or their families had the requisite resources and ambition. Though a family's ambition for its sons might outstrip the financial and educational resources locally available, the universality of the educational process ensured that even these boys, and those from families with a more moderate ambition, received an education that put them in possession of a *paideia* that they shared with others whose circumstances were more fortunate. In their education at least, these boys could grow up to be the peers of their fellow-citizens within a town or a region or even the Greek-speaking world. In short, the proliferation of schools of rhetoric helped to create an élite with shared values that had not existed previously in so widespread an area of the Mediterranean world.

Inevitably, some schools – at Athens and Rhodes, for example – were regarded more highly than others and attracted the best teachers and the best students from all over the Greek-speaking world, but students elsewhere were taught the same basic principles in their classrooms, though, inevitably, teachers in different places put their individual stamps on their teaching methods. In the realm of theory, students learned about the different kinds of speeches; they studied aspects of style; they received instruction in the great variety of figures that could be employed for one kind of effect or another; they considered the nature of words themselves; they listened to their teachers discussing prose rhythm. Naturally, the teachers provided examples to illustrate theoretical issues. In the course of their education, schoolboys composed speeches, often on artificial themes, that instilled an ability to put their knowledge of rhetorical theory to practical use. As models, they analyzed, often memorized, the orations of the great orators of the past, primarily Lysias, Isocrates and Demosthenes.

They emulated them in their exercises in school, then attempted to model the speeches of their adult life on these orations.

Once boys who had been educated in rhetoric grew up to be men, they were ready for a role in the public life of their cities and towns. Depending on the level of their training and the availability of other candidates, they might be appointed to serve on an embassy to a ruler or to negotiate some point of contention with another town or to express gratitude to a benefactor. Visiting dignitaries, like rulers or their representatives and ambassadors from a neighbouring city, were generally welcomed with speeches delivered by a town's most accomplished orator. Speeches were delivered at religious festivals and at other civic occasions. Somewhat more mundane, perhaps, but no less important for establishing influence and reputation, was election or appointment to a position of leadership within the community and a permanent place on the city council. In all these spheres of activity and more, the schools of rhetoric prepared boys for their adult life, in their own communities and outside them. Rather quickly, in fact, a rhetorical education became virtually a minimum requirement for full élite status. That is evident from the proliferation of schools of rhetoric, which trained far more students than the need for orators demanded: élite families simply could not permit their sons to be less impressively educated than their peers, who were, as well, often their rivals for influence in their communities.

4 Refinement of Theory and Practice

With few exceptions, such as a generous patron on occasion, education in rhetoric was the responsibility of families, who paid teachers directly. Consequently, a teacher's livelihood often depended on the number of students he could attract, and competition for students developed as a result. One way for a rhetorician to attract more students was to have a better reputation than other teachers. This could be achieved in a number of ways. The first is perhaps rather obvious: teachers in major centres tended to develop better reputations; indeed, their establishment in these centres was usually a consequence of their quality. A second way was for a teacher to be an accomplished orator himself, in his oratory and in his successes, as an ambassador or in another forum where his oratory had been instrumental or particularly effective; not unnaturally, parents felt that such men were better able to teach their sons to be effective orators. Thirdly, though the approach to rhetorical training was everywhere the same, a teacher could develop techniques that were more effective than those of his contemporaries or his predecessors. For example, a teacher might find a method to instill in his pupils a quicker understanding of the principles by defining them in a manner that resonated better with his young students. He could find examples in the literature and speeches of the past that illustrated his theoretical points more effectively or simply caught the attention of his pupils more readily, thus generating a stronger likelihood that his students would be able to compose higher quality orations after fewer months of training, allowing study at a more advanced level in the remaining years in the classroom. At the same time, his pupils might well remember his precepts for a longer period of time after their studies had been completed; their subsequent successes naturally reflected positively on their teachers, whose reputations would thereby assure a steady supply of new students.

Extant writers on rhetoric or references elsewhere name many individuals who wrote works that do not survive. Most often, they are mere names to us, with very little information about the authors themselves, including their dates. Frequently, a writer is cited by only one later author for a single point of interpretation (with which the citing author may agree or disagree), or for a single example used to illustrate a particular figure, or for a specific sentence in a speech, or other such things. The important point here is not the individual examples handed down by other authors, however interesting and instructive they might be, but the proliferation of individuals who wrote about rhetoric. For the most part, we may assume, they did not develop rhetorical theory, for more would then likely have survived of their writings in agreement or disputation. That being so, a large percentage of known, but not extant, works were most likely handbooks prepared by the teachers of rhetoric to assist them in their educational activities, often, no doubt, copied by or for their pupils as reference manuals to be consulted while they were still students but also afterwards, perhaps when they were called upon to compose and deliver a type of speech whose precise requirements had slipped their active memory. In other words, many writings on rhetoric were little more than shortcuts to success, in the classroom and afterwards, and might contribute during his career to a teacher's reputation and his ability to attract students.

We do not know the details of most of these writings, but some features must generally have been present. Their authors must surely have defined the three basic types of speeches; sometimes, perhaps most often, different sub-types were included as well, as they are, for example, in the third-century AD treatises ascribed to Menander.¹⁵ Similarly, Theophrastus' four elements of style were important enough for inclusion and discussion, for, as noted, they were widely accepted. Treatment of technical matters, such as sentence structure, word choice, and prose rhythm, would also have been necessary. Inevitably, they included sections on the different figures of thought or speech an orator might employ to make his speeches interesting and effective; examples include prosopopoeia, irony, anaphora and synonymy.¹⁶ Certainly in these latter sections, and probably in the earlier, writers included examples from earlier authors to illustrate the discussions, examples that would be emulated or employed with little modification. For the most part, these handbooks did not offer extensive discussions of rhetorical theory; instead, they concentrated on classification and practical techniques that would train the average élite youth to deliver effective orations in his adulthood in the public life of his city or town. Many pupils and their families were satisfied with this; they were not interested in, perhaps not capable of, understanding the field of rhetoric in all its complexities. Except for those few who desired to embark upon careers as *rhētores*, training in rhetoric was primarily a matter of imbibing the shared *paideia* sufficiently well to be successful in later life and to be regarded as educated. For that reason, handbooks were not treatises extending to the combined length of Theophrastus' writings on rhetoric, but were rather one or two books summarizing the main points for the practical orator: essentially, they were 'Operator's Manuals'.¹⁷

If what we might call the social circumstances of the Hellenistic age best explains the proliferation of writings on rhetoric, then the period also saw the refinement of rhetorical theory and its application to oratory. Like the handbooks, the work in this area is largely not extant either; like the handbooks, we know of its existence mainly

from references by later authors. To a large extent, we only know what developed because we can see how scholarship after the Hellenistic period differs from earlier scholarship. Quite regularly, it is impossible to supply dates, but despite this pessimistic preamble, the remainder of this section will outline a few of the more important developments and treat a couple of the main writers and their contributions to rhetorical scholarship.

One feature of Hellenistic scholarship on rhetoric was continual refinement and more precise definition, a process inherent in scholarship itself. Though this began with the earliest works of theory, including those by Aristotle and Theophrastus, over time the treatments of figures of speech define these in greater detail. Sometimes figures are divided into sub-types, generating a longer list of figures for students to understand (and no doubt part of the reason for the continual production of handbooks). In many ways, this process goes hand in hand with developments in literary criticism during the period. To take just a single example, poetry as a literary form was divided and sub-divided into an increasingly large number of genres and sub-genres. This is especially so for lyric poetry, where different metres, dialects, and places of origin became the bases of a large number of genres and sub-genres; poems and poets were classified accordingly.¹⁸ As noted earlier, Aristotle had divided speeches into the three basic types of epideictic, deliberative and judicial. Though we do not know whether Theophrastus developed this further, by the end of the Hellenistic period epideictic orations in particular had been subdivided into a large number of sub-types: the *epitaphios* (funeral speech), the *basilikos logos* (imperial oration), *epithalamios* (marriage oration), *genethliakos* (birthday speech), *presbeutikos* (embassy oration), among many others.

Hermagoras of Temnos, dating to the second century but otherwise very little known, is regularly credited by subsequent authors for the development of a theory of the *stasis*.¹⁹ While scholars are divided and uncertain about the choice of the term itself, which means ‘revolution’, the concept is straightforward: it relates to the essential and central point at issue, applied initially to cases in the legal environment. In other words, on what key point does a case turn? By learning how to identify that point, an orator was better able to understand the most important elements of his brief in the effort to prosecute or defend successfully. Soon, the concept was extended to other oratory where the ability to focus on a key point was beneficial. In the political arena, for example, an orator who identified the *stasis* of a political issue and focused on arguments relevant to that point was more likely to persuade or dissuade a political audience, whether that be a city council meeting or an assembly of citizens.

Not surprisingly, given its utility, teachers gave their students much practice in identifying the *stasis* in a variety of situations. Once students had been trained in some preparatory exercises (called *progymnasmata*), their instructors would put before them a circumstance, drawn from history, mythology, or social practices, with no overriding concern for plausibility. Students were to examine the situation, discover the *stasis* and compose speeches arguing a point of view, often from both sides of an issue in turn. These speeches are usually called ‘declamations’, with a further division, in Latin terms, into those reflecting the judicial environment, called *controversiae*, and those in the political arena, called *suasoriae*, where students attempted to persuade or dissuade a political gathering. The practice of delivering orations on imaginary or fictive themes continued beyond students’ years in school, partly to maintain

competence, but largely, in the case of professional orators, for rhetorical display and the development of reputation. The best extant ancient treatment of declamation is the work of the Elder Seneca in Latin early in the first century AD. He provides numerous examples of the types of situations set before students and orators, and discusses how different orators treated the same 'case' set before them. Since many of his examples reflect Greek persons and situations, it is clear that these had become standard in the Hellenistic period and that students and orators in the Greek-speaking world engaged in the same practices; indeed, some of Seneca's orators are of Greek origin.²²

Two examples of the types of circumstances that could be set as topics will need to suffice.²¹ First, a situation with judicial implications: after a man and his daughter are captured by pirates, he promises his daughter's hand to anyone who will ransom them. A young man agrees, but finds the father dead and ransoms only the girl. When they return home, her kinsman claims her, stating that the father's offer was invalid. Here, orators could, for example, present speeches for or against the young man's claim to the girl, and for and against the kinsman's right to the girl and her inheritance. The following situation falls in the deliberative category: though resident foreigners were not permitted on a city's walls, one man nevertheless appears there and distinguishes himself in fighting off besiegers. Should he be held to account for transgressing the law or be rewarded for his heroism? Again, orators could present a series of different angles on the issues involved.

Another writer of the Hellenistic period is Demetrius, author of an extant work *On Style*. His further identity is unknown, but he is not the philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum, as was once thought. Rather, general agreement now holds that he lived in the first century. Much of his work centres on what we would call literary criticism, but it is nevertheless important for the study of rhetoric for the simple reason that the techniques of both literary and rhetorical styles are similar or even the same. The use of literary figures to generate specific effects appears in both speeches and other prose, even poetry. As a consequence, Demetrius' *On Style* provides the modern student of ancient rhetoric with one of the very few surviving discursive treatments of stylistic issues, even though it is impossible to determine with complete accuracy to what extent the treatise reflects the standard points of view on these matters in the late Hellenistic period or how innovative it may be.

5 Attic, Rhodian, and Asianic Rhetoric

Towards the end of the first century, we see the evidence of a debate between proponents of three distinct styles of oratory in the works of Cicero on oratory and in the reactions of his contemporaries and later scholars to his own oratory.²² Some of Cicero's detractors accused him of practising Asianic rather than Attic oratory; he defended himself by appealing to Demosthenic antecedents, and others, including the emperor Claudius, wrote works against Cicero's detractors. The details of Cicero's rhetorical style are not relevant here, but his experience alerts the modern scholar to that development of distinct styles of rhetoric, whose merits and faults are treated in a number of Greek and Latin writers. While Classical Greek orators and theorists of rhetoric, including Aristotle, had paid some attention to the existence of different styles, the sharp divisions between schools of thought on this issue were a product of the Hellenistic period. That is perhaps

self-evident from the name given to one of these schools, the Asianic, for its very existence depends on the Hellenization of Asia Minor and the presence of schools for instruction in rhetoric in that part of the eastern Mediterranean. Since the debates had become acrimonious by Cicero's time, these different points of view on the proper style for oratory had become entrenched by the mid-first century. Thus, the rise of these three approaches to style is clearly a Hellenistic phenomenon.

The styles are difficult to characterize for the simple reason that even ancient writers do not agree on the precise characteristics. In general, Attic oratory, which sought its models in the canonical Attic orators, such as Isocrates, Lysias, and Demosthenes, was typically simple and straightforward, while Asianic was the opposite: florid and complex; the Rhodian style was somewhere in between. The matter was not, however, as simple as that. The Attic orators differed greatly among themselves; Demosthenes' oratory was far more ornate, with its long complex sentences, than that of Lysias, and had he not been an Athenian orator some might well have considered his oratory Asianic (once the term was invented, of course). Cicero certainly did not think so, for, as noted, he defended himself, and others defended him, against charges of Asianism by stating that he employed Demosthenes as a model of Attic oratory. Furthermore, many Hellenistic and later Greek orators, and Cicero in Latin, adopted different stylistic characteristics at different times or as the situation demanded: when straightforward prose was most beneficial, they employed the Attic style; when flourish and ornateness might accomplish an objective more readily, Asianic oratory was featured in a speech.

Rhodian oratory is not much discussed in the ancient writers, for it was neither too simple to annoy the Asianists nor too complex to bother the Atticists. It perhaps hardly needs stating that the style is closely associated with the schools at Rhodes; possibly, Antisthenes, said to have founded a school there in the fourth century, is responsible for the origin of the style, though that is not a necessary conclusion: it may also have developed subsequently. To a considerable extent, Asianic oratory developed as a consequence of the widespread expansion of rhetorical schools over the Greek-speaking world in the Hellenistic period. As *rhētores* sought to distinguish themselves from each other, and as the refinement in the treatments of rhetorical theory and practice grew ever more precise, one avenue to reputation was the use of a florid style in displays of an orator's craft. Simply put, Asianic oratory attracted more attention because it encouraged virtuosity, often for its own sake. Oratory, we may suggest, came full circle during the Hellenistic period. What had begun as a dispute between the philosophers and the sophists about the utility and nature of rhetoric became a disagreement between different schools of rhetorical thought on the proper style for oratory. In some ways, the Asianists replaced the sophists in what was by and large the same debate, a battle now fought in technical terms rather than centring on issues of morality. At the same time, the dispute between groups can be seen as little more than typical disagreement between scholars, though each side also worked out a practical application for its point of view.

6 Philosophy and Rhetoric

The brief re-emergence of the debate between the philosophers and the sophists in the previous section raises another feature of Hellenistic rhetoric, that is, the respective

roles of the philosopher and the orator in Greek society. The issue was certainly not decided during this period, for it rears its head regularly during the Roman imperial period, in such works as Philostratus' *Lives of the Philosophers*. Even in the fourth century AD, Themistius and his contemporaries still disagreed about the role of the philosopher in the realm of rhetoric. Essentially, this debate centred on the right to make moral and other types of judgements in speeches. As in Plato's castigation of the sophists for their inattention to morality and attention to technique, philosophers continued to hold that only they had the uprightness as well as the independence of mind to deliver certain types of judgements. *Rhētores*, to them, were little more than technicians dependent on favour and patronage for success and reputation, thus rendering favourable remarks, about a ruler, for example, very suspect. In contrast, by virtue of being philosophers, they had *parrhēsia*, often translated as 'freedom of speech', but better defined as independence of mind unencumbered by the vicissitudes of fortune; when a philosopher praised a ruler, to use the same example, his judgements were true and valid, not suspect. Orators naturally disagreed, in the belief that they were fully capable of making judgements that were valid and true, and indeed that they had the right, even the obligation, to do so.

In practical terms, this dispute is most directly relevant to speeches *On Kingship* in the Hellenistic period. Though, as usual, very little of that oratory survives, it is clear that rulers often heard speeches on the concept of kingship, and more often than not they were praised in these orations. That was accomplished in different ways, varying from pure flattery to the description of an ideal king, with whose characteristics the royal subject of an oration is inevitably compared favourably. The latter approach was designed to avoid charges of pure flattery, for a king is not praised solely because he is king, but rather at one remove, as a reflection of the ideal; this approach has a Platonic flavour for that reason. Naturally, an orator could construct his ideal king with precisely those characteristics that his oration's subject possessed, as has been argued for Dio Chrysostom's orations for Trajan.²³ Themistius illustrates this point even more clearly: his speeches to a series of emperors paint different pictures of the ideal that emperors emulated or were to emulate, primarily by emphasizing particular virtues for particular emperors.²⁴ On occasion, he even calls an emperor a philosopher because he displayed a specific virtue. To illustrate the larger point, some of Themistius' contemporaries regarded him, partly because of the nature of his speeches, partly because he took an active role in politics, as no more than a flatterer,²⁵ and at two periods in his life, he felt compelled to insist that he was a philosopher with *parrhēsia*.

The earliest surviving Greek orations on kingship are Dio Chrysostom's speeches for Trajan early in the second century AD. Despite the lack of specific evidence, these speeches reflect the development of views on kingship by philosophers and *rhētores* during the Hellenistic period. Dio Chrysostom was both an orator and a philosopher, and his remarks had a validity in philosophical circles that a *rhētōr*'s statement would not have; indeed, they were an important basis for Themistius' orations.²⁶ Dozens of orators and some philosophers delivered similar speeches during the Hellenistic period, and each group considered its own statements perfectly valid, though philosophers were not much enamoured with *rhētores*' treatments of this theme, for they felt that *rhētores* were poaching in their territory. Their claims to independence of thought were largely attempts to occupy some high moral ground in this dispute,

because philosophers also felt it important not to become too involved in political activity; addresses to kings inevitably put them in that arena.

Over time, three categories of practitioner developed: the *rhētōr*, the sophist, and the philosopher. While this was a development of the Hellenistic period, it is best evident in the first and second centuries AD, the period usually called the Second sophistic.²⁷ A *rhētōr* was purely a technician, while a sophist was either a highly accomplished *rhētōr* or an orator with a philosophical mien (or both). Thus Herodes Atticus, widely regarded as the best orator of his day, and Dio Chrysostom could both be considered sophists, though the latter is sometimes considered a philosopher or a sophist who became a philosopher. In terms of moral authority, philosophers sometimes conceded to sophists the capacity to hold *parrhēsia* and the right to make moral judgements. Inevitably, the definitions are not precise and depend on perspective: the same individual might be considered a sophist by one person and a philosopher by another, and self-definition played a part as well. Consequently, this division into three categories helped little in resolving disputes over territory and may have exacerbated them.

The schools of philosophy approached rhetoric somewhat differently from each other. As already noted, much of the impetus for the nature and theoretical aspects of Hellenistic rhetoric originated with the Peripatetics, who presumably lost some influence in purely technical matters as these areas came more and more under the control of rhetoricians. The Academy accommodated itself over time to the existence of rhetoric, but remained cautious, especially in regard to the questions of the authority to make moral judgements and to undertake active roles in politics. Despite contributions to grammatical theory and literary criticism, the Stoics contributed little to developments in rhetoric, except in the sense that their philosophical perspectives might filter down into arguments and moral judgements. In fact, this was generally true of all philosophical schools: each was influenced by the others, and some elements of each became part of the *paideia* of the Hellenistic world. A proper education, even without specific training in philosophy, instilled elements of philosophy in students during their years in school.

The Cynics' approach to rhetoric, like their approach to most else, was different, for they simply did not adhere to established rules. They cared little for the niceties of social discourse, and cared equally little for the niceties of verbal discourse, tending rather to say exactly what they thought without the adornment of rhetorical technique. Indeed, Cynic philosophy was by nature opposed to the trained and artificial eloquence created by the system of education, though many Cynic philosophers had experienced a quality education of the normal type. Their pronouncements (the term orations is perhaps a misnomer) were straightforward, to the point, and often annoying. On one hand, Cynic philosophers might be said to have been the true possessors of *parrhēsia* because of their unwillingness to be influenced by external factors; on the other, they exercised not so much an independence of thought as a deliberate desire to create an effect on their audiences, a perspective that goes a little beyond what *parrhēsia* was intended to signify.²⁸ Nevertheless, itinerant Cynic philosophers did have an effect in the long term: their methods of addressing audiences and castigating them with a view to improving the moral condition of society have justifiably been seen as playing an important role in the development of religious preaching.

7 Conclusion

In the Hellenistic period, rhetoric became an important part of Greek society and culture. Though the discipline had begun earlier, the peculiar circumstances of the period generated a massive increase in the importance of rhetorical training to the élite and to their sons. In consequence, the number of schools grew dramatically; so did the number of teachers in these schools and the number of *rhētores* who wrote handbooks on the nature of rhetoric and the techniques that orators could use to accomplish the objectives of their speeches. During the three centuries of the Hellenistic era, these technical treatments grew ever more precise and detailed, as is natural in scholarship. The different disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric continued the debate on some issues that had attended the rise of rhetoric in the late fifth century with no resolution. Despite all this, the Hellenistic world was filled with students engaging in practice orations during their school years and with adults displaying their oratorical skills at almost every public occasion. Perhaps the most accurate summary is this: in the Hellenistic period, rhetoric came of age.

Bibliographical Essay

Specialized studies have been published on many topics, too many to list here. The standard general survey of the Hellenistic period remains P. Green, *From Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1990). More succinct, but nevertheless offering fairly detailed discussions of developments in literature, philosophy, religion, and science, is G. Shipley, *The Greek World after Alexander 323–30 BC* (London: 2000). Most recently, there is A. Erskine (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: 2003), which covers many aspects of the Hellenistic World. Most topics addressed in this chapter are treated in the standard works on Greek rhetoric, which have generally not been cited in the notes. Pride of place in English must be given to G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963); more recent is his *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), a single volume that combines material from his separate treatments of Greek, Roman, and Late Antique rhetoric. Even more recent is the English translation by W.E. Higgins of L. Pernot, *Rhetoric in Antiquity* (Washington: 2005), originally published in France in 2000. S.E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 BC–AD 400* (Leiden: 2001), offers essays on many aspects of rhetoric, including a considerable number on Christianity and Christian writers. On technical aspects of rhetoric, readers may consult Pernot's brief 'Thesaurus: The System of Rhetoric' appended to the main text of his *Rhetoric in Antiquity* cited above) at pp. 215–235. For more detailed definitions and discussion of figures and other technical aspects of rhetoric, see G.A. Rowe, 'Style', in S.E. Porter, *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric* (cited above), pp. 121–157. To the extent that literary criticism and rhetorical theory coincide, a still useful work is G.M.A. Grube, *The Greek and Roman Critics* (Toronto: 1965), who treats individual authors, including Demetrius, in sequence. D.A. Russell, *Criticism in Antiquity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1981), is more recent and follows some narrative chapters with

thematic ones. D.A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (eds.), *Ancient Literary Criticism. The Principal Texts in New Translations* (Oxford: 1972), provide introductions and translations of the main texts.

Notes

- 1 See further, J.A.E. Bons, Chapter 4.
- 2 A good collection of essays on various aspects of Theophrastus may be found in W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby and A.A. Long (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 2 (New Brunswick, NJ: 1985).
- 3 The modern student has an advantage over earlier ones with the publication of W.W. Fortenbaugh *et al.*, *Theophrastus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, 2 vols. (Leiden: 1992), which collects the *testimonia* for Theophrastus' writings; on rhetoric: see 2, pp. 508–559.
- 4 See G.A. Kennedy, 'Historical Survey of Rhetoric', in S.E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. – A.D. 400* (Leiden: 2001), p. 22, for the fact that Aristotle's writings on rhetoric were not available to the public until their rediscovery and editing in the first century.
- 5 For a more detailed treatment, see D.C. Innes, 'Theophrastus and the Theory of Style', in W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby and A.A. Long (eds.), *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 2 (New Brunswick, NJ: 1985), pp. 251–263 and G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 273–284. Both cite earlier work.
- 6 That is, a word that calls up a pleasant visual image.
- 7 See W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Theophrastus, the *Characters* and Rhetoric', in W.W. Fortenbaugh and D.C. Mirhady (eds.), *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle* = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 6 (New Brunswick, NJ: 1994), pp. 15–35 (p. 34 for possible links to New Comedy). See also P. Green, *From Alexander to Actium* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1990), pp. 68–71, for a brief discussion of the *Characters*.
- 8 Most surveys of the Hellenistic period treat this development at least briefly, but see also A. Chaniotis, 'The Divinity of Hellenistic Rulers', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: 2003), pp. 431–445. S. Price, *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor* (Cambridge: 1984), pp. 23–52, discusses the phenomenon as background to imperial cult.
- 9 A. Erskine, Chapter 18, draws on accounts and summaries of speeches found in the writings of historians and on inscriptions to draw a more detailed picture of the utility of rhetoric in Hellenistic political life, both within cities and in relation to kings.
- 10 See C.P. Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* (Cambridge, MA: 1978), pp. 115–123.
- 11 See J. Vanderspoel, *Themistius and the Imperial Court: Oratory, Civic Duty, and Paideia from Constantius to Theodosius* (Ann Arbor: 1995), *passim*.
- 12 See R. Rees, *Layers of Loyalty in Latin Panegyric: AD 289–307* (Oxford: 2002).
- 13 L. Pernot, *Rhetoric in Antiquity*, trans. W.E. Higgins (Washington: 2005), titles his chapter (3) on Hellenistic rhetoric 'The Hellenistic Globalization'.
- 14 For a more detailed treatment of the relationship of grammatical and rhetorical education, see T. Morgan, Chapter 20.
- 15 Best studied in the edition by D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford: 1981). The extant work of Menander treats only part of the field of rhetoric, perhaps at greater length than many handbooks of the Hellenistic period.

- 16 The number of figures of both types is large. See the Bibliographical Essay for some modern works that offer lists and definitions.
- 17 See G.A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata. Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden: 2003), for five handbooks from the Roman imperial period translated into English. Hardly remarkably, these handbooks largely treat the same subjects in much the same sequence.
- 18 See further, W.H. Race, Chapter 33.
- 19 See M. Heath, 'The Substructure of *Stasis*-Theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes', *CQ*² 44 (1994), pp. 114–129.
- 20 On declamation in the Greek world, see D.A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge: 1983). For Seneca's works, see M. Winterbottom, *The Elder Seneca*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: 1974).
- 21 For convenience, these examples are drawn from Russell, *Greek Declamation*, pp. 23–25.
- 22 On rhetoric in the Roman era, see J. Connolly, Chapter 11.
- 23 See Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, pp. 115–123.
- 24 See Vanderspoel, *Themistius*, *passim*.
- 25 P. Heather and D. Moncur, *Politics, Philosophy, and Empire in the Fourth Century. Selection Orations of Themistius* (Liverpool: 2001), are more inclined than I am to accept this view of Themistius.
- 26 Vanderspoel, *Themistius*, pp. 7–9.
- 27 For a brief treatment, see Jones, *Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, pp. 9–13.
- 28 See K. Kennedy, 'Cynic Rhetoric: The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance', *Rhetoric Review* 18 (1999), pp. 26–45.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

The New World Order: Greek Rhetoric in Rome¹

Joy Connolly

Such was the Art of Rhetoric. It bears all the marks of its Greek origin. It was the creation of the Greek intellect, with its intellectual subtlety and its love of logic and fine distinctions, but of the Greek intellect in its decline, no longer adventurous and creative, but confined within professional and pedagogic bounds ... But on the whole the Romans took to it with surprising readiness.²

Greek rhetoric in Rome: any essay on the topic must begin by acknowledging that it threatens to subsume Latin literary production *tout court*. A few examples prove the point. From Varro, the prolific late republican polymath, to the minor Augustan grammarian Cloatius Verus, who composed a catalogue of Italian fruits and nuts, Roman writers of technical literature owe the logical structure of their work to the system of definition and division developed by Greek rhetoricians. The stylistic catchwords of Latin lyric and elegy such as *tenuis*, 'slender', are affiliated with the stripped-down oratorical aesthetic known to Greeks and Romans in the first century as 'Attic'. Horace's *Ars Poetica* draws on the Peripatetic theory of style. The innovative Coelius Antipater, the first historian to abandon the year-by-year format of the traditional Latin annalistic style, ornaments his monograph on the second Punic war with the polished rhythms and figures used by contemporary Greek prose writers, themselves deeply influenced by Hellenistic rhetorical theory. Later Latin historians follow Coelius in treating history, in Cicero's phrase, as an *opus oratorium*, 'an orator's job' (*De Legibus* 1.5). As for oratory proper, speeches in Latin from the second century, the date of our earliest evidence, follow a template that is recognizably Greek. Under the rule of the Caesars, interest in declamation and epideictic oratory steadily spreads throughout the Greek- and Latin-speaking parts of the empire, a development reflected in literary experiments across genres in both languages. In the field of rhetoric proper, the Greek conceptualization of rhetoric as the *disciplining* of language, in the sense both of institutionalizing an area of study and of mastering a thing that resists, is early transposed into a Roman key, with important consequences for the literary and political culture of the empire.

The main debt Roman rhetoric owes to Greek is the formal system of classification and organization that Greek rhetoric applies to language, according to which the rhetorician distinguishes and names types of arguments, approaches to topics, parts of speech, ornaments, styles, and so forth. To classify language is, of course, to place it in systematic order. Given the practical contexts and uses for which rhetoric is designed, this is a point of major significance. To Aristotle, rhetoric is the study of ‘the available means of persuasion’ in the political contexts of the lawcourt and Assembly, as well as in epideictic displays where civic values were reinforced (*Rhet.* 1.2). Roughly two centuries later, Hermagoras declares that rhetoric involves ‘treating the proposed political question as persuasively as possible’ (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 2.62). Hermogenes repeats (c. AD 200) that the most important element of rhetoric is the division of ‘political questions’ (*politika zētēmata*) arising from any ‘rational dispute’ (*amphibētēsis logikē*) based on established laws or social customs (*On Ideas*, 1.1). The notion that ‘by investing Demosthenes’ in the speaker’s soul, rhetoric cultivated the penetrating insight and self-control necessary for good government, underpins rhetorical pedagogy into the fifth century AD and beyond.³ Horace famously describes the presence of Greek culture in Rome as an act of conquest: ‘captive Greece took captive her savage conqueror, and brought the arts into rustic Latium’ (*Epistles* 2.1.156). Throughout its ‘occupation’ of Roman culture, as the continuity of these definitions shows, Greek rhetoric is a political discourse, and it is on this point that I will anchor my survey. The intellectual history of the era encompasses complexities obviously unmasterable in any single essay, and several important topics will have to be omitted altogether. My sketch of the history of Greek rhetoric at Rome is thus guided by this argument: that what M.L. Clarke characterizes in the epigraph to this chapter as the ‘surprising readiness’ of the Romans to adopt Greek rhetoric is best explained by viewing rhetoric as the imposer of limits, the arbiter of communal propriety, the source and guard of standards of rational communication across time and space, a universalizing adhesive for the social order that worked its effects through the disciplined mind, breath, nerves, and muscles of each speaker.

Rome was a militaristic, deeply conservative society whose political institutions retained much of the flavor of a small agrarian city-state – demanding citizens to be physically present in Rome in order to vote, for instance – even after its conquests had won it power on a scale hitherto unknown in the Mediterranean world. The incessant demand for military manpower to expand and defend the imperial borders, in tandem with the inflow of slaves and treasure from conquered provinces, changed the face of Roman society, creating new pockets of poverty and wealth and placing intense pressure on traditional beliefs and practices. Empire meant that the governing elite, which based its legitimacy in part on its reverent preservation of ancestral custom (*mos maiorum*), had somehow to marry tradition with innovation and flexibility in order to meet the unpredictable challenges of imperial rule. How were the rights of Roman citizens to be guaranteed in far-flung provinces? How would citizens and non-citizens interact, in legal, political, and social terms? Would Roman law become the law of conquered nations? How would Rome communicate its will to the communities it defeated, and how would they in turn convey their concerns to Rome? How would education prepare the citizen for his place in the imperial order? Translated and adapted from Greek sources, in a process that began during the Punic Wars of the

third and second centuries and lasted into the fifth century AD, rhetoric offered Roman culture the discursive resources to meet the challenge of empire. To cite a text that was viewed within a generation of its composition as the quintessential Roman poem, preoccupied as it is with the problem of limits and haunted by the vision of boundless power: 'For them I set no limits of things or time, I have given empire without end' (Vergil, *Aeneid* 1.278–279). Rhetoric is a discipline for the new world order Vergil describes.

My survey begins with two competing versions of Greek rhetoric's journey to Rome, which shed light on the cultural prejudices that shape its reception and early development. Next, in the longest section of the chapter, I turn to the earliest Roman rhetorical treatises, composed by Cicero and the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (hereafter referred to as 'the Auctor'), and their counterparts in Greek and Roman rhetoric of the high empire. In the chapter of his authoritative and influential history of Greek rhetoric that deals with Hellenistic theory, G.A. Kennedy concludes that Greek rhetoricians after the fourth century do not share the concern, especially characteristic of Aristotle and Isocrates, with 'the place of rhetoric in society.'⁴ This view ignores these writers' goal of constructing a logical system of rational discourse for the public arena, and I will suggest that it should be abandoned. The third section considers the debate over style in Cicero's later works, Caesar's fragmentary *De Analogia*, and the essays of the Augustan critic Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in light of the emerging canonization of the literature and culture of fifth and fourth century democratic Athens. In the fourth section, staying with the topic of style, I address the tradition of Isocrates, Theophrastus, Cicero, Quintilian, and Hermogenes. The chapter concludes with rhetoric in the Roman empire, concentrating on the preoccupation of so-called 'Second Sophistic' orators with re-enacting the events and accents of the past in performances whose cultivated refinement embodies a universalizing imperial Roman ideal even as it sustains the memory of Greek uniqueness.

1 Fear the Greeks When They Bring Gifts

According to a Greek story retold by Cicero and Quintilian, Tisias and Corax invented rhetoric in the course of property disputes during the fifth century transition to democratic government in the Greek city of Syracuse.⁵ The earliest teachers of rhetoric at Rome were Greek, or at least fluent Greek speakers (Cic. *De Oratore* 1.14). Cato the Elder, the exemplary defender of Roman ancestral custom against foreign infiltration, was supposed to have complained of Greek influence in the early and middle second century (Plut. *Cato* 23.2). If Cato himself wrote a rhetorical treatise in Latin, as Quintilian claims, it does not survive (3.1.19); nor do the late second century efforts of M. Antonius.⁶ Cicero and the Auctor produced the first Latin treatises in the early first century, Cicero in the 80s, the Auctor at the same time or soon thereafter.

Delivering speeches was an established custom in Roman politics long before this. Polybius treats the delivery of speeches in the Senate and the Forum as a normal occurrence, along with trials before the people (e.g., 1.11, 1.17, 6.14), and he highlights commemorative epideictic oratory in his famous description of the funerals of leading men (6.53–54). Roman writers describing the era when the city's history

blurs with legend represent oratory as playing a key role in overthrowing the monarchy and establishing the *res publica* and its rule of law. In or soon after 510 (not coincidentally close to the traditional date of the establishment of democracy at Athens), Junius Brutus aroused the people to rebellion against the Tarquin monarchy in a speech delivered over the corpse of Lucretia, who had been raped by the king's son (Livy 1.52). The early formalization of public oratory is suggested by the lictors' custom of lowering their rods of office when a magistrate spoke at a public meeting, allegedly established by L. Valerius Poplicola soon after the founding of republican government (Cic. *De Republica* 2.53). Over the following five centuries, until the consolidation of autocratic power by Augustus, the dynamic negotiation of political power between popular mass and senatorial elite – beginning with the so-called 'struggle of the orders' between plebeians and patricians and ending with the courtship of the urban masses by self-identified 'popular' speakers – created conditions under which public oratory flourished. Ennius, the first Latin epic poet, referred to *Peithō*, the Greek goddess Persuasion, as *Suada*, and claimed that M. Cornelius Cethegus 'was the "marrow" of that goddess' (Cic. *Brutus* 59). Consul in 204, Cethegus was the first Roman orator whose speeches were preserved in prose. In his history of Roman rhetoric, written in 45, Cicero lists ten additional men of senatorial rank during the two centuries before Cethegus famous for their ability to persuade (*Brutus* 54–57). One of them, the eminent Appius Claudius, elected Censor in 312 and Consul in 307 and 296, gave a speech in the Senate against making peace with the Epirote king Pyrrhus in 280. Ennius paraphrased it in verse, making it the first Latin speech to be 'recorded' in a text (Cic. *De Senectute* 16).

These fragments and their belated history must be placed in a broader cultural context. From its earliest recorded beginnings, Latin literature springs from the imperative to persuade. *Carmina*, a word related to *canere*, 'to sing', embraces oaths, capital sentences, magical spells, prayers, and treaties: Cicero refers to the Twelve Tables, Rome's oldest lawcode, as a *carmen* (*De Legibus* 2.59). Only later did the semantic range of the word focus on song and poetry. One of the earliest best-preserved *carmina* is a prayer to the gods on behalf of fields and farm animals, which was recorded by the elder Cato in his *De Agricultura* (itself one of the earliest surviving examples of Latin prose) early in the second century. This prayer – an attempt to 'persuade' the gods through rhythmic, pleasing language – reveals traces of what become characteristically Roman oratorical habits. It features repetition and alliteration, including several declarations of *esto*, 'let it be', *bonas preces precor*, 'I pray these prayers', and *porco piaculo*, 'sacrificial pigs' (four times in a single sentence), and homoteleuton, such as *porco piaculo immolando esto* (134.1–4, 139.1; cf. Gellius 4.6.3–10). A longer prayer to Mars, to be pronounced by a farmer purifying his land, is also resonant with repetition and parallelism (141.2–3):

Father Mars, I pray and I seek that you be willingly favorable to me and my house and my household, for which reason therefore I have ordered a triple sacrifice of pig, ram, and bull to be led around my field and land and farm, so that you keep off, defend, and remove disease, both seen and unseen, and barrenness and bleakness, disaster and unseasonable weather; and so that you allow my crops, grain, vines, and groves to come out well, and so that you keep safe my shepherds and flocks, and give good health and vigor to me and my household and family.

Mars pater, te precor quaesoque uti sies volens propitius mihi domo familiaeque nostrae, quoniam re ergo agrum terram fundumque meum suovitaurilia circumagi iussi, uti tu morbos visos invisosque, viduertatem vastitudinemque, calamitates intemperiesque, prohibeas defendas averuncesque; utique tu fruges, frumenta, vineta virgultaque grandire beneque evenire siris, pastores pecuaque salva servassis duisque bonam salutem valetudinemque mihi domo familiaeque nostrae.

If it seems unlikely that these ancient prayers owe a debt to Greek rhetoric, the context in which they are cited certainly does. A narrative model of a traditional Italian agrarian lifestyle, Cato's *De Agricultura* reveals the influence of Greek rhetorical techniques in its structure and style. Its opening sentence employs the first of the *loci communes*, or 'commonplaces', the appeal to ancestral authority (cited at *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 2.30.48). The entire proem, as A.D. Leeman has noted, follows the Auctor's dicta regarding deliberative speeches, earlier advanced by Aristotle, by presenting brief arguments for both the usefulness and the honorableness of the 'policy' of leading a rustic life (*tuta, honesta, Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 3.3).⁷

Cicero claims that Cato's own orations to the Senate and Assembly, though they sounded harsh and old-fashioned to his contemporaries, show Sophistication in their unfolding of argument and use of tropes and figures (*Brutus* 69, 294). His secretary Tiro attacks a Catonian oration for using faulty enthymemes and inductive arguments: he appears to take for granted that Cato is employing the Greek rhetorical toolbox (Gellius, *Attic Nights* 6.3.26, 35, 38). In the fragmentary evidence for Roman oratory before Cicero, the specialized traces of Greek rhetorical influence are difficult to unravel from broader cultural references: for example, in Scipio Aemilianus' dramatic use of *ēthopoeia* in a speech skewering a political rival, in G. Gracchus' joking reference to the Attic orator Demades, and in Gracchus' famous appeal to the people: 'Where am I to go, wretched as I am? Where shall I turn? To the Capitol? But it is soaked in my brother's blood' – lines that may echo Euripides' (and perhaps Ennius') *Medea* as well as Demosthenes' speech against Aphobus (28.18).⁸ Early Latin comedy also suggests a casual familiarity with rhetorical techniques that, although it may originate with the Greek New Comedies on which the plays are modelled, nonetheless functioned successfully in the Roman context. Plautus expands the Greek soliloquy, allowing his characters to address the audience on moral topics, using elevated language and elaborately worked out *prosopopoeia*, the figure by which the speaker assumes another's voice.⁹ The prologues of Terence, which self-consciously appeal to the audience as though they were members of a jury, embody Aristotle's advice to make one's hearers well-disposed with humor and compliments (*Rhet.* 3.14.7).

Against these traces of a rhetorical culture flourishing in middle republican Rome are the signs of another competing narrative, one that recalls rhetoric's arrival in Rome as a matter of cultural contestation and cyclical expulsion. After the Second Punic War, inaugurating an ethnic-joke commonplace that resurfaces in Juvenal's satires in the early second century AD, Plautus pokes fun at pseudo-scholarly 'cloaked Greeks who are bulging with books and baskets' that they expect their patrons to fill with largesse (*Curculio* 288–291). In 161, the Senate empowered the Praetor M. Pomponius to see that no Greek philosopher or rhetorician remained in the city.¹⁰ Just over a decade earlier, in 173, two Epicurean philosophers had suffered the same treatment (Athenaeus 12.547a), and eight years before that, the Praetor Q. Petilius

had burned seven books of philosophy written in Greek, along with seven Latin books dealing with religious topics (Livy 40.29) – an ironic backdrop to the elder Cato's complaint that wherever the Greeks bring their books 'they bring destruction' (Elder Pliny 29.14). When three philosophers visited Rome as part of an Athenian embassy in 155, Cato attempted to stir up Roman anxieties about the effects of Greek eloquence on impressionable young men by condemning Carneades, the Academic representative, who gave well-received speeches showing off his ability to argue both sides of an issue – in this case, first praising and then criticizing justice.¹¹ Yet Cato himself was known to cultivate knowledge of Greek language and literature, and Cicero and Quintilian recommended that the orator read widely in Greek. While it is impossible to speculate the history or popularity of the practice, some perspective may be gained by recalling the following juxtaposition of scenes.¹² A decade after Cicero composed a dialogue in which a well-known Roman senator of the previous generation angrily defends himself against charges of being a 'Greekling' (*De Oratore* 1.102), Cicero himself was making bilingual jokes about technical aspects of Greek accentuation in a casual private letter to a friend (*Ad Atticum* 12.6.2).

The combination of attraction to and distaste for Greek learning apparent in Roman high society, and the cultural prejudices that underpin it, have aroused much scholarly debate. Did members of the Roman elite wish to limit access to the Greek education that both equipped them to dominate political and juridical discourse and marked them alone as culturally refined? Or, as Roman moralists like Cato, Sallust, and Juvenal represented it, were Greek arts understood as posing a genuine threat to the Roman ancestral tradition, the *mos maiorum*, at a time when traditional values were strained by the luxuries and foreign customs infiltrating Rome from the conquered regions of the Mediterranean and farther eastward?¹³ The vast Roman investment in and appropriation of Greek cultural production, in the forms of statues and other works of art, libraries, and theatrical performances, left an indelible stamp on the social, religious, and aesthetic experience of the Roman mass and elite. Equally clear is that the Greek presence (which, it should be remembered, was part of Italian culture for centuries before the Romans dominated the peninsula) broadcasted a range of cultural associations to Roman observers, from the triumphal memory of the conquests that brought spoils of Hellenic culture to Rome, to the terror of contamination by the defeated foreigner. That said, any explanation of Greek rhetoric in Rome must begin from the contextual understanding that the distance between Roman and Greek culture, such as it was, was staked out and cultivated by the Roman themselves. If the Romans' relationship with the rhetorical arts of the Greek world was very ancient, it was also a relationship that, as one Latinist wisely remarks of Greek religion, 'the Romans were careful never fully to naturalise or domesticate'.¹⁴ Public signs of serious interest in Greek culture appear to have remained politically dangerous to elite Romans well into the first century. Cicero gets a robust laugh from the jury with jokes about the younger Cato's well-known adherence to Stoic beliefs in his speech *For Murena* – but then again, the audience was sufficiently familiar with the school to get the jokes (Plut. *Cato the Younger* 21.5). Crassus and Antonius, the senior interlocutors in Cicero's *De Oratore*, punctuate their discussion of Greek rhetorical theory with contemptuous dismissals of its practitioners, who (they claim) have twisted the study of eloquence into an excessively technical, abstract discipline.¹⁵ The Auctor similarly attacks the 'empty pride' (*inanis*

arrogantia) of his Greek predecessors, and he begins his Theophrastean discussion of style by condemning the use of examples borrowed from Greek rhetorical schools (4.1–10). The Auctor does not mention the name of a single predecessor in rhetorical studies, Greek or Latin.

The periodic expulsions of Greek rhetoricians, and the Roman slowness to compose rhetorical treatises themselves, may be related to another field in which Romans were late to contribute: political theory. Despite its internal variety, Greek rhetoric is united in bringing traditional techniques of persuasion and philosophical argument into the realm of the political: Aristotle, through the classification of proofs and the analysis of human psychology, Isocrates, by presenting himself as a model of elegant civility, a living force for the amelioration of political disagreement, Hermagoras, by refining the taxonomical analysis of the issues (*staseis*) at the heart of arguments, and Zeno and other Stoics, by collapsing the distance between philosophical dialectic and public discourse. As the historian Polybius recognizes, the Roman republic was a complex amalgam of political institutions and practices: it posed a challenge to the historian or political theorist because it combines the authoritarian practices of traditional kingship and aristocracy with the dynamism and popular participation proper to democracy (6.11). Until Cicero, no Roman writer known to us embarks on analysis of what we anachronistically call ‘the Roman constitution’. The reason for this omission may also explain why no Roman writer before Cicero and the Auctor turned his hand to rhetoric.

To write about rhetoric is to advance an architecture of civic discourse, a blueprint for citizens’ interaction in the public sphere. It seems likely that it was this that encouraged Romans to maintain a careful distance from the originally Greek fields of political theory and rhetoric as they did not in the cases of history or epic poetry. This is a powerful example of the dilemma faced by those of the Roman elite as they sought to maintain their authority in a rapidly growing empire. Embedded in a system whose expertise had long been transmitted orally, they resisted clarifying and giving permanent shape to their political practices by putting them into forms of writing to which social or ethnic outsiders might gain access.¹⁶ Strong adherence to tradition, the preference for custom over law, the habit of political exceptionalism (embodied by an office like the dictatorship, which temporarily overturned electoral government in times of emergency), and the extra-legal nature of political influence and authority combined at Rome to create a political culture that sought to protect traditional elite hegemony by preserving political knowledge within its ranks while keeping lines of popular communication open.¹⁷ The mystification of the sources of political legitimacy about which Polybius complained was itself an essential ingredient of the ruling order’s claim to legitimacy. Seen in this light, the unwillingness of the Romans to domesticate Greek rhetoric, even as they drew on its techniques, is more easily understood. When Roman rhetoric finally emerges as a formal discourse, it occurs in what is often called the last generation of the republic – in Cicero’s case at least, introduced by a relative newcomer to Roman politics who views the analytic tradition of Greek texts as a solution to worsening problems of political unity and harmony, problems that eluded the reach of traditional aristocratic paths of knowledge transmission and conflict resolution.

Aristotle is the first to call rhetoric an offshoot (*paraphuēs*) of politics (*Rhet.* 1.2). Cicero and his anonymous contemporary, the first Latin rhetoricians, follow his lead. Their work sharply diverges from his emphasis on the three proofs (*pisteis*) of

argument, character, and emotion (*logos, ēthos, pathos*, *Rhet.* 2.1.4–5): both pursue instead the system of *stasis* theory associated with the second century rhetorician Hermagoras. Their fundamental orientation, however – their treatment of systematically trained speech as an instrument of mediating disputes among citizens and of advocating utility and honor for the polity –, ultimately derives from Aristotle. Their approach to speech as a key instrument of political healing, which was advanced (directly and indirectly) by later Peripatetic and Stoic rhetoricians, provides a good starting point to an investigation of what Roman rhetoricians ultimately chose to construct as ‘Roman rhetoric’ out of, and in part against, its Greek counterpart.

2 A Greek System in Rome: Aristotle, Hermagoras, Hermogenes

Beginning in the late fifth century, teachers of eloquence began publicly to define the fundamentals of their profession. The long opening exchange in Plato’s *Gorgias* between Socrates and the Sophist suggests that Gorgias’ inability to define what he teaches his students demonstrates the basic failure of insight that afflicts all those who speak on the basis of mere opinion rather than knowledge (447d–461b). Elsewhere, Plato ridicules Sophistic rhetoricians preoccupied with *ta kompsa*, the ‘nice refinements’ of the art, namely the *moria logou* or ‘parts of the speech’: the proem, narration, various types of proof, evidence, refutation, and the summary (*Phaedrus* 266d–267d). He compares this approach to that of a doctor who knows various treatments without grasping the art behind them (*technē*, 268c).¹⁸ Following Plato, Aristotle characterizes the parts of speech as external to the subject. Rhetoric, in his view, is properly concerned with (1) three species of proofs (*pisteis*), namely argument, character, and emotion (*logos, ēthos, pathos*, *Rhet.* 1.1.9, 1.2.3–5), (2) the speaker’s manner of expression (*lexis*, 3.1–12), and (3) the order of his presentation (*taxis*, 3.13–19).¹⁹ Aristotle organizes his discussion according to the three major sites of civic experience: the lawcourt, the council or legislative assembly, and social occasions such as funerals and festivals, where the orator seeks to draw the audience to share his sentiment, but demand no action of them (*Rhet.* 1.3.2–6).²⁰

Approaching rhetoric along these ‘cuts’ allows Aristotle to identify the different ends of the court case, legislative oratory, and civic display, and their separate ‘times’: the trial judges the past, the Assembly the future, the epideictic the present (*Rhet.* 1.3.4). In practice, his implicit injunction to stay within the borders of each genre is difficult to obey, and indeed, five centuries later, Hermogenes rejects the notion, reserving his highest praise for mingled speeches (*Peri Ideōn* 380). The orator speaking in one site invokes ends, times, and techniques ‘proper’ to the others: the Attic orators, for instance, typically celebrate and chastise the citizens in a lawcourt and assembly by using techniques of amplification that Aristotle segregates in his discussion of epideictic (*Rhet.* 1.9). Demosthenes, in his deliberative *Olynthiac* orations (1–3), transforms the Athenian Assembly into a jury rendering judgment against Philip II of Macedonia. In the lawcourt, Dinarchus’ client invokes the citizens’ fear of reprisals from Alexander in order to build his case against Demosthenes (e.g., *Din.* 1.68). Also in the lawcourt, speaking against Timarchus, Aeschines constructs the jury as the arbiter of Athenian sexual ideology as well as justice, asking

that it not only condemns the accused but also joins him, epideictic-style, in upholding ancestral tradition regarding the protection of boys (1.5–11). By this logic, it is both the jury's conviction of Timarchus and its (extra-judicial) approval of Aeschines' oratorical simulacrum of Athens as a *polis* of mutually supervised manly virtue that reinforces the social order: the legal judgment and the collective acclaim of common values act as partners in the project of preserving the city-state through acts of speech. In short, oratory in action tends to blur the lines drawn by rhetorical theory. It is against this kind of ambiguity that the post-Aristotelian rhetoricians seek to refine the system, fashioning increasingly fine-grained distinctions of proof and style that will not only aid the orator in composing speeches, but – what is of great importance in the polyglot, cosmopolitan context of the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman empire – generating what was to become a common 'dictionary' of civic discourse: universal guidelines for the form, structure, and style of public speech.

This assessment of Hellenistic rhetorical theory, it is fair to say, diverges from that of many twentieth century scholars: 'The last stage of Aristotelian rhetoric: its dilution by syncretism. Rhetoric . . . is henceforth a theory of writing and a thesaurus of literary forms'.²¹ As R. Barthes' trenchant dismissal suggests, scholars of Hellenistic rhetoric have summed it up as pedantic reworkings or arbitrary refutations of the schemes of Gorgias or Aristotle: the elaboration of proofs and the intricate analysis of cause (*thesis*), issue (*stasis*) and style have been understood as signs of rhetoric's isolation and academicization in this period.²² This interpretation can no longer hold. It has been invalidated by the work of historians of the post-Alexandrian city-state, who have shown that civic oratory flourished locally under the regional control of the Hellenistic monarchies and later, under the Roman empire.²³ If rhetoric after the fourth century produces a proliferation of Aristotelian and Sophistic taxonomies for use in rhetorical schools, it should be understood not as a (mere) academic exercise, but as a response to the evolving conditions of oratorical practice. Nor can we appeal to the Roman rhetoricians for reliable evidence of the Greeks' supposed transformation of rhetoric into an overly theoretical or hyper-technical discourse. When the Auctor criticizes Greek abstraction, it is in the context of his effort to underline the practical utility of his treatise, in the course of which he builds on conventional Roman prejudice to summon approval for his ostensibly 'home-grown' effort. This is not objective analysis of Greek theory, but a *captatio benevolentiae*. Cicero repeatedly apologizes for discussing in detail the technical elements of style, but he also reminds his readers in strong terms that the material is centrally important to rhetorical training (*Orator* 140).

Continuing the emphasis on utility, Quintilian praises Greek rhetoricians who attract a following among Romans active in politics (3.1.16–18), and he underscores the practical usefulness of his own technical analysis of cause and issue (3.9.70). He laments Cicero's adult dismissal of his youthful work of Hellenistic theory, *De Inventione*, which Quintilian clearly considers to have transmitted key precepts (3.1.20). The biographer Eunapius recounts an anecdote about a brilliant young student of rhetoric named Prohaeresius, who lived in Athens in the early fourth century AD: while in minor trouble with the law, he delivered a speech on the day the Proconsul visited his school. So impressed was the Proconsul with Prohaeresius' eloquence that the legal trouble soon vanished (Eunapius, *Lives* 483). In a persuasive reading of this scene, P. Brown emphasizes its embodied aspects: Prohaeresius'

‘striking demeanor’, his gracious subtlety, which cool the official’s fury and permit everyone involved to save face.²⁴ All true: but in Hellenistic rhetorical theory, with its scrupulous demarcation of proof and ornament, we glimpse the mental depths of the training. In fact, Eunapius is clear: the Proconsul ‘was overcome by the force of his arguments’ as well as by Prohaeresius’ weighty, fluent style.

The intermingling of epideictic (see C. Carey, Chapter 16), forensic (see C. Cooper, Chapter 14), and deliberative (see S. Usher, Chapter 15) techniques perceptible in Attic oratory is an example of the kind of problem that the Hellenistic rhetoricians sought to resolve by expanding earlier attempts at outlining proof and style. Their system pushes back against the speakers’ tendency to employ the techniques of emotional arousal proper to a funeral oration in an assembly or to appeal to civic knowledge on foreign policy in the lawcourt. Passionate appeals to patriotism are likely to vitiate debate over policy and consideration of political consequences may taint a jury’s decision on a particular crime. In its systematic production of lists and categories, Hellenistic rhetoric seeks to discipline civic language, rationalizing its properties, and reining in its emotional flourishes by translating them into the codes of tropes and figures. ‘The appeal to pity must be brief,’ the Auctor drily observes at the end of his long discussion of forensic *inventio*, ‘for nothing dries faster than a tear’ (*Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 2.31.50). Rhetoric’s abstracting and rationalizing impulse imposes systematic order on speech that always threatens to escape its proper bounds. It anchors persuasive eloquence in a rational system that seeks to compensate for contingencies with a superabundance of possibilities for classification. It is important to remember, though space does not permit detailed discussion of this issue, that Hellenistic theory develops alongside philosophical schools undertaking innovative investigations into the nature and power of words. The Stoics, for example, embarked on the challenging task of describing the kind of *logos* proper to the sage (Diog. Laert. 7.47). This involved the rejection of the notion, implicit in the private setting of Plato’s dialogues, and in Aristotle’s composition of both exoteric and esoteric works, that there is one type of speech for (say) oratory or history, and another for philosophical dialectic (Quint. 10.1.84).²⁵

Rhetoricians after Aristotle appear to have effected at least four major additions and refinements to his system of proofs. Since one cannot build a proof without first having grasped what needs to be proved, Aristotle’s *pisteis* were supplemented with a systematic method of deciding the issue (*stasis*) and the best way to approach it on the available evidence. The definitive form of this method, known as *stasis* theory, was associated by ancient authors with the second century rhetorician Hermagoras of Temnos. Second, Aristotle’s student Theophrastus added performance techniques under the rubric of *lexis* and further elaborated the classification of style and delivery in two works on those topics (Diog. Laert. 5.2.48). Apparently last to be included, though it is not clear by whom, were methods of memorization. Finally, by the early first century, the material of rhetorical discourse, and the task of the rhetorician, revolved around a full-fledged account of the mental processes involved in speech-making, starting with the initial sketch of ideas and ending with the performance: analyzing what to say by drawing on available evidence (in Latin, *inventio*, in Greek, *heuresis*), arranging the argument (*dispositio*, *taxis*), deciding how to express it (*elocutio*, *lexis*), memorizing key points (*memoria*, *mnēmē*), and delivering the speech with appropriate gestures and expressions (*pronuntiatio*, *hypocrisis*).²⁶

The consequences of Hellenistic elaboration for the Roman tradition are threefold. First, the orator's skill in constructing plausible arguments using the tools of *stasis* theory is established as a primary goal of pedagogy. Second, the post-Aristotelian turn to style and delivery lends analytic justification for the long-established Roman habit of rendering moral judgement and gauging reputation (*existimatio*) on the basis of men's public self-presentation – how they walk, speak, dress, and gesticulate. Cicero's extensive discussion of propriety, the last of the four civic virtues he examines in his Stoicizing treatise *On Duties* (1.93ff.), reveals the depth of the Roman identification between traditional aristocratic ethics and the conventions of social practice (in speaking and in daily life more generally), which is a theme of Roman literature as early as Cato the Elder. 'As a man speaks, so he is' is a tenet of the elder and younger Senecas and Quintilian.²⁷ In the imperial period, Greek physiognomical literature draws implicitly on the rhetorical tradition in its attempt to construct a scientific basis for character analysis through the observation of speech and appearance. Third, the evolution of the logical analysis of argument side by side with observations on crowd psychology and the codification of style leads to a dynamic tension in Latin rhetorical writing between persuasion by purely rational means, especially via arguments from probability, and persuasion by other means – stirring up the audience's emotions, swaying its assessment of the speaker's character, and entertaining with virtuoso flourishes of diction and meter.

The earliest Latin rhetorical treatises are Cicero's *De Inventione* and the anonymous *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*. The former is an unfinished work, originally designed as a study in at least five books encompassing all five of the orator's tasks. The *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* devotes two books to invention and arrangement and two more to style, memory, and delivery. Both works are devoted to examining the process by which speeches are composed – above all, to explication of *stasis* theory, the analysis of the *stasis* or 'issue' at stake. This applied most naturally to lawcourt cases, but its advocates insist on its usefulness in deliberative and epideictic contexts (e.g., *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 3.2.2ff., 3.6.10ff.). The result is a presentation of rhetorically trained language as a penetrating force capable of mediating civil dispute, discerning political policy, and grasping the basis on which public judgment of character is made.

It is as difficult to over-emphasize the intellectual significance of *stasis* theory as it is tempting to dismiss it. *Stasis* theory occupied a prominent place in the Greek and Latin rhetorical tradition long after the Roman empire divided into mediaeval kingdoms, retaining its position for centuries: the late fourth century AD work of Aphthonius attained immense popularity in early modernity, going into 114 printings of 10 separate editions from 1507 to 1680.²⁸ By teaching a systematized approach to evaluating the fact of a matter, its significance, and context – the three main *staseis* in the tradition transmitted by the Auctor, to which Cicero adds one and the imperial Greek rhetorician Minucianus nine more it constructs a view of the world where differences of all imaginable types are subject to resolution through rational speech and judgment. Cicero and the Auctor stress the pragmatic benefits of this approach to rhetorical studies. Echoing Aristotle's and Hermagoras' definition of rhetoric as a political discourse, the Auctor defines the orator's goal as the ability to speak about 'matters fixed by law and custom for citizen use, with the agreement of his audience in so far as he is able to obtain it' (1.1.1). The emphasis throughout his presentation

falls on transparency, both in terms of the orator's relation to his audience and (no less importantly) the author's relation to the reader. *Stasis* theory demands meticulous sign-posting: 'now', 'therefore', 'having explained x, I will now explain y', 'this being the case', and similar markers punctuate the handbooks. The introduction is thus the part of the speech 'through which the hearer's mind is prepared for listening', the division is that 'through which we open up what is agreed upon and what the disagreement is, and we explain what points we are going to discuss', and so forth (1.3.4). Three centuries later, Hermogenes showed the same concern for clarity and careful organization (e.g., *On Issues* 34.15–20). Where the systems show confusion is in the competing names for issues, and the proper order in which they should be used in the process of composition.

The flavor of *stasis* theory, if not its immensity of detail, is easily grasped. Form follows content as the Auctor begins his discussion with a definition: 'The issue [translated by the Auctor and Cicero as *constitutio*] is the defense of the accused joined with the charge of the accuser' (1.10.18). The orator must first decide whether the issue is a matter of fact (did he do it?), legal (he did it, but how is his act defined under the law?), or juridical (he did it, but his action was justified). This question answered, the orator embarks on the analysis of the conflict with a view toward plausibility of presentation and ultimate resolution. He must decide whether the case is honorable, suspicious, or petty, whether it demands direct or indirect introduction, and whether the defendant will benefit from a straightforward or subtle presentation of the evidence. If the case turns on a legal issue, is it best solved by appealing to the difference between the spirit and the letter of the law, conflict between two existing laws, ambiguity in the law, bias in the jury, or an uncertainty regarding the suitability of the charge (*Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 1.11.18–13.23)? If the last of these, the challenge to the orator is particularly intellectually bracing. The Auctor's example is Servilius Caepio, a young magistrate who, having physically prevented the popular Assembly from voting on an inflammatory grain law, was acquitted on a charge of treason: 'For the word itself is being defined when we ask what treason is' (1.12.21). Thinking through these issues involved knowledge of how the term had been used in the past and speculation as to how its use might affect an audience in the present. In tandem with the rest of rhetorical education, which guided the student's management of his face, posture, and gestures, *stasis* theory embedded the student in elite Roman (and later Greco-Roman) society, its memory, mental habits, and perhaps most importantly, its claim to govern and pass judgement on rational, reasonable grounds. It is the mental analogue of the carefully draped toga and the upright stance: it teaches a code that enables the budding orator to speak with an authority granted partly by his confidence that he was speaking an 'official' language. On a deeper level, *stasis* theory represents and enables a rationalizing assessment of action in the world; it projects the order of language onto the surface of social configurations, and it makes possible the objectification of the relationship between the spoken word and popular belief.

By the second century AD, figures such as Minucianus of Athens and Telephus of Pergamum had expanded the original list of three or four *staseis* adopted by the Auctor and Cicero. In the second century AD, the youthful prodigy Hermogenes made important further revisions to the system; his commentators, notably the rhetorician Sopatrus (author of a collection of over eighty sample 'questions,'

complete with *stasis* analysis) and the philosopher Syrianus (scholar of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and teacher of Proclus), debated his revisions.²⁹ While the development of *stasis* theory is a technical matter best pursued in the scholarly literature, it is worth noting here that it first appears to emerge in tandem with the Peripatetics' elaboration of Aristotle's analysis of proof as well as the Stoics' seminal contributions to grammar, logic, and rhetoric. *Stasis* theory should be understood as part of a large-scale rationalization of discourse in Greek and Roman intellectual culture occurring through the first century BC, comparable in scope and importance to the technical and encyclopaedic projects of (among others) Varro (religion, language), Julius Caesar (the calendar), and Vitruvius (architecture).

The Roman rhetoricians, and Greek rhetoricians in the Roman empire, transmit an amalgam of Hellenistic approaches which themselves already mix earlier rhetorical systems and flatten philosophical disputes. What was an epistemologically and ethically important dispute in Plato, for example, namely rhetoric's status as an art (*technē*), Quintilian blithely resolves with a diluted version of the Stoic Cleanthes' definition of *ars* as a 'power realized through ordered methods', taking for granted that training supplements natural talent (2.17.41). In the introduction to his work on *stasis*, Hermogenes similarly defines rhetoric as a *technē* constituted out of certain elements which have been 'grasped' from the beginning (which explains the eloquence of Homer's speeches long before rhetoric emerged as a professional discipline) but which were refined according to experience over time (28.3–4). We have already seen Socrates' attack on the parts of speech (*exordium*, narration, division, proof, refutation, conclusion) as reliable grounds for the construction of rhetorical education (Pl. *Phaedrus* 266d–267f). Though Aristotle echoes Socrates at *Rhetoric* 1.1.9, he later includes the parts of speech within the larger frame of his discussion of proofs (*Rhet.* 3.13–19). Cicero and the Auctor follow Aristotle, inserting discussion of the parts of speech into their versions of the originally Hellenistic quinquepartite list of the orator's tasks (*inventio*, etc.: *Ad Herennium* 1.3.4, *De Inventione* 1.14.19). Quintilian's interleaving of the orator's tasks and the parts of speech extends irregularly over seven books (4–11). The Roman rhetoricians thus blend what was originally a fifth century Sophistic approach to the parts of speech with proof analysis (by Aristotle or a handbook distillation of Aristotle) and then remix the blend with the elaborate *stasis* theory of Hermagoras and other Greek rhetoricians whom we know only by name.³⁰

As the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*'s reference to the Caepio case suggests, *stasis* theory was best taught by example. The Hellenistic rhetorical practice of arguing through such examples becomes a centerpiece of Roman education. Aristotle originally defined a *thesis* as an assertion or negation of a philosophical tenet, for example, 'that all existence is one', and the *hypothesis* as a specialized claim. Even earlier, Protagoras was supposed to have composed and argued *theses* (Diog. Laert. 9.53), and the early Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus the logical rules for defending them – suggesting that the relationship between rhetorical argument and the Hellenistic philosophical schools, especially the Peripatetics and Stoics, was profoundly fruitful, though the sources that would help us understand it have largely vanished. Cicero handles *thesis* and *hypothesis* in a range of rhetorical works, translating *thesis* as *quaestio* and *hypothesis* as *causa* (*De Inventione* 1.6.8, *De Oratore* 1.138) and *propositum* (*Topica* 21, 79). The elder Seneca is the first Latin author to use the word *thesis*

(*Controversiae* 1, Preface 12). Nearly a century later, Quintilian was still working with *thesis* and *suasoria* (2.4.25, 3.5.5), using among other examples the *thesis* ‘should one marry?’ and the *suasoria* based on the *hypothesis* ‘should Cato take a wife?’ Quintilian’s brief apology for handling these ‘worked-over subtleties’ (3.11.21) must be considered in the context of his own presentation of (and practical refinements to) them, expressed over the course of three books.

If the precepts of the Greek rhetoricians make for arid reading, there is excitement in the rhetoricians’ attempt to fit virtually every imaginable type of conflict into *stasis* theory’s mediating frame. In a landmark article, Otto Dieter reads *stasis* theory in light of Aristotle’s physics, showing that a key aspect of the theory is the notion of motions in balance:

Since *rhētores* serve their clients by handling or managing their *amphibētēseis* [disputes] for them, *rhētores* must in the zetetic [questioning] phase of their rhetorical function also seek the *stasis* which is the *meson* [middle part] of the *amphibētēsis*. In terms of modern physics one might perhaps describe the *constitutio* of the auctor as the physical contrivance, or engine, by means of which, after it has been set in motion, rhetorical heat can be converted into oratorical energy and transmitted to the listener as the power of effective response.³¹

The turn to technical classification embodied in *stasis* theory does not simply discipline the surface of language. It acknowledges that in the arena of the spoken word, ethics, law and its interpretation, religion, knowledge of economics and foreign affairs, and social values, interact and overlap in the grey area we call popular opinion. Rhetoric is a theoretical discourse concerned not to define virtue or justice – a job that requires the precise techniques of division and distinction proper to, say, philosophical dialectic – but to work with the messy inconsistencies of popular opinion, not to mention with the special contingencies, including the emotions, of the moment. Bridging the distance between ideal and practice, rhetoric continuously recognizes the ‘realities’ of oratory in the world – fickle, ignorant audiences, time limits, and the overriding need, sooner or later, to act. Rhetoricians theorize the interrelation of social values and justice, policy-making and moral findings, reasoned argument and emotional arousal, while remaining closely attuned to the fluctuating field that is popular opinion. The resulting text, the rhetorical treatise, closely identifies language’s power to order language with language’s power to order the world. To continue the comment of Hermogenes quoted above: ‘First we must state what we mean by a political question. It is a rational dispute on a particular matter, based on the established laws or customs of any given people, concerned with *what is considered* just, honorable, advantageous, or all or some of these things together. To investigate what is *truly and universally* just, honorable, and so forth, this is not the task of rhetoric’ (*On Issues* 1.1). Greek rhetoric’s invention of a finite, logical system capable of meshing with the virtually infinite disorder of the world is a useful tool for a society seeking to impose order on an ever-expanding, diverse, often rebellious empire. It exerts a profound, lasting influence on Roman thinking about communication and civil life, particularly in the area of education. When Kennedy remarks that ‘to a practicing lawyer [*stasis* theory] would probably be self-evident’, he overlooks the extent to which rhetoric actively contributed to the organization of thought in the public sphere.³²

There is significance in the fact that a key term in Hellenistic rhetorical theory, ‘stance’ or *stasis*, also connotes civil strife, or that its Latin translations, *status* and *constitutio*, refer to the disposition of things generally, and more specifically, the ordering of a ‘state’ or ‘constitution.’ In the late republic, when the tradition that becomes ‘Roman rhetoric’ first takes shape, the worsening ruptures in the social and political order, embodied in the image of civil war, are central themes in it. The two earliest Latin rhetorical treatises were written within a decade or so after the Social War, the bloody rebellion of the Italian allies against Rome that began in 91. The Auctor chose examples from the Social War to illustrate his discussion of the high and middle styles of speaking: each brief excerpt represented the war in a different light, in a subtle demonstration of the power of oratory to shape interpretation of recent historical events (*Ad Her.* 4. 12–13). Cicero begins his *De Inventione* with a glowing fable of civic concord according to which a wise man discovers the arts of eloquence and thus brings peace to a war-torn land, emancipating its inhabitants from savagery (1.1–5). From its earliest surviving works in Rome, then, rhetoric appears to furnish an answer to Cicero’s worried remark that virtuous men and customs are required to preserve what he emphasizes is an *imperial* republic (*imperantem rem publicam*): ‘But our own age has accepted the republic just like a beautiful artwork, now fading with age ... We see our ancient customs drowned by forgetfulness, so that not only are they not practiced: they are unknown’ (*De Republica* 5.1.1–2). *Stasis* theory and its correlatives in rhetorical discussions of style protect the community by rationalizing its language (*De Inv.* 1.5).

Like *stasis* theory itself, the methods of rhetorical training grew increasingly elaborate over time. The fourth century AD Aphthonius (whose treatment generally agrees with Pseudo-Hermogenes, Apsines, and Nicolaus of Myra) lists fourteen preliminary exercises (*progymnasmata*) ranging from the recital of simple fables and moralistic anecdotes (*chreiai*) to the impersonation of a historical or mythical character (*ēthopoeia*, *prosopopoeia*), the argument for or against a *thesis*, and most challenging of all, the proposal of a law. After building skills in *stasis* analysis and polishing his small pieces with suitably historical and literary references, the student would advance to the lengthy formal declamation, the *meletē*, which the Romans had since the first century divided into two types: the *controversia* (argument modeled on a legal case) and the *suasoria* (on a deliberative issue). The *suasoria* is a Roman development of the *logos protreptikos* and the *logos epotreptikon* (Arist. *Rhet.* 1.3.3–6, 1.4); the Romans also drew inspiration for content from Greek literature, especially tragedy (Elder Seneca, *Suasoriae* 1–4). The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* included detailed rules for handling such exercises: it seems probable that long exercises similar to the *suasoria* were practiced in Greek schools from at least that period. ‘May a man act dishonorably to save his own life?’ is a thesis inviting philosophically-inflected reflection. ‘Advise Cicero to burn his writings, thereby mollifying Mark Antony and saving his own life’ is a formal *suasoria*. ‘What are the advantages of wealth?’ is a thesis. ‘A miser has a valiant son who, when given the choice of any prize he chooses by his grateful city, selects a crown of wild olive; the father seeks to disown him’ is a *controversia*. Libanius’ ingenious speech on behalf of the father is an excellent example of the genre (*Declamations* 33), for to the boy’s imagined question, ‘how am I to survive [once disinherited]?’ the father may say, ‘win the prize again, and ask for gold!’³³

The example reveals another way in which Hellenistic and imperial rhetoric embedded its students in a shared world-view: its construction of a catalogue of common civic and domestic disputes. The themes in the many surviving collections cross the boundary lines of Greek and Latin, for declamations in both languages consider tyranny and tyrannicide, military heroism and its consequences, rape, kidnapping by bandits, illegitimacy, adultery, and class conflict. With its concern for precision and its tendency toward elaboration and fantasy, declamation was an easy target for satirists like Persius, Petronius, and Lucian, who ridiculed the ‘ivory tower’ elements of education (*Satyricon* 5). But the lives of their contemporaries were studded with lawcourt trials and speeches on civic occasions: the polemics of Tacitus notwithstanding, oratory did not fall with the republic (*Dialogus* 25). On the contrary, Tacitus’ friend the younger Pliny carefully cultivated his oratorical skills and his friendships with rhetoricians. In the *longue durée*, the similarity of Pliny’s own *Panegyricus* to the later imperial Latin and Greek panegyricists is evidence that rhetoric cultivated an enduring set of common communicative practices, including knowledge of logic and a language of taste, which were made portable, even universalizable, by the practices of codification and abstraction that the satirists found laughable.

3 The Debate over Style: Theophrastus, Caecilius of Calacte, Dionysius of Halicarnassus

Within a few decades of the earliest surviving Latin adaptations of Greek rhetorical treatises, a new controversy emerged that derived its key terms from Greece: the debate between the ‘Asianists’ and ‘Atticists’ (on which see J. Vanderspoel, Chapter 10). Cicero’s late rhetorical treatises, *Brutus*, *Orator*, and *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*, provide the earliest insights into the debate: they are written in part as Cicero’s defense against charges of Asianism by men who called themselves *Attici*, such as Brutus and Catullus’ acquaintance, Licinius Calvus. By the end of the first century AD, some regarded Cicero as an unsophisticated, old-fashioned orator, but his Atticist contemporaries attacked him as a ‘bombastic Asianist, repetitive, and too excessive in his repetitions, sometimes off-putting in his jokes, sensuous in his arrangement of phrases, prone to exaggeration’, and even ‘effeminate’ (*molliorem*, Quint. 12.10.12–13). Cicero and the Atticists exchanged invective-ridden letters in which he ridiculed their style as bloodless and thin, while they complained of his flabby rotundness of phrase and ‘broken, castrated’ style (*fractum atque elumbem*, Tacitus, *Dialogus de Oratoribus* 18.4–5). The central issue for the Atticists was purity of language, both linguistic and stylistic: they sought only a pure accent, good grammar, and familiar diction, and they abhorred archaism and neologism. The plain, smooth Lysias was their oratorical exemplar. Cicero’s main complaint is that the Atticists’ worship of purity and plainness puts them at risk of excluding all orators who adopt a grand style, whether brilliant and full of ornamental phrases or melodic and lovely (*Brutus* 325). By the Atticists’ standards, the great Athenian orator Demosthenes would not be Attic (*Orator* 24).

The broader significance of the controversy is a matter of guesswork. There is no clear sign of it in Cicero’s magisterial dialogue *De Oratore*, written in 54, but it dominates his late works, thus suggesting the existence of a fully-fledged debate with

which his readers would have been familiar. To begin with, the word ‘Attic’ has a complicated history made up of at least four interlocking strands. First, beginning in the third century, Greek grammarians and literary critics – notably those active in the library of Alexandria, such as Eratosthenes and Aristophanes of Byzantium – edited and examined the texts of Athenian authors, taking careful note of their linguistic distinctiveness, in works like Aristophanes’ ‘On Words Suspected of not having been Spoken by the Ancients’. Doubtless spurred by this model, but primarily interested in pure Latinity and related matters of oratorical excellence, self-styled Roman Atticists like Calvus sought models in Athenian prose. They may have drawn also on an emerging trend among Greek intellectuals working at Rome, whose rejection of Hellenistic poetics, and possibly Pergamene views of grammar, led them to express allegiance to the archaic, notionally purer style of fifth and fourth century Athens.³⁴ One recent study has suggested that the first to construct the Asianist–Atticist distinction was Caecilius of Calacte, the author of the Greek treatises ‘How the Attic Style differs from the Asiatic’ and two books ‘Against the Phrygians,’ as well as the first self-styled lexicon of Attic vocabulary.³⁵ The first reference to Atticism in Greek appears in the critical essays of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who worked in Rome after 30. Dionysius (and Caecilius) may be following the practice of native Greek rhetoricians who, teaching in the Hellenistic kingdoms of the eastern Mediterranean, developed the terminology in order to distinguish themselves from their ‘Asian’ rivals in Pergamum, Rhodes, and Egypt. In an age where the Greeks were expanding political and cultural influence northward and eastward, into areas that Greek culture had previously defined in opposition to itself, the stakes on claiming pure ‘Greekness’ were high. Or the terms may have arisen in Rome, in a transposition of long-established Roman prejudices against the culture of the eastern Mediterranean. All these movements should be distinguished from the culmination of Atticism in the Greek-speaking culture of the Roman empire beginning in the first century AD, where Greek orators, rhetoricians, and grammarians under Roman rule transform the standards of linguistic propriety that Cicero and Dionysius call ‘Atticism’ into an all-embracing ideology – a reverence for the fifth and fourth century Athenian past that extends to the cultivation of archaic accents and the adoption of a historical world-view that stops, chronologically speaking, with the conquests of Alexander the Great (died June 323).

Atticism, then, was a multivalent term, associated with a variety of positions on grammar and philosophy. The examples of Cornelius Celsus, the author of an early imperial encyclopaedic work in Latin on medicine, the military arts, agriculture, and rhetoric, and the orator and historian L. Cornelius Sisenna, an important figure in the history of Latin literature whose work is now almost wholly lost, demonstrate the challenge of pinning down its meaning. Celsus is supposed to have objected to neologism and stylized prose rhythm, a critique that suggests adherence to Atticism as it was defined in his period. However, his work on rhetorical figures followed an Asianist model, Gorgias of Athens (not to be confused with the sophist, Quint. 9.2.102). A much more complicated example is Sisenna, Praetor in 78, who wrote a major historical work recounting the Social War and the subsequent civil wars, which Sallust praises enthusiastically (*Jugurthine War* 95.2) but Cicero somewhat less so (*Brutus* 228). Too little of Sisenna’s prose survives to enable us to gauge its style, apart from his preference for archaic and curious words, a characteristic associated

with 'Asianists'. Cicero appears to judge Sisenna's faults in Asianist terms with his objection to the 'immature' (*puerile*) tone of Sisenna's writing, the product of obsessively imitating the 'tragic' Hellenistic Greek historian Cleitarchus (*On Laws* 1.7). Cleitarchus embroidered history with melodrama, describing, for instance, Themistocles' death by suicide as the result of swallowing a bowl of fresh bull's blood – a scene ripe for 'rhetorical and tragical' treatment, as Cicero caustically remarks (*Brutus* 43). Pseudo-Longinus, author of the treatise *On the Sublime*, connects Cleitarchus to the inflated style that originated with the fifth century sophist Gorgias and blossomed in the work of the *rhētōr* Hegesias. For Cicero and the later Greek and Latin rhetorical tradition, Hegesias is the model of Asianism, 'halting, minced, and immature' in style (*fractum, minutum, puerile, Brutus* 287).

Is Sisenna also to be labelled an Asianist, then? Perhaps yes, perhaps no. E. Rawson pointed out that Cicero associated Sisenna's skeptical view of the role of dreams and prophecies in history to Epicurean influence, and we know from Sisenna's contemporary, the philosopher Philodemus, that the Epicureans soundly rejected the Asianists' linguistic artfulness and rhythm (*Rhetoric* 4.1).³⁶ On the other hand, the imperial Greek rhetorician Theon, presenting models of overworked prose rhythm, cites 'the works of Hegesias, and all those orators who are called Asian, and something of Epicurus' (*Progymnasmata* 2.169). Some Epicureans at least came to be associated with Asianist style in the Roman period, and Sisenna may be one. In a final confusing twist, Sisenna is recorded as having an interest in the approach to language known by the first century as 'analogy', the belief in natural regularities of grammatical formation, as opposed to the rival school of thought, anomaly. Sisenna insisted, for instance, on saying not *adsentior* (a deponent verb meaning 'I agree') but *adsentio*, the active form of the verb, presumably on the grounds that there is no passive sense to the act of agreement. Quintilian claims that 'he was imitated by many, on the grounds of analogy', though *adsentior* is the correct (common) usage (1.5.13). One view of Greek and Roman intellectual life in the first century, associated with E. Norden, assumes a natural affinity between analogy and advocacy of a simple, 'Attic' rhetorical style. Yet the Stoics also favored a pure, dry style, and they were anomalists. The attempt to pigeonhole either Celsus or Sisenna according to their Greek models of historiography, philosophy, or grammar ends in confusion.

Our inability to pinpoint the source of the dispute is less important, however, than the fact that it persists in Greek and Roman writing well into the imperial period, taking on new associations over time.³⁷ Whatever the distinction between Asianism and Atticism meant to grammarians, rhetoricians, and practicing orators at any given moment, it was a fruitful carrier of social values, ably expressing and reinforcing prejudices about 'eastern' ethnicity (however that might be defined), notions of cultural decline as a consequence of foreign taint, and most significant of all, the emergent idealization of fifth and fourth century Athens. The institutionalization of the Museum and its library culture by the Ptolemies in Alexandria, and the Hellenistic kings' patronage of Pergamum and Athens as scholarly centers, established Athenian cultural production (drama, philosophy, history, and oratory) as the exemplary model of Hellenic culture. This is the reason why Roman orators and rhetoricians by Cicero's lifetime sought affiliation with the Atticist label: not exclusively on aesthetic terms, but because the term had been 'branded' as representing, simply, excellence. Atticism combines the appeal of the ancient past with the promise of forging a

common civil discourse – common because notionally pure, constructed as such by grammarians and rhetoricians seeking models for contemporary practice. Asianism, by contrast, is often described in medically inflected metaphors of swelling, bursting, and infection. Dionysius of Halicarnassus describes Asianism as a ‘prostitute’ who expelled the ‘virtuous Attic matron’ from her household, only to be put in her place by Greece’s new Roman overlords (Preface, *On the Ancient Orators*):

The ancient, native Attic Muse, having lost her civic standing (atimon), had her possessions torn away from her, while her enemy Muse, having just this moment arrived from some Asiatic pit, an evil thing from Phrygia or Caria, claimed the right to rule over Hellas . . . The cause and beginning of this great change lies in Rome: the mistress of the world makes all other cities look to her. Her own men of power, who govern their country on the highest moral principles, are men of education and fine judgment.

Like *stasis* theory, the Asianist–Atticist controversy has political overtones. Julius Caesar wrote his treatise on grammar, *De Analogia*, while he was engaged in the conquest of Gaul, a project that included the establishment of provincial lawcourts. ‘Steer clear of the unusual word’ is the substance of one of few surviving fragments (Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1.10.4). Rather than seeking to explain *De Analogia* as a grammatical polemic, or as an intellectually Sophisticated defense of Caesar’s own famously elegant, pure oratorical style, the work has been seen as an expression of Caesar’s interest in constructing a set of logical rules for proper speech, by which ambitious provincials could better integrate into the urbane political culture of Rome.³⁸ We have already seen Cicero and the Auctor engaged in the attempt to formalize and codify civil discourse in their works in *stasis* theory, and the growth of a common set of imaginary theses in the declamatory culture of imperial Rome. For Julius Caesar, the label ‘Atticism’ may stand for a plain communicative style, accessible to non-native speakers: a language of citizenship on an imperial scale. Small wonder that Augustus, seeking to legitimize his experiment in autocracy, turned to classical Athens for imagery in art and poetry.³⁹ Julius Caesar’s heir made his adopted father’s linguistic program visible in the stone fabric of Rome. It is tempting to see the continuing interest in the codification of style in the early empire – seen in the work of the Augustan rhetorician Rutilius Lupus, for example, who promoted the teachings of the first century sophist Gorgias of Athens in a work *On Figures of Language and Style* – as the outgrowth of the emperor’s classicizing efforts.

4 Style: Isocrates, Theophrastus, Hermogenes

So far my survey has concentrated on aspects of rhetoric that embody its capacity to discipline the spoken word with tools of logical organization and standards of purity. But the precept-handbook – or more precisely, the belief that it furnished sufficient tools for good oratory – is the target of Cicero and Quintilian, who point out that the handbook (and the pedantry that brought it to life) cannot, and should not, provide rules for every contingency. Solid training in rhetoric is not mechanical but (ideally) gives the budding orator the psychological sensitivity and mental flexibility to handle a virtually infinite range of conditions (Cic. *De Oratore* 2.43).

The point is hardly new. When the sophist Gorgias boasts that he can speak *ex tempore* on any topic suggested by his audience, he means to display his excellence precisely in the transcendence of precepts – a claim that Socrates demolishes by arguing that the agility of the rhetorical mind is mere shallow relativism (Pl. *Gorgias* 457c–466a). The Greek rhetorical tradition responded to Plato’s critique of sophism in two ways. Isocrates upheld the ideal of the educated man as a well-rounded amateur (12.30–32), and defended Gorgias’ claim by articulating an eternal cycle of ethico-political education in the public sphere, in which the older generation supervises the younger, the younger observes and imitates the older, and the implicit agreement of both generations to act and speak with a view to the common good contributes to the good fortune of the state (15.174).⁴⁰ Theophrastus, building on the third book of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, pursues a different route (Diog. Laert. 5.47–48). He classified four virtues of style in his (lost) treatise *On Style*: correctness (*hellenismos*), clarity (*saphēneia*), propriety (*to prepon*) and equipage (often translated as ‘ornament,’ *kataskenē*). Theophrastus also explored the performative aspects of oratory: Cicero relies on his analysis of prose rhythm, and repeats an anecdote about a Greek actor that may derive from his book *On Delivery* (*De Oratore* 3.221).⁴¹ Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, notably Panaetius, deal with four civic virtues, apparently canonical: justice, wisdom, propriety, and great-heartedness. The points of contact with Theophrastus’ stylistics are suggestive.

Both approaches – Isocrates’ compelling if vague insistence on the ethical potential of rhetorical education and Theophrastus’ presentation of style in terminology easily transposed into moral discourse – exerted immense influence on Roman rhetoricians, who in turn greatly augmented the claims of their predecessors. Cicero identifies the Aristotelian and Isocratean tradition as the two ‘fountains’ (*fontes*) of inspiration for later rhetoric (*De Inventione* 2.7) in a treatise that begins, as we have seen, with an Isocratean fable of the original invention of civilization.⁴² His choice of *De Oratore* (‘On the Orator’) as the title for his magisterial dialogue (whose speakers sit under a plane tree, as did Socrates in the *Phaedrus*) instead of *Rhetorica* or *Topica* is a sign of his decisive turn toward the relations of speech, style, and character.

Quintilian imitates and expands on Cicero; we shall see in the final section that Cicero is a symptom of a broader movement in Roman culture that identifies the stylistics of the self as a primary object of ethical concern. In the opening lines of his *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian defends its lengthy twelve books by explaining his sense of double obligation: to his friends, who had demanded that he clarify and correct the conflicting views of earlier writers, and to his readers, for whom he will present something new. The novel topic he explores is the education of the young, beginning from infancy, with the choice of wet-nurse and slave-attendant, with a view toward creating the perfect orator, who is a virtuous man as well as an effective speaker (1.1.1–11, 1, *Preface* 9).

Quintilian’s interest in the training of the young and his desire to train the perfect orator reveal a key development in Roman approaches to the formal study of eloquence. Where Greek rhetoricians are primarily concerned with language as such, with its classification and systematization, the major Roman rhetoricians consistently frame their discipline as a mode of moral education. The rest of Quintilian’s work bears out the point. Having promised that his teachings will inculcate virtue, long understood to be the proper domain of the philosopher, he lays out a

systematic program: one book on early education, the next on the history of Greek and Latin definitions of and approaches to rhetoric, with a pronounced emphasis on moralist views; and after five books on invention and arrangement, he devotes the remaining five to style and delivery, with a climactic book devoted to the explication of the ideal orator's character. Quintilian's consideration of ornament and delivery deploys the language of social values, for he is especially concerned to guard against ornaments that might connote weakness, effeminacy, or slavishness (8.3.6–11, 9.4.142, 10.1.27). We may contrast the presentation of Hermogenes, which rivals Quintilian's in detail if not length, but which bears little sign of the Roman 'anxiety of ornament'. The second century Greek sophist Aelius Aristides complained bitterly about his contemporaries' sing-song, womanish style (*Oration* 34.47); however, this text is not a treatise but an agonistic performance.

5 The Invention of Greco-Roman Culture: The 'Second Sophistic'

Partly because it is the age of vividly drawn biographies, the high empire appears to us a period of profoundly compelling individuals. I will summon up just two. Polemon, a sophist from a noble family in second century Laodicea and once a student of Dio Chrysostom, gained fame as a physiognomist and as a teacher. Trajan, Hadrian, and Antoninus considered Polemon a friend; he taught Herodes Atticus, the first Greek to be named Consul. His biographer Philostratus recounts that his success was partly due to his careful attention to his appearance and expression of emotion: he employed actors' methods, and even in death dramatically reaffirmed his commitment to rhetoric in his last words: 'Give me a body and I will declaim!' (Philostratus, *Lives* 544). In a famous pair of speeches, Polemon adopted the characters of two fathers who had each lost a son at Marathon, a virtuoso performance that displayed his perfect facility with the Attic Greek spoken seven centuries earlier and his ability to bring that era passionately alive. Polemon spoke in many ancient voices: Xenophon, pathetically wishing to die with Socrates, Darius and Xerxes, stunned at the news of the Persians' defeat, and Demosthenes, after the victory of Philip II over the Greeks at Chaeronea.

A contemporary of Polemon, Marcus, came from an ancient Byzantine family, served as an ambassador to Hadrian, and played a key role in mediating a serious dispute between Athens and Megara (Philostratus, *Lives* 529–530). He imitated the fourth century Attic orator Isaeus, to great acclaim, but cultivated a rather coarse, 'rough and ready' appearance, apparently designed to match his talent at extemporization. When, on a visit to Polemon's school, Polemon publicly insulted him, Marcus famously redeemed himself by giving a grand extempore rebuttal. His best-known speech, however, was a polished affair describing a high point in the history of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenian victory at Sphacteria (recorded at Thuc. 5.34). Assuming the character of a Spartan elder, Marcus advised in the strongest terms against allowing soldiers who had thrown away their arms to re-enter the city (*Lives* 528).

In scenes like these from Philostratus' *Lives of the Sophists*, composed in the late second century AD, the typical 'Greek' orator may hail from Asia Minor, Gaul, or Egypt, delivering epideictic orations in Greek to a mixed audience of Latin and Greek speakers. Much has changed in the four centuries since the teaching of rhetoric was

banned in Rome, and Cato warned his son to beware of things Greek: what has emerged may be called a Greco-Gallo-Hispano-Africo-Roman culture united, in its upper echelons, by the common experience of rhetorical training. Philostratus called the period the 'Second Sophistic,' after the first, which he located in the philosophical activity in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries (*Lives* 481).

In the earlier era, a sophist is a rhetorician who takes pay for his teaching; in other words, a man like Gorgias. Most of the stars of Philostratus' Second Sophistic, born into wealthy families, played prominent roles in local politics and gained fame through speaking, though not necessarily in that order.⁴³ They were defined by their primary activity, epideictic speechmaking, a practice they transformed into an agonistic competition that entertained as much as it advertised and transmitted cultural literacy. Sophistic rhetoric is best understood by the limit it set for itself: no diction that does not appear in approved Attic authors. The research of Aristophanes of Byzantium and his colleagues was being put to new use. These men used public spaces in cities throughout the empire (especially in the Greek-speaking east) to re-create and re-enact classical Athens in the content of their speeches and their own comportment. The Sophistic thought-world was all at once eclectic (this is the age of the great encyclopaedic collections of Aulus Gellius and Athenaeus), in love with the trivial (the sophist-philosopher Dio Chrysostom devotes an encomium to a full head of hair, which the fifth century AD Synesius rebutted in an oration 'In Praise of Baldness'), and intently devoted to re-creating the cultural tastes of the Attic past. The sophists themselves cultivated a small library of literary quotes, artfully deployed, from Homer, the nine lyric poets, Herodotus, Thucydides, Euripides, Plato, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Aeschines, and the New Comedians. Writers returned repeatedly to selected textual *topoi* – Lucian and Athenaeus to Plato's *Symposium*, Fronto to the *Phaedrus*, while Aelius Aristides dreamt of Plato and Demosthenes (*Oration* 50.57). They replaced the double -ss- of the Ionic *koinē* (common dialect) with the Attic -tt-, and revived the optative mood, the dual case, and -mi verbs (sometimes overcompensating). Historians in this period pursued events beyond the death of Alexander the Great only when they were concerned specifically to write about Rome – a choice shared by sophists and teachers of rhetoric in their declamations.⁴⁴ With these tools of diction and theme, the sophist not only presented his audience with a set of ideals, political, social, cultural, aesthetic, but also he re-enacted them through his carefully cultivated image of manliness, courage, and refinement, functioning as a living physical transmitter of classical Greek ethics and cultural history. Yet he moved comfortably in a Roman setting, an embodiment of elite educational culture – the ideal Greco-Roman man.

Due in part to heightened awareness of the modern imperial experience, and the contestatory aspect of cultural formation within the context of empire, modern scholarship on the Second Sophistic tends to interpret it as an attempt to compensate for a glorious Greek history now centuries in the past, overshadowed by the power of Rome and its legions. By this view, the Greek sophists' exclusivist form of language, restrictive literary canon, and limited view of history were part of a broader project of Greek cultural self-definition: 'It is less and less easy to accept the view that a harmonious cultural equilibrium was ever reached between Greek and Roman cultures whether in the Rome of Augustus or the Athens of Hadrian'.⁴⁵ That the quest to define and lay claim to 'pure Greekness' partly drives the Atticism and archaism of Greek rhetorical culture in the Roman empire seems obvious. At the same time, as we

have seen, Atticism is a movement with roots in first century Rome. If Latin-speaking Roman elites did not join in speaking Atticized Greek or delivering Sophistic orations, then Roman rhetorical education and treatise-writing bore a strong resemblance to their Greek counterparts. One Roman historian recently observed that Rome's longevity as an imperial power rests partly in its gradual extension of government by consensus formation to all its subjects. To the Romans, the maintenance of imperial society depended on shared communicative practices: documents, inscriptions, and coins.⁴⁶ The classicizing movement of which Atticism was a part was a major instrument in the spreading and inculcating of imperial communicative practices, the common keystone of logical argumentation and stylistic taste.

As a discourse in close contact, even competition, with philosophy, especially in the way its curriculum combines the training of mind and body, rhetoric also plays a role in evolving attitudes toward the self and notions of the good life. In the third volume of his *History of Sexuality*, Foucault argued that imperial writings concerned with the *epimeleia heautou*, or 'the care of the self', represented an epistemic shift in the traditional ethics of self-mastery that originated in the fourth century BC. Working with the sciences or pseudo-sciences of physiognomy, dream analysis, and medical treatises, and in philosophical essays and memoirs, Foucault traces a shift that he describes as the intensification of the 'relation of the self by which one constituted oneself as the subject of one's acts', resulting in the transformation of life into the 'artful practice of life'.⁴⁷ Habitual self-examination, moderation of the passions, and attention to external appearance were all ways by which the educated Greek or Roman man sought to live the good life, in accordance with social convention and the precepts of philosophical schools, especially Stoicism. Rhetorical training played a major role in enabling educated men in the imperial period to monitor their words and bodily actions: just as it taught the modulation of pleasing phrases and the arrangement of compelling arguments, its exercises set the body in order, with the proper mixture of manly uprightness and civil grace.

This holds in a general sense for Greek rhetoric at Rome. After the consolidation of power by Augustus and the military dictators who followed him, rhetoric (like its coeval and constant influence, Stoicism) persisted in presenting the world as a knowable, ordered system. It became, in that sense, a partner of empire, a key to the stability of imperial government. I conclude with Aldo Schiavone's recent observation that 'modernity is infinity that has become history – or the infinite productivity of human labor and intelligence . . . It is also the unlimited growth of needs, desires, and individualities, with dissatisfaction as its justification and battle standard'.⁴⁸ If the sign of modernity is dissatisfaction with limits, one sign of Rome is the desire to impose limits on a world that defies them, and not only through armed resistance. Greek rhetoric at, in, and through imperial Rome offered a universal language of limits. The literary creativity it inspired and the ethical stylistics it helped to shape must be left to another surveyor.

Bibliographical Essay

In recent years, the important but outdated surveys of G.A. Kennedy have been supplemented by useful edited collections: W.J. Dominik's *Roman Eloquence*

(London: 1997), J. May's *Brill's Companion to Cicero* (Leiden: 2003), and W.J. Dominik and J. Hall's forthcoming *Blackwell Companion to Roman Rhetoric* (2007). T. Habinek's *Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory* (London: 2005) is an outstanding compact overview that gives roughly equal time to Greek and Roman material. On the important case of the afterlife of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see the two-part article of F. Solmsen, 'The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric', *AJP* 62 (1941), pp. 35–50 and 167–190. On the reception of Greek rhetoric in the republican and early imperial period, in addition to the works cited above, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus', in W.W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz (eds.), *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos* (New Brunswick: 1989), pp. 23–60 and 'Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean Rhetorical Doctrine', *Rhetorica* 23 (2005), pp. 37–64. E. Fantham's *The Roman World of Cicero's De Oratore* (Oxford: 2004) skillfully treats Cicero's aristocratic audience and his handling of Plato's critique of rhetoric, an aspect of Greek reception I omitted here. T. Morgan, 'A Good Man Skilled in Politics: Quintilian's Political Theory', in Y.L. Too (ed.), *Pedagogy and Power* (Cambridge: 1998), pp. 245–262, explores Quintilian's Isocratean hopefulness that rhetorical training will stabilize the fragility of the (still relatively) new autocratic order. Recent work on Greek and Roman rhetorical education and its background in grammar includes R. Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley: 1988), T. Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge: 1998), R. Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: 2001), and J. Connolly 'Problems of the Past in Imperial Greek Education', in Y.L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden: 2001), pp. 339–373. On the technical aspects of declamation and *stasis* theory, D. Russell's *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge: 1983) covers Apsines, Pseudo-Dionysius, Theon, Libanius, Himerius, and others more and less familiar. M. Heath's work on imperial rhetoric, especially his translation of Hermogenes' *On Issues* (Oxford: 1995), is invaluable; see also his 'The Substructure of *Stasis*-theory from Hermagoras to Hermogenes', *CQ*² 44 (1994), pp. 114–129. C.W. Wooten translates Hermogenes' *On Types of Style* (Chapel Hill: 1987) and C.R. Hock and E. O'Neil translate the *Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric: Classroom Exercises* (Leiden: 2002), and see also G.A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden: 2003). S.F. Bonner's *Roman Declamation* (Liverpool: 1949) needs updating, but remains useful; see also L. Sussman, *The Elder Seneca* (Leiden: 1978). Pioneering work on the sophists in the Roman empire, beginning with G. Bowersock, *Sophists in the Roman Empire* (Oxford: 1969) and P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity* (Madison: 1992), has been brilliantly matched by M. Gleason, *Making Men* (Princeton: 1995) and T. Whitmarsh's broadly conceived *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire. The Politics of Imitation* (Oxford: 2004). S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250* (Oxford: 1996), sheds light on the sophists' role in the construction and transmission of Greek identity in the Roman empire, with special attention to the challenging problems of Atticism and archaism.

Notes

- 1 Editor's note: Originally, this book was to have had a chapter on rhetoric in the republic (by Joy Connolly) and one on rhetoric in the empire. However, when the person writing the latter chapter withdrew from the book one month before the delivery date, Professor Connolly agreed to write also on the empire, hence the length of this chapter. I am very grateful to her.
- 2 M. Clarke, *Rhetoric at Rome* (London: 1996), p. 37.
- 3 Libanius, *Epistle* 1261.2 (fourth century), Himerius, *Oration* 48.19 (fifth century).
- 4 G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), p. 267.
- 5 Cicero, *Brutus* 46, refers to their manual and precepts (*artem et praecepta*); cf. Quint. 2.17.7, and on Tisias and Corax see further, M. Gagarin, Chapter 3.
- 6 Cic. *Brutus* 163, *De Oratore* 1.94; cf. Quint. 3.6.44.
- 7 A.D. Leeman, *Orationis Ratio* (Amsterdam: 1963), pp. 22–23.
- 8 Speeches quoted by Aulus Gellius 6.12, 11.10; cf. Cic. *De Oratore* 3.213–214.
- 9 For example, *Curculio* 338–353, *Captivi* 479–481, *Stichus* 185–190.
- 10 Gellius 15.11, Suetonius, *De Rhetoribus* 1, *De Grammaticis* 25.
- 11 Cic. *De Oratore* 2.155, Elder Pliny 7.112, Gellius 6.14.8–10, Plut. *Cato* 22.
- 12 Cic. *De Oratore* 1.155, Quint. 1.1.12, 10.1.46ff. Cicero's introduction to his translation of Demosthenes' *On The Crown* (18) is preserved in *De Optimo Genere Oratorum* (the translation itself does not survive, if it was ever made).
- 13 C. Moatti, *La Raison du Rome* (Paris: 1999), pp. 192–193, E. Gruen, *Studies in Greek Culture and Roman Policy* (Berkeley: 1990), pp. 190–191, T. Habinek, *Politics of Latin Literature* (Princeton: 1998), pp. 64–68. For a skeptical view of the depth of Greek influence in Rome, see H. Jocelyn, 'The Ruling Class of the Roman Republic and Greek Philosophers', *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester* 59 (1977), pp. 323–366.
- 14 D. Feeney, *Literature and Religion at Rome* (Cambridge: 1998), p. 26.
- 15 Cic. *De Oratore* 1.221, 2.156 (on the danger of appearing too thoughtful or too Greek); see also 1.18 (rejection of Greek models), 1.45 (Crassus dismisses arguments as 'Greekish'), 1.82 and 2.4 (Antonius and Crassus (mis)represented as unlearned in Greek), and 1.102–105 (Crassus criticizes 'Greeklings').
- 16 T. Murphy, 'Privileged Knowledge: Valerius Soranus and the Secret Name of Rome', in A. Barchiesi, J. Rüpke, and S. Stephens (eds.), *Rituals in Ink* (Potsdam: 2004), pp. 127–137, explores a similar dynamic in Roman religion.
- 17 On the nature of the Roman republic, see R. Morstein-Marx, *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Republic* (Cambridge: 2004), pp. 1–12.
- 18 See further, T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24.
- 19 See further, W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9.
- 20 On Aristotle as the first to distinguish the three, see E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999), p. 99.
- 21 R. Barthes, 'The Old Rhetoric: An aide-mémoire', in his *The Semiotic Challenge* (New York: 1988), pp. 26–27.
- 22 This is the opinion of G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: 1972), pp. 117–118. M. Heath, *Hermogenes on Issues* (Oxford: 1995), pp. 2–3, criticizes the dismissal of Hellenistic rhetoric.
- 23 See further, A. Erskine, Chapter 18.
- 24 P. Brown, *Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity* (Madison: 1992), pp. 44–45.

- 25 Full discussion in C. Atherton, 'Hand over Fist: the Failure of Stoic Rhetoric', *CQ*² 38 (1988), pp. 392–427.
- 26 Cic. *De Inventione* 1.9, *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* 1.3, Quint. 3.3.1.
- 27 The elder Seneca complains of effeminate youths and their love of loose, lilting speech (*Controversiae* 1 preface), while the younger criticizes the speech and character of Augustus' friend Maecenas (*Epistulae Morales* 114); cf. Quint. 11.1.30.
- 28 G. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden: 2003), p. 90.
- 29 Hermogenes' adolescent genius and 'burn-out' in his twenties has become a staple of rhetorical lore (Philostratus, *Lives* 577).
- 30 Quintilian 3.1.1–3.6.62 surveys the Hellenistic tradition.
- 31 'Stasis', *Speech Monographs* 17 (1950), pp. 345–369; quotation from p. 360.
- 32 Kennedy, *Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, p. 117.
- 33 Insightfully discussed by D.A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge: 1993), pp. 97–102.
- 34 U. von Wilamowitz Moellendorf, 'Asianismus und Atticismus', *Hermes* 35 (1900), pp. 44–46. Whether a dispute between Alexandrian and Pergamene grammarians (the name usually mentioned is Crates) was centrally important to Roman intellectual life in the first century has been much criticized – compare Elizabeth Rawson, *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* (London: 1985), pp. 120–131 with A.E. Douglas' skeptical 'M. Calidius and the Atticists', *CQ*² 5 (1955), pp. 241–247.
- 35 Two of three confused references in the *Suda* (a tenth century Byzantine encyclopaedia), place him in the Augustan period, while the other one pushes his date backward to the lifetime of Pompey (mid first century): N. O'Sullivan, 'Caecilius of Calacte, 'Canons', and the Origins of Atticism', in W.J. Dominik (ed.), *Roman Eloquence* (New York: 1997), p. 40.
- 36 Rawson, *Intellectual Life in Late Republican Rome*, p. 384.
- 37 Seneca, *Controversiae* 10.5.21, Petronius, *Satyricon* 2, Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 1.
- 38 P. Sinclair, 'Political Declensions in Latin Grammar and Oratory, 55 BCE–CE 39', *Ramus* 24 (1995), pp. 95–96.
- 39 On the 'Atticizing' elements of Augustus' program of public art (quoting Dionysius), see P. Zanker, *The Power of Images in the Age of Augustus* (Ann Arbor: 1988), pp. 98–99 and 239–263.
- 40 Isocrates carefully distinguishes himself from Gorgias (15.155–157).
- 41 Theophrastus' four virtues of style in *De Oratore*: 3.37–49 (Latinity, *ut Latine*, clarity, *ut plane*), 3.91–100 (equipment, *ut ornate*, propriety, *ut apte*); on Theophrastus and prose rhythm, cf. Cic. *Orator* 172, 228 and *De Oratore* 3.184.
- 42 The relevant passages in Isocrates are 15.253–254 and 13.79. For Cicero's later view, see *De Oratore* 3.60–73, where the two *fontes* have become the divided rivers (*flumina*) of rhetoric and philosophy due to the influence of Socrates.
- 43 E.L. Bowie, 'The Importance of sophists', *YCS* 27 (1982), pp. 29–60. Note that the label 'sophist' was strongly repudiated by some 'sophists', such as Aelius Aristides (e.g., *Orationes* 2.342, 3.98, 33.19), presumably rehearsing disavowals of the term from the fourth century; Galen and Dio Chrysostom styled themselves philosophers.
- 44 A selection of favorite declamatory themes includes the Persian War (Scopelian), the defense of Sparta (Lollianus of Ephesus), the life of Alex (Dio Chrysostom), the lives of the philosophers (Lucian's dialogues), mythical themes such as the 'Arms of Ajax' (Lucian, *Dialogue of the Dead* 29), *Iliad* 9 (Aelius Aristides, Dio), the Sicilian expedition (Polemon), and imitations of Critias (Herodes Atticus).

- 45 G. Woolf, 'Becoming Roman, Staying Greek: Culture, Identity, and the Civilizing Process in the Roman East', *PCPS* 40 (1994), pp. 116–143. My own contribution to this view appears in 'Reclaiming the Theatrical in the Second Sophistic', *Helios* 28 (2001), pp. 75–96.
- 46 C. Ando, *Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire* (Berkeley: 2000), p. 77.
- 47 Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality 3: The Care of the Self* (New York: 1988), p. 41.
- 48 A. Schiavone, *The End of the Past: Ancient Rome and the Modern West* (Cambridge, MA: 2000), p. 206.

CHAPTER TWELVE

Rhetoric in Byzantium

Elizabeth Jeffreys

Throughout the millennium-long existence of the Byzantine state, rhetoric remained a perceptible and all-pervasive element in its literary culture; indeed the lingering influence of Byzantine rhetoric, in its widest sense, can be traced to this day in some of the more conservative aspects of the official documents of contemporary Greece.

Centred on the seventh-century BC Megarian colony of Byzantium refounded as Constantinople by Constantine in AD 324 to be the new Christian capital of the East Roman Empire, the Byzantine empire continued a vigorous independent existence until – by then consisting of little more than the City and its immediate hinterland – it finally fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453.¹ However, the terms ‘Byzantium’ and ‘Byzantine’ that are now in general use are anachronisms created in seventeenth-century France as a useful short-hand reference to the last phases of the Later Roman Empire;² their usefulness continues. The inhabitants of the successor empire in Constantinople paradoxically never ceased to refer to themselves as Romans – paradoxically because the language of administration and literature was from the fourth century largely, and from the late sixth century entirely, Greek. It was thus the Greek intellectual heritage from the ancient world and late antiquity that moulded the development of Byzantine literary practices, while the machinery of state and army continued in, and evolved from, the Roman pattern. Byzantine culture, now recognised as a distinctive entity rather than a mere bridge between antiquity and the modern world, is often summed up in a sweeping generalisation as being Roman in law and administration, Greek in culture and intellectual life, and Christian in religion. In time the religious aspects of life in Byzantium came to permeate every aspect of the empire’s existence, one result of which has been a legacy of distinctive visual images in icons and church architecture.

1 Periodisation

Byzantine political theorists saw their empire and its ruler as a New Rome that was part of a seamless and unchanging continuity with the empire of Old Rome, though now divinely supported by the Christian God.³ Ritual and ceremonial was devised to reinforce this and to convince the empire's citizens no less than the visiting outsider.⁴ Yet that there were changes and developments is an inescapable fact. The empire's boundaries fluctuated: at their greatest in the mid-sixth century under Justinian (527–565) and the early eleventh century under Basil II (963–1025), at their most attenuated in the seventh century during the Arab onslaught and again in the fourteenth when facing both Latins and Turks.

Similarly, the intellectual climate fluctuated. Here there are two aspects to consider: the secular, and the ecclesiastical or theological. The secular, drawing on the literary traditions of pagan antiquity, inevitably made use of the genres in which rhetorical techniques had originally developed; the ecclesiastical, developing Christian traditions in the third element of the mix that made up Byzantine culture, also, and also inevitably, put these initially secular techniques to use though alternative theories and attitudes developed.⁵ In practice there was a messy divide. Thus it can be said that Byzantine literary culture was vibrant in the sixth century (when it was largely but not entirely secular and classicizing, with figures like Procopius and Paul the Silentiary), withdrawn into itself in the seventh (when a characteristic text would be the *Hodegos* of Anastasius of Sinai), to emerge in the eighth with a different set of preoccupations, largely theological and bound up with issues to do with Iconoclasm or the use of images in worship.⁶ Then come a series of 'Renaissances' or revivals, by which is meant a resurgence of interest in aspects of the secular, classical past – and with it a revival of the rhetorical techniques thereby implied.⁷ Thus in the ninth century the patriarch Photius both read widely, as can be seen from the books recorded in his *Bibliotheca*, and reflected on the processes of what he had read.⁸ In the tenth century, the activities of Photius and his pupils led up to the so-called Macedonian Renaissance that culminated in the encyclopaedically humanist interests of the intellectuals around the court of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus (ruled 945–959).⁹ The eleventh century was dominated by the all-encompassing intellectual explorations of the polymath courtier Psellus.¹⁰ The twelfth century, a period of high self-confidence under the Comnenian dynasty, witnessed a lively interest in the literary past and the appearance of cohorts of rival writers such as Theodore Prodromus, Eustathius of Thessaloniki and John Tzetzes.¹¹ Following the sack of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204, the thirteenth century was a period of consolidation and regrouping in the replacement capital of Nicaea, but one in which the scholar emperor Theodore II Laskaris (reigned 1254–1258) himself practised what he had been taught, and encouraged his student protégés. The fruits of these endeavours were seen in Constantinople following its recovery in 1261 by Michael Palaeologus (reigned 1259–1282). In what has come to be called the Palaeologan Renaissance, which lasted well into the fourteenth century, scholarship flourished, the court provided a welcoming environment for literary experiment, while monks such as Maximus Planoudes explored the classical heritage, statesmen such as Theodore

Metochites examined their souls in soi-disant Homeric hexameters and emperors turned monks wrote their memoirs with Thucydidean echoes.¹²

However, before focusing on the uses made of rhetoric in Byzantium there are some further background issues that need to be clarified. These involve Byzantine attitudes towards language, the nature and purposes of Byzantine education, and the extent of literacy in the Byzantine world.

2 Language

Every language has registers; educated users are aware of what is appropriate in given contexts. Greek is no exception; indeed its long history gives great scope for a subtle interplay of syntax and vocabulary. But what is exceptional perhaps is the strictness with which these registers came to be used in Byzantium. Throughout the Latin-based Middle Ages in Europe the formal linguistic register never ceased to be supplied by Latin for diplomatic, theological, scholarly purposes, while the informal registers – used for correspondence, tales of entertainment or mild edification – were formed from the developing romance languages. In Greek all these purposes continued to be combined within one linguistic framework which never dissolved into separate forms or even developed mutually incomprehensible dialects (although Cypriot comes close to that at times). There developed what could be called a *diglossia*,¹³ a situation in which two varieties of the one language co-existed, the one informal and used in daily life, and the other formal and having to be learnt formally. There were clear perceptions of which forms of syntax and vocabulary were appropriate in given contexts – and which forms were not.¹⁴

Formal Greek nevertheless evolved also. In brief, Attic Greek developed into the Alexandrian *koinē*, and then the New Testament *koinē*; there followed the conservative Atticist movement of the Second Sophistic and the formation of the Byzantine *koinē*.¹⁵ All these, as is clear from the non-literary papyri of the fourth and fifth centuries, were at some remove from the spoken language and had to be acquired. The attitudes behind the *diglossia* came to be expressed in an intense linguistic conservatism. This demanded, at the very least, that vocabulary from everyday speech was excluded from formal writing: from the fourth-century grammarians list preferred lexical items whilst from twelfth there are cases of litterateurs squabbling over a rival's vocabulary.¹⁶ Hexameters were to be couched in Homeric vocabulary (unsurprisingly), or letters to one's superiors were to be full of recondite phrases. Style should be appropriate to the genre, with appropriate syntax, morphology and lexical items, the standard being set by models from deep in antiquity, with mimesis a deliberate goal.¹⁷ Elegant obscurity (though masquerading in the handbooks as clarity) was the goal of much Byzantine fine writing, and anything that had resonances with the vernacular was in almost every instance to be avoided.¹⁸

3 Education and Literacy

Why such conservatism? The answer would be much the same as to why Greek and Latin lingered so long in the English education system: it was a reasonably good

method for producing mandarins capable of turning an elegant phrase and constructing a lucid argument. For as long as the state and ecclesiastical bureaucracy had need of high-level word-spinners and lower-level competent wordsmiths, so the conservatism continued, with implications for the processes of education and the types of literature that were produced. The Byzantine state functioned until the fifteenth century; thus the education and literary aspirations that had been set up in late antiquity lingered on too.¹⁹

As in the ancient world, education in Byzantium came in stages. The most elementary involved basic reading and writing, usually using the Psalms as an instructional manual; teaching at this level was probably quite widely available at most periods, and would have taken place from the ages of 6 to 11. The next called for deeper study of orthography, morphology and syntax, based on grammars like that of Dionysius of Thrax, and the composition of writing exercises ranging from the simple to the relatively complex; depending on the student's ability and his parents' willingness to pay, this stage could last until the age of 16.²⁰ At any point in the Byzantine millennium there would have been fewer opportunities at this level, but appropriate teachers would have certainly existed in Constantinople and Thessaloniki, and probably in large towns. Information on the process is scattered: the correspondence of an anonymous tenth-century school-master is illuminating, as are comments from Tzetzes in the twelfth century and George of Cyprus in the thirteenth.²¹ But the picture is reasonably consistent, of practice in orthography and the somewhat ill-understood *schede* (parsing exercises).²² It is at this stage that training in rhetoric can be said to have started, with increasing use of *progymnasmata* as an aid to fluent composition. For the majority of those who had progressed this far, their education would now come to an end, the emphasis having been on form (accurate linguistic usage) rather than on the content of the texts from which the form was learnt. Any further progress would depend on the student's ability and ambition, his parents' means and the availability of a teacher. The careers of Photius (civil servant turned patriarch), Psellus (courtier and would-be statesman) and Tzetzes (impoverished literary polymath) each demonstrate both the possibilities of what could be achieved and the range of material – literary, philosophical, historical – that could be mined. However, after the loss of Alexandria and Beirut to the Greek-speaking world in the seventh century, university-level instruction, of whatever content, was provided in the capital only intermittently: key phases were the short-lived establishments set up by Bardas (perhaps; d. 866), Constantine IX Monomachus (reigned 1042–1055), and then the Patriarchal School which from the twelfth century supported the training of clergy; after 1204 strenuous efforts were made in Nicaea to set up establishments to provide trained state officials.²³

What proportion of the population was involved in this process, or could be considered literate, is difficult to estimate.²⁴ The Byzantine fisc and army ran on files and detailed records, and employed a significant number of officials, as witnessed by the numerous seals once attached to their documents; they must have been at least minimally literate. It has been calculated for the tenth, twelfth and fourteenth centuries that at no time were there in the capital many more than two hundred individuals who had passed through the higher levels of the educational process and who would have been capable of writing and appreciating the written products of the process.²⁵ It was at this level of advanced literary composition that rhetoric in Byzantium functioned to its fullest extent.

However, despite the bureaucracy and the importance of the written word, Byzantine society remained largely oral. Manuscripts were costly and silent reading was remarked upon.²⁶ Publication was by performance; letters were read to the recipient, often in a public gathering (a *theatron*) for entertainment;²⁷ sermons were a significant part of the Church's outreach to the congregation;²⁸ court ceremonial demanded suitable orations at diplomatic or festive occasions. The texts that have survived from these occasions more often than not make no concessions to the audience, whether or not they could have been expected to have been trained to appreciate stylistic subtleties.

4 Handbooks and Commentaries

The presence of rhetoric in literary Byzantium can be ascertained through the existence of handbooks, the theoreticians, as it were, of rhetoric. A useful indication is the survival of manuscript copies of certain key texts, for example, Hermogenes of Tarsus' *Peri staseōn* or *Peri ideōn*,²⁹ Menander of Laodicea's epideictic treatises,³⁰ or Aphthonius' *Progymnasmata*.³¹ Note, however, that a crude headcount of manuscripts is not necessarily an index of the use or knowledge of a text, given the hurdles of transliteration (from uncial to minuscule) and preservation through which any author had to pass, whether classical or early Byzantine.³² Most major authors whether classical or Byzantine survive only in manuscripts from the twelfth century onwards. That there is clustering of writers on rhetoric in a number of tenth-century manuscripts (e.g., *Paris. Gr.* 1741, *Paris. Gr.* 2919, *Paris. Gr.* 3032)³³ is certainly indicative of the general intellectual stirrings of the time, but the dearth of earlier copies by no means suggests ignorance of these authors prior to this point. Patriarch Germanus I (in office 715–730), for example, shows distinct awareness of Hermogenes' ideas on style, as does Photius in the following century.³⁴ As significant are the 'collected' manuscripts from the thirteenth century (e.g., *Oxford, Barocc.* 131, *Escorial* Y II 10, *Vienna, Phil. Gr.* 321) in which the *disiecta membra* of earlier scholarship were collected up after the disaster of 1204.

Indicative also of the significance of the handbooks are the numerous commentaries they generated. Thus, to name but the most significant, Hermogenes' *Peri staseon* and *Peri ideon* were commented on in the mid-fifth century by the Neoplatonic Syrianus.³⁵ Subsequently in the high Byzantine centuries they received commentaries either in part or as a whole, from a sequence of writers. Significant names, either for their content or for the implication of the availability of, and demand for, this material are John of Sardis (mid-tenth century?), though his text is lost – like that of the prolific soldier-poet John Geometres (late tenth century); both are known only through references by the eleventh-century John Doxopates in his own commentary.³⁶ More successful as a survivor, despite his overblown style, is John Siceliotes,³⁷ also from the eleventh century but to be distinguished from Doxopates. From the twelfth century there comes the work of Christophorus of Grottaferrata and Gregory of Corinth,³⁸ while in the late thirteenth Maximus Planudes produced a major edition and commentary of the entire Hermogenean corpus,³⁹ which was in turn used by the intelligent but anonymous 'Rhetor Monacensis' in the late fourteenth century.⁴⁰ That these treatises were considered an important tool in the instruction

process is indicated by paraphrases in fifteen-syllable verse made by, for example, Psellus or by Tzetzes: the implication is that this was an important but complex text that needed exposition for a student audience.⁴¹

The treatment given Menander's treatises was less full. Though there is evidence from early in the sixth century that his work was known and used, by, for example, Procopius of Gaza and his pupil Choricus, there is something of a blank thereafter. And while there are clear signs that John of Sardis, John Doxopatres and Joseph Rhacendytes in different Byzantine centuries were all aware of Menander's work, no independent commentaries have survived. This, combined with the relatively sparse manuscript tradition, is somewhat paradoxical since the genres for which these treatises set out rules (the *basilikos logos*, the *epitaphios*, *epithalamios*, *genethliakos*) were those which had the most enduring existence and were in vogue until the last years of Byzantium. It could be that this text was relatively straightforward and few aids were needed either to understand it or to put the rules into practice.⁴²

With Aphthonius and his *Progymnasmata*, however, matters are rather different. His textbook of 'preliminary exercises', based on Hermogenes and other predecessors, set out twelve useful building blocks or elements of composition (*mythos*, *diégēma*, *chreia*, *ekphrasis*, *enkomion*, *éthopoia*, etc.), with examples. In comparison with Hermogenes, this was regarded as a miracle of clarity, but nonetheless attracted commentaries, from amongst others John of Sardis and John Doxopatres.⁴³ Perhaps because the individual units made neat self-contained exercises and provided a teacher with an excuse to set out 'fair copies' and also display his own ingenuity, a number of worked examples of sets of *progymnasmata* survive: by, for example, John Geometres, Nicephorus Basilaces (from the twelfth century) or George Pachymeres (from the thirteenth).⁴⁴

These handbooks, the commentaries and – in the case of the *progymnasmata* – the 'fair copies' formed the tools by which rhetorical theory was taught throughout the Byzantium millennium, though with varying degrees of intensity and with a distinct diminution in the seventh and eighth centuries. But the thread of awareness of these tools ran through this period, to be strengthened and revived. It will be obvious from the references cited here that most of these texts lack modern editions; the most recent for many are the admirable Teubner editions of H. Rabe from the early twentieth century, but for an appreciable number recourse has to be had to the less critical editions of C. Walz or L. Spengel from the 1830s and 1850s. Much work still needs to be done, and some texts remain unedited. Equally, the authorship of others remains unclear – clarification of which is potentially of considerable interest for the light that could be shed on intellectual groupings. In this context the verse commentaries are particularly intriguing: for whom were they written, if the authors are to be seen as Psellus or Tzetzes?

It is not easy to characterise the authors of the commentaries. Most are little more than names attached in the manuscripts – this is perhaps most true of Siceliotēs, though a detailed re-reading of his work may produce surprising nuggets of information, as is probably even more likely for Doxopatres, who seems to have had court connections. It is probably fair to say that most were scholars working partly for their own private purposes and partly to build up their teaching materials. On this latter aspect, the best information comes from the later Palaeologan period, from figures such as George of Cyprus, Maximus Planudes, and Joseph Rhacendytes.

5 Free-standing Examples: Exercises

If the initial purposes for which the bundle of communication techniques covered by the term ‘rhetoric’ came into being were those of persuasion and debate, to enable a citizen to take part in public political discussion, then much of this had long since ceased to be relevant in Byzantine society. Political and legal decision-making in the developed Byzantine state rested ultimately with the emperor, and of course with the advisers who had his ear; these would have used their own techniques of persuasion in private, closed discussion. The Senate lingered on as an honorific and ceremonial body, but not one which envisaged serious debate.⁴⁵

The most obvious function to retain a use was epideictic oratory as a means of demonstrating an individual’s competence at handling words, whether written or spoken, whether at public ceremonial or on private domestic occasions. To some extent, this practice blurred into the custom of producing exemplary exercises, particularly of *progymnasmata*. Certain categories lent themselves particularly well to use as free-standing show pieces. Prominent among these is the *ekphrasis*.⁴⁶ Generally of works of art or buildings but also of small artefacts or works of nature, examples would include the long hexameter description of Hagia Sophia by Paul the Silentiary on its rebuilding by Justinian in 563,⁴⁷ while Procopius’ *Buildings* (c. 555?), a listing of most of Justinian’s constructions, could perhaps be considered as one extended *ekphrasis*.⁴⁸ Other examples could include Geometres on the oak tree,⁴⁹ Manasses on the palace mosaics of the court of Manuel Comnenus,⁵⁰ Nicolaus Mesarites (c. 1200) on the church of the Holy Apostles,⁵¹ and George Pachymeres (c. 1280) on wine.⁵² Striking from the Palaeologan period is the revival of the *ekphrasis* of cities: there are examples on Nicaea by Theodore II Lascaris and Theodore Metochites (c. 1290),⁵³ on Trebizond by Bessarion (c. 1438/9) and John Eugenius,⁵⁴ and on Constantinople by Metochites.⁵⁵ The Byzantine *ekphrasis* has attracted scholarly attention in recent years; it has been examined as an index of changing attitudes towards the depiction of emotion, in parallel with developments in the visual arts, particularly in the course of the twelfth century,⁵⁶ whilst the processes through which the contents of the *ekphrasis* are presented to the reader or hearer, particularly in accounts of large buildings, have also been the subject of fruitful enquiry.⁵⁷

At times, the *ekphrasis* can verge on *enkomion*,⁵⁸ though *enkomia* are largely reserved for people rather than objects. The persons to be praised were initially, as in Menander’s handbook, the great and the good: emperors and generals. This developed in Byzantium into regularly occurring *enkomia* of the emperor presented at certain points of the liturgical year, chiefly Epiphany (when, as is seen for example from the mid-tenth-century *De Caerimoniis*, the emperor confirmed new officials in their posts) and, from the twelfth century, on Lazarus Saturday, immediately preceding Holy Week, under the direction of the *maistor tôn rhêtōrôn* from the Patriarchal School.⁵⁹ From the eleventh century onwards *enkomia* were increasingly produced on behalf of private individuals – an indication both of the increasing wealth at the disposal of aristocratic households and of the growing numbers of trained but unemployable youth, a phenomenon with parallels in Latin-based Europe at this time.⁶⁰ These could be in verse as well as prose: a notable, and partially published, collection can be found in *Marcianus Graecus* 524.⁶¹ The subjects would vary from

straightforward praise of an individual whether emperor or potential aristocratic patron, to less direct praise in the form of *epithalamia* (wedding songs) in which the patron's family and antecedents would be prominent, or *epitaphioi* and monodies (funerary laments). The twelfth century is a particularly fertile period for these productions, with a remarkably skilled exponent being Theodore Prodromus, whether writing for the emperor John Comnenus after a victory in Cilicia or the birth of a child to his daughter-in-law.⁶² Not all *encomia* were serious: Psellus unbent so far as to write *enkomia* of fleas, lice and bed-bugs.⁶³

The reverse of *enkomion* is *psogos* or invective.⁶⁴ Perhaps the most famous Byzantine invective is Procopius' *Secret History*, with its vehement denunciation of the manners and morals of Justinian and his empress.⁶⁵ In the collections of *progymnasmata*, *psogos* and *enkomia* are paired, focusing on plants or animals or literary characters from the ancient world: George Pachymeres, for example, praised Telamonian Ajax and excoriated Paris.⁶⁶ But *psogos* also had a role in 'real life', and was a useful weapon against opponents the status of whose religious beliefs or intellectual stance might be dubious; thus Arethas of Caesarea vehemently denounced Leo Choerosphactes (whose name lent itself to unfortunate puns) for his 'paganism' as did Constantine of Rhodes, though the motives for both were assuredly factional.⁶⁷ In the twelfth century invective became enmeshed in satire, in Lucianic pieces written by some of the most prominent literary figures of the period – such as the *Timarion* (perhaps by Theodore Prodromus), the *Anacharsis* (perhaps by Nicetas Eugenianus) or the *Bagoas* of Nicephorus Basilaces.⁶⁸

Of the other *progymnasmata* the *êthopoia*, or 'character sketch', had a potentially innovative existence.⁶⁹ Initially drawing blandly on figures from mythology or ancient history and with titles such as 'What Andromache would have said when dissuading Hector from going into battle', from the tenth century onwards, and particularly during the twelfth century, names from contemporary events or the recent past or Biblical narratives were brought into play, often with a neat sense of irony. Thus John Geometres wrote a sketch of the emperor Nicephorus Phocas, and Nicephorus Basilacis, an inventive exponent of this form, wrote on 'What the Virgin Mary would have said when the water was turned to wine' as well as 'What Pasiphae would have said to the bull'.⁷⁰ These exercises demonstrated a developing sensibility for the depiction of emotion that had the potential to spill over into more sustained narratives.⁷¹ But though pieces in this manner continued to be produced into the last years of Byzantium with one of the final instances coming in 1402 from the emperor Manuel II Palaeologus on 'What Timur would have said to Bayazid after the disaster of Ancyra',⁷² the verve had gone.

6 Free-standing Examples: Practical

Nevertheless, although the practical functions of rhetoric – even in the sixth century – had largely degenerated into the decorative and epideictic, there did remain some residual practical functions, chiefly due to the need for ceremonial speeches at the imperial court. These followed several patterns.

Perhaps the most notable of these is the *basilikos logos*.⁷³ Defined by Menander as a form of *enkomion*, it normally dealt with the emperor's origins, his physical appearance, his deeds (his victories in war), and his virtues as a wise and humane ruler. An

early (rather long) Christianised example, Eusebius of Caesarea's panegyric and subsequently controversial *Vita Constantini*,⁷⁴ set a precedent for presenting an idealised rather than strictly accurate imperial image. The *basilikos logos* could function either as straight *enkômion* or be used to inveigle advice into the emperor's hearing – becoming in effect a 'Mirror of Princes'. Examples of the latter sort can be seen in the advice addressed to Justinian by Agapetus in the sixth century or to Leo VI in the ninth, attributed to his notoriously unlettered father Basil I but surely by a member of the court.⁷⁵ Also from the ninth century comes the slightly puzzling *Life of the Empress Theodora*, who in 843 presided over the ending of the last phase of Iconoclasm; this has recently been re-interpreted as a version of a *basilikos logos*, which focused on a female ruler rather than male, and which expressed the empress' deeds of valour in terms of piety and the defeat of Iconoclasm.⁷⁶ The *basilikos logos* proper was presented on specific festal occasions such as Epiphany, as mentioned above. One such panegyric text on the emperor Constantine IX seems to have been the starting point for Psellus' *Chronographia* since its recipient encouraged the young author to extend his range. From the twelfth century come numerous examples of imperial panegyric, largely addressed to Manuel Comnenus, from, for example, the learned Eustathius of Thessaloniki, Michael Italicus, or the less able but persistent anonymous writer known as Manganeius Prodromus;⁷⁷ but while narrative played a part in some of these speeches and some of their content can be usefully corroborated, criticism did not. However, with many of the instances from the Palaeologan period, advice reappears. Thus neither Maximus Planoudes nor Theodore Metochites refrained from inserting adverse comments on the policies of Andronicus II into their speeches;⁷⁸ nor in 1347 did Demetrius Cydones with John Kantacouzenus.⁷⁹ The re-established ceremonial of the Palaeologan court may have held to the former rituals, but the conventions were stretched.

Other occasions which called for formal speeches – of welcome (*eisiterios*) or disembarkation (*epibaterios*), for example – continued to be marked, though with decreasing frequency in the early and middle Byzantine periods. The twelfth century, however, whether through the accidents of survival or because this really was one of the liveliest periods of intellectual and literary activity, provides some fascinating instances of these, in particular of the *eisiterios logos*. Contrasting examples survive in connection with imperial brides: the formal and high style welcome by Eustathius of Thessaloniki for Bertha of Sulzbach on her arrival for her marriage with Manuel Comnenus, and the bizarre vernacular greeting for the young Agnes of France a generation later (in 1179) to be married to Manuel's son Alexius; the reasons for this latter extremely rare instance of forms from the spoken language appearing in a formal genre are still debated.⁸⁰

Instances of the *epithalamios logos*, or speech on the occasion of a marriage,⁸¹ survive from the early Byzantine period, for example by Choricus of Gaza,⁸² but come into their own in the twelfth century when they become one of most favoured types of 'occasional' poetry supported by the genealogy-conscious aristocratic households of Comnenian Constantinople, giving ample opportunity for poetic ingenuity over clan names and images of fecundity.

One other genre of what should probably be classed as epideictic oratory retained an independent and important role in Byzantine culture, and this was the *epitaphios logos* or funerary oration.⁸³ Also referred to as a monody or a *thrēnos* (though these

terms imply lamentation only), this developed into a mixed genre, combining elements of praise of the deceased, mourning and consolation for the bereaved, and were often presented in the course of a funeral or memorial service. Again this was a type of occasional discourse that lent itself to domestic situations as well as state occasions for emperors or patriarchs; the twelfth-century legal commentator Balsamon expressly forbids the pronouncement in church of commemorative discourses in iambic verses, of which some examples by the so-called Manganeius Prodrōmus survive for an aristocratic household. Beneath the conventional expressions of grief an *epitaphios logos* can be a useful source of information on the person and his circumstances, a prime instance being George Tornicius' oration on the princess Anna Comnene, author of the *Alexiad*.⁸⁴

Two texts provide primary evidence for the occasions on which formal oratory was required in the court system of Byzantium: the tenth-century *De Caerimoniis* attributed to Constantine VII Porphyrogenetus, and the fourteenth-century *Treatise on Dignities and Offices* attributed to Pseudo-Codinus.⁸⁵

7 Embedded Uses

However, it is in the embedded uses of rhetorical techniques that the all-pervasiveness of rhetoric in Byzantium is apparent. This can be considered in terms of the use of the larger units that have been discussed thus far, as well as on the small scale, in the use of tropes and figures of speech that have not yet been referred to. What follows is a necessarily incomplete and rather random set of examples designed to stimulate curiosity.

The area of literature for which Byzantium is justly renowned is in the writing of history. There is an almost unbroken sequence of historians and chroniclers from the earliest centuries through to the last, working with varying degrees of artistry but almost without exception drawing on an interesting range of rhetorical and literary techniques.⁸⁶ The usefulness of the *progymnasma* as a tool for expression and a unit of composition is plain. Procopius in two of his works provides, as has been suggested already, extended versions of both the *ekphrasis* (in *Buildings*) and the *psogos* (in *Secret History*). However, the *Buildings* itself also has inserted passages of carefully worked up *ekphrasis*, on the city of Antioch, rebuilt following an earthquake, and on the great church of Hagia Sophia.⁸⁷ An *ekphrasis* of the plant and animal life that came into being at the beginning of the world is a conspicuous part of the verse chronicle of Constantine Manasses, which was written in about 1140 for an aristocratic patroness.⁸⁸ The carefully artless history by the former emperor John Kantakouzenus (reigned 1347–1354) includes a number of set piece descriptions, amongst them a vivid word picture of the *prokypsis* scene at the marriage of his daughter to the Turk Orchan, a forerunner of the Buckingham Palace balcony appearances.⁸⁹ *Psogos* also makes an appearance, slyly in the case of Psellus and his *Chronographia*, much of whose apparent admiration for Constantine Monomachus can be read not far beneath the surface as criticism. Psellus is also master of the *ēthopoia*, for example in his depiction of the empress Zoe.⁹⁰ That the *diēgēma*, or 'story', another of the *progymnasmata* though not one discussed so far, was a useful building block is clear from its ubiquity: neatly constructed episodes can be isolated in virtually every

historian. Much discussed recently has been the use made of these by the generals Cecaumenus (mid-eleventh century) in his *Precepts and Anecdotes* and Nicephorus Bryennius (early twelfth century) in his *Materials for History*, neither of whom are the sort of individuals who might be expected to be well versed in literary techniques (fighters rather than pen-pushers), but both of whom produced a well told 'story'.⁹¹ Amongst the most obvious 'set-piece' scenes one might expect from a historian are battles, noteworthy being several of those by Procopius; though some later writers may be accused of slipping into formulas, in the case of Scylitzes (c. 1090) the reason would be that he was consciously summarising his sources.⁹² Histories also provide their authors with opportunities to debate issues through their protagonists' speeches, as in Procopius' presentation of the fraught debate on how to deal with the Nica Riot (*Wars* 1.24), or in the countless cases of generals exhorting their troops to battle; Leo the Deacon in the late tenth century has some particularly effective ones.

A similar list could be drawn up for, for example, that most typical of Byzantine literary genres, hagiography, that is, saints' lives. Examples of hagiography also come from all stages of the Byzantine millennium and from a wide range of authors and with a surprisingly disparate set of agendas.⁹³ Conspicuous are *ekphraseis* of festivals, *epitaphioi* for the central figures, *diēgēmata* on the saints' exploits. For homilies or sermons, the evidence is again abundant: leaving aside the skills of the well-trained fourth-century Cappadocian Fathers, one might point – more or less at random – to the eighth-century patriarch Germanus, with his lyrical depictions of the spring morning of the Annunciation and his lively dialogue between Gabriel and Mary with its use of anaphora.⁹⁴ Much could be said too of the techniques found in the hymnographers, whether the rhythmic *kontakia* of Romanus from the sixth century with its inventive word play governing the sequence of ideas, or the complex imagery of the iambic canons of John of Damascus in the eighth, or the Great Canon of Andrew of Crete.⁹⁵

Perhaps the most conspicuous examples of the embedding of units of the rhetorical tool-kit into a continuous composition are provided by the 'novels' from the Comnenian renaissance. These were produced by four of the ambitious and under-employed literati of the early part of the 1140s, and were modelled on the novels of the Second Sophistic, notably the *Leucippe and Clitophon* of Achilles Tatius (on which, see R. Webb, Chapter 34). Although long derided as feeble pastiches, these works are now attracting increasing attention in their own right. For a modern readership they are amongst the most approachable texts in the Byzantine literary oeuvre, and are beguilingly open to critical decoding.⁹⁶ But their linear plot-lines are decorated at intervals with show-stopping pieces of rhetorical *tours-de-force*, from the *ekphraseis* of gardens, Virtues and Vices, and the seasons of the year in Macrembolites' *Hysmene and Hysminias* to the verse mock-Platonic dialogue on why only the best (including one's friends) should be sacrificed to the gods in Theodore Prodromus' *Rhodanthe and Dosicles* to the speech 'What a young man should say when persuading his sweetheart to elope' in Nicetas Eugenianus' *Drosilla and Charicles*.⁹⁷ These read like nothing so much as a set of 'fair copies' produced by a teacher to encourage his pupils. A similar set of romances, this time all in verse and all anonymous, appear in the early fourteenth century, to some extent modelled on the Comnenian examples, and notable for the spectacular, and potentially allegorical, *ekphraseis* of castles, their legendary inhabitants and their gardens.⁹⁸

Inevitably embedded into a work are the small-scale tools of rhetoric, the rhetorical figures or the tropes and schemata,⁹⁹ of which Byzantine writers made ample use, at times perhaps to excess. Knowledge of these was transmitted by a number of handbooks, some from antiquity (such as that of Tryphon), others – of obscure date and authorship – from the Byzantine period: the names that appear are Choeroboscus (ninth century) and Gregory Pardus (twelfth century), though Pardus' work is in fact to be attributed to Tryphon.¹⁰⁰ The list of tropes in these 'Byzantine' handbooks has been extended to twenty-seven, to include allegory, ellipsis, hyperbole, irony, metaphor, metonymy, pleonasm, simile, synecdoche, riddle. Examination of virtually any Byzantine writer would demonstrate how commonplace these turns of speech had become: for metaphor, perhaps a supreme master is Nicetas Choniates in his *History* of the Comnenian emperors;¹⁰¹ for a glorious mix of allegory, anaphora, hyperbole, metonymy, simile and synecdoche, with a liberal admixture of punning etymologies, it is hard to go past Manganeius Prodromus, though there were indeed many more skilled and learned practitioners in court rhetoric than he.

Little has been said so far about the interaction between the secular literary traditions in which education took place and the religious environment. A classic statement of the cultural problem is the fourth-century treatise by Basil of Caesarea, *Address to Young Men*, on how to interact with secular classicism (with caution),¹⁰² but there is little subsequent development of these ideas apart from statements that the 'simplicity of the fisherman' is to be preferred to the complexities of the Atticist. Elements of a theory to support this attitude can be seen, for example, in Photius' statements that Saint Paul is to be emulated rather than secular authors (*Ep.* 156) or in Psellus' judgements of the style of Gregory of Nazianzus, a model of impeccable orthodoxy from all points of view.¹⁰³ There are signs here that a rhetoric of theological discourse is being developed: this is a topic which deserves further investigation.

8 Conclusion

There have been honourable attempts to discuss and situate the role of rhetoric in Byzantine society and literature. Pride of place must go to H. Hunger, who produced a series of studies over the course of several years whilst he was preparing the indispensable section on 'Rhetorik' included in his reference work on high-style secular Byzantine literature, and which has been much cited in the notes to this chapter.¹⁰⁴ Hunger's handbook, however, though it contains many helpful insights into Byzantine literary culture, was never intended to be discursive. Notable in the expository direction have been the studies by G.A. Kennedy¹⁰⁵ and G. Kustas.¹⁰⁶ In the one volume of his projected *History of Byzantine Literature* that was published, A. Kazhdan made an especial point in connection with each author he examined to discuss notable features of that author's style, prominent among which were the rhetorical figures and techniques used; he had previously ensured that rhetoric and its constituent elements received a generous place in the collaborative *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium* which he edited.¹⁰⁷ It is nevertheless a fact, sad or otherwise, that the study of the functioning of rhetoric in Byzantine literature is much neglected.¹⁰⁸ While it is a truism that modern editions of many of the relevant texts are a desideratum, the majority of the Byzantine commentators are nevertheless

available in a printed version that is at reasonably acceptable (and there is no need to plough through the manuscripts): the diligent and enterprising reader is rewarded with unexpected nuggets and insights into the texts, their writers and the world in which they lived. And it remains essential in the close reading of any text that the rhetorical background is kept in mind if an author's meaning is to be decoded with any degree of success: students of the Byzantine millennium neglect at their peril the rhetorical tradition behind the texts on which they focus.

Bibliographical Essay

Most of the recent, useful secondary literature in English is mentioned in the last paragraph. Details of the editions of the relevant texts, both of the theoreticians (chiefly Hermogenes and Menander) and of the Byzantine commentators and practitioners, can be found in H. Hunger's *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, 2 vols. (Munich: 1978–79). Hunger's handbook also lists virtually every writer using Byzantine Greek, and is a vital reference tool. Many of the texts are contained in the collected editions of C. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci*, 9 vols. (Stuttgart: 1832–36), L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci*, 3 vols. (Leipzig: 1853–56) and the volumes in the Teubner series edited by H. Rabe and his colleagues in the early twentieth century. Few have been translated. Exceptions involve the *progymnasmata*, and deal with the ancient rather than the Byzantine uses: see G.A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition* (Leiden: 2003) and R.F. Hock and E.N. O'Neil (eds.), *The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric, Classroom Exercises* (Leiden: 2002).

Notes

- 1 For a succinct overview, see the historical chapters by P. Sarris, W. Treadgold, P. Magdalino and S. Reinert in C. Mango (ed.), *The Oxford History of Byzantium* (Oxford: 2003). For more information on the names and places that appear in this chapter, consult A. Kazhdan et al. (eds.), *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols. (Oxford: 1991).
- 2 See, e.g., J.-M. Spieser, 'Du Cange and Byzantium', in R. Cormack and E. Jeffreys (eds.), *Through the Looking Glass: Byzantium through British Eyes* (Aldershot: 2000), pp. 199–210.
- 3 Useful discussion in G. Dagron, trans. J. Birrell, *Emperor and Priest: The Imperial Office in Byzantium* (Cambridge: 2003); see also the texts collected in E. Barker, *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium from Justinian I to the Last Palaeologus* (Oxford: 1957).
- 4 The prime texts that summarise Byzantine attitudes are the treatises compiled by and for the emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogenetus: *De administrando imperio* (ed. G. Moravcsik and R. Jenkins [Washington, DC: 1967]) and especially *De Ceremoniis* (ed. J.J. Reiske [Bonn: 1829–30] and A. Vogt [Paris: 1935–40]; new edition in progress by G. Dagron and others).
- 5 See A. Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1991) for a confrontation with some of the issues.
- 6 See, e.g., the papers by A. Cameron, M. Whitby and J. Haldon in A. Cameron and L. Conrad (eds.), *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Middle East I: Problems in the Literary Source Material* (Princeton: 1992). On Iconoclasm and the literature it generated, see

- L. Brubaker and J. Haldon, *Byzantium in the Iconoclast Era (c.680–850): The Sources, An Annotated Survey* (Aldershot: 2001).
- 7 See W. Treadgold (ed.), *Renaissances before the Renaissance: Cultural Revivals of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages* (Stanford: 1984).
 - 8 R. Henry (ed.), *Photius, Bibliothèque*, 6 vols. (Paris: 1959–91); particularly noteworthy are the judgements made on each authors for style and content.
 - 9 P. Lemerle, *Le Premier Humanisme Byzantin* (Paris: 1971) remains indispensable.
 - 10 On whom the article by E. Kriaras in *PW*, Supp. 11 (1968), cols. 1124–1182, still provides the best overview.
 - 11 Useful discussions in P. Magdalino, *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos, 1143–1180* (Cambridge: 1993).
 - 12 See in general, C.N. Constantinides, *Higher Education in Byzantium in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries, 1204–ca.1310* (Nicosia: 1982) and S. Mergiali, *L'Enseignement et les Lettrés pendant l'Époque des Paléologues (1261–1453)* (Athens: 1996).
 - 13 E. Kriaras, 'Diglossie des Derniers Siècles de Byzance: Naissance de la Littérature Néo-hellénique', *Proceedings of the XIIIth International Congress of Byzantine Studies* (Oxford: 1967), pp. 283–299. Greek is not unique in this, while a form of *diglossia* only disappeared from the Greek state of today when *katharevousa* and the polytonic system of accentuation, which had to be learnt rather painfully, ceased to be the official form of the language in 1980.
 - 14 R. Browning, 'The Language of Byzantine Literature', in S. Vryonis (ed.), *The 'Past' in Medieval and Modern Greek Culture* (Malibu, CA: 1978), pp. 103–334.
 - 15 See G. Horrocks, *Greek: A History of a Language and its Speakers* (London: 1997), and still also R. Browning, *Medieval and Modern Greek*² (Cambridge: 1983).
 - 16 Browning, *Medieval and Modern Greek*, pp. 44–52.
 - 17 The classic statement of the role of *mimesis* in Byzantine literature is H. Hunger, 'On the Imitation (*mimesis*) of Antiquity in Byzantine Literature', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 23–24 (1969–70), pp. 15–38.
 - 18 See R.H. Robins, *The Byzantine Grammarians: Their Place in History* (Berlin: 1993), for an account of tools of instruction.
 - 19 There is a parallel in Merovingian Gaul; cf. P. Heather, 'Literacy and Power in the Migration Period', in A. Bowman and G. Woolf (eds.), *Literacy and Power in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: 1994), pp. 177–197, at p. 196: as long as financial benefits (i.e., employment by the state) were perceived to accrue from a classical education, that education – and its literary products – persisted.
 - 20 See, e.g., A. Moffatt, 'Early Byzantine School Curricula and a Liberal Education', in D. Obolensky (ed.), *Byzance et les Slaves. Mélanges Ivan Dujcev* (Paris: 1979), pp. 275–288 and H. Hunger, *Schreiben und Lesen in Byzanz. Die byzantinische Buchkultur* (Munich: 1989).
 - 21 On the tenth century: A. Markopoulos (ed.), *Anonymi Professoris Epistulae* (Berlin: 2000). Tzetzes: cf. the diatribes on teachers, those that were taught and education in general in P.A.M. Leone, 'Ioannis Tzetzae Iambi', *Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici* 6–7 (1969–70), pp. 135–141. On George of Cyprus: R. Webb, 'A Slavish Art? Language and Grammar in Late Byzantine Education and Society', *Dialogos* 1 (1994), pp. 81–103.
 - 22 H. Hunger, *Die hochsprachliche Profane Literatur der Byzantiner*, 2 vols. (Munich: 1979), 2, pp. 24–29.
 - 23 P. Speck, *Die Kaiserliche Universität von Konstantinopel. Präzisierungen zur Frage des höheren Schulwesens in Byzanz im 9. und 10. Jahrhundert* (Munich: 1974), W. Wolska-Conus, 'L'École de Droit et l'Enseignement du Droit à Byzance au XIe siècle: Xiphilin et

- Psellos', *Travaux et Mémoires* 7 (1979), pp. 1–107, Magdalino, *Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 331–356 and Constantinides, *Higher Education*, pp. 1–27.
- 24 Byzantine literacy is a vexed and insufficiently discussed issue; see, e.g., M. Mullett, 'Writing in Early Mediaeval Byzantium', in R. McKitterick (ed.), *The Uses of Literacy in Early Mediaeval Europe* (Cambridge: 1990), pp. 156–185 and the introduction to C. Holmes and J. Waring (eds.), *Literacy, Education and Manuscript Transmission in Byzantium and Beyond* (Leiden: 2002), pp. 1–32.
 - 25 Lemerle, *Premier Humanisme*, p. 243, I. Sevcenko, 'Society and Intellectual Life in the Fourteenth Century', *14e Congrès International des Etudes Byzantines, Bucarest, 1971, Rapports I* (Bucharest: 1971), pp. 7–30, at p. 10.
 - 26 Hunger, *Schreiben und Lesen*, pp. 125–130.
 - 27 Hunger, *Literatur* 1, pp. 210–213.
 - 28 M. Cunningham and P. Allen (eds.), *Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics* (Leiden: 1998).
 - 29 H. Rabe (ed.), *Hermogenis Opera* (Leipzig: 1913): at least one tenth-century manuscript, and at least nine from the eleventh century.
 - 30 D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson (eds.), *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford: 1981): one tenth-century manuscript (a particularly key manuscript for the transmission of texts on rhetoric), and a complex set of subsequent apographs with omissions and variations.
 - 31 H. Rabe (ed.), *Aphthonii Progymnasmata* (Leipzig: 1926): at least six manuscripts from the tenth and eleventh centuries; copious later copies; clear signs of use in the mid-tenth century (in, e.g., the *Geoponica* commissioned by Constantine Porphyrogenetus).
 - 32 No uncial copies have survived for Hermogenes, Menander or Aphthonius. For Menander only one manuscript survives from the tenth century and the immediate post-transliteration period.
 - 33 *Paris. Gr.* 1741 includes much Aristotle, Dionysius of Halicarnassus and, significantly, Menander, *Paris. Gr.* 2919 has important *Scholia* on Hermogenes, and *Paris. Gr.* 3032 is an instance of what became a conventional combination of Aphthonius and Hermogenes with *Scholia*.
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 - 35 H. Rabe (ed.), *Syriani In Hermogenem Commentaria* (Leipzig: 1892–93).
 - 36 Doxopatres: H. Rabe (ed.), *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig: 1931), pp. 80–155, 304–318, 360–374, 423–426. On Geometres: Hunger, *Literatur* 1, p. 83. On John of Sardis: Hunger, *Literatur* 1, p. 78.
 - 37 C. Walz (ed.), *Rhetores Graeci* 1–7 (Stuttgart: 1832–36), 6, pp. 56–504.
 - 38 Christopher: Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 7, pp. 861 ff. Gregory of Corinth (Pardus): D. Donnet, *Le Traité 'Peri syntaxeos logou' de Grégoire de Corinthe* (Brussels: 1967).
 - 39 Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 5, pp. 212–276; cf. C. Wendel, *PW* 20.2 (1950), cols. 2202–2253, at col. 2231.
 - 40 *Monac. Gr.* 505; cf. H. Rabe, 'Rhetoren Corpora', *RhM* 67 (1912), pp. 321–357, at p. 345; Hunger, *Literatur* 1, p. 85.
 - 41 The rhythmic 15-syllable line was regularly used as a medium of instruction: M.J. Jeffreys, 'The Nature and Origins of the Political Verse', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 28 (1974), pp. 142–195. Psellus: Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 3, pp. 687–703. Tzetzes: Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 3, pp. 670–686 (but still not fully published).
 - 42 Russell and Wilson, *Menander Rhetor*, pp. xl–xli. The variations in order in later manuscripts may perhaps reflect teachers' practices.
 - 43 Sardis: Rabe, *Aphthonii Progymnasmata*. Doxopatres: Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge*, pp. 80–155, and commentary in Walz *Rhetores Graeci* 2, pp. 81–564. On relative clarity: Tzetzes, *Chiliades* 11, 112–148, P.A.M. Leone (ed.), *Ioannis Tzetzae Historiae* (Naples: 1968).

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- 45 Kazhdan *et al.*, *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, s.v. Senate.
- 46 Hunger, *Literatur* 1, pp. 170–188.
- 47 P. Friedlander (ed.), *Johannes von Gaza, Paulus Silentarius und Prokopios von Gaza: kunstbeschreibungen Justinianischer Zeit* (Leipzig: 1912).
- 48 H.B. Dewing, *Procopius 7: Buildings* (Cambridge, MA: 1940).
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- 53 C. Foss, *Nicaea: A Byzantine Capital and its Praises: With the Speeches of Theodore Laskaris, In Praise of the Great City of Nicaea, and, Theodore Metochites, Nicene Oration* (Brookline, MA: 1996).
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- 57 For example, R. Macrides and P. Magdalino, 'The Architecture of Ekphrasis: Construction and Context of Paul the Silentiary's Ekphrasis of Hagia Sophia', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 12 (1988), pp. 47–82, R. Webb and L. James, 'To Understand Ultimate Things and Enter Secret Places: Ekphrasis and Art in Byzantium', *Art History* 4 (1991), pp. 1–15, R. Webb, 'The Aesthetics of Sacred Space: Narrative, Metaphor and Notion in *Ekphraseis* of Church Building', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 53 (1999), pp. 59–74.
- 58 Hunger, *Literatur* 1, pp. 120–132.
- 59 R. Browning, 'The Patriarchal School at Constantinople in the Twelfth Century', *Byzantion* 32 (1962), pp. 167–202 and 33 (1963) pp. 11–40, and Magdalino, *Empire of Manuel I*, pp. 426–427.
- 60 See, e.g., G. Dagron, 'The Urban Economy', in A. Laiou (ed.), *The Economic History of Byzantium from the Seventh through the Fifteenth Century* (Washington, DC: 2002), pp. 393–462, R. Beaton, 'The Rhetoric of Poverty: The Lives and Opinions of Theodore Prodromos', *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies* 11 (1987), pp. 1–28.
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- 92 C. Holmes, *Basil II and the Governance of Empire (976–1025)* (Oxford: 2005), especially pp. 120–170.
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- 106 Kustas, *Studies in Byzantine Rhetoric*, *passim*.

- 107 Kazhdan, *History of Byzantine Literature*, pp. 55–74, Kazhdan *et al.*, *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, s.v. Rhetoric (with cross-references).
- 108 *Rhetoric in Byzantium* is a volume of conference papers to which several references have been made in this chapter. The conference was the thirty-fifth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, held on behalf of the British Society for the Promotion of Byzantine Studies, at Exeter College, Oxford, in March 2001. The topic produced grimaces when the subject was proposed but eager discussion in the event.

PART III

Rhetoric and Speeches

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

The Parts of the Speech

Michael de Brauw

Greek and Roman speeches are traditionally divided into four parts: *prooimion*, *diēgēsis*, *pistis*, and *epilogos*, that is, introduction, narrative, proof, and epilogue. Rhetoricians proposed many subdivisions, and the parts were at times given different names.¹ But the four-part speech and the parts' individual functions were familiar throughout the rhetorical tradition: the *prooimion* should inform the audience of the matter at hand, seize its attention, and win its goodwill. The narrative should give a clear and persuasive account of the speaker's version of events. The proof should confirm the narrative. The *epilogos* should recapitulate the argument and make a final emotional appeal to the audience. The scheme, as is often noted, is best suited to judicial speaking. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* and the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* both describe ways the structure can be applied to symbolctic and epideictic speeches, but generally that means omitting the narrative or combining it with the *prooimion* or the proof.²

Methods for dividing speeches are discussed throughout the history of ancient rhetoric. In this chapter, however, I intend to focus on the canonical four-part division in the fifth and fourth centuries. I shall first discuss the early history of its arrangement and then compare instructions concerning the parts of the speech in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* with speech divisions in the Attic orators. In other words, I shall compare the parts of the speech in theoretical works with their appearance in roughly contemporary practice.

1 History

The origins of the canonical four-part speech, like the origins of rhetoric itself, are obscure. The 'standard' account synthesizes the evidence as follows:³ Corax, the reputed inventor of rhetoric, developed the first (and the simplest) division of speeches: *prooimion*, *agōn* (argument), and epilogue. His successor Tisias added a narrative

section. Their different schemes of arrangement correspond to both men's apparently preferred genres of speaking: Corax, working immediately after the expulsion of the Syracusan tyrants in 467, invented a form of deliberative rhetoric designed to win influence in the newly democratic government, and Tisias then developed judicial rhetoric to address property disputes arising from the city's recent political upheaval. Tisias is also reported to be the first to have composed a rhetorical handbook, or *techné logôn*, which he organized around instructions for various parts of speech. Other fifth-century handbooks are believed to have been organized in the same way.

This narrative has recently become controversial, for a number of reasons noted by T. Cole and E. Schiappa. None of these early handbooks survive, and the testimonia surrounding Corax and Tisias are notoriously sketchy and in some cases contradictory, for ancient authors have Corax inventing three, four, five, or seven parts of the speech.⁴ What is more, available evidence suggests that the earliest handbooks consisted primarily of examples and that treatises focusing on analytical precepts (such as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*) developed only later. Cole and Schiappa have thus gone as far as to argue that neither rhetoric as a discipline nor 'rhetorical consciousness' existed prior to the fourth century.⁵ To be sure, they note, fifth-century writers work with elements of a theory of rhetoric, including forms of argumentation, such as arguments from *eikota* (probability) and appeals to pity, and they also composed model speeches and model parts of speeches.⁶ Yet, Cole and Schiappa maintain, the conception of a speech as an abstraction, wherein form was separable from content, appears no earlier than Plato.

Down-dating the four-part theory of arrangement is important to this revisionist account, for a self-conscious theory of composition is precisely what Cole and Schiappa claim fifth-century writers lacked.⁷ Apart from testimonia concerning Tisias and Corax, there are two main arguments for placing the canonical speech order in the fifth century. Let us consider both, as well as the revisionist counter-arguments, in turn.

First, there is perhaps evidence for fifth-century theories of quadripartite arrangement in a passage from Plato's *Phaedrus*, where Socrates discusses the contents of *technai logôn*. Socrates mentions *prooimion*, narrative, proof, and recapitulation (*epanodos*) in order, and some thus infer that he is reproducing the arrangement of rhetorical handbooks (*Phaedrus* 266d5–267d4):

Socrates: What do you mean? Could it be that we've left out something that nevertheless pertains to the art? It must not be neglected by you or me; we must say whatever remains of rhetoric.

Phaedrus: Well, Socrates, a lot of stuff, all the things in the books on the art of speaking.

Socrates: You're right to remember; first the *prooimion*, I think, how it needs to spoken at the beginning of the speech. Is that what you mean, the finer points of the art?

Phaedrus: Yes.

Socrates: Second is the narration, topped off with witnesses; third, the evidence; fourth, arguments from likelihood. And I think that eloquent, most fine gentleman from Byzantium speaks of both a proof and supplementary proof.

Phaedrus: You mean the good Theodorus?

Socrates: Who else? And it's necessary to make refutation and supplementary refutation in both accusation and in defense. And shall we not mention the noble Parian, Evenus, who first discovered insinuation and indirect praise? They say he spoke invective in measure, thanks to memory.

(*The list of rhetorical devices and their inventors continues.*)

And it seems to be agreed among all that there should be a conclusion to the speech. Some call it a recapitulation. Others call it something else.

On the one hand, this passage lists the four canonical parts of the speech in their canonical order, and this perhaps suggests that Plato is following the arrangement of handbooks that would have existed during the dialogue's dramatic date. On the other, Plato does not stay with the division but introduces more elements that are not parts of the speech (such as indirect praise). Cole thus argues that it is unlikely that Socrates is reproducing an arrangement taught in the rhetorical handbooks. What is more, Socrates' complaint (*Phaedrus* 264a4–e3) that the speech of Lysias he and Phaedrus are discussing has no order would be inconsistent with widely available handbooks offering instruction in *taxis*.⁸

A second argument for placing the canonical division in the fifth century is that early speeches appear to be informed by such rules.⁹ Early Attic oratory tends to blend narrative and proof (such as in Antiphon 5, *On the Murder of Herodes*), but commentators have often found the traditional parts in fifth-century speeches in a variety of genres. Some typically cited examples include Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* (*prooimion*, 1–2; narrative, 3–6; proof, 7–19; epilogue, 20), Antiphon 1 (*prooimion*, 1–4; narrative, 14–20; proof, 21–30; epilogue, 31), and the speech Euripides has Medea address to Jason (*prooimion*, 465–74; narrative, 475–87; proof, 488–515; epilogue, 516–19).¹⁰

Revisionists on the contrary deny that any speech before the fourth century shows evidence of a four-part division. Their main argument against counting these speeches as examples of the canonical division in each instance concerns the narrative. In all, the section identified as a narrative is short and underdeveloped, or displaced. Gorgias proposes to free Helen from blame, but in the so-called narrative section of his speech he expatiates on the nobility of her lineage while saying little about the episode for which she is blamed. Rather than offering his own version of Helen's voyage to Troy, he tersely alludes to the well-known tradition (*Encomium of Helen* 3). By contrast, in Antiphon 1, a young man's speech in the prosecution of his stepmother for the murder of his father, the vivid and detailed account of the alleged poisoning is its most important part.¹¹ But rather than appearing immediately after the *prooimion*, this narrative is postponed by a disproportionately long *prokataskuē*, or preliminary argument, which arguably makes the speech a poor example of the canonical order. The narrative in Medea's speech to Jason, like that in Gorgias' *Helen*, also arguably serves more a function of reminding than recounting.

Leaving aside the question of whether these speeches constitute inadequate or deficient examples, the appearance of a speech divided in four parts need not prove the presence of a theory of arrangement. It seems entirely possible that a four-part speech was spoken before rules for composing one were written down or consciously articulated. The beginning and end of a speech appear to have always been considered

special, and in judicial speaking, one of the most important forums for early Greek oratory, a speaker was typically required to give a version of events and to prove that they occurred as he claimed. Given these tasks, the speaker had essentially two options for presenting material in between the beginning and the end: he could intersperse the telling of events with the arguments confirming his version of them, or he could recount the events continuously and then present the arguments *en bloc*. If he did the latter (and of course included an introduction and conclusion), he could easily have produced a canonically divided speech, without necessarily following any doctrine. It is possible that the four-part arrangement was created 'by accident' and only later codified in theoretical works.

Even in the fourth century, speeches that divide neatly into four parts are fewer than those that do not.¹² Yet it is in the fourth century that we find speeches with more pronounced divisions. Lysias' *Against Simon* (3), a speech written for the defendant in a trial for 'intentional wounding', dates to the mid-390s and is a virtually perfect example of the four-part arrangement.¹³ It also illustrates how the sections complement one another to advance the strongest possible case. The speaker (Lysias' client) is a middle-aged man engaged in an erotic rivalry for a Plataean boy. His rival claims that the speaker and the boy came to his home wielding potsherds and attacked him. The speaker devotes the *prooimion* to dispelling prejudice, specifically by expressing embarrassment that at his age he should find himself in court over such a matter (1–4). His narrative is a detailed but clear version of the events leading up to the fight, which he claims Simon started (5–20). The transition from the narrative to the proof is marked: 'You have heard what happened from me and from witnesses . . . Now, I will try to explain the matters concerning which my opponent is lying' (21). The proofs then neatly subdivide into refutations of the opponent's arguments (27–34) and confirmation of speaker's narrative (35–39), especially through arguments from probability; for example, that if he had come to Simon's house intending to fight, he would have brought friends to help. The epilogue restates the case, and makes a final appeal to pity (46–48): the stakes are not the same for accuser and the defendant, for the latter is in danger of exile. And so, he reasons, he deserves the judges' sympathy. This speech, with its methodical and marked divisions, does indeed appear to be informed by a theory of arrangement.

If the four-part arrangement was not taught by the fifth-century *technai*, but appears only at the beginning of the fourth century, it is possible that Isocrates (436–388) was the first to teach it. Quintilian and Dionysius of Halicarnassus associate the four-part speech with Isocrates and his school and, on this basis, some modern writers refer to the four-part division as the 'Isocratean' arrangement.¹⁴ Isocrates' judicial speeches do in fact tend to fall into four parts.¹⁵ Aristotle's contemporary Theodectes, a student of Isocrates, apparently wrote a manual that taught the canonical order and connected each part with its traditional functions.¹⁶

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* represents a departure from such earlier methods of organizing a handbook: rather than dividing the speech, he divides the art of rhetoric. *Taxis* is only one part of the discussion, not an organizing principle. He is critical of predecessors who had organized instruction around parts of the speech, especially for the tendency to make ever-finer subdivisions among the parts: 'If one continues making divisions such as the followers of Theodorus make, there will be a second narrative, and a preliminary narrative, and a refutation, and supplementary refutation' (3.13.5).

Aristotle's own treatment of *taxis* contains advice similar to what we would expect to find in earlier handbooks, but it is framed by a concern with reducing the speech to its essential components and describing it as an organic whole. According to Aristotle, a speech may have as few as two parts: a *prothesis* (proposition) and a *pistis* (argument or proof). Similarly, no speech 'needs' to be divided into more than four parts: a *prooimion*, a *prothesis* (which may be a narrative), *pistis*, and an epilogue. These parts are naturally distinct because they perform different functions in the speech: the *prooimion* introduces, the *prothesis* asserts, the proof demonstrates, and the epilogue reminds.

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* contains a more extensive treatment of the parts of the speech. In fact, some have suggested that the last part of the treatise (29–37) is a separate work that, taken alone, can be considered the fourth-century version of the original handbook Tisias would have written.¹⁷ According to its author, the canonical speech divisions can apply to all three genres of speaking, deliberative, epideictic, and judicial; in judicial speaking, he also recognizes anticipation of the opposing arguments (*procatalepsis*) as a separate, fifth division. His discussion is organized primarily around the rhetorical genres, with subdivisions for the each of the parts of the speech, which would seem to imply that the instructions for the parts are different in each genre. This is true for deliberative and epideictic. However, when the author comes to the judicial genre, he abbreviates in several places by referring the reader back to the instructions on parts of deliberative speeches. These somewhat awkward cross-references perhaps could have been avoided if the author had made the parts of the speech his major headings and then made subdivisions for the rhetorical genres, as Aristotle does in the *Rhetoric*. Nevertheless, the discussion of speech divisions in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is generally more detailed and more extensive than that in the *Rhetoric*, and it was almost certainly intended to contain more practical advice.

Matching instructions to parts of the speech is generally thought to have been a practical method for organizing a handbook. Nevertheless, most of classical rhetoric would follow Aristotle's lead with regard to arrangement by treating it as one part of rhetoric rather than an organizing principle. Rhetorical manuals organized around the parts of the speech continue to appear into late antiquity.¹⁸ Yet the more common method in Hellenistic and Roman rhetoric was to organize manuals around the duties of the orator: invention, arrangement, style, delivery, and memory.¹⁹

2 The *Prooimion*

The traditional functions of the *prooimion* are to inform, to capture the listeners' attention, and to win their goodwill. Both Aristotle and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* recognize these functions, but Aristotle lays the most emphasis on informing the audience. According to him, winning goodwill, or dispelling hostility, are in fact remedies (*iatreumata*) for particular situations and so should not be viewed as inherent parts of the *prooimion* (3.14.6–7). By contrast, holding the audience's attention is necessary throughout the speech, and phrases that speakers say at the beginning of speeches (I beg your attention, etc.) are often a waste, for they delay the speaker from addressing his main points, and thus can make him appear undignified. Slaves, according to Aristotle, often dance around what they have to say by 'prooimizing' (3.14.8–10).

The *prooimion* is associated with the most colorful commonplaces in Greek rhetoric and oratory. We find speakers flattering audiences, proclaiming the enormity of the matter at hand, begging for a fair hearing, protesting their ignorance of rhetoric, and imputing the worst motives to their opponents.²⁰ Speakers bewailing their oratorical disadvantages seem ubiquitous in judicial speeches. In the words of one scholar: 'There are hardly *exordia* in the orators in which the pleader fails to lament his inexperience with the courts and speaking while insinuating that his opponent is a capable orator and an old hand at pettifogging'.²¹ This is somewhat of an exaggeration, for speakers who were active in public life could not plausibly claim inexperience, and in the existing speeches they do not try. Nevertheless, the humble, plainspoken private citizen who finds himself in court only because of his opponent's intransigence (or greed) is a character speechwriters often gave to their clients.²²

The *prooimion* of Lysias 32, a speech presented on behalf of two plaintiffs in an inheritance dispute, exemplifies the apologetic tone often assumed by Athenian litigants:

If the case were not of the greatest importance, gentlemen of the jury, I would never have brought these people before you, because I consider it most shameful to quarrel with relatives, and I know that you disapprove not only of wrongdoers, but also those who cannot tolerate some minor mistreatment on the part of their relatives. But, gentlemen, since the plaintiffs have been deprived of a great sum of money, and suffered terrible abuse at the hands of those who should least abuse them, they sought protection from me, their brother-in-law, and I have found myself obliged to speak on their behalf. I am married to their sister, the daughter of Diogeiton's daughter. Initially, after having been beseeched by both of them, I persuaded them to submit the matter to the arbitration of friends, because I thought it was important that no one else know about this dispute. But Diogeiton dared to refuse all the friends' advice, even though he was plainly shown to be holding the property, and decided to face a lawsuit and undergo the worst risks rather than doing the right thing and settling their case against him. So I beg you, if I show that their grandfather mismanaged their guardianship more shamefully than anyone in this city ever has, even if the guardian was not a relative, come to their aid, give them justice. If not, believe this man in everything he says, and think worse of us from now on. I will now try to inform you about these matters from the beginning.

The speaker assumes that the judges will frown upon plaintiffs suing a relative, so emphatically places responsibility for the lawsuit with the opponent (cf. Dem. 41.1–2). He notes that the suit is not for a trifling amount, the sisters offered arbitration, and the opponent's behavior has been exceptionally unreasonable and unjust (a point underscored by hyperbolic promise to show that the grandfather's guardianship was the worst of all time). These tactics for blaming a lawsuit on the opponent are not discussed in existing fourth-century rhetorical manuals, but Dionysius of Halicarnassus knew of works in which they were offered as commonplaces (*Lysias* 24).

The example cited above comes from a plaintiff's speech in a private suit. Defendants and prosecutors in criminal cases needed somewhat different tactics, for prosecutors had to respond to hostility inherent in their role, and defendants, who spoke second, had to face the hostility prosecutors had stirred against them. Prosecutors in Athens were not public officials, but rather private volunteers, and Athenians could be suspicious of those who took such initiative. They could appear as *polypragmones*

(‘busybodies’) or, since some charges involved monetary rewards, profiteers ([Dem.] 53.1, 59.1). Prosecution speakers thus often begin by seeking to dispel such suspicions. To this end, they could sometimes point to their personal involvement in the case (for example, as one of the defendant’s victims) or, employing a strategy that confounds our notion of impartial law enforcement, they could assert a preexisting personal enmity towards the defendant (e.g., Lys. 14.1, [Dem.] 58.1–2). It was however also possible for a prosecutor to assume the stance of the public servant (e.g., Lyc. 1.3–6), or to suggest that ‘private enmities often correct public wrongs’ (Aes. 1.2). As for the defendant, by the time he reached the podium, his character often would have been thoroughly maligned. Rhetoricians and orators thus agree that his first task is to respond to *diabolai* (prejudicial attacks).²³ In oratory, typical responses are vigorous denials and counter accusations, especially of lying and *sycophantia* (malicious, or profit-driven, prosecution).²⁴

The *prooimion* in epideictic gets very brief treatment in the *Rhetoric* (3.14.2–3) and *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1440b5–23). As for the *prooimion* in deliberative oratory, Aristotle suggests it is often not necessary (as the audience is probably already informed, 3.14.12), while the *Rhetoric to Alexander* treats it in detail, generally emphasizing the ways a speaker can win goodwill or dispel prejudice by presenting a modest demeanor (1436b15–1437b32). Demosthenes, however, shows that deliberative speeches could begin with an arrogant tone, such as his opening of *On the Peace* (5.2), where he berates the Assembly for its shortsightedness. Demosthenes also wrote a collection of stock deliberative *prooimia* that are similarly bold, and this is perhaps surprising. While one might think that the point of a stock *prooimion* would be its adaptability or its usefulness for teaching, it is hard to imagine these *prooimia* being spoken by anyone but an established orator.²⁵

A *prooimion* may seem like an essential speech component, yet there are examples where what the rhetoricians consider a proper *prooimion* is omitted. Hermogenes (*On Types of Style* 227–228) suggests that omission of the *prooimion* is a feature of the ‘pure’ style and cites Demosthenes 41 and 56 as examples. This is also true of several speeches of Isaeus (3, 5, 9 and 11), and Dionysius notes that Lysias sometimes proceeds directly to the narrative (*Lysias* 17). The openings of such speeches are not devoid of the commonplaces associated with the *prooimion*, such as pleas for a favorable hearing, but all produce a feeling of the speaker beginning in *medias res* that is absent from speeches with developed *prooimia*.

3 The Narrative

When scholars speak of the narrative as part of a speech, they typically mean a continuous, discrete narrative.²⁶ Some scholars distinguish the continuous ‘narrative’ from pieces of ‘narration’ that appear in other parts of the speech. When the orators use a discrete narrative, it is typically introduced by a formulaic transition sentence such as ‘I wish to recount these matters from the beginning’, and then begins with the particle *gar*.²⁷ The orators do not however always include a stand-alone narrative. A speaker’s side of the story is often segmented and combined with arguments. Isaeus uses this technique for handling the complexities of inheritance cases, wherein arguments needed to be contextualized by complicated sets of facts, as does Demosthenes

in speeches where the argument is built around documents (e.g., Dem. 35), or where the facts to be narrated are episodes of past litigation (e.g., Dem. 34.6–21).²⁸

The *Rhetoric to Alexander* states that a narrative should be clear and concise, and according to Quintilian this advice dates back to Isocrates. Aristotle bristles at the idea that one can set a rule for length. As he writes (showing his sense of humor), ‘But nowadays they all ridiculously say that the narrative should be rapid. Yet, as the man said to the baker when asked whether the dough should be kneaded hard or soft, “What? Can’t it be done right?”’²⁹ The orators however often promise to as brief as possible (e.g., Isoc. 21.2, Dem. 37.3, 40.5, 54.2). One speaker notes that his time is insufficient to discuss all his opponent’s crimes, and so promises to focus on only the worst and most relevant ([Dem.] 53.3).

According to Aristotle, not every speech needs a narrative. For example, the audience may already know the facts of a deliberative speech (*Rhet.* 3.16.11). The *Rhetoric to Alexander* by contrast seems committed to the notion that every speech should have a narrative in some form: if the facts are already known to the audience, it is possible to attach the narrative to the *prooimion*, but it is still necessary to remind them; or it is necessary for speaker to narrate the facts that are going to happen, and a speech without a narrative may lack bulk (1438a2–16). The narrative is often omitted in the orators, and not only in deliberative speeches. Aristotle says that occasionally the narrative is also unnecessary in defense speeches because the prosecution will have already established the facts of the case (*Rhet.* 3.16.6). This however probably does not account for the fact that narratives are sometimes missing because defense speakers practically never accepted the prosecution’s version of events. Moreover, rather than simply disputing the main point, they tend to offer a ‘counter-narrative’ meant not only to deny the misdeed in question, but also to re-contextualize the whole situation of the trial.³⁰ A more relevant reason is that a separate, continuous narrative is not useful in every case. Neither Aristotle nor the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* take into account the common practice of team litigation as a reason for omitting a narrative. Often as many as three different speakers would argue a case, and the narrative, if it was necessary at all, could be presented by just one of them.³¹

The schema of the four-part speech implies that the narrative is mainly a proposition to be confirmed by the proof. The *Rhetoric to Alexander* refers to the narrative section as ‘the facts’ (*hai praxeis*, 1438a4), while referring to the proof section as the confirmation (*bebaiosis*, 1438b29). Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.13.4) conveys the same by implying that a speech without a narrative has a *prothesis* (statement of the case) instead. They give little or no indication that a narrative can be a means of persuasion as well as a statement of the facts. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.16.8) notes that the narrative should be ‘ethical’, that is, it should reveal the speaker’s character. But neither come close to describing how powerfully the narrative itself can function as a vehicle of persuasion.

The narrative of Demosthenes’ *Against Conon* (54) is case in point.³² The speaker is suing a certain Conon for an assault that took place in the Agora. He strengthens his case by recounting how his conflict ultimately began two years earlier when he was stationed on garrison duty with Conon’s son (54.3–5):

Two years ago we went out to garrison duty at Panactum. The sons of Conon camped near us (how I wish they hadn’t!), for our enmity and hostility began there. You will hear about these matters. They drank every day, beginning at breakfast time and continuing

all day, and they did this the whole time we were on garrison duty. We however behaved there, as we are accustomed to behaving at home. When dinnertime for others came, typically they were already drunk. They ended up doing violence to our slaves, and eventually to us. Claiming that our slaves bothered them with smoke from cooking, or that they spoke to them rudely – whatever it was – they beat the slaves, emptied chamber pots on them, and pissed on them; they committed every form of abuse and insult you can think of. Seeing this we were vexed, but at first we let it go. Yet when they continued to insult us and wouldn't stop, we reported the matter to the general – not us alone, but with all of our messmates. But even after he chewed them out and reprimanded them, not only for their insolence towards us, but for their whole behavior around the camp, they were so far from stopping or being ashamed that as soon as it grew dark, that same evening, they burst into our tents, where they first hurled insults and then struck me. They made such hue and cry that both the general and the captains as well as some of the soldiers came and prevented them from doing us any serious harm, and also prevented us from doing the same to our drunken attackers.

A speaker, Aristotle notes (*Rhet.* 3.16.8), can reveal moral character through the narrative by calling attention to deliberate choices. Demosthenes shows us that the character revealed through narrative and the facts narrative reports can in effect corroborate one another.³³ Conon, the speaker's opponent, apparently planned to argue that the fight in question was nothing but youthful brawling, that the speaker provoked it, and his decision to bring the matter to court was unmanly and litigious. The background related in this passage anticipates and indirectly rebuts each of these claims. The reported behavior of Conon's son establishes him as a ruffian and a menace, while the speaker's initial decision to ignore insult illustrates his forbearance. His suggestion that fellow soldiers needed to restrain him from his attackers as much as his attackers from him disputes the notion that he would turn to law out of weakness. The audience is led to think that the speaker's actions must have been as he reports them because that is the sort of person he is – he must be that sort of person because his actions reveal him to be so. In that, narrative functions as a form of proof in and of itself.

4 The Proof

In the context of ancient rhetoric, the term *pistis* has two meanings. It refers to a part of the speech, but it is also a general term for argument or means of persuasion, as in Aristotle's definition of rhetoric as 'the ability, in each situation, to find the available *pisteis*' (*Rhet.* 1.2.1). This ambiguity creates a certain difficulty for delimiting the proof section as a section of the speech. The means of persuasion that rhetoricians describe as *pisteis*, such as arguments from probability or citations of documents, do indeed cluster in the proof section. But they are not limited to that section, nor do they comprise all of it.

Pisteis (in the sense of means of persuasion) are classified by Aristotle into two categories: artless proofs (*pisteis atechnoi*), that is, those that are not provided by the speaker but are pre-existing, and artistic proofs (*pisteis entechnoi*), that is, those that are created by the speaker. The *Rhetoric to Alexander* employs essentially the same distinction with different terminology. Artless proofs include witnesses, testimony of

slaves taken under torture, laws, contracts, and oaths, which, at the time of Aristotle's writing, were all forms of documentary evidence. Artistic proofs for Aristotle fall into three categories: *ēthos*, or persuasion generated by the speaker showing good character, *pathos*, or appeals to emotions, and *logos*, or logical argument.³⁴

Aristotle's distinction between artistic and artless proofs is seminal, yet in oratorical practice the distinction is blurred, for artless proofs are handled quite artfully. The periodic introduction of documentary evidence, which required the speaker to stop while a clerk read, apparently served to punctuate the speech. Speakers could also introduce artless proofs not obviously relevant to the legal matter at hand in order to make broader claims, such as to show their civic-minded, law-abiding character or to illustrate the 'fact' that the opponent despises the laws in general.³⁵ We find Demosthenes, for example, citing the law of *hubris* ('humiliating violence') not for the purpose of building his legal case, a suit against his enemy Meidias for having punched him at a public festival, but for a variety of emotional reasons (21.48–50).³⁶ Indeed, he expects that the very sound of the clerk reading it will have an emotional impact on his audience: 'Nothing is like hearing the law itself!' In the proceeding discussion of the law, he focuses on its protection of slaves, a provision that has nothing to do with his case against Meidias. For Demosthenes, though, the law functions as evidence of the Athenians' generous and humane character. In this, he not only flatters his audience but also amplifies Meidias' crime. If the Athenians are so generous as (theoretically) to protect slaves from *hubris*, how 'unAthenian' must Meidias be to have punched a citizen?³⁷ *Pisteis atechnoi* could be used in other inventive ways not described in handbooks. From the early fourth century on, witness testimony was presented as written depositions. Since litigants themselves drafted the depositions and then had the witnesses swear to them, there could be considerable art in how the testimony was phrased.³⁸

As for the proof as a part of the speech, speakers sometimes use transitional phrases at the end of narrative sections to mark a shift from telling to showing (e.g., Isoc. 17.24, Lys. 3.21, 19.23), which in some respect makes the proof a distinct section. But the contents of that section are quite diverse and, for a variety of reasons, often consist of large portions of narration. The introduction of documents, for example, might require the speaker to relate additional background. The speaker might also recount a story to impeach an opposing witness' credibility (e.g., Dem. 54.38–39), cite historical events ([Dem.] 59.94–103), simply assert damaging 'facts' pertaining to the opponent or his supporters (e.g., Dem. 40.57–59), or hurl invective at them directly (Dem. 45.79–80). The proof section in practice is thus something of a catchall category. Perhaps it was in an effort to account for its diverse contents that theorists devised ever more subdivisions within it.

5 The Epilogue

Aristotle names three functions for the epilogue: to dispose the audience favorably to the speaker and unfavorably to the opponent, to stir the audience's emotions (*pathē*), and to recapitulate the main points of the speech (*Rhet.* 3.19.1). He places a certain emphasis on recapitulation, as he suggests that the epilogue can sometimes be omitted in a short speech (*Rhet.* 3.13.3). Other authors consider emotions the

most salient part of the epilogue; for example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus refers to *to pathikon*, ‘the emotional part’ (*Demosthenes* 13).

Like the *prooimion*, the epilogue tends to be thick with commonplaces, which differ somewhat according to whether the speech is for the prosecution or the defense. One very common closing sentiment expressed by prosecutors is that they have done their best, and now obligation lies with the judges, as in the pithy closing of Antiphon 1 (*On the Stepmother*): ‘Now I have told my story and come to the aid of the dead man and the law. It is now up to you to look out for yourselves and to rule justly. I think those who have been wronged are a care to the gods below’ (21; cf. Lys. 14.46–47, Aes. 1.196, Lyc. 1.149–50, Din. 1.114, Arist. *Rhet.* 3.19.5). Similarly, prosecutors might remind judges of their oath to vote in accord with the laws (Lys. 10.32, Dem. 20.167, 55.35), that the community or the gods is watching how they vote, and they should be ashamed to acquit ([Dem.] 25.98, Lyc. 1.146). They might also suggest that the laws will be invalid if the defendant is acquitted (Dem. 19.342, 21.224–225, 56.48, Aes. 1.192), and claim that conviction will be in accord with both the laws and what is just (*ta dikaia*), and sometimes also that it will also serve the interests of the city (*ta sumpheronta*). The following example from Apollodorus’ speech *Against Neaira* (= [Dem.] 59) is a less than perfect example of an epilogue, as it lacks a formal recapitulation of the case.³⁹ It nevertheless illustrates some of the key themes of a prosecution epilogue:

Gentlemen of the jury, it was to avenge the gods against whom these people have committed impiety and to avenge myself that I brought them to trial and subjected them to your vote. With the understanding that the gods, whom they have offended with their crimes, will observe how each you casts his ballot, you must vote for what is right and bring vengeance – in the first place for the gods and then for yourselves. If you do this, all will think that you have well and fairly tried this case that I have brought against Neaira, that she is a foreign woman who lives as though married to an Athenian.⁴⁰

In the *prooimion*, a prosecutor sometimes needs to state his personal stake in the case; in the epilogue, he emphasizes its consequences to the community. Apollodorus reminds the judges that he is avenging himself (having been wronged by Neaira’s husband), but he stresses that the defendant’s offense was against the gods and the city, and hence against the judges as well.⁴¹ It has been suggested that the most important emotions in the epilogue are anger and pity. Apollodorus surely stirs anger, but his invocation of the gods was surely meant to arouse fear as well.

Defendants often appeal to pity or favor (*charis*), though neither is completely limited to defense speakers. They remind judges of the severity of the penalty they face and note the unfairness of the unequal risks faced by the defendant and the prosecutor (e.g., Lys. 4.20, Dem. 57.70, Aes. 2.180–183); they could also display their children from the podium (e.g., [Dem.] 44.81–84). Such measures are mocked in Attic comedy (cf. Aristoph. *Wasps* 568–574), and Plato (*Apology* 34c–d) makes Socrates reject the idea of calling his sons to the podium (though not before mentioning that he has sons). Plato would have us believe that such passionate appeals must be inextricably tied to the character of Athenian democracy, but we should remember the equally if not more flamboyant practices in Rome under both the republic and the empire.⁴² In asking for *charis*, speakers would remind the jury

of past services they or their relatives had performed on behalf of the *polis*, such as funding construction of warships or outfitting dramatic choruses (Lys. 3.47, 18.27, [Dem.] 50.64). Modern readers are often struck by how openly litigants appeal to considerations that are essentially irrelevant to the judicial question at hand (such as whether the defendant broke the law, or violated the contract, and so on), but Athenians saw no contradiction. At Hyperides 4.40–41, for example, a defense advocate tells the judges that they should disregard the speeches, and focus only on the law and the indictment. He then immediately beckons the defendant to bring his family to the podium. D. Konstan (Chapter 27) makes an observation that is helpful for understanding such passages: pity (*eleos*) for the Greeks was an emotion felt for the innocent victims of misfortune. It is thus for a good reason that appeals to pity appear in the epilogue, for they must be preceded by an argument for the defendant's innocence.

Epilogues in oratory differ from theorists' descriptions in a number of ways. Powerful emotional appeals are not limited to the epilogue but can be diffused throughout speeches.⁴³ Aristotle suggests that the length of the epilogue should be proportional to the speech, but long speeches of the orators can have short epilogues, and short speeches long ones.⁴⁴ Theorists also say very little about the advantages of being abrupt, though in the orators it is common tactic. Aristotle suggests that asyndeton (the omission of conjunctions) is a figure especially well suited to the epilogue, for the logical connections between the speaker's points have been established, and it is now enough to simply remind the audience. He cites an example very similar to the ending of Lysias 12 ('I have spoken; you have listened, you have the facts, you judge') but says nothing about the force of such a closing. Two speeches of Demosthenes (36.62, 38.28) produce a similar effect when the speaker ends by expressing faith in the judges and then ceding his time: 'I don't know what reason there is for me to say more; for I believe nothing I have said has escaped you. Pour out the water clock'. Handbooks also fail to remark on the rather common practice of ending speeches with readings of documents, especially depositions (Lys. 14, Is. 3, 8, Dem. 36, [Dem.] 47, 50). Apparently the clerk's reading lent an air of authority. It is not uncommon for the orators to omit a formal epilogue (e.g., Lys. 16, Dem. 30, 40, 54, 55, 56), a possibility not mentioned in the *Rhetoric in Alexander*, and mentioned by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* merely to underscore his point that only *prothesis* and *pistis* are essential.

6 Conclusion

G.A. Kennedy, in his landmark study of the art of persuasion in Greece, concluded a chapter on the Attic orators as follows: 'There is a general unity of theory and practice . . . The four parts of the oration discussed in Aristotle and Anaximenes are adequate as the structural basis of real speeches. Judicial speeches almost always have the four parts, unless the work is a "second" speech, in which case the narration is sometimes omitted. The parts of the speech regularly perform the functions attributed to them by the theorists'.⁴⁵ In this brief survey, I have tried to note points of agreement and disagreement between rhetorical theory and oratorical practice. However, in the final analysis the points of disunity appear more salient. The majority of speeches

in Attic oratory deviate significantly from the canonical four-part arrangement, and rhetoricians only partially describe the functions of oratorical narratives and proofs.⁴⁶

Bibliographical Essay

For a more detailed treatment of what tropes are associated with various parts of the speech, see O. Navarre, *Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote* (Paris: 1900), who attempts to synthesize the teachings of fifth-century rhetorical handbooks from extant literary sources. H. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*, trans. M.T. Bliss, A. Jansen and D.E. Orton (Leiden: 1998), has an exhaustive catalogue of Greek and Roman rhetoricians' advice for various parts of the speech under the heading 'Invention'. For the parts of the speech in the Attic orators, S. Usher, *Greek Oratory, Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), covers the entire corpus and is attentive to speech divisions. For discussion of individual parts of speeches, see M. Edwards' 'Part Five: Oratory', in I.J.F. de Jong, R. Nünlist and A. Bowie (eds.), *Narrators, Narratees, and Narratives in Ancient Greek Literature: Studies in Ancient Greek Narrative 1* (Leiden: 2004). Proof is discussed by C. Carey, 'Rhetorical Means of Persuasion', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 26–45. For the parts of the speech in Hellenistic rhetoric, see W. Wueller, 'Arrangement', in S.E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C.–A.D. 400* (Leiden: 1997), pp. 51–88.

Notes

- 1 The *prooimion* is often followed by a *prothesis* (a statement of the case) or a *parakataskenē* (preliminary argument). The narrative is sometimes referred to as *ta pragmata*, *ta erga*, or *hai praxeis* (the facts), *apaggelia* (report), or *katastasis* (presentation). The proof can be referred to in the plural (*pisteis* instead of *pistis*) and is called the *bebaiosis* (confirmation) in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*; it was at times subdivided into confirmation and refutation, and also various types of supplementary proofs. The epilogue can be called the *epanodos* (recapitulation). The Latin terms for the parts of the speech (which scholars often use in secondary literature) are *exordium*, *narratio*, *probatio*, and *peroratio*. 'Parts' of the speech in Greek are *merē* or *moria logou* and divisions are *merismoi*. The practice of dividing or arranging the parts of the speech is called *taxis* or, in later authors, *diathesis* or *oikonomia*; in Latin it is *dispositio*.

In this chapter I refer to the parts mostly in English for two reasons. First, ancient terminology for the parts varies with the exception of *prooimion*. Second, in some cases the categories may be more ours than those of the Greeks; that is, we can never know for certain whether Demosthenes sat down intending to write a *pistis* for a given speech, but it may still be useful for us to describe part of that speech as the proof section.

- 2 The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* is assumed to be Anaximenes, but see P. Chiron, Chapter 8, pp. 101–103. On Aristotle's *Rhetoric* generally, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9. I treat symbouleptic (deliberative) and epideictic oratory rather little in this chapter; for these genres, see S Usher, Chapter 15 and C. Carey, Chapter 16, respectively.

- 3 See E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999), pp. 4–6; cf. G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 58–61, and also C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 203–205 and M. Gagarin, Chapter 3.
- 4 T. Cole, ‘Who was Corax?’, *ICS* 16 (1991), pp. 65–84; also see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3.
- 5 T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991) and Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*. For criticisms, see S. Usher’s review of Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric* in *CR* 42 (1992), pp. 58–60 and J. Hesk’s review of Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory* in *CR* 51 (2001), pp. 60–61.
- 6 For *eikos* arguments, see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3, pp. 31–33. Antiphon’s *Tetralogies* are examples of model speeches; he is reported to have written a collection of stock *prooimia* and epilogues. Thrasymachus reportedly wrote a work called the *Eleoi* (Pl. *Phaedrus* 267c), which was probably a stock collection of appeals to pity.
- 7 Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric*, pp. 84–85 and Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, pp. 43–45, 105–110.
- 8 Cf. Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, pp. 54–57 and Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric*, pp. 130–132.
- 9 See especially S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), pp. 21–26.
- 10 For these examples, see M.A. Smeltzer, ‘Gorgias on Arrangement: A Search for Pragmatism amidst the Art and Epistemology of Gorgias of Leontini’, *Southern Communication Journal* 50 (1996), pp. 156–165, M. Gagarin, *Antiphon: The Speeches* (Cambridge: 1997), pp. 18, 106–121, D.J. Mastronarde, *Euripides: Medea* (Cambridge: 2002), p. 250, and M. Lloyd, *The Agon in Euripides* (Oxford: 1992), pp. 24–28 (who also finds that Polynices’ speech at *Phoenissae* 469–496 could be divided in four parts but notes that the narrative is followed by series of proposals rather than a proof). C.T. Murphy, ‘Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric’, *HSCP* 49 (1938), pp. 81–83, looks for a four-part division but concludes that most of Aristophanes’ speeches lack narratives. T.K. Hubbard, Chapter 32, pp. 500–501, however, makes a compelling argument that the speech of the Cydathenian Hound in Aristophanes’ *Wasps* (907–930) contains all four parts in their canonical order.
- 11 Usher, *Greek Oratory*, p. 29.
- 12 Authorities can differ as to what counts as a canonically divided speech. Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, pp. 217–219, for example, finds four parts in Demosthenes 22, while the Scholiast contends that it is missing a *prooimion* and a narrative (M.R. Dilts, *Scholia Demosthenica* [Leipzig: 1986], p. 257). Thus, anyone’s count is open to argument. That said, I find 24 canonically divided speeches: Lys. 1, 3, 12, 13, 19, Isoc. 17, 18, 19, Is. 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, Dem. 23, 24, 27, 29, 33, 46, 55, 57, [Dem.] 52, 59, and Aes. 1.
- 13 On the legal charge and this speech generally, see C. Carey, *Lysias: Selected Speeches* (Cambridge: 1989), pp. 86–114. Carey also offers a succinct account (pp. 6–12, with further bibliography) of Lysias’ role as a logographer, or a ghostwriter of judicial speeches, as does C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 206–207.
- 14 Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 16; cf. F. Solmsen, ‘The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric’, *AJP* 62 (1941), pp. 35–50, 169–90.
- 15 Isoc. 17: *prooimion* 1–2, narrative 3–23, proof 24–52, epilogue 53, 18: *prooimion* 1–4, narrative 5–11, proof 12–65, epilogue 66–68, and 19 (though it in fact contains two narratives): *prooimion* 1–4, narratives 5–12, 18–29, proof 30–46, epilogue 47–51.
- 16 H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig: 1931), p. 216.
- 17 Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, p. 119, calls this section ‘the fourth-century version of the original rhetorical handbook’. On the issue of the separate parts of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, see P. Chiron, Chapter 8 and M. Patillon, ‘Aristote, Corax, Anaximène et les Autres dans la Rhétorique à Alexandre’, *REG* 110 (1997), pp. 104–125.

- 18 See, for example, M.R. Dilts and G.A. Kennedy, *Two Greek Rhetorical Treatises from the Roman Empire: Introduction, Text, and Translation of the Arts of Rhetoric Attributed to Anonymous Segurianus and Aspinus of Gadara* (Leiden: 1997).
- 19 For descriptions of these parts of rhetoric, see Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, pp. 10–12. Quintilian (3.3.1) observes that most rhetoricians organize their treatises according to these.
- 20 Flattery: *Rhet. Alex.* 1442a14–15, Ant. 1.3–4, 5.4, And. 1.8–9, Lys. 3.2; magnitude of the case: Lys. 1.1–4, 15.4; plea for fair hearing: Ant. 5.8, 6.10, And. 1.9, Lys. 3.2, 19.2, Aes. 2.24. See below for ignorance of rhetoric and attacks on opponents.
- 21 O. Navarre, *Essai sur la Rhétorique Grecque avant Aristote* (Paris: 1900), pp. 222–223.
- 22 For examples of this type of character presentation, see Ant. 1.1, 5.1, Is. 10.1, Lys. 7.1, 10.1, 12.3, 19.55, 32.1–2, Dem. 34.1, 39.1, 41.2, 45.1, 54.1.
- 23 Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14.7 and Dem. 45.6; cf. *Rhet. Alex.* 29.10–17.
- 24 For example, Lys. 7.1–2, [Dem.] 52.1–2, 57.1–5. Regarding sycophants, see the contrasting views of R. Osborne, ‘Vexatious Litigation in Classical Athens’, and D. Hardy, ‘The Sykophant and Sykophancy’, both in P. Cartledge, P. Millet and S. Todd (eds.), *Nomos: Greek Law in its Political Setting* (Cambridge: 1990), pp. 83–102 and 103–122, respectively.
- 25 R. Clavaud, *Demosthène: Prologues* (Paris: 1974), pp. 38–50, especially p. 41; see too Ian Worthington, Chapter 17, pp. 265–267, for further discussion of these *prooimia*.
- 26 As W.E. Major and E. Schiappa, ‘Gorgias’ “Undeclared” Theory of Arrangement: A Postscript to Smeltzer’, *Southern Communication Journal* 62 (1997), p. 150, have put it ‘separation of narrative from proof is the hallmark of classical rhetoric’.
- 27 Lys. 1.5, 7.3, 12.3, 32.3, Isoc. 18.4. We find nearly the same language (‘I will recount to you from the beginning’) at [Dem.] 52.2, and a very similar statement (‘It is necessary for you to hear about these matters from the beginning’) at Lys. 13.3.
- 28 On Isaeus, see Dion. Hal. *Isaeus* 14, and Usher, *Greek Oratory*, p. 128; for Demosthenes’ use of documents, see D. Mirhady, ‘Demosthenes as Advocate: The Private Speeches’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes, Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 181–205.
- 29 3.16.4, trans. G.A. Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civil Discourse* (New York: 1991). Plato (*Phaedrus* 267b) reports that Prodicus advised ‘moderation’ in the narrative.
- 30 S. Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy: The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens* (Austin: 1999), pp. 47–67.
- 31 Dilts, *Scholia Demosthenica*, p. 257; cf. L. Rubinstein, *Litigation and Cooperation: Supporting Speakers in the Courts of Classical Athens* (Stuttgart: 2000), p. 39.
- 32 See C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 208–209, for further discussion of this speech.
- 33 C. Carey, ‘Rhetorical Means of Persuasion’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 38–43, observes the same dynamic in Lysias 1, 3, 7, and 24. C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 211–214, treats Lysias 1 in detail.
- 34 See W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9, pp. 117–118, for further discussion.
- 35 C. Carey, ‘*Nomos* in Rhetoric and Oratory’, *JHS* 116 (1996), pp. 33–46.
- 36 On this law and the case, see J.P. Sickinger, Chapter 19, p. 297 and C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 207–208.
- 37 Cf. 6–7, and see M. de Brauw, ‘“Listen to the Laws Themselves”: Citations of Laws and Portrayal of Character in Attic Oratory’, *CJ* 97 (2002), pp. 165–168.
- 38 C. Carey, ‘“Artless” Proofs in Aristotle and the Orators’, *BICS* 39 (1994), pp. 95–106.
- 39 *Against Neaira* is preserved within the Demosthenic corpus (hence identified as [Demosthenes] 59), but is now recognized as the work of Apollodorus. For a biography, see J. Trevett, *Apollodorus the Son of Pasion* (Oxford: 1992).
- 40 [Dem.] 59.126, trans. V. Bers, *Demosthenes, Speeches 50–59* (Austin: 2003), p. 194.

- 41 For the background of this speech and the case, see D. Hamel, *Trying Neaira: The True Story of a Courtesan's Scandalous Life in Ancient Greece* (New Haven: 2003).
- 42 See, for example, M. Winterbottom, 'The Peroration', in J.G.F. Powell and J.J. Paterson (eds.), *Cicero the Advocate* (Oxford: 2004), pp. 215–232; cf. Quintilian 6.1.30, who mentions the established practice of bringing forth the disheveled defendant and his family.
- 43 Carey, 'Rhetorical Means of Persuasion', pp. 26–34.
- 44 Cf. *Rhet.* 3.13.3, and the epilogues of [Dem.] 59 (quoted above) and Dem. 27.
- 45 *Art of Persuasion*, pp. 261–262.
- 46 I would like to thank Michael Gagarin, Deborah Lyons and Ian Worthington for their helpful suggestions on this chapter.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Forensic Oratory

Craig Cooper

1 *Prooimion*: A Plea for Forensic Oratory

Although the method of deliberative and forensic oratory is the same, and although the pursuit of deliberative oratory is nobler and more worthy of the statesman than that of the latter, which concerns private transactions, they (writers on rhetoric) say nothing about the former, but all without exception attempt to make rules about forensic oratory, because there is less scope to speak outside the matter at hand in deliberative speeches and deliberative oratory is less about trickery than forensic because it is more general in nature. (Arist. *Rhet.* 1.1.10)

According to Aristotle, previous writers of rhetorical handbooks had concentrated solely on forensic oratory partly because it allowed greater opportunity for employing the rhetorical tricks of the trade and speaking outside the matter at hand. In his opinion deliberative oratory, which restricted such opportunities, was a more worthy pursuit. Aristotle was not alone in his opinion; both Isocrates (13.19) and Plato (*Phaedrus* 261b) also noted that writers of rhetorical *technai* had concentrated on lawsuits, and Plato at least held such writers in contempt because they sought to distort the truth. Plato's prejudice to some extent has shaded modern perceptions of the moral value of forensic oratory, and so in this chapter I would like to provide a defence of forensic oratory, both in its own terms and in terms of the context in which it thrived and flourished.

2 *Prodiēgēsis*: The Primacy of Forensic Oratory

The primary focus on forensic oratory in earlier treatments of rhetoric was recognized by Aristotle elsewhere. In an earlier work, the *Sunagōgē Technōn*, which collected and summarized earlier rhetorical treatises (Cic. *De Inventionē* 2.6), Aristotle placed the development of rhetorical theory in the context of private disputes to recover property after the expulsion of the tyrants in Syracuse and the introduction of democracy

(Cic. *Brutus* 46). As Cicero notes on the authority of Aristotle, Corax and Tisias were the first to put together precepts. In late rhetorical *Prolegomena*, which record the history of the rise of rhetoric, Corax is credited with developing the parts of speech.¹ The most reliable of these introductions, which may go back to Timaeus, notes, however, that Corax invented a tripartite scheme (*prooimion, agōn, epilogos*) that he used to persuade the Syracusan *dēmos*. In all these late examples the context is deliberative and not forensic oratory, but as far as we know, Aristotle knew nothing of this tradition; for him Corax's art consisted only of probability (*Rhet.* 1402 a 17), and this, it seems, in the context of judicial oratory.² Moreover, elsewhere we learn from Cicero (*De Inventione* 2.6) that Aristotle's *Sunagōgē Technōn*, which, as we noted, was a compilation of earlier handbooks, began with Tisias, who seemed exclusively concerned with judicial oratory. This seems to be the implication of Plato's *Phaedrus* (272d–273b). As Socrates notes, in courts (*en tois dikastēriois*) what is most convincing is not the truth but the probable (*to eikos*). Whether in prosecuting or in defending himself (*en katēgoria kai apologia*), the speaker must aim at the probable (*to eikos*), paying no attention to the truth. The presence of probability throughout the entire speech furnishes the art, he says. Phaedrus confirms that professional rhetoricians, those who claim to be technicians in speeches (*oi peri tous logous technikoi*), consider probability of the utmost importance, and Socrates adds that Tisias himself defined probability as what most people think, and to illustrate invented the dicastic scenario where a weak brave man assaulted a strong coward and each argued the improbability of the one attacking the other.³ It is possible that Tisias' *technē* consisted of model judicial speeches based on probability,⁴ much like Antiphon's *Tetralogies*, which were imaginary homicide cases that served as 'exercises in argumentation' and provided 'useful training for a variety of cases'.⁵ Indeed, the scenario of *Tetralogy* 1, in which the defendant as the most likely suspect argues the unlikelihood of his killing, parallels the one envisaged by Tisias, who may have modelled his own scenario on a recent trial.⁶ Earlier in the *Phaedrus* (267a–b) Socrates tells us that both Gorgias and Tisias valued probabilities (*eikota*) over truths and could make small things great and great things small through the power of their speech (that is their model speeches). Though Gorgias' *Defence of Palamedes* was essentially an epideictic speech on a mythical topic, it still provided students with a series of legal arguments.⁷ Whether the speech was epideictic in character or more fully judicial, the aim was to explore legal arguments.

Slightly earlier in the *Phaedrus* (266d–267d) Socrates' summary of the contents of rhetorical handbooks circulating in the late fifth century indicate that these types of *technai* were exclusively concerned with judicial oratory; they dealt with the various components of the judicial speech: the *prooimion*, *diēgēsis*, the evidence (*martyriai*), proofs based on *tekmēria* and *eikota* and the *epilogos*.⁸ Some writers, like Theodorus, went so far as to subdivide the argument section into proof and supplementary proof. Others, like Evenus of Paros, invented ways to introduce indirect praise and blame into a speech, while still others, like Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, produced handbooks on how to arouse pity, stir anger or create and confront slander. These are the emotions that Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.1.4) considers outside the subject and directed only at the dicasts, but they were very much the preoccupation of earlier writers of rhetorical handbooks. These same writers, he notes, also laid down what each part of a speech should contain in order to put the judge (*kritēs*) into a particular frame of

mind (*Rhet.* 1.1.8). It would seem, then, that in the late fifth and early fourth centuries most written works on rhetoric, whether model speeches or practical discussions about the structure of a speech, were primarily, though not exclusively, aimed at forensic oratory, and for good reason.⁹

3 The *diēgēsis*: The Background of Forensic Oratory

As Aristotle notes (*Rhet.* 1.1.4), those extraneous matters (slander, pity and anger) that preoccupied earlier compilers of rhetorical handbooks were aimed at putting the dicast and judge in a certain frame of mind. Aristotle uses two terms, *dikastēs* and *kritēs* (judge), to describe essentially the same person and his role in a court of law. The term *dicanic*, that is forensic, comes from the dicast, the individual who sat in the Athenian court both as judge and juror of the case. He decided both the law and facts of the case, based on what he heard from the litigants, without receiving instruction from the magistrate who simply presided over the case in a formal manner.¹⁰ It was to that individual that litigants directed their speeches and with whom rhetorical handbooks were so much concerned.

The preoccupation of early rhetoricians with judicial oratory arose out of a pressing demand. As Aristotle noted in the case of Syracuse, the demand for formal precepts arose out of litigation associated with the democracy, and in Athens it was the democratization of the legal system that directly led to a demand for rhetoric there. After the reforms of Ephialtes in 462, most judicial matters were decided by panels of ordinary citizens, who reached their decisions after hearing speeches by the two litigants. Because each litigant was expected to plead his own case before his peers, there was a real need to acquire some knowledge of judicial oratory which would allow him to deliver a speech that could sway the dicasts, who decided his fate. Failure to understand and effectively appropriate the language of the court could result in significant financial loss or worse yet death (as was Socrates' fate).

Both Plato's *Apology* and Aristophanes' *Wasps* make clear that there was a growing expectation on the part of the dicasts that litigants behave and speak in a certain manner. Because Socrates is 'completely foreign to the language of the courts' (*atechnōs oun xenōs echo tēs enthade lexeōs*), the dicasts will only hear things said at random in whatever words occur to him (*Apology* 17cd). Plato's choice of words here is deliberate; the adverb *atechnōs* carries a double sense: Socrates' foreignness to and unfamiliarity with the language of the court comes from him being *atechnos*, completely artless in his presentation. He is, as he characterizes himself, a foreign speaker who fails to understand and appreciate the intricacies and subtleties of another language and so cannot effectively use its idiom. Idiomatic usage of court language called for, as Socrates says of his accusers, speeches that have been carefully crafted, decked with fine words and phrases (*Apology* 17c). That kind of speak is so persuasive that Socrates claims to have nearly forgotten who he was, and he wonders just how the dicasts' passions have been affected by his accusers (*Apology* 17a). Philocleon in the *Wasps* knows this exactly, and he expects, when he sits in the court, to hear all sorts of words aimed at securing acquittal; there will be flattery of the dicasts, pleas of poverty to elicit pity, fanciful stories told, funny little tales from Aesop and even some joking to raise a laugh and release his anger. If all else fails the defendant will parade

his small children and aged father before him, all in the hopes of having the dicast relent (*Wasps* 561–574). In all cases both the speech and the antics of the court were aimed at putting the dicast in a certain frame of mind that would best benefit the speaker. Socrates, however, refuses to do any of this; he will not beg and beseech the dicasts or parade before them his children to elicit their pity, as some of dicasts themselves may have done in earlier cases of their own of far less importance. Consequently some dicasts may become enraged and vote in anger against him (*Apology* 35c). Anger was an emotion that a properly constructed speech could arouse, though not against oneself but against one's opponent. Indeed, anger was regarded as legitimate when it led to justice and satisfaction for a wrong done (Arist. *Rhet.* 2.2.1, 2.4.31).¹¹

To help fashion a speech in the appropriate language of the court, one could turn to the services of a logographer, a speechwriter who would provide his client with a written speech for delivery in court. It has been suggested that little or no collaboration went on between the logographer and his client; after the initial consultation, the logographer composed the speech on his own 'in his own words and with the exact degree of emphasis and emotional appeal that he considered necessary'.¹² Since the litigant was expected to maintain an illusion of spontaneity, he had to deliver the speech completely from memory, something which could prove challenging.¹³ Alcidas (*On Sophists* 18) emphasizes the difficulty of memorizing a whole written text, which, he says, 'is necessary to commit to memory and learn precisely both the arguments and the words and the syllables'.¹⁴ He notes the embarrassment of forgetting parts of the speech during the delivery and instead recommends extemporizing. This difficulty is parodied in Aristophanes' *Knights* (347–349): in order to win his trivial little case against an alien, the sausage-seller must stay up all night going over and over his speech, repeating it on the streets, drinking only water and rehearsing it to an audience of exasperated friends. Not only would a litigant's verbal stumbling in court be embarrassing but also it could be costly, as the inadequacy of his words could suggest to the dicasts that the litigant was guilty of hiding something. As Euxitheus notes in his opening statement (*prooimion*) in defence of the murder of Herodes, many innocent people, who lacked speaking ability, were condemned because they were unconvincing in arguing the truth, whereas many others, who were able speakers, were acquitted because they were convincing with their lies. He petitions the dicasts to attribute his speaking mistakes to inexperience and not to injustice (Ant. 5.3–5). There was, then, a real need to deliver a polished speech and the speechwriter could be just the ticket.

But the services of a logographer did not come cheap. For those who could not afford a speechwriter, there were books circulating in the Agora that could be purchased rather cheaply.¹⁵ Some included, as we noted, discussions on the parts of a judicial speech; others contained collections of commonplaces¹⁶ or examples of *prooimia* and *epilogoi* which could be utilized in composing one's own speech for trial.¹⁷ At the very least a potential litigant could go down to the courts and observe proceedings and learn first hand what to say and not to say in order to win over the dicasts. Spectators were always present at trials, and if an Athenian had himself done dicastic duty, he would know something of what it took to win a case, experiencing first hand the kinds of arguments and emotional appeals that most affected his decision. Again the reaction of the dicast is of central importance to success in a

case, and it is to him and the context in which he heard a forensic speech that we now turn more specifically.

As we have stressed, the rhetoric of a judicial speech was directed at the dicasts, who decided the case. In Athens dicastic panels were comprised of ordinary citizens who offered their services for the year. The Athenians had adopted the practice of selecting by lottery 6,000 citizen men to serve on jury panels for the year, and it was quite possible that many of the same men served from year to year and in time acquired a degree of rhetorical and legal sophistication.¹⁸ This seems to be the comic implication of Philocleon's expectations of what he will hear and see in court. Dicastic panels on which men like Philocleon served were large by modern standards. In private cases, the panels consisted of 201 or 401 dicasts: the greater the compensation demanded by the plaintiff, the larger the required jury. In public suits, which could involve cases such as aggravated assault (*hybris*) or treason and carry with them severe penalties, the smallest dicastic panel comprised 501 men. The large size of these panels, the format of the trial itself and the actual legal space in which the trial took place all dictated the shape of a forensic speech.

In Athens juries were extensions of the community at large, sharing the same social values as the litigants, and it is to these shared values that litigants must direct their emotional appeals and arguments.¹⁹ This point is vividly illustrated in Demosthenes 21.2, where Demosthenes reminds the dicasts that some of them were present at the meeting of the Assembly which voted to condemn Meidias for his *hybris* and how they actually came up to him after that meeting and urged him to proceed with prosecuting Meidias in court. Whether or not any of the dicasts had in fact done this is immaterial; Demosthenes expects them to share his outrage and anger at such an act of public humiliation, as Meidias smacking him across the face in the Theatre of Dionysus. As Carey rightly notes, 'the jurors are asked to become emotionally involved',²⁰ and far from being extraneous, such emotional appeals and emotionally charged arguments were not only highly effective in putting the dicasts into a particular frame of mind but also relevant as they helped to define juristically the issue at stake, since the law itself was not always a clear guide.²¹

So for instance, the law covering the crime of *hybris*, which Meidias is alleged to have broken, like most Athenian laws, does not define the offence.²² It simply reads:

If any one commits *hybris* against another, either child, woman, man, whether free or slave, or does anything unlawful to any of these, let any eligible Athenian who wishes bring a public suit (*graphē*) to the Thesmothetae.

The law is not written in any kind of technical language but in everyday language of the dicasts who would understand *hybris* in their own terms.²³ I accept Gagarin's contention that the law was restricted to physical actions against the person, but agree with Fisher that the physical violence needed to involve some form of public humiliation and insult to constitute *hybris*.²⁴ Either way the offence of *hybris* was wide open to interpretation and could cover a wide variety of activities. Consequently a charge of *hybris* overlapped with many other offences, which were covered by other laws and prosecuted by other legal means. Thus, for instance, battery (*aikēia*), which in extreme instances could be construed as *hybris*, was often prosecuted by a private suit (*dikē*). The litigant who chose instead to proceed by a public suit for *hybris*

(*graphē hybreos*) had to prove to the dicasts that the particular violence done to him was in fact hubristic. To do so, he would draw on their collective understanding as to what constituted *hybris* and suggest reasons why in his particular case the act of striking another was *hybris* and not simple battery. In the narration, the litigant would obviously describe his version of the incident, emphasizing what in the striker's behaviour made his action hubristic. As Demosthenes himself notes (21.72–73), to be struck is not so terrible as to be struck with *hybris*, but the victim finds it difficult to put into words the gesture, the look or the tone of voice which the striker had when he committed *hybris*. No one, he adds, can describe the *hybris* to his audience as vividly as it appeared in truth and reality both to the victim and those who witnessed it. Neither the testimony of the witnesses (*martyriai*) nor the narration of facts (*erga*) is sufficient to get across the seriousness of the offence. And here is where emotionally charged appeals often contained in the proof section of a forensic speech become so important in achieving the vividness needed to recreate the outrage.

Demosthenes begins the account that we have been examining (21.72) by citing an incident apparently familiar to the dicasts, the killing of Boeotus at a public banquet and gathering by Euaeon, who had retaliated in anger for a single blow that had dishonoured him. Then he invites the dicasts to consider and calculate how much more justified he was to be angry at being victimized by Meidias than Euaeon when he killed Boeotus (21.73). His argument is framed in a highly antithetical manner that is intended to arouse the dicasts' own anger with each contrast (21.73–74): Euaeon was struck by an acquaintance, who was drunk, before six or seven witnesses, who also were acquaintances, in a home where Euaeon need not enter. Demosthenes was 'hybristized' by an enemy who was sober, early in the morning, prompted by *hybris* not wine, in the presence of many foreigners and citizens, in a temple where he had to enter in his civic duty as *choregos*. That such arguments were effective is clear from Aeschines' warning about the beguiling nature of Demosthenes' antitheses (2.4). With each calculation of the argument (struck/'hybristized', acquaintance/foe, drunk/sober, few acquaintances/many foreigners, home/temple), the jurors are further drawn in emotionally. The above example packs an emotional appeal in the guise of an argument from probability, of which antithesis is a species: Demosthenes actually invites the jurors to exercise their cognitive powers.

To combat such arguments the opposing litigant could ridicule the whole incident and turn it to laughter. This is precisely what Ariston, who had been viciously assaulted, expects Conon will do when he tries to divert attention from the *hybris* of his assault by comically reducing the whole incident to a harmless scuffle between young men over call girls, and by contrast represent Ariston and his brothers as violent drunks who are purely vindictive (Dem. 54.13–14). From what Ariston says, we can imagine that Conon framed his argument in an equally antithetical manner to heighten the ridicule and emphasize the absurdity of the charge. It may have run as follows:

There are many men in the city, sons of gentlemen, who play around like young men do, giving themselves obscene nicknames; some fall in love with call girls, like my son, and often get into fights over call girls. That's the way of boys. But you and your brothers (in contrast to the many sons of gentlemen) are drunk and violent (in contrast to playful), unreasonable and vindictive (in contrast to light hearted ways of boys).

As Aristotle notes (*Rhet.* 3.18.7), jests have value in judicial contests and Gorgias was correct to advise combating an opponent's seriousness with jesting and his jesting with seriousness. Certainly Demosthenes has Ariston come across as an earnest young man, who argues the importance of using legal remedies to prevent the escalation of violence (54.18–19). In anticipation of Conon's strategy Ariston opens his *prooimion* in dramatic fashion; the very first word he utters, *hybris* (*ubristheis*), was intended both to shock the dicasts and set a serious tone for the whole speech (54.1). But such emotional appeals were not restricted to the *prooimion*, though that was a favourite place for them.²⁵ Aristotle's comments about jesting are actually made in his discussion of proofs, and as he notes in Book 1 of the *Rhetoric* (1.2.3–5), *pathos*, emotion, was a form of proof. That early rhetoricians and speakers in court devoted so much attention to creating *pathos* both in the *prooimion* and through their arguments indicates its effectiveness in a judicial context.

The reason why so much energy went into arousing or calming the passions of the dicasts is explained by the format of a trial itself, which consisted of a single set of speeches.²⁶ In some private suits each litigant had an opportunity to deliver a short rebuttal after the main speeches, but by and large the litigant had only one shot at making a favourable impression upon the dicasts. The story is told of how one of Lysias' clients complained about a speech that he had composed for him. On first reading it appeared marvellously good but on subsequent readings dull and ineffectual. Lysias jokingly replied that he was only going to speak once before the dicasts ([Plut.], *Moralia* 504c). The point is that dicasts only had one opportunity to hear the case. Once the speeches concluded, they immediately proceeded to vote without any deliberation on the strengths or weaknesses. Further compounding problems was the length of time granted each litigant to speak, where the time was measured by a water clock. In private suits, even those involving a large financial compensation (over 5,000 drachmas), a litigant was given at most 10 *choes* of water for his first speech (about thirty minutes) and 3 *choes* (about nine minutes) for his rebuttal speech (*AP* 67.2).²⁷ For smaller claims the litigants had even less time to speak.²⁸ In public suits, each litigant was assigned a third of a day to speak, perhaps around three and half hours. The longer length for public suits presented the speaker with the problem of sustaining his delivery over an extended period of time, and this problem (running out of rhetorical steam) was alleviated by the assistance of *synērgoroi*, co-pleaders, who would share the speaking time. One co-pleader might be assigned the task of developing a particular argument; another with delivering the epilogue.²⁹ But private suits presented a very different constraint: the litigant had only a limited amount of time to win over the good will of the dicasts, narrate his version of the facts, make two or three convincing arguments and finally sum up.

Moreover, the litigant must sustain the dicasts' attention throughout in what were not ideal conditions. Juristic silence was not something maintained or even expected in an Athenian court. The courts themselves were semi-open spaces, like stoas, where spectators could stand around and watch the proceedings, prepared at any moment to voice their approval or disapproval.³⁰ The dicasts were also inclined to interject their thoughts and interrupt a speaker, and we can well imagine that the din from such large dicastic panels could be quite unnerving for a speaker. In the extreme it could even prevent a litigant from speaking (*Dem.* 45.6). But a skilled speaker could respond to, play upon and even manipulate to his own advantage murmuring from

the dicasts, eliciting expressions of approval for his own arguments or encouraging them to express their disfavour at his opponent.³¹ Anaximenes (*Rhet. Alex.* 1432b33–1433a29) suggests ways to confront such interruptions, which shows that they were real enough and the speaker needed to be attuned to them. In short, then, emotional appeals and arguments designed to arouse emotions of the dicasts, far from being extraneous, were highly relevant in forensic oratory as they allowed the speaker not only to grab and sustain the attention of the dicasts but also to define juristically, as we have suggested, the offence for them.

4 The *Pistis*: The *Paradeigma* of Lysias

In order to sustain the dicasts' attention, the litigant had to deliver a speech that was also easy to follow, as dicasts would not tolerate long speeches (Dem. 58.25).³² According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, what was appropriate and essential in forensic oratory was a quality that Lysias excelled in, namely a manner of expression that reduced ideas to their essentials and expressed them tersely (*Lysias* 6). A litigant could not afford to engage in wordy or overly intricate arguments that might obscure his ideas since the dicasts had, as we have seen, only a limited time to process the arguments and were given no opportunity afterwards to reflect and deliberate on them. At the same time, however, a litigant could not underestimate the legal sophistication that dicasts would have acquired from listening to multiple cases, and who in turn would appreciate and welcome a skilful display of rhetoric. A balance thus had to be struck and what a litigant needed to present was an account of events that seemed plausible on first hearing, followed by arguments that were equally plausible as they built naturally on the narrative account that had gone before. The one fed into the other. Again Lysias succeeded at this because he was able to create for each speaker a specific character that seemed readily believable (Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 8).³³ That characterization was then sustained right through the narrative into the proofs, where the speaker presented arguments that proved equally convincing because they were based on the evidence introduced to support the case and the character created for the case.³⁴ As Dionysius notes (*Lysias* 15), Lysias was skilled at discovering arguments inherent in any situation; he omits no elements that constitute an argument, whether found in the persons, the situations or actions.

In early forensic oratory, emphasis was placed on narrating the facts and providing supporting evidence of witnesses. There was little or no attempt to create character or attention paid to arguments that could enhance one's own evidence and challenge the evidence of an opponent.³⁵ By the time we get to Antiphon and certainly with Lysias, direct evidence (such as laws, witnesses, torture, oaths) was less important but still one of many elements that went into constructing a convincing argument. Laws and such came to be treated as persuasive evidence that could be rhetorically manipulated to benefit the speaker's argument. This became readily apparent in the case of witnesses, when the Athenians shifted in the 370s from oral testimony, presented by the witnesses themselves, to written depositions, composed by the litigants and read out in court like any other form of written evidence (e.g., laws or contracts). The witnesses' role was reduced to confirming the deposition or denying under oath any knowledge of the event. This allowed the litigant

considerable scope in manipulating the actual text of the deposition.³⁶ It is perhaps for this reason that Anaximenes treats direct evidence as supplementary to the proofs drawn from the actions, words and persons; that is, arguments based on probabilities, examples (*paradeigmata*), inferences (*tekmeria*), maxims and signs (*semeia*) (*Rhet. Alex.* 7.1 1428a17). Anaximenes' distinction between rhetorical proofs drawn from the actions, words and person and supplementary proofs drawn from direct evidence is similar to the distinction drawn by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.2.2–3) between artistic and non-artistic proofs; the former is based on the character of the speaker, the emotional frame of mind of the dicasts (*pathos*) and what the speech can logically demonstrate to be true or apparently true.³⁷ Non-artistic proofs are based on direct evidence, which is not invented by the speaker but simply employed by him. Whatever formal distinctions rhetoricians drew between different types of proof, they were all treated the same by litigants, as 'evidentiary material' on which to build arguments that made for a convincing case.³⁸

The speaker of Antiphon 6.30–31 lays out the new approach in forensic oratory. According to him, if someone had given a verbal account of the facts, without providing witnesses, one might say that his words lacked witnesses;³⁹ if he had provided witnesses, without providing inferences (*tekmeria*) to support the witnesses, one might make the same criticism. But in his case he has presented plausible arguments (*logous eikotas*),⁴⁰ with witnesses to support the arguments, facts to support the witnesses, and inferences (*tekmeria*) based on the facts. The approach is that laid out in the handbooks that we find summarized in the *Phaedrus*: narrative, witnesses, *tekmeria* and *eikota*. In the new realities of forensic oratory, witnesses or any other type of direct evidence was insufficient to win a case; there needed to be arguments to strengthen that evidence, and this privileging of argument over direct evidence in forensic oratory remains throughout the fourth century. We find it expressed, for instance, in Demosthenes 55.12. The defendant is being charged with property damages by his neighbour. Between their two properties runs a path of some sort that serves as a public road in the dry season and a bed for runoff in the rainy season. The plaintiff claims that a wall on the defendant's property line, which was built by the defendant's father to prevent runoff from the road on to his land, has caused flooding on his own property. He alleges that the wall obstructs a watercourse actually running through the defendant's property. As public property such watercourses could not be blocked off. The defendant argues that the road serves as the actual watercourse for runoff and that the piece of land in question is in fact private property. In his narrative, he has given his description of the land and the circumstances leading his father to build the wall many years earlier. At Section 12 he states, 'to prove the truth of what I say, I will provide witnesses who know the facts, and, men of Athens, inferences (*tekmeria*) much more compelling than the witnesses'. The witnesses testify to the presence of trees, vines and tombs on the particular piece of land. The logical inference is that their presence signifies private property and not public land. The argument may be specious but is plausible.

As we have suggested, by the time we get to Lysias, argument, based on inferences, probabilities and character became a central feature of forensic oratory, and all other elements of the speech were built toward that. We can illustrate our point by looking more closely at Lysias, who excelled above all in forensic oratory. One of Lysias' most brilliant speeches was his defence of Euphiletus (1), who was charged with killing

Eratosthenes, who was caught in act of seduction (*moicheia*) with Euphiletus' wife. Under Athenian homicide law, Euphiletus could plead justification, as certain killings, like self-defence or the killing of a seducer caught having illicit sex with a woman under a man's charge, carried no penalty. Two problems, however, faced Euphiletus. First, Eratosthenes' relatives have charged him with entrapment, which was illegal, and secondly, social expectation in Euphiletus' day (early fourth century) called for the aggrieved husband to accept financial compensation for the offence. By this period, the killing of a seducer seemed to be an archaic solution that was rarely acted on. The laws relating to seduction were themselves ambiguous; they did not dictate killing but only granted impunity to the one who happened to kill a seducer caught in the act. Euphiletus deals with the second issue first. In the *prooimion* (1–5) he suggests to the Areopagus, the council that is judging his case, that seduction is a universally hated crime, both in democracies and oligarchies, and no penalty is too small for a crime so great. The language that he adopts is that of a victim: he has suffered, he is indignant, and the crime is the worst form of *hybris*.⁴¹ This prepares the jury to accept the killing of a seducer, though an extreme act, as acceptable in Euphiletus' case. The first issue, though addressed in the *prooimion*, is treated more fully in the narrative (6–28), where Euphiletus comes across as a trusting and somewhat naive husband, who was incapable of planning a homicide or of entrapping Eratosthenes.⁴² But he is also represented by Lysias as a man who on occasion was given to outbursts of anger, a characterization that helps suggest to the dicasts that Euphiletus acted impulsively when he caught Eratosthenes with his wife.⁴³ The first two parts of the speech, the *prooimion* and narrative, support the arguments that follow.

The proofs begin with the legal arguments (29–36). The narrative concludes (25–26) with Euphiletus describing how he caught the young seducer in the bedroom with his wife. Eratosthenes admits his guilt, we are told, begs for his life and offers money. At Section 26 Euphiletus shifts into direct speech which not only dramatizes 'the character of a man whose natural impulsiveness readily expresses itself' but also sets the stage for the legal arguments that immediately follow.⁴⁴ Euphiletus speaks in a contrived antithetical manner that has two purposes: first, it downplays his role in killing by stressing that the law itself, now personified, demanded satisfaction, and second, it emphasizes Eratosthenes' criminal behaviour by stressing his preference for pleasure over lawful and decent behaviour: 'It is not I who will kill you but the law of the city, which by violating you have held in less regard than your own pleasures, and have chosen to commit crime such as this against my wife and my children rather than obey the laws and behave decently.'

The first piece of evidence that Euphiletus has read out in court to support his legal arguments is the law of seduction, which allowed a man to deal with a seducer caught in the act in whatever way he saw fit (28).⁴⁵ The law itself did not, it seems, actually order the killing of a seducer, but left that as an option among other possibilities (ransom for instance). In order to obscure the weaknesses of this direct evidence, Euphiletus again argues in a highly antithetical manner that emphasizes his legal and moral justification in killing (29).⁴⁶ Note again how the emphasis is shifted from Euphiletus to the personified law and not only to the law itself but now also to the jurors, who are entrusted with affirming the moral authority of the law. The jurors have been implicated in his argument:

He did not dispute it, gentlemen, but admitted his guilt, and begged and implored not to be killed, and was ready to pay money. But I did not agree with his assessment. I thought the law of the city had more authority, and exacted the penalty which you yourselves thought was most just and so imposed on those who practice such things.

The jurors are again reminded that Eratosthenes confessed his guilt and offered money, which however was rightly refused, on the grounds that the legal and moral authority of law was not something open to negotiation.⁴⁷ The implication here is that not only is the defendant justified in killing but also he is legally bound to, and the jurors have no option but to affirm that act. Finally, Euphiletus calls up his first witnesses who confirm that Eratosthenes was indeed caught in the act in his wife's bedroom and confessed his guilt (30).⁴⁸

But Lysias is not content to leave the matter at that. He introduces two further laws to bolster the argument that Euphiletus was both legally required and morally justified to kill Eratosthenes. The first, part of Draco's homicide law, contains the provisions dealing with justifiable homicide, in particular the provision that exculpates a man who has killed another found 'on top of' a woman under his charge (30). Like the law on seduction, the homicide law does not expressly order the killing or insist on the death penalty, as Euphiletus would have the jury believe ('you hear, gentlemen, how the Court of the Areopagus . . . has expressly decreed that a man is not to be convicted of homicide, if he captures a seducer with his wife and exacts this penalty from him'), but simply grants impunity. To suggest that it did more than this Euphiletus resorts to a hypothetical inversion based on the terms of the law. The provision in question specified precisely the women who were covered under the homicide law: mother, sister, daughter, wife and concubine. Euphiletus argues that the lawgiver was so convinced of the justice of the death penalty in the case of married women that he imposed the same penalty in the case of concubines, who are of lesser importance: 'For clearly if the lawgiver had had a more severe penalty than this, he would have imposed it; but in fact as he was unable to find a stronger sanction than death in their case, he decided the penalty should be the same as in the case of concubines' (31). This hypothetical inversion suggests that the only penalty reserved for a seducer is death.

Finally Euphiletus cites the law on violence (*bia*), which was perhaps the Athenian equivalent of rape. It protected adults and children, both male and female, slave or free. Under the terms of that law the penalty for violence/rape was damages in the form of financial compensation to the victim or the victim's family. Again, Euphiletus' argument is framed in antithetical terms that exclude the possibility that rape could have been dealt with by different means (such as a public suit for *hybris*) that involved other penalties, or that seduction could have been compensated financially (32):

Thus, gentlemen, the lawgiver thought those who use violence deserve a lesser penalty than those who use persuasion; the former he condemned to death; on the latter he imposed double damages, thinking that those who get their way by force are hated by those violated, while those who use persuasion corrupt women's minds in such a way that make other men's wives more loyal to themselves than to their own husbands.⁴⁹

The conclusion that Euphiletus draws from the legal arguments that he has just presented is that not only have the laws acquitted him of any wrongdoing but also have actually ordered him to exact the death penalty (34). It is now up to the jurors,

he states, to determine whether the laws have authority or no value at all. Again the jurors have been implicated in his argument.

The second argument (37–42) tackles head on the question of entrapment. Here Lysias depends heavily on the character that he has established for Euphiletus in the narrative, a trusting, naive man incapable of staging a homicide but given at times to bursts of anger. In the narrative Euphiletus describes how on the night of the killing as he was returning from the country, he met up with a close friend, Sostratus. He invited him home for dinner, after which he sent him on his way. Later, he was wakened in the middle of the night by his slave girl who informed him that Eratosthenes was in the house. He slipped out to find witnesses, discovering as he made his search that some friends were home and others were not. The account has a ring of truth to it (he mentions a name, Harmodius, who was not at home when he went to his house), and it introduces a series of probability arguments that are framed as rhetorical questions (40–42):

If I had been plotting against Eratosthenes that night, would it have been better for me to dine elsewhere or bring my dinner quest home? . . . Then again do you think I would have let my dinner guest go and be left alone and unsupported or urged him to stay to help me punish the seducer? Then again, gentlemen, don't you think I would have sent word to my associates during the day and bid them to gather at house of a friend living closest to me rather than running around in the middle of the night as soon as I discovered it, not knowing whom I would find at home or out? . . . Yet if I had known this ahead of time (who was home and who was not) don't you think I would have prepared my servants and sent word to my friends so I could enter in complete safety . . . and exact the penalty with the greatest number of witnesses?

But in fact he claims to have known nothing of what was going to happen that night, and to prove his point he calls his final set of witnesses, who have been held back until this point in the argument for maximum effectiveness.⁵⁰ Among them would be men like Harmodius who would have testified that they were not home on the night in question. The witnesses make the arguments from probability all the more convincing.

5 *Epilogos*

Time constraints have forced me like an Athenian litigant to focus my argument on a single *paradeigma*, the example of Lysias, to illustrate something of the rhetorical beauty and vitality of forensic oratory. The very nature of a trial, which allowed a litigant only a limited time to speak in his defence, forced him to concentrate all his rhetorical efforts on building two or three convincing arguments. The plausibility of these arguments depended on the rhetorical force that he generated by his manipulation of the evidence that he had assembled and from the character that he created for himself or his opponent in the narrative. By using the example of Lysias, I have not, as Anaximenes suggests (*Rhet. Alex.* 1429a29), tried to prop up what is an otherwise unconvincing case, nor do I think forensic oratory was more about plausibility than the truth. It was about justice and equity, and in an effort to obtain these, the truth sometimes needed rhetorical assistance. Aristotle may have

regarded deliberative oratory as more noble and more worthy of the statesman than forensic oratory. But a statesman in Athens of any political worth needed also to be a good forensic orator, for he could easily find himself in court defending his policies and political actions before a body of dicasts, who had also heard him speak in the Assembly. The Athenians saw little distinction between the two arenas. Aristotle's criticism seems to have been directed at the fact that forensic oratory allowed greater scope for the practitioner to speak outside the matter and employ rhetorical trickery. As I have shown, such emotional appeals and arguments were absolutely essential as they allowed the litigant not only to grab and focus the attention of the dicasts but also to fire their imagination and define for them juristically the actual issue at hand. Was this particular action, let us say, *hybris* or not? Moreover, the stakes were often high, life and death, satisfaction for a crime against one's person or family, and a litigant needed to use whatever rhetorical means at his disposal in order to persuade his fellow citizens of the justice of his case. In similar circumstances we would do no less.⁵¹

Bibliographical Essay

Various general works on Greek rhetoric include discussions of forensic oratory. J.F. Dobson, *The Greek Orators* (London: 1918), has comments on the life of each of the orators in the so-called 'Canon of the Ten Attic Orators', a discussion of their oratorical styles and short summaries of their speeches. So also do G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 125–152 and 206–263, his abridged version *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), pp. 64–80 and M. Edwards, *The Attic Orators* (London: 1994). For those approaching forensic rhetoric for the first time, Edwards' book is a good starting point, for he also catalogues all of the extant speeches, along with their classification (deliberative, epideictic, forensic), and their approximate date of delivery (Appendix 2). The most recent and most comprehensive treatment is S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999). There are several commentaries on individual orators in the *Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics* series. These are primarily intended for Greek readers, but each commentary offers an accessible introduction that provides essential background information. Here I would include C. Carey, *Lysias: Selected Speeches* (Cambridge: 1989), C. Carey and R.A. Reid, *Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches* (Cambridge: 1985) and M. Gagarin, *Antiphon: the Speeches* (Cambridge: 1997). For translations of speeches, there is a collection in C. Carey, *Trials from Classical Athens* (London: 1997) and in the University of Texas Oratory of Classical Greece series (see this book's Preface). There are numerous articles that deal with rhetorical means of persuasion in forensic oratory; of especial significance are C. Carey's '“Artless” Proofs in Aristotle and the Orators', *BICS* 39 (1994), pp. 95–106, 'Rhetorical Means of Persuasion', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 26–45 and 'Nomos in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory', *JHS* 116 (1996), pp. 33–46, and E.M. Harris, 'Law and Oratory', in Ian Worthington, *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (cited above), pp. 130–150.

Notes

- 1 For a discussion of these *Prolegomena*, see S. Wilcox, 'Corax and the Prolegomena', *AJP* 64 (1943), pp. 1–23, G.A. Kennedy, 'The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks', *AJP* 80 (1959), pp. 169–178 at p. 176, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), p. 59, and more fully *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), pp. 217–224.
- 2 Kennedy, 'Rhetorical Handbooks', p. 176. Aristotle attributes to Corax essentially the same probability argument about the weak/strong man attributed to Tisias by Plato in the *Phaedrus* (273b–c). For a fuller discussion of Corax and Tisias and their relationship, see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3, pp. 30–34, Kennedy, 'Rhetorical Handbooks', pp. 175–178, *Art of Persuasion*, pp. 58–61, *New History*, pp. 32–34, where he rethinks his position in light of T. Cole's scepticism in 'Who was Corax?', *ICS* 16 (1991), pp. 65–84 and *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991), pp. 82–83. For my purposes, it matters little whether the tradition about Corax and Tisias is reliable or not, but only that it existed and connected the beginnings of rhetoric with forensic oratory.
- 3 For a full discussion of this scenario and which of the two was more likely to be authentic, the one described by Plato or Aristotle, see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3, pp. 30–33.
- 4 Socrates states that Tisias 'wrote a *technikon*' (Pl. *Phaedrus* 273b).
- 5 M. Gagarin, *Antiphon: The Speeches* (Cambridge: 1997), pp. 121–122, Kennedy, 'Rhetorical Handbooks', p. 170; but see M. Gagarin, *Antiphon The Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists* (Austin: 2002), p. 105, who now suggests that the *Tetralogies* were intended for a reading audience primarily made up of other intellectuals and not those seeking specific training in forensic oratory.
- 6 So E. Carawan, 'The *Tetralogies* and Athenian Homicide Trials', *AJP* (1993), pp. 235–270 at p. 240 and n. 10.
- 7 J.J. Bateman, 'Some Aspects of Lysias' Argumentation', *Phoenix* 16 (1962), pp. 157–177 at p. 157, Kennedy, 'Rhetorical Handbooks', p. 169. For epideictic oratory in the fifth century, see C. Carey, Chapter 16. For a detailed look at Gorgias, see J.A.E. Bons, Chapter 4, pp. 236–237.
- 8 For a discussion of this passage and whether Plato in fact is following the arrangement of a rhetorical handbook as Kennedy argues (*Art of Persuasion*, pp. 54–57), see M. de Brauw, Chapter 13.
- 9 We need to be careful not to overstress this point. Some sophists, like Protagoras, catered to the needs of both the forensic and deliberative orator. He is said to have composed sets of arguments (*antilogiai*) which, when learned, would allow one to argue effectively in court and in the Assembly (Pl. *Sophist* 232de). On deliberative oratory in general, see S. Usher, Chapter 15.
- 10 On the magistrate's role at a trial, see J.P. Sickinger, Chapter 19, p. 288.
- 11 On appeals to anger in forensic oratory, see C. Carey, 'Rhetorical Means of Persuasion', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 26–45 at pp. 29–33.
- 12 S. Usher, 'Lysias and his Clients', *GRBS* 17 (1976), pp. 31–40 at p. 36. See also C. Carey and R.A. Reid, *Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches* (Cambridge: 1985), pp. 14–15, who argue that the logographer handled a client's case from start to finish; *contra* K.J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacaum* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1968), pp. 148–174, who suggests a greater degree of collaboration; cf. Ian Worthington, 'Once More, the Client/Logographos Relationship', *CQ* 43 (1993), pp. 67–72.
- 13 J. Schloemann, 'Entertainment and Democratic Distrust: The Audience's Attitudes toward Oral and Written Oratory in Classical Athens', in J.M. Foley and Ian Worthington (eds.), *Epea and Grammata: Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece*

- (Leiden: 2002), pp. 133–145 at pp. 136–137, E. Hall, ‘Lawcourt Dramas: The Power of Performance in Greek Forensic Oratory’, *BICS* 40 (1995), pp. 39–58 at p. 47. The speechwriter would include certain phrases that gave the impression of spontaneity: Hall, ‘Lawcourt Dramas’, p. 47.
- 14 Trans. J. Muir, *Alcidamas: The Works and Fragments* (London: 2001). For a discussion of Alcidamas, see M. Edwards, Chapter 5.
 - 15 Socrates notes that one can pick up the book by Anaxagoras in the market for as cheap as a drachma (Pl. *Apology* 25d); presumably works on rhetoric came equally cheap.
 - 16 Gorgias and Protagoras were known to have compiled collections of common places (Cic. *Brutus* 46).
 - 17 Antiphon and other sophists are said to have put together collections of *prooimia* and *epilogoi*: Kennedy, ‘Rhetorical Handbooks’, p. 170 and *Art of Persuasion*, p. 53.
 - 18 On jury selection, see D.M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London: 1978), pp. 33–40 and S.C. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford: 1993), pp. 82–87.
 - 19 C. Carey, ‘Legal Space in Classical Athens’, *G&R* 41 (1994), pp. 172–186 at pp. 175–177. Carey points out that courts were ‘an extension of decent discourse’ of the community. On the class composition of the jury, see S.C. Todd, ‘*Lady Chatterley’s Lover* and the Attic Orators: The Social Composition of the Athenian Jury’, *JHS* 110 (1990), pp. 146–173, M.M. Markle, ‘Jury Pay and Assembly Pay at Athens’, in P.A. Cartledge and F.D. Harvey (eds.), *Crux: Essays Presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday* (Exeter: 1985), pp. 265–297, K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: 1974), pp. 34–35, A.H.M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford: 1957), pp. 35–37. I would accept Todd’s arguments that the jurors were largely composed of farmers, some of whom would have been at the subsistence level but who still shared the values of all farmers, including litigants.
 - 20 Carey, ‘Legal Space’, p. 177.
 - 21 On the ambiguity of Athenian laws, see J.P. Sickinger, Chapter 19, p. 289.
 - 22 Meidias was actually charged for ‘wrong done concerning a festival’ under a *probolē*, a procedure that called for a preliminary vote in the Assembly, which could then be followed by a prosecution in court. On the procedure, see D.M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes: Against Meidias* (Oxford: 1990), pp. 13–23, and as to whether the case actually made it to court, see pp. 23–28.
 - 23 Carey, ‘Legal Space’, pp. 178–179.
 - 24 M. Gagarin, ‘The Athenian Law against *Hybris*’, in G.W. Bowersock, W. Burkert and M.C.J. Putnam (eds.), *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies presented to Bernard Knox* (Berlin: 1979), pp. 229–236, N. Fisher, ‘The Law of *Hubris* in Athens’, in P. Cartledge, P. Millett and S. Todd (eds.), *Nomos: Essays in Athenian Law, Politics and Society* (Cambridge: 1990), pp. 123–138.
 - 25 For a more detailed consideration at the rhetorical function of the *prooimion*, see M. de Brauw, Chapter 13, pp. 191–193.
 - 26 This is true only in *atimētoi* cases where the penalty was fixed by law. In *timētoi* cases where the penalty was not fixed in the law but assessed, after a conviction, each litigant was given a few minutes to talk about the appropriate penalty; see notes 27 and 47 below.
 - 27 See P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford: 1981), pp. 719–721, D.M. MacDowell, ‘The Length of the Speeches on the Assessment of the Penalty in Athenian Courts’, *CQ* 35 (1985), pp. 525–526. The whole trial would take just over two hours to complete: 60 minutes for the first set of speeches, 20 minutes for the two rebuttal speeches and 20 minutes for the assessment of the penalty. There was also the reading out of evidence, which did not count against the speaker’s time, and the time needed for the dicasts to vote.

- 28 Only in the case of private suits did the reading out of evidence (laws, witness depositions) not count against a speaker's time. The water clock was not stopped in public suits, when evidence was read out in court. The scholarly consensus is that even serious political trials were completed in a day, but see Ian Worthington, 'The Duration of an Athenian Political Trial', *JHS* 109 (1989), pp. 204–207, and more recently 'The Length of an Athenian Public Trial: A Reply to Professor MacDowell', *Hermes* 103 (2003), pp. 364–371 against D.M. MacDowell, 'The Length of Trials for Public Offences in Athens', in P. Flensted-Jensen, T.H. Nielsen and L. Rubinstein (eds.), *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday* (Copenhagen: 2000), pp. 563–568.
- 29 On co-pleaders, see L. Rubinstein, *Litigation and Cooperation: Supporting Speakers in the Courts of Classical Athens* (Stuttgart: 2000).
- 30 On spectators in court, see A.M. Lanni, 'Spectator Sport or Serious Politics? *Oi peristēkontes* and the Athenian Lawcourts', *JHS* 117 (1997), pp. 183–189.
- 31 V. Bers, 'Dikastic Thorubos', in P.A. Cartledge and F.D. Harvey (eds.), *Crux: Essays Presented to G.E.M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday* (Exeter: 1985), pp. 1–15 and J. Roisman, *The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators* (Berkeley: 2005), pp. 135–139.
- 32 Assemblymen also shared the same intolerance for long speeches: see Ian Worthington, 'Oral Performance in the Athenian Assembly and the Demosthenic *Prooimia*', in C. Mackie (ed.), *Oral Performance and its Context* (Leiden: 2004), pp. 129–143 at pp. 136–139.
- 33 As Kennedy notes, *Art of Persuasion*, p. 136, often small character flaws in the speaker were allowed to come through which the dicasts could identify with and so regard as credible. For examples of such flaws in the speaker of Lysias I, see S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), pp. 56 and 117.
- 34 Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, p. 91; cf. C. Carey, *Lysias: Selected Speeches* (Cambridge: 1989), pp. 66, 95, for Lysias' ability to provide a consistent characterization.
- 35 G.A. Kennedy, 'The Oratory of Andocides', *AJP* 79 (1958), pp. 32–43 and *Art of Persuasion*, p. 89, Carey, 'Legal Space', p. 17 and "'Artless" Proofs in Aristotle and the Orators', *BICS* 39 (1994), pp. 95–106 at p. 96; *contra* Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, pp. 60–63, who argues that Andocides actually works hard at delineating his character in *On the Mysteries* (1), the very speech which earlier scholars point to as lacking in characterization.
- 36 See Carey, "'Artless" Proofs in Aristotle and the Orators', pp. 97–106, for a good discussion of this.
- 37 See D. Mirhady, 'Non-Technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes', *AJP* 112 (1991), pp. 5–28, who suggests that both Aristotle and Anaximenes, despite their differences, drew from a common source.
- 38 M. Gagarin, 'The Nature of Proofs in Antiphon', *CP* 85 (1990), pp. 22–32 at pp. 24–25. See also M. de Brauw, Chapter 13, p. 196, who suggests that Demosthenes' introduction of the law of *hybris* was a rhetorical means of maligning Meidias' character (Dem. 21.48–50).
- 39 Ironically this is what the speaker of Antiphon 1 does, who without any supporting witnesses must rely exclusively on an inference of guilt (*tekmēria*) based on his opponent's refusal to torture slaves (1.11).
- 40 It is difficult to know whether the speaker means 'plausible arguments' as C. Carey translates (*Trials from Classical Athens* [London: 1997], p. 69) or 'plausible words' or 'plausible account' as M. Gagarin translates (M. Gagarin and D.M. MacDowell, *Antiphon and Andocides* [Austin: 1998], p. 84).
- 41 Carey, *Lysias*, p. 64.

- 42 See M. de Brauw, Chapter 13, pp. 194–195, for his discussion of how the narrative, as for example in Demosthenes 54, can be used not only as a statement of facts but also as a means of proof.
- 43 Usher, *Greek Oratory*, pp. 56–57.
- 44 Usher, *Greek Oratory*, p. 57.
- 45 This seems suggested at Lysias 1.49, where Euphiletus states that the laws ‘bid, if someone catches a seducer, to deal with him in whatever way he pleases’.
- 46 See Bateman, ‘Some Aspects of Lysias’ Argumentation’, pp. 171–172.
- 47 Many crimes in Athens did not have specific penalties attached to them. After a conviction both the plaintiff and defendant were given an opportunity to propose a penalty, between which the dicasts voted. For some offences, however, the penalty was fixed in the law, and by his language Euphiletus is suggesting that the penalty for seduction, namely death, was so fixed.
- 48 At the time of this case the witnesses still gave their testimony orally.
- 49 On the Athenian attitude toward rape and seduction, see E.M. Harris, ‘Did the Athenians Regard Seduction as a Worse Crime than Rape?’, *CQ*² 40 (1990), pp. 370–377 and C. Carey, ‘Rape and Adultery in Athenian Law’, *CQ*² 45 (1995), pp. 407–417.
- 50 Carey, ‘“Artless” Proofs in Aristotle and the Orators’, pp. 103–104.
- 51 I would like to thank Michael Gagarin, Marianne McDonald, Joseph Roisman and Ian Worthington for reading drafts of my chapter and for their helpful suggestions.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Symbouleutic Oratory

Stephen Usher

Speeches by statesmen (*symbouloi*) were concerned with questions of policy. These included war and peace, alliances, and domestic legislation.¹ Athenian, and probably other Greek assemblies and parliaments, required their politicians to display a degree of oratorical ability, which seems to have excluded their reading from prepared texts.² This differentiated them from litigants, most of whom addressed juries with speeches written for them by speechwriters.³ This difference accounts for the preservation of many more forensic than deliberative speeches. But the latter would have been of interest to writers and readers of history as well as to students of oratory. Indeed, the spoken word was an integral element of most literature, but the circumstances in which historians introduced it usually required them to exercise their imagination since they were usually not present when the speeches were delivered, and their text was not preserved. In the few cases when symbouleutic oratory was preserved, its author's purpose may have been to publish his views, as in a political pamphlet, in order to promote his public career or vindicate his policies. Or its author may not have been a politician at all, but a sophist or a propagandist.

Of two fragmentary passages of deliberative oratory, both preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Demosthenes* 3 and *Lysias* 32–33), the first, by Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, describes the paradoxical behaviour of politicians, who are said to yield too readily to adversity, and to quarrel with one another even when they share the same objectives, and even opinions as to the means of achieving them. The subject of the speech – the ancestral constitution – is introduced, but there are no specific details beyond that. The passage has the timeless characteristics of a sophistic exercise dealing in generalities rather than those of a live piece of oratory addressed to a particular audience.⁴

The fragment which Dionysius quotes from Lysias (Speech 34 in the Corpus), and which he pronounces to be 'composed in a suitable style for an actual debate', can be located with some precision. It is apparently addressed to an Athenian Assembly soon after the restoration of the democracy in 403. Its subject is a decree proposed by

Phormisius to restrict the franchise to those citizens who held some form of landed property. After the bloody ending of the oligarchy of the Thirty, this proposal would have inflamed strong feelings and revived dissension among the people. Yet Lysias addresses the question in very measured tones, coolly dismissing fears that the Spartans, who still garrisoned the Acropolis, would view a defeat for Phormisius with disfavour. We also know that Lysias, as a resident alien (*metic*) could not have delivered the speech himself. As it is difficult to imagine that a contemporary politician who opposed Phormisius, like, for example, Archinus, would have commissioned Lysias to write his speech for him, the natural conclusion suggested by logic is that the piece is a minor tract endorsing Athenian sovereignty and independence after the Peloponnesian War. It thus joins the Thrasymachus piece as a literary exercise rather than a record of what was actually said.

Delivered perhaps twelve years after Phormisius' proposal, the speech *On the Peace with Sparta* by Andocides,⁵ concerns the ending of the series of conflicts which afflicted the Greek cities in the first decade of the fourth century. Andocides had a personal programme of political rehabilitation, and the speech has the qualities of a contribution to a live debate, being controversial and perhaps unorthodox. His aristocratic pride prevented him from advocating merely popular or traditional policies or following conventional practice. He took a direct approach, and laid strong emphasis on what he saw as pure Athenian self-interest. Whereas in the speeches which Thucydides had given to orators on all sides in the Peloponnesian War the topics of justice, expediency, and possibility were accorded more or less equal status, Andocides focusses firmly on the second of these, and specifically on the benefits of a negotiated peace after a period of war (3–12). He pays lip service to the theme of justice by defining a just war ('when one is either suffering wrong oneself or helping another who is being wronged', 13), and by pointing out that the Spartans have acted with justice in victory (19). But his central argument concerns the stark realities of contemporary inter-state politics. Alliances against Sparta have proved fragile, and the nationalist pride which in the past prompted politicians to cast Athens in the role of defender of the oppressed has led to repeated disaster. Throughout the speech, Andocides dwells upon the advantages that the Athenians stood to gain from the policies he advocates; and their guiding principle is quietism, the avoidance of conflict. Altruism and the espousal of just causes are luxuries which Athens can no longer afford.

A salient feature of the speech is the use of examples from history to justify his recommendations.⁶ Unfortunately his versions of events are riddled with inaccuracies, but their function is clear: they provide precedents for action and avoidance, the latter where consequences have been unintended or disastrous. They show how unselfish and altruistic policies have been unappreciated by their beneficiaries. The allies of Athens have consistently failed to fulfil the terms of their alliances. Such allies (Corinth and Argos), who were pursuing narrowly selfish aims, were not worth defending (24–28). The historical examples (*paradeigmata*) also illustrate the darker side of Athenian imperialism as Andocides speaks of the methods used: 'partly by stealth, partly by bribery, and partly by force' (37). They thus serve to inject realism into the argument.

Andocides' proposals for peace with Sparta were rejected, and he and his fellow-ambassadors were exiled in 391. This could be due to two factors: the raw chauvinism which discomfited his Athenian audience because of its lack of morality, and the

associations which his proposed *rapprochement* with Sparta had with the hated oligarchy which they had so recently expelled. More discerning speakers, before and after Andocides, would have paid attention to their audiences' expectations. Commitment to upholding justice, whether in discharging treaty obligations or defending the weak and rectifying wrongs, was traditionally linked to the ideals of Athenian democracy. This accounts for the regular occurrence of variants of the *topos* of justice in the epideictic (ceremonial) oratory of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. Thucydides makes Pericles begin his Funeral Speech (2.35.3) by saying that he will try to fulfil his audience's wishes, and it is natural to attribute this idea to Thucydides' readers when examining his other speeches. He feels no need to give reasons for their presence in his account of the Peloponnesian War, any more than Herodotus had. 'What was said' was as integral to the story as 'what was done', as it had been in Homer. As to the content of his speeches, Thucydides tells us that he was guided by authenticity, as far as possible, and by 'what was required' (*ta deonta*) (1.22.1). Of these two criteria, the first was usually impossible to meet because he was absent and lacked reliable report while the second certainly includes the idea of creative writing. The historian's view of 'what should have been said' filled the gaps in his knowledge of what was actually said, and the material he used to do this would have included subjects and sentiments which audiences were conditioned to hear. Unlike Andocides, Thucydides had no personal axe to grind. As a historian, he knew Herodotus, whose live speech often comes in the form of debates: we even hear Xerxes' adviser Artabarnus expressing their desirability, so that both sides of an argument could be heard (Herodotus 7.10a.1). As well as being historical in most contexts, antilogies were also a response to contemporary literary stimuli, arising in the main from sophistic influence. It is against this background that we turn to the first pair of speeches.

The address of the Corcyrean ambassadors to the Athenian Assembly (Thuc. 1.32–36), in which they appeal for help in their quarrel with Corinth, begins with a strong appeal to Athenian self-interest. That theme is embedded in the opening argument, and when the ethical argument of 'bringing aid to the wronged' is introduced (Thuc. 1.33.1), it is sustained only briefly before reasons of advantage take over again, the foremost of these being the effortless accession of the powerful Corcyrean fleet to Athenian armaments (Thuc. 1.33.2), together with Corcyrean gratitude and a wider acclaim. The ambassadors complete this part of their argument by reminding the Athenians of the dangers of rejecting their overtures. Their treatment of the theme of justice is strictly reciprocal and legalistic: the Corinthians committed the first injustice, and the Athenians would be breaking no existing treaties by accepting the Corcyrean offer, and their speech ends, as it began, with the theme of self-interest.

The Corinthian counter-argument is studded with righteous protest, condemning Corcyrean actions as evil, vicious and unjust (Thuc. 1.37.2). They are further portrayed as devoid of respect for their colonial obligations to their mother-city, and unscrupulous in their use of specious arguments. The Corinthians urge the claims of justice (*dikaïōmata*) based on international law (Thuc. 1.41.1). They also invoke the moral concept of past benefits to be repaid (*charis*). Their case is that their claims are supported not only by the law but also by the weightier argument of moral rectitude.

The decision of the Athenian Assembly, as reported by Thucydides, was dictated by a fatalistic mind-set: 'They thought that they faced an inevitable war with the Peloponnesians' (1.44.2). In that frame of mind, the question of whether the war

would have been just, and arguments addressed to that question, would have been irrelevant. It would be interesting to know whether Thucydides, when he composed these speeches, was thinking primarily of the state of the collective Athenian psyche at this critical time. With the transference of the debate on the war to Sparta, the Corinthians rely again on claims for justice (1.68). To the Spartans they complain of wider Athenian aggression, and broaden the argument to include an examination of the Athenian character (1.70), which is one of optimism and restless ambition, against which the Spartans are hampered by their own morality (1.71). The Corinthians, having established the justice of their cause, have moved on to argue for realism in pursuing it; and they end with a specific demand for the immediate invasion of Attica.

The reply of the Athenians to the Corinthian charges contains their own version of justice. They argue that their own past services to Greece should not be repaid with hostility: that would be unjust. It would also be unjust to impugn the expansion of their empire, since this came about not by force but by voluntary accession (Thuc. 1.75). Then, after defending their empire by appealing to natural human acquisitiveness, they make a further claim to morality by giving a number of examples of their use of their power with moderation (Thuc. 1.76–77).⁷

Other Thucydidean speeches explore the tensions between the deliberative *topoi* as well as displaying them in isolation.⁸ After the cautious Spartan king Archidamus has dealt in practicalities rather than morality (1.80), the Corinthians in their final speech before the declaration of war (1.121–122) introduce the theme of possibility as they weigh up the prospects of success, coupling it with that of expediency (1.124). The new theme appears again in Pericles' speeches to the Athenians (1.141–144 and 2.62–63), where also the dilemma between justice and expediency is encapsulated in the sentence: 'Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go'.

The claims of justice at the expense of expediency may be difficult to uphold in certain situations. In Thucydides 1.3.10, the Mytilenean ambassadors to Sparta argue that justice is the only firm basis for relationships between both men and states: 'There can never be a firm friendship between men and men or a real community between different states unless there is a conviction of honesty on both sides'. Their speech traces the course of the breakdown of trust between themselves and the Athenians and blames the Athenians for it. But the latter elsewhere show that this ideal did not apply universally: in their dialogue with the Melians, they say: 'justice is seen by reasoning men to arise from equal power to compel, and the strong do what they can, and the weak submit to it' (Thuc. 5.89). Against this attitude it was impossible for justice to survive as a practical argument. The Mytileneans knew that their protest against Athenian injustice would probably need support from other arguments. They had available the most powerful one to put before the Spartans: 'The greatest opportunity (*kairos*) yet' (3.13, arising from Athenian vulnerability after the ravages of the plague). *Kairos* may be regarded as a *topos* in its own right, but it is also clearly related to both expediency and possibility. It assumes great importance in later deliberative oratory.

Cleon, in his speech to the second debate on Mytilene, begins by deploring the influence enjoyed by clever speakers through their sophistry (Thuc. 3.37), and he chooses for himself a forthright, brutal version of Pericles' brand of justice as the best

answer to the 'injustice' of the Mytileneans, which had arisen out of *hybris* generated by past Athenian leniency (Thuc. 3.39.4). Firm action now could meet the needs of both justice and expediency: 'Let me sum up the whole thing: I say that, if you follow my advice, you will be acting both justly as far as the Mytileneans are concerned, and in your own interests' (Thuc. 3.40.4). There are no theoretical abstractions here: the Mytileneans will get what they deserve and the Athenians what will safeguard their own security.

Cleon's opponent in the debate, Diodotus, tries to set it on a higher intellectual plane. He counters Cleon's warning against listening to sophistry by arguing that mature debate, in which the probity of speakers is not questioned, should always precede important decisions (Thuc. 3. 41–42). He then argues that the relevant question is not whether the Mytileneans are guilty, but whether it is in the Athenians' interest to inflict the severest punishments on them (Thuc. 3.44.1). Expediency alone should be the measure of policy, and Diodotus further argues that fear of punishment does not deter those who believe they will succeed in their enterprise (Thuc. 3.45), so Cleon's plan fails the test of expediency on that specific count. Finally, Diodotus links Cleon's plea for justice with emotionalism.

Yet the plea for justice can still be argued when the circumstances demand it. It was a necessary *topos* for the Plataeans to use since they had little else to offer the Spartans when they were forced to come to terms with them in 427 (Thuc. 3.53ff.). They try to generate sympathy by relying heavily on *aporia*, and remind them of their well-earned reputation for justice. It is probable that Thucydides deliberately uses sym-bouleutic oratory, where possible, to characterize the morality of the antagonists in relation to peace and war. The Spartan general Brasidas (Thuc. 4.85) begins his speech to the Acanthians with some effective variants on the theme of justice, and claims that his city's policy is aimed only at 'gratitude, honour, and glory' (Thuc. 4.86.5). He is even made to justify his use of force in obedience to a higher duty to liberate the Greeks, even against their will (Thuc. 4.87.2–4).

As the war becomes prolonged and embittered, justice becomes more and more irrelevant, a trend to be noted most markedly as the theatre of operations moves to Sicily. For Hermocrates of Syracuse (Thuc. 4.59–63), the sole reason for a state to wage war was to further its own material interests. Likewise, as in the present situation, it is advantageous to avoid war, compose past differences, and seek alliances (of states within Sicily), when danger threatens from outside. He further warns his Sicilian neighbours: 'If there is anyone here who thinks he will accomplish anything by force or because of the justice of his cause, let him not be surprised when his hopes are disappointed'. This seems to be an argument against the indiscriminate use of justice as a *topos*.

The use of deliberative speeches for characterization, as found occasionally in forensic oratory, is an important tool for the historian, who is often right in explaining policies and decisions in terms of the natures and temperaments of the leaders who initiate them. Nicias, in his first speech in the debate on the Sicilian Expedition (Thuc. 6.9–14), is portrayed as ultra-cautious, but, more significantly, astute in understanding the mood of his audience, who are bent on war. Though famously pious himself, Nicias knows that, for them, considerations of justice are long past, so he must concentrate on the strongest possible arguments of in expediency. In these danger figures prominently from enemies that would be left behind in Greece,

quiescent under an unstable truce, and from discontented subject-allies. In this role, Nicias continues the line of literary tragic warners, begun by Cassandra and continued by Teiresias and Artabarnus, but without their religious associations. He thoroughly explores the negative side of the themes of self-interest and possibility, and concludes that a show of strength to the Sicilians, followed by departure, should be sufficient to intimidate them. After this Nicias turns to politics, describing Alcibiades and his supporters as rashly ambitious and extravagantly expansionist, and arguing the opposite case. After reading his speech, men would better understand one of the main causes of the failure of the expedition: the reluctance of its senior general to act decisively in its initial stages.

Part of the characterization of Alcibiades has already been done by Nicias, but in his own speech (Thuc. 6.16–18) the size of his ego is even more strongly emphasized. He claims that his equestrian successes at Olympia magnify the city's standing. Accepting that unpopularity in some quarters follows success, Alcibiades nevertheless goes on to justify the acclaim he has come to enjoy – itself a piece of characterization – before going on to sound like an old-fashioned imperialist as he urges his audience to 'make it your endeavour to advance our city further' (Thuc. 6.18.6). After applying justice to his own career, he also reminds the Athenians that they have treaty obligations to their allies in Sicily, and questions of expediency and possibility are also considered; but the amount of discussion of them is disproportionately small compared with the space occupied by his personality. But once again the emphasis laid by the historian on a particular aspect of a speaker's character explains the events which follow, and prepares the reader for them: Alcibiades' proneness to youthful bravado and political intrigue made him a leading suspect in the scandal of the *Hermæ*, which led to the removal of the expedition's most enthusiastic advocate.

In his answer to Alcibiades (Thuc. 6.20–23), Nicias magnifies the logistical requirements of the marine enterprise, hoping to undermine his audience's confidence. But Alcibiades has caught their optimistic mood and augmented it, so that there is no going back.

In his speech to his fellow-Syracusans, after the expedition has set sail, Hermocrates is naturally concerned with practicalities (Thuc. 6.33–65), but he must first convince them of the full extent of Athenian ambitions, and then of the magnitude of the measures needed to frustrate them. (This seems to have been necessary, to judge from the speech of his democratic opponent, Athenagoras, who seems to think that the alarms he is raising are part of an oligarchic plot: Thuc. 6.36–40.) Hermocrates must also furnish the reasons for confidence, and these include the same that Nicias had used to discourage the Athenians from sailing (Thuc. 6.33.5–6; cf. 6.20). All this involves a calculated assessment of possibilities, but he also stresses that success depends on pan-Sicilian co-operation. He envisages different strategies and counter-strategies, like a field-commander conducting a discussion with his staff. Later, when he addresses the men of Camarina, he shows himself to be the complete politician. Morality takes over, and in a number of forms, in this subtle speech (Thuc. 6.76–80). It is vitally important that they understand the true character of Athenian imperialism – that the subject's loss of freedom is an inevitable consequence of it, whatever the Athenians may say. Readers of Pericles' funeral speech would recall the idealistic gloss which he had given it, but he was addressing a receptive audience. Hermocrates chose to represent the difference between the two sides at a basic level:

Sicilians were mostly freedom-loving Dorians, whereas the Athenians' subject-allies were, like them, Ionian. This also enables him to identify Syracusan interests with those of their neighbours, some of whom were suspicious of their ambitions, and to advise them that alliance with them was the right course, as well as the one most likely to succeed.

The Athenian representative at this meeting, Euphemus, puts self-interest before justice, expressly repudiating the hackneyed claims to eminence based on past services to Greece (Thuc. 6.83.2), and relying on the argument that the Sicilians generally and the Athenians had common interests. *Symbouloi* henceforth tend to use justice-arguments more for personal purposes, as does the exiled Alcibiades (Thuc. 6.89), than to support policies.

On turning to the speeches in Xenophon's *Hellenica*,⁹ a change of literary influences accompanies one of personality. He honed his own oratorical skills when campaigning, and his audiences were a cosmopolitan band of seasoned mercenaries. The speeches in the first two books have a mostly judicial or quasi-forensic context, and are concerned with past events rather than future actions. In all these speeches, the theme of justice, expressed in various forms, predominates: affirmation of the law and of personal loyalty, and condemnation of lawlessness and treachery. The trial and execution of the ten generals after the Battle of Arginousae (1.7.1–34), and later that of Theramenes under the tyranny of the Thirty (2.3.23–56), were not environments in which reasoned debate and deliberation had a place. Again, when the returning democrats are addressed by their leader Thrasybulus at Phyle (2.4.13–17), the prospects of success are emphasized, but the prevailing force of the oratory is not deliberative but hortatory. After all, hortatory oratory is shown to be Xenophon's own metier in his account of the March of the Ten Thousand, the *Anabasis*, where the best speeches are his own. The *Hellenica* shows similarity to that remarkable story as it becomes more and more concerned with the careers of individuals, who express their personalities mainly in conversations and summary pronouncements. But at the end of Book 3 (5.8–15), a speech addressed by Theban ambassadors, representing the Boeotian League, to the Athenians in pursuance of an alliance against Sparta in 395, is a full deliberative oration. They use a blend of morality and expediency, justifying their request by arguing that they had not been the Athenians' worst enemies in the recent war, and pointing out the advantage of making a combined stand against Sparta over opposing them singly. The same blending formula is deployed by the Spartan Dercyllidas in his speech to the Abydenes (4.8.4). Cligenes of Acanthus, apprising the Spartans of the Olynthians' ambitions in the Chalcidice in 382 (5.2.12–19), invokes the *topos* of *kairos/dynaton* against the background of their activities in the area. Like Thucydides, Xenophon uses speech to convey facts which properly belong to narrative, perhaps as a means of giving variety. Among speeches which recall those he himself delivers in the *Anabasis* is that of Jason of Pherae reported by Polydamas of Pharsalus, which is a speech within a speech (6.1.5–12). It is much concerned with prospects of success founded on military prowess, and the influence that the threat of force can have. The function of some speeches seems to be to illustrate the character of the speaker, and this is done more overtly by Xenophon than by Thucydides, reflecting his greater interest in personality.¹⁰ Examples of this are the speeches of the Athenians Callias and Autocles to the Spartans (6.3.4–6, 6.7–9), and especially that of the famous orator Callistratus (6.3.10–17), who was greatly

admired by Demosthenes. Callias reminds the Spartans of his past family connections with them, and of its standing in Athens. This fits in quite well with his argument, which explores the common ground between the two states as a preparation for a proposal of alliance against Thebes. It is also appropriate for an ambassador whose family has priestly connections to refer to mythology linking Sparta and Athens. Callias' theme is justice: historical ties should rule out future hostilities between two states who prided themselves on their observance of religion (6.6). The next speaker, Autocles, is characterized as 'a very dexterous orator', but his speech makes him appear less diplomatic than those preceding or following him. Autocles bluntly accuses the Spartans of total opposition to the independence of other states, contrary to their claims (6.3.8). The speech as it stands is too short, and contains no conciliatory arguments. Perhaps Xenophon is conveying the prevailing mood against Sparta through the mouth of the most talented speaker in the debate. He records that the speech was received in silence, but adds that 'he had succeeded in giving pleasure to those who were angry with the Spartans'. Autocles, like Alcibiades in Thucydides, has recognized and reflected the feelings of his audience. This leaves the final resumption of more conventional diplomacy to Callistratus, who eschews flights of rhetoric in favour of practical advocacy of fair dealing, and makes a point of reminding the Spartans of the expediency of an alliance, which would silence the Laconizing and the Atticizing factions everywhere (6.14), and overawe potential enemies. A nice touch comes near the end (6.16), where he deplores over-competitiveness, as exemplified in athletes and gamblers: parables like this are found in the best speeches of Demosthenes (9.69, 18.194, 243). If Xenophon is reporting from an actual text, as has been suggested, the content of this speech may have been known to Callistratus' admirer, and one of his devices noted for future use.

The above debate was separated from the next by the Battle of Leuctra, a famous victory for the Thebans, which they followed with an invasion of Laconia (370/69). Procles of Phlius, acting as a spokesman for the Spartans, had an uphill task when he tried to persuade the Athenians to renew their failed alliance. These had enjoyed hearing other speakers arguing pleas for justice in the expectation that they would respond favourably to them. But the most persuasive arguments came from Procles, who began by unashamedly invoking self-interest, pointing out that they would be the Thebans' next victims if Sparta should fall again, and they would be on their own (6.5.38–39). Justice plays its part in his argument in an interesting way: Sparta's reputation for observing it is counted as a catalyst in the process of building alliances with her (6.5.42–43). That Procles ends an otherwise pragmatic speech with a moralistic theme which has an almost epideictic flavour as it recounts Athenian deeds of selfless valour, suggests that Xenophon, at least, regarded him as a consummate deliberative speaker, who was able to carry the most sceptical audiences with him. This ability was tested again as the Thebans prepared a second invasion of the Peloponnese (spring 369). The Spartans were by then severely weakened, but the Athenians had come to realize the enormity of the Theban threat and decided to formalize an alliance with Sparta. So Procles was to a large extent knocking upon an open door when he argued the case for it (7.1.2–11). But if the Athenians had already decided to help Sparta, there were still the terms of the alliance to be considered. Here again, it seems that the Athenians had already agreed to a division of command, so when Procles draws an antithesis between Athenian naval prowess and Spartan

military supremacy, he is using a literary device reminiscent of Thucydides, but also reminding the still sceptical members of his Athenian audience of the mutual dependence of the two cities in the face of the victorious Thebans. In the end, the sceptics won the day, and the Athenians decided on independent command of all their forces, so Procles' speech seems here to have been the vehicle for the pro-Spartan Xenophon's own opinion. They contain the arguments which *should* have led the Athenians to make the right decision.

The development of symbouleutic oratory took place in a changing intellectual context in the fourth century, the flowering-period of classical Greek prose. Present in fifth century sophistic teaching, the study of politics made significant advances now through the medium of rhetoric.¹¹ It also acquired a market: aspiring statesmen were prepared to provide Isocrates with a comfortable living in return for instruction in his 'political philosophy'. His school was famous for educating princes, but most of his known pupils were Athenian, and some of them embarked on careers in public life.¹² According to the biographers, Demosthenes might have become one of them, but could not (or would not) afford the fees. Isocrates' school was a symptom of, and perhaps a catalyst for, the growth of interest in political discourse; and he stimulated this further by circulating his teaching in rhetorical form in works which articulate his views on politics, literature, and his own individual brand of philosophy. For present purposes the main interest is upon the effect which Isocrates' teaching and writing had on Demosthenes. They established a literary genre and opened up a stage on which he could display his talents and advance his career.

Politics lie in the background of some of Demosthenes' early speeches which are strictly forensic: those against Leptines (20), Androtion (22), Timocrates (24), and Aristocrates (23). But the first strictly symbouleutic oration is *On the Symmories* (14) of 354.¹³ It concerned retrenchment and rearmament at a time of dual crisis. Some of the strongest members of her maritime alliance had seceded from it, and the Persian King was threatening to interfere in Hellenic affairs. Isocrates' discourses *On the Peace* and *Areopagiticus*, composed around this time, would both have been known to Demosthenes, but the former was quietist, and the latter mainly concerned with domestic politics. Neither of these subjects seemed to him to meet the needs of the current situation. Hence a motive for circulating his thoughts on the present issue, and that may be added to a more general desire to rival Isocrates and challenge his views and those of men who had been influenced by him, like his pupil Androtion. The opening sentence of the speech reads like a thinly veiled criticism of Isocratean epideictic themes and style:

Those who praise your ancestors, Athenians, seem to me to choose a gratifying subject, but it fails to confer any advantage on those whom they are praising ... For my part, however, I shall simply try to tell you how best to make your preparations.

Thus Demosthenes announces himself as a practical politician rather than a purveyor of epideictic rhetoric. With that manifesto to fulfil, his concentration on practicalities is predictable. Considerations of justice and honour, while important, must not impede preparations for possible conflict (14.3–4). There is also a matter of emphasis: it is unnecessary to dwell for long on arguments about justice when the King of Persia, the inveterate enemy of Greece, is the main subject of concern. The analysis of

the present state of relations with him is perceptive (3–13), and from this he passes on to his proposals – the enlargement and redistribution of the tax-syndicates (*symmories*: 16–17), reorganization of equipment for the navy (18–22), manning of ships (22–23), and financial provision (24–28). He already recognizes that a major duty of a *symoulos* is to predict the likely consequences of his policies, and he assures his audience that these will be favourable. He also knows the need to provide a stirringly patriotic peroration (35–36). His first purely political speech contains the essential ingredients: the caution and thorough preparation that the situation requires, and the subordination of idealism to pragmatism at a time when the city was facing dangers on several fronts.

During the following year the Peloponnese became a possible theatre of war, alarming the men of the newly established Arcadian city of Megalopolis. The Spartans had become intent on recovering some of the power they had lost at the Battles of Leuctra and Mantinea. Demosthenes' speech *For the Megalopolitans* (16) was his contribution to the debate at which ambassadors from Arcadia and Messenia were heard. Athenian altruism, so often trumpeted in the past, gives way for a while to hard-headed self-interest. The main reason for helping Sparta's neighbours is to prevent her from recovering her former power and to keep both her and the Thebans as weak as possible (4–5). While paying lip-service to traditional sentiment by admitting that the Arcadians had fought against them at Mantinea, the Spartans on their side, he argues that present aggression by the Spartans should cancel this recent alliance because of the danger to future security that it posed. And how far should that aggression be tolerated? Until they had taken Megalopolis or until they had overcome Messene? After that they might be difficult to oppose (6–10). But Demosthenes knows that he cannot leave justice out of the argument for long because the policies and actions of cities are still determined by its demands. He thinks that the Spartans, notwithstanding their recent sharp practice, will recognize Athens' past services and even help her recover her lost territory (15–18). In trying to show the wider implications of each policy, he engages in an intricate analysis which would have been difficult for any Assembly to follow. He asks them penetrating questions, explores many alternatives, and engages in complex ratiocination. Perhaps he actually spoke like this; more likely, the text that we have is intended for the readers of the periodic discourses of Isocrates or the dialogues of Plato. He was interested in explaining to a wider audience in time and place that politics was a complicated business. In the present case, a difficult choice had to be made between Sparta and Thebes, two parties which were both behaving unjustly (25–26): 'Therefore it is in every way expedient that the Arcadians should not be abandoned, and that if they do survive, they should not seem to owe their preservation to themselves or to any other people than you' (31).

Priority of expediency over justice is even more plainly dictated by the circumstances of the speech *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* (15). From the Athenian point of view, there could be no justice in freeing the Rhodians from the oligarchy imposed by Mausolus, Satrap of Caria, since the island had seceded from their league in 355 under the very democrats who were now pleading for restoration. There was deep resentment at Athens against them. Demosthenes begins his resolution of this difficulty with a bold *captatio benevolentiae*: he pretends that the right course of action is already clear to his intelligent audience, so that his only task is to persuade them to

follow it (1). Then he points out the danger of the precedent that would be set by letting Persian influence spread, whereas preventing this now would discourage future attempts at aggrandizement (9–13). Demosthenes conducts the case against justice indirectly and subtly: while seeming to show sympathy for it by saying that the Rhodians deserve to suffer the consequences of their treachery, and even enumerating examples of it, he appeals to his audience's generosity of spirit ('you should try to save the men and let bygones be bygones', 15–16). Having thus ingratiated them further, he returns to the world of practical politics. A major advantage for Athens of restoring the Rhodian democracy is that democracies are easier to deal with than oligarchies (18). Even here Demosthenes manages to introduce a note of idealism: it would be discreditable to do nothing for the Rhodian democrats against a barbarian, and a woman, Artemisia, Queen of Caria (23), and cowardly to allow the King of Persia to continue his intrigues (24). This develops into an argument about the pitfalls awaiting those who pursue justice in individual cases at the expense of patriotism and a higher justice (26–29). But the main strand which unifies the speech is aversion to oligarchy. It is the main reason for restoring the Rhodian democrats. Also, the threat of oligarchy was a constant danger to the body politic of Athens herself. Its adherents are likened to soldiers who are willing to abandon their post in order to promote it (32–33). This becomes a major theme for him, and adds a distinctive sharpness to his deliberative oratory.

Demosthenes shared Thucydides' interest in human psychology, and he was stimulated to develop it by the fact that he was an active politician who needed to interact with the men who shaped the history of his time, and also to no small degree by his own contentious character. His *First Philippic* oration (4) made personalization a permanent feature of deliberative oratory.¹⁴ A portrait of Philip II of Macedonia emerges early: he is an insecure and therefore dangerous tyrant (4.8), hyperactive and unstable (9). Against such an enemy there is no time to consider questions of right and wrong, and considerations of expediency require no debate. The third deliberative *topos*, possibility, which is mentioned by Anaximenes (*Rhet. Alex.* 1421b) and Aristotle (*Rhet.* 2.1392a), but not thoroughly explored, receives its fullest exposition in the *Philippics* and *Olynthiacs*. The Butlerian definition of politics as 'the art of the possible' receives a thorough exposition in these speeches. The situation in which Philip's advances had placed the Athenians by the year 351, the probable date of the *First Philippic*, seemed to Demosthenes to demand immediate action. He felt that he had to engender a new sense of urgency and tried to achieve this by three means: argument, exhortation, and practical logistic recommendations, which were the bread-and-butter of the *topos* of possibility. He prepares his ground by assuring his audience that Philip is not as unchallengeable as he may seem, and that his real strength has not yet been tested. He is not secure in his own dominion, but his dissatisfied subjects need positive action from the Athenians to encourage their opposition to him and to take advantage of it (8–12). Demosthenes has thus put his audience in the right frame of mind to listen to his practical measures, and these form the core of the speech (13–22). They are followed by a reasoned explanation (23–27) and an assessment of their cost (28–29).

Certain stylistic features of the *First Philippic* are new in extant deliberative oratory. The use of direct speech (10–11: 'Is there any news? ... Is Philip dead? ... He certainly isn't, but he's ill') has occasionally been effective in forensic speeches (e.g.,

Lys. 32.9, 13, 15–17), and Demosthenes, who wrote and delivered speeches for the courts before and after he became a politician, did more than anyone else to break down the false boundaries between the genres of oratory. He also introduced literary colour by means of simile (40):

You always wage war against Philip in the same way as a barbarian boxes. For, when struck, the barbarian clutches the stricken spot, and if you hit him somewhere else, there go his hands. He neither knows how to defend himself nor how to look his enemy in the eye, nor does he wish to do either.

Here the paradox of fighting the barbarian Philip in the barbarian's own style will not have been lost on his audience. Earlier (26) he has likened the appointment of Athenian officers to the creation of clay puppets, because they function only on ceremonial occasions. This serves to animate one of his main themes – the need for Athens to mobilize its citizen-army rather than relying on mercenaries. The urgency of this receives the required emphasis through rhetorical questions: 'Shall we not man the fleet ourselves? Shall we not march out with at least a proportion of our own citizens in the army, now if never before? Shall we not sail against his territory?' (44).

Philip's ambitions were not curbed by Demosthenes' attempts to arouse the Athenians. But when, in 349, Olynthian ambassadors came with news that he had begun attacking their city, they reacted promptly, and when Demosthenes came forward to deliver his first *Olynthiac* speech (1) they already had before them logistical proposals, itemized and costed (1.20). He came forward and set the debate on a higher mental plane by introducing at the outset (2) the idea of *kairos* ('opportunity'),¹⁵ calling upon the Athenians 'almost with an audible voice'. But the precise nature of the *kairos* requires careful analysis. Philip is clever at disguising his moves, and moreover enjoys the executive advantages of sole command; but he has shown his intentions by his treatment of the men of Amphipolis and Pydna (3–5), and this should stiffen determination to resist him, which the orator seeks to affirm by exhortation (6):

Make up your minds; rouse your spirits; put your heart into the war, now or never. Pay your contributions cheerfully; serve in person; leave nothing to chance.

This exhortation is repeated in Section 24. Before that the urgency of the situation is maintained, with further reference to Philip's hyperactivity (12–13), leading to the prospect, in the absence of action by the Athenians, of Philip arriving in Attica (15). But Demosthenes is careful not to lead his audience into panic, and he guards against this by outlining measures to meet the danger (17–18), adding reassurance in the form of an unfavourable assessment of Philip's position (21–22).

This is developed at greater length in the *Second Olynthiac* (2). Whereas the *First Olynthiac* has a strong hortatory element, the second explicitly eschews highly-charged oratory, and he explicitly chooses not to dwell on Philip's successes (3–4). Instead he delivers an argument which has an old-fashioned moral tone, concluding that the wrongs which Philip has done to those who have trusted him in the past will be his eventual undoing: 'It is impossible, Athenians, to gain lasting power by injustice, perjury, and falsehood' (10). But those who are now threatened by him

still need to know that Athens will come to their aid (11–13). The centrepiece of the speech is a critical analysis, more thorough than that in the previous speech, of Philip's autocracy (14–21), which is represented as motivated by ambitions not shared by his subjects. Like tyrants before him, he is inhibited by his own jealousy and insecurity from using the talents of his ablest men, and so his court contains only toadies and boon-companions. These passages affirm Demosthenes' purpose of writing instructively about politics and history, not merely preserving his own reputation. The *Third Olynthiac* (3) seems designed to summarize its two predecessors, while being concerned mainly with domestic politics.

After Olynthus had fallen and later still after Philip had forced upon the Athenians the humiliating terms of the Peace of Philocrates in 346, Demosthenes was compelled to rein in his aggressive instincts. The speech *On the Peace* (5) is characterized by small scale and subdued tone as he looks towards an uncertain future. In it he seems primarily concerned with securing his own continued role as *symboloulos*. Nevertheless he succeeds in landing some useful blows on his opponents (5–7).

The *Second Philippic* (6) was delivered in response to renewed activity by Philip in the two years following the Peace of Philocrates. He had been careful to avoid overt infringement of its terms, and had even felt confident enough to complain of unwarranted Athenian hostility. Demosthenes had no alternative but to be equally circumspect. The tone of the speech is reasoned rather than inflammatory, moderating his now familiar reproaches of Athenian reluctance to act. Since there is nothing specific to counter, general charges against Philip have to suffice; and in the absence of the need for immediate measures, arguments about justice and a change in moral attitudes find their natural place. But these arguments start from the premise that there has been no change in Philip's ambitions, only in his recognition of the Athenians' commitment, which other states do not share, to the cause of Greek freedom (8–12). He notes that some of these states, after enjoying short-lived advantages from Philip's injustices, have suffered betrayal and ruin after ignoring the warnings of Demosthenes (20–27), 'so much does the pleasure and ease of the moment prevail over what is likely to be of longer-term benefit' (27). The speech turns to the insidious and growing internal danger from men on Philip's payroll (30–34) and ends on a note of grim foreboding, but with no concrete recommendations.

In 342 attention was drawn to the Chersonese. This peninsula flanking the Hellespont to the north was of vital strategic and commercial interest to both Philip and Athens. The latter had sent Diopeithes there with a party of cleruchs in 343/2, but left him to find his own sources of money, while Philip pursued his own interests without flagrant violations of the Peace, and listened sympathetically to complaints from those who were suffering from Diopeithes' exactions. In the debate on this situation, Demosthenes was once more unable to point to any new infringement by Philip. He was therefore forced to argue that the fact that nothing had changed was enough to require action. The speech *On the Chersonnese* (8) emphasizes this in forthright language. Philip is still 'our national enemy' (3) and the Athenians have the 'just and righteous task' to defend themselves against the 'aggressor' (7). It contains more dire and extravagant predictions than earlier speeches, and more live speech to dramatize these and to characterize those who favour passivity. Furthermore, Philip's plans and attitudes are represented as reality (39):

Firstly, Athenians, you must fix this firmly in your minds, that Philip is waging war with the city and has broken the peace: you must stop wrangling with one another about that. He is ill-disposed and hostile to the city and to its very foundations – and, I will add, to every man in it, even to those who think they enjoy his greatest favour . . . he is set on the destruction of our free constitution.

In Demosthenes' speeches against Philip, arguments about justice are concerned less with weighing right and wrong than with speaking with conviction and emotion from an already established position. And now, after excoriating them in 343 in his speech against Aeschines, *On the Embassy* (19), he is more openly hostile towards Philip's alleged sponsors, who should be 'abominated and crucified' (61). Deliberative oratory has become the medium for a personal voice, and the speaker's concern for his own standing colours his whole presentation of his counsel.

These features are very pronounced in the *Third Philippic* (9). Now, in 341, emphasis is laid on Philip's actions, not his words or supposed intentions. Instances of his duplicity in the Chalcidice, Phocis, Thessaly, and nearer to Athens in Euboea and Megara, are accompanied by intense personal attack. Philip is like a spreading disease (29); and he is not even a respectable barbarian, but 'a pestilent knave from Macedonia, whence it was not even possible to buy a decent slave' (31). The catalogue of Philip's incursions and annexations (32–35) serves to illustrate vividly the principle that unchallenged ambition will grow indefinitely, and to underline the argument that the problem he posed was pan-Hellenic, and required the revival of a pan-Hellenic psyche, which the Athenians once possessed. This was the point of the example of Arthmius of Zelea (41–45), who forfeited his rights because he conveyed Persian gold not to Athens, where he was a privileged resident, but to the Peloponnese. The Athenians regarded his offence against other Greeks with the same abhorrence as if it had been against their own city.

A united Greek front, for which Demosthenes worked assiduously in these years, was essential, because Philip was a new kind of enemy who could implement the innovations that had been made in the arts of war (47), in respect of timing, armaments, tactics, and training (48–52). Embedded in this description is another factor which Demosthenes would not let his audience forget, and which had the effect of diluting the efforts of every state affected by it: 'most disasters are due to traitors, and none is the result of a regular pitched battle' (49). The hyperbole underlines the importance he attaches to this factor. All countermeasures against Philip, however well conceived, will be futile if 'the enemy within' is given free rein (53–55). Their activities have ruined other states (56–62), frustrating the good politicians' plans for their defence. They can do this because they can offer seductive inducements to the citizens which apparently free them from their patriotic duties; whereas the true statesman 'cannot say something agreeable, because he is obliged to consider the safety of the state' (63). The nautical imagery in the following parable is apt, being addressed to an audience whose navy is now useless against a terrestrial super-power (69):

While the vessel is safe, whether it be a large or small, then is the time for the sailor and the helmsman and everyone in his turn to show his mettle, and to take care that it is not capsized, deliberately or not, by anyone; but when the sea has overwhelmed it, zeal is useless.

Demosthenes now introduces his own measures with a solemn promise that they are for the true benefit of the city (70). Alliances remain for him the key to success, but they must be matched with domestic self-sacrifice by men whose past history had singled them out as champions of Greek freedom (74–75). The *Third Philippic* is Demosthenes' most accomplished speech; it was also his most effective in that it led to provision and action, and it finally established him as Athens' leading statesman as the city prepared for the final showdown with Philip.

Two phases may be discerned in the development of symbouleutic oratory. In the fifth century, historians provide the only surviving examples of it. For Thucydides, speeches were intellectual exercises which served to describe the reasoning that led to decisions, to provide literary variety and dramatization, portraying the prevalent mood, and showing the interaction between his speakers and their audiences. Most of Xenophon's speakers would have been recognizable to those who attended political assemblies in the first half of the fourth century. But the wider circulation of political discourse, stimulated by the school of Isocrates, together with the multiplying dangers and emergencies that threatened the city-state, produced, in the speeches of Demosthenes, and to a lesser extent those of Aeschines, Lycurgus, Hyperides and Dinarchus, a new kind of symbouleutic oratory. It drew upon a rich and colourful treasury of literary devices to arouse patriotic emotions, and also sympathy with the speaker, as he justified his policies even when they led to disaster, and at the same time invited his readers to think more deeply about their history and about their future decisions as participants in their democracy.

Bibliographical Essay

Symbouleutic oratory receives little attention from F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit* (Leipzig: 1887–98) before Demosthenes (Vol.3.i). The remarks of R.C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus I* (London: 1893), pp. cxxviii–cxxxvii refer to no texts. G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 203–206, describes its early status succinctly, as does M.J. Edwards, *The Attic Orators* (Bristol: 1994), p. 4. S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), examines deliberative speeches in chronological order at pp. 38, 42, 48–51, 68–69, 191–243. Isocrates' subject-matter and the *topoi* he employs are the same as those found in symbouleutic oratory, but his discourses are epideictic, for he is a teacher and not a statesman. However, his relationship with Demosthenes is an important and relevant subject, and may provide the answer to the question of why Demosthenes decided to publish his most influential political speeches. It is sidelined in the main studies, such as J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London: 1976), G.L. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London: 1978) and R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and His Time: A Study in Defeat* (Oxford: 1993). M.M. Markle, 'Support of Athenian Intellectuals for Philip: A Study of Isocrates' *Philippus* and Speusippus' *Letter to Philip*', *JHS* 96 (1976), pp. 80–99, gives useful background to their differences, but there is room for a thorough examination of these. Relevant to this chapter is Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), especially R.D. Milns' chapter 'The Public Speeches of Demosthenes' (pp. 205–223). Demosthenes' oratory is sensitively analysed by L. Pearson, *The Art of Demosthenes* (Meisenheim an Glan:

1976; repr. Ann Arbor: 1981). G. Ronnet, *Étude sur le Style de Démosthène dans les Discours Politiques* (Paris: 1951), is still the best study of his style. A full study of his style awaits a scholar with the time and the expertise.

Notes

- 1 Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.4.7–13 1359b–60a, has an overlapping list: ways and means (*poroi*), war and peace, the defence of the country, imports and exports, and legislation. Likewise, *Rhetoric to Alexander* 2 1423a lists religious ritual, legislation, the form of the constitution, alliances and treaties, war and peace, and finance.
- 2 See H.L. Hudson-Williams, 'Political Speeches in Athens', *CQ*² 1 (1951), pp. 68–73, who gives the evidence for this, but also warns against deducing from it that deliberative speeches were unprepared (on p. 71).
- 3 See M. Lavency, *Aspects de la logographie judiciaire attique* (Louvain: 1964).
- 4 For a stylistic appreciation, see J.D. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style* (Oxford: 1952), pp. 14–15.
- 5 See M.J. Edwards, *Greek Orators IV: Andocides* (Warminster: 1995), pp. 105–129, 194–205.
- 6 The pioneering study is K. Jost, 'Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren bei den attischen Rednern bis Demosthenes', *Rhetorische Studien* 19 (Paderborn: 1936). Other studies: L. Pearson, 'Historical Allusions in the Attic Orators', *CP* 36 (1941), pp. 209–229, S. Perlman, 'The Historical Example, its Use and Importance as Political Propaganda in the Attic Orators', *Scripta Hierosolymitana* 7 (1961), pp. 150–166, M. Nouhaud, *L'Utilisation de l'Histoire par les Orateurs Attiques* (Paris: 1982), Ian Worthington, 'History and Oratorical Exploitation', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 109–129.
- 7 On the justification of Athenian imperialism, see J. De Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (Oxford: 1963), especially pp. 242–310.
- 8 See M. Heath, 'Justice in Thucydides' Athenian Speeches', *Historia* 39 (1990), pp. 385–400.
- 9 E. Vorrenhagen, *De Orationibus quae sunt in Xenophontis Hellenicis* (Diss. Elberfeld: 1926) and V.J. Gray, *The Character of Xenophon's Hellenica* (London: 1989). A modern study of the speeches is needed.
- 10 Especially the personalities of men who embodied his ideals of leadership, on which see N. Wood, 'Xenophon's Theory of Leadership', *Cl. & Med.* 25 (1964), pp. 33–66.
- 11 According to Plato (*Protagoras* 318e–319a), that fifth-century sophist undertook to teach a pupil to 'manage the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as a speaker and man of action'. Career-politicians (*rhētores*) were already addressing the Assembly in Cleon's time: Aristoph. *Acharnians* 38, 680, *Knights* 60, 358; see further Ian Worthington, Chapter 17.
- 12 On Isocrates, see especially T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6.
- 13 On Demosthenes' early speeches and their political context, see E. Badian, 'The Road to Prominence', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 9–44.
- 14 See T.B.L. Webster, *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens* (London: 1956), pp. 47, 98–100.
- 15 See S. Usher, 'Kairos in Fourth-Century Greek Oratory', in M.J. Edwards and C. Reid (eds.), *Oratory in Action* (Manchester: 2004), pp. 52–61.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

Epideictic Oratory

Christopher Carey

1 Dividing the Corpus

Though the division of oratory into three types (*eidē*) according to function is first attested in Aristotle and Anaximenes in the fourth century, both the division¹ and the labels are derived from existing trends in oratorical practice. Fourth century rhetoric codified but did not create the categories.² The recognition that different modes of argument suit different spheres is already visible in Thucydides' account of the debate about the fate of the rebel city of Mytilene, where Diodotus complains that his opponent Cleon is treating a policy debate as though it were a trial (3.44).³ His protest is itself a rhetorical ploy to change the terms of the debate, but for its effect it draws on a shared recognition of the goals and methods appropriate to different contexts. Similarly, in our earliest encounters with the funeral oration (the most prominent of the forms of epideictic oratory) we detect inherent principles of form and overt trends in content which are clearly understood by speaker and audience, if nowhere articulated – or perceived – as a set of objective rules.

These categories were serviceable enough to stand for centuries after Aristotle. As a general approach to Greek oratory the division is useful, but it has limitations. Like any attempt at taxonomy in literary genres, by imposing firm boundaries it ignores the flexibility of and fluidity between literary forms in living traditions. It is particularly misleading if we try to apply Aristotelian categories to earlier oratory. Aristotle distinguishes the types as follows:

The concern of counsel/advice (*symbolē*) is partly exhortation, partly dissuasion. For in every case people who offer private advice and people who speak in public on civic issues do one or the other of these. The concern of the lawsuit is partly accusation, partly defence. For inevitably people in dispute do either of these. The concern of display is partly praise and partly blame.⁴

This emphasis on praise and blame as the focus of epideictic oratory excludes fake forensic speeches from this class, except for speeches located in mythical trials. This means that works written for fictitious trials such as Antiphon's *Tetralogies* (speeches addressing a series of invented cases from the opposing standpoint of prosecution and defence), which are in a real sense epideictic, must be shoe-horned into the judicial class. In defining the genre the fourth century rhetoricians narrowed it. Moreover, as we shall see below, the categories are not watertight; there is movement between them.

2 Oratory as 'Display'

The third of Aristotle's generic terms is derived from the Greek noun *epideixis*, whose nearest equivalents in English are 'display', 'show', 'demonstration'.⁵ The label indicates that this kind of oratory differs from the other two in having no immediate practical outcome. Both the court and the Assembly must reach decisions, and winning and losing bring visible practical consequences. This gives epideictic oratory an ambiguous status. The terminology itself makes the activity sound frivolous in English, largely because our culture sets so little store by formal public speaking. In Greek too as in English 'show' very easily shades into 'show off'. Lysias has the prosecutor of the younger Alcibiades upbraid the generals for using the defence of a criminal to demonstrate their influence (14.21). Diodotus accuses Cleon obliquely of taking money to make aggressive speeches and demonstrate his ability or influence (Thuc. 3.42). He is responding to an allegation of Cleon's that his opponents are engaged in a rhetorical competition in cleverness. In these passages the objection is not to *epideixis* but to *epideixis* in the wrong context. But 'display' or 'demonstration' oratory could also be dismissed in Athens – irrespective of context – as trivial or self-serving in comparison with the other two categories. Isocrates observes (5.26):

Yet I'm not unaware of the immense difference between speeches delivered with a view to persuasion and those which are read, nor that everyone assumes that the former are concerned with serious matters which require urgent debate and the latter have been written for display (*epideixis*) and profit.

Though he is referring specifically to written speeches, the antithesis between display and seriousness is more general. Blanket dismissal of *epideixis* of this sort is especially common in Isocrates (cf. 4.17, 12.271, 15.147), who is concerned to stress the educational value of his training in contrast to the posturing of others.⁶ But despite his sometimes dismissive tone, Isocrates was perfectly happy to practice epideictic oratory. He took it seriously. So did other teachers of the art of speaking. Absence of urgency of context or immediacy of outcome does not mean absence of practical goals. In the case of the funeral oration, speeches classed as display had an important role to play in social definition. Other speeches in this category had an important place in rhetorical education, as a demonstration of methods of argumentation.⁷ Epideictic oratory was a serious pursuit.

The rise of epideictic oratory is a natural result of the new prominence of prose in Greek culture during the classical period. Oratory is already a prized skill in our earliest sources. Hence Agenor's admiration for Odysseus' speech to the Trojans during the Greek embassy to persuade them to surrender Helen and the treasure stolen by Paris

described in the *Iliad* (3.221–224). In other archaic sources as well the pleasure provided by good speaking is comparable to that derived from song and music. The speech of Adrastus, the type of good speaking for Tyrtaeus (fr. 12.8 West),⁸ is described as *meilichogērus*, soft-spoken or pleasing/soothing in speech. The adjective *ligys*, literally ‘shrill’, applied repeatedly in Homer to effective speakers (*Iliad* 1.248, 2.246, 19.82), is also applied to the Muse (*Odyssey* 24.62, *Homeric Hymn* 14.2, etc.), the lyre (*Iliad* 9.186, 18.569, *Odyssey* 8.67, 105, 254, etc.), a pleasing singing voice (Hesiod, fr.150.33). But despite the importance of oratory in the Homeric Assembly and also in (at least some) lawsuits (*Odyssey* 11. 545) and its continuing importance in all archaic states, regardless of political colouring, prose never had the status of verse. In a world without a book trade, ideas needed to be in verse in order to survive. Hence the fact that the Athenian politician Solon at the beginning of the sixth century puts so much of his political thought in poetic form; hence also the fact that his version of events at the end of the sixth century has imposed itself on posterity. The fifth century is a watershed for Greek literary forms, in that prose steadily emerges as a rival to poetry, through the work of the Ionian logographers, through the growth in technical writing, and through the study of rhetoric, which in turn led to an enhanced status both for rhetoricians and for oratory. Though the increased sense of speaking as teachable technique brought some anxieties like all technical and cultural change, in this case anxieties about the prominence of an art which (as both prose and verse sources demonstrate) has the potential to reward verbal skill without consideration of moral purpose, another result of the birth of rhetoric was an informed audience with an interest in speeches for educational purposes as a preparation for intervention in public life and more generally an appreciation of skill in speaking. In the case of deliberative and judicial oratory, the impact of the age of the sophists may systematize but it does not create the art form. But oratory as display owes its existence to the new recognition of the full potential of prose.

Part of this process is the emergence of opportunities for oratory as performance. There had always been competitions in poetry and music at civic and panhellenic festivals, for instance in the dithyramb at Athens or in flute playing at the Pythian games. Perhaps most relevant in the present context (because it involves solo performances by the human voice) is the rhapsodic competition at the Panathenaea in Athens involving recitations of Homer. But by the last quarter of the fifth century there were opportunities for declamation at the panhellenic athletic festivals. We have small fragments of an Olympic speech (*Olympikos*) by Gorgias and he is also credited with a speech delivered at the Pythian festival at Delphi (*Pythios*). We have a part of a speech from early in the fourth century allegedly delivered by Lysias at Olympia (33). The practice is alluded to by Isocrates (5.5, 13, 15.147). There was no formal organization and no prizes (Isoc. 4.3), but there was a vast audience available drawn from the whole of the Greek world, and the persistence of the practice indicates that enough were ready to listen to make it worthwhile for leading intellectuals to devote time and effort to writing a speech and travelling to the festivals. So Isocrates can write (*Letter* 1.6):

In addition this too is clear to everyone, that the festivals suit those in need of display (*eideixis*) – for each can broadcast his own powers there to the largest audience – but those who want to achieve something practical should speak to the person who is to carry out the acts disclosed in the speech.

Within Athens the most important opportunity for declamation was at the state funeral for the war dead, to which we shall return shortly. As well as these authorized events, there was from the late fifth century a ready audience for privately organized performances, like the one by Gorgias that is represented as preceding the dialogue that bears his name (Pl. *Gorgias* 447a). And some of these *epideixeis* will have been performances of the model speeches produced by the sophists to demonstrate rhetorical technique.⁹ At Thucydides 3.38.7, Cleon alludes to such occasions sneeringly when he compares the Assembly to ‘observers of the sophists’ (*sophistōn theatai*). Wealthy Athenians were prepared to host such events (as we know from Plato’s *Protagoras*)¹⁰ And audiences were willing to pay. Certainly the sophist Prodicus could charge up to fifty drachmas a time for his lectures (at least according to Pl. *Cratylus* 384b). The opportunity for *epideixis* was expanded with the rise of the book trade. By the late fifth century there was a market for books in Athens, both verse and prose, including oratory.¹¹ The book trade expanded still further in the fourth century. This opened up the prospect of extending the audience for a speech which had been delivered (by subsequent publication with or without revision) and also of creating speeches entirely for a reading audience, either written texts masquerading as real speeches or texts which use the tropes of real speeches but make no secret of the fact that they were always and only meant to be read.¹²

Epideictic oratory does not seek to win a political or courtroom debate and there is no formal decision that marks out success or failure. It does, however, like the other forms of oratory, seek to persuade. It may be entertaining – an anecdote has Prodicus assert that if his audience was flagging at one of his less costly lectures he would throw in a gem from his fifty drachma session to keep them attentive (Arist. *Rhet.* 1415b) – but its goal is not solely to entertain. It is intended to demonstrate ability. In a society that values public speaking it enhances the status of the speaker. This is thus a highly competitive activity.¹³ The element of competition is stressed in the funeral speech ascribed to Lysias (2.1–2):

If I thought it possible, you who are present at this burial, to make clear in speech the courage of the men who lie here, I would criticize those who gave instructions to speak in their honour at a few days’ notice. But since for all mankind all time would not be enough to prepare a speech equal to their deeds, I think that the city gave the order at short notice out of concern for those who speak here, in the belief that in this way they would be most likely to be forgiven by their listeners. However, though my speech is about these men, my contest is not with their deeds but with those who have spoken in their honour previously.

Despite (or arguably because of) the explicit disclaimer, the pressure on the speaker (no less real for being exaggerated for effect) is evident. As the text notes,¹⁴ the audience are measuring the speech against the honorands (as we all do with all laudatory speeches) to see if it adequately expresses the collective view of their merits. Alongside this synchronic evaluation there is a diachronic judgement, the more challenging because for the audience the comparators are not consulted on paper but seen through the aggrandizing eye of individual and collective memory.¹⁵ The speaker is compared with all who have ever spoken at such an event, a comparison tacitly acknowledged by the generic allusion within the funeral oration (see below, pp. 243–245).

The competitive element is as marked an element of other areas for oratorical *epideixis*. Some speeches viewed as ‘display/demonstration pieces’ (*epideixeis*) by their contemporaries were written essentially as advertising (this is what Isocrates means by *ergolabia* – profit – in 5.26, quoted above). Aeschines gives the clearest insight into the process (1.173–174):¹⁶

For I’m told he declares to them, drumming up business at your expense, that without your noticing he will shift the ground of debate and your attention; that he will bring confidence to the defendant the moment he appears in court and reduce the accuser to panic and fear for himself; that he will summon such loud and hostile heckling from the jurors by dragging in my political speeches and criticizing the peace which was brought about through me and Philocrates that I will not even turn up in court to defend myself, when I submit to audit for my service as envoy; I’ll be content if I receive a moderate punishment and am not condemned to death!

The verb I translate as ‘drumming up business’ is *ergolabeisthai*, literally ‘acquire work’. Demosthenes is giving a display of the skills he can teach in order to attract or keep pupils. The allegation is false; but it is still revealing. Aeschines is describing a judicial speech. But fictive speeches could serve the same purpose, as Isocrates stresses in the case of the encomium to Busiris written by the early fourth century rhetorician Polycrates, which Isocrates sees as a display of what his teaching can offer to his pupils (11.47). And the trade was competitive; a successful teacher like Isocrates could attract pupils from all over Greece (Isoc. 15.146). This element of competition is most clearly demonstrated by Isocrates, who having criticized the *Busiris* of Polycrates explicitly offers his own encomium as an example of how it should be done (11.9). He does exactly the same in his praise of Helen. Here the competitive element is still more to the fore, since the predecessor he singles out for criticism is the fifth century rhetorical master Gorgias (according to tradition one of his teachers,¹⁷ hence perhaps the more gentle manner of criticism). In almost identical terms to those used in 11.9, he offers his own praise of Helen as a corrective to that of Gorgias. In the same spirit we find Alcidas (another pupil of Gorgias, according to the entry on him in the medieval *Suda* lexicon) writing a speech for delivery by Odysseus in the prosecution of Palamedes at Troy; it can hardly be coincidence that Gorgias had written a defence speech for Palamedes.

Thus though the outcomes of epideictic oratory have none of the urgency of the other two categories, the stakes for the speaker are still high, in terms of public standing and (sometimes) profit.

3 The Funeral Speech

No institution better illustrates the status of prose oratory than the Athenian funeral speech (*epitaphios logos*).¹⁸ The general custom in ancient Greece was to bury the dead on the field of battle. The Athenians however burned their dead and brought the remains home. They then held a state funeral at the end of each war year for those who had died in battle for the city, for which our best source is Thucydides.¹⁹ In his account of the end of the first year of the war (2.34) he says:

In the same winter the Athenians following their ancestral custom gave a funeral at public cost to those who had first died in this war in the following manner. Three days beforehand they erect a tent and lay out the bones of the dead; and each person brings to their relatives any offerings they please. When the funeral procession takes place, wagons carry cypress coffins, one for each tribe; the bones of the dead are placed in the coffin of their tribe. One empty bier is carried decked for the missing, those who could not be recovered. Any citizen or stranger who wishes joins in the funeral: and the female relatives are there to lament at the burial. They put them in the public burial ground [*dēmosion sēma*] in the most beautiful suburb of the city, and in this they always bury the war dead, except for those slain at Marathon, whom they buried on the spot because they judged their valour extraordinary. After they cover the bodies with earth, a man chosen by the *polis*, who is deemed to be intelligent and of pre-eminent reputation, pronounces over them a suitable praise; after which all disperse.

Thucydides describes an event that combines public and private, family and state ceremony. The funeral is augmented by three distinctive features: the funeral oration spoken over the dead, the use of a communal burial site for all the dead (though this could be regarded as again an extension of the concept of the family), and the funeral games held in their honour. The event is a remarkable hijacking of the trappings of elite honour for the democracy. These dead men individually are ordinary Athenian citizens. Yet collectively they receive a level of honour that in an earlier period – or in some other states – would be reserved for a very small privileged group. The appropriation is especially by the celebration of funeral games, noted by Lysias (2.80):

For they are buried at public cost, and competitions of strength and wisdom and wealth are held in their honour, on the principle that those who die in war deserve to receive the same honours as the immortals.

These games are a remarkable phenomenon. They take us into the world not just of the early aristocrat (like the funeral contests for Amphidamas in Euboea in which Hesiod competed, *Works and Days* 654–657) but also that of the hero (on which Amphidamas' games were probably modelled), like the funeral games for Patroclus in *Iliad* 23 or the games for Pelias celebrated in Greek myth. Within this larger appropriation, the funeral oration makes its own territorial gain. The funeral oration like the games has its roots in much earlier practice. We do not know how far back this particular practice goes. But it has very illustrious antecedents. Originally lyric poetry was the medium for ornate celebration of the dead, and we have examples of the commissioning of distinguished lyric poets to produce laments in praise of aristocrats and rulers for public choral performance. The Athenian funeral oration appropriates the role previously played by such laments and places those who die for the democratic *polis* on the same level as the aristocratic dead of former generations. This kinship and rivalry is acknowledged in the speeches themselves, which often speak of poetic treatment of the themes (see below).

The funeral oration in Athens developed into a distinctive genre, with all that the term implies, that is a recognizable but flexible set of characteristics (never explicitly defined but always implicitly present), a recurrent set of themes, and a relationship between artist and audience which is based on the mutual recognition of these elements and an acceptance that success lies in the effective deployment and redefinition of those

elements to make something simultaneously familiar and original. Our evidence for the genre is a strange farrago of speeches, only one of which is unambiguously and directly derived (with or without revision) from a speech actually uttered. The unambiguously genuine (in the dual sense that it was written by its putative author and for its avowed context) example is the fragmentary speech of Hyperides for the dead of the Lamian War (6). The others all come with a health warning, though collectively they are still very informative about the characteristics of the genre.

Fittingly for a genre which is invariably ornate, one of our earliest sources is a fragment of Gorgias, whose elaborate style lent itself so readily to speaking on ceremonial occasions and who preferred set piece speeches to other kinds of oratory. Since distinguished citizens delivered funeral orations and Gorgias was an alien, his speech is – and was – self-evidently a rhetorical exercise rather than a speech written for a state funeral.

From the same period we have the most famous example of the genre, the funeral speech that Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles in the second book of his history (2.35–46). The relationship between the speeches in Thucydides and those actually delivered is contentious. But we do not need to hold ‘Pericles’ to his every word, merely to accept that the broad tenor of the speech has been reproduced.

The second speech in modern editions of Lysias affects to have been delivered for the dead in the Corinthian War in the late 390s. As a metic, Lysias could never have delivered the speech himself, while the Athenian principle of selecting a distinguished speaker makes it unlikely that an active politician chosen to deliver the speech would have hired a speechwriter in an age when speeches were generally bought for the court, not for contexts of public debate or display.²⁰ So we cannot be sure that the speech was written at the date or for the events it appears to commemorate. It could be an exercise. If it is a genuine funeral speech, its author may have been the Athenian chosen to make the speech. Certainly it was written by someone familiar with the Athenian funeral oration and with the topography of the Cerameicus (2.63). So it is a useful guide to Athenian practice in the *epitaphios logos*.

We also have funeral oration spoken by Socrates in Plato’s *Menexenus* and allegedly learned from Pericles’ mistress Aspasia. If this dialogue is really by Plato, some of it at least must be tongue-in-cheek, since the enthusiasm for democracy evidenced in the funeral speech is at odds with the views of Plato’s Socrates elsewhere and those of Plato himself. But again, questions of authenticity (and purpose) do not diminish the usefulness as evidence for generic trends.

The same applies to the funeral oration that survives in the medieval corpus of Demosthenes, printed in modern editions as Speech 60. This purports to be the speech that we know Demosthenes to have delivered for the dead of the Battle of Chaeronea in 338. Its authorship was already suspected by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Demosthenes* 23, 44) in the first century, and many modern writers are disinclined to accept it as the genuine work of Demosthenes.²¹ It contains some nice Demosthenic turns of phrase, and it follows a markedly Demosthenic line about the role of destiny in the Athenian defeat. The author knew his Demosthenes. The work rises to some fine moments but it is structurally weak and often flat. These sources are supplemented by the praise of Athens in Isocrates’ *Panegyricus* and *Panathenaicus*, which clearly draw on the same encomiastic tradition and so help to confirm the generic status of specific elements in the surviving funeral speeches.

From this collection of texts,²² sometimes by inclusion, sometimes by the explicit refusal to treat themes that the audience are expecting, we gain a sense both of the purpose and of the distinctive features of the funeral oration. Though its obvious function is to praise the dead, which it does, like all funerary activity the *epitaphios logos* is more for the living than for the dead.²³ While commemorating the achievements of the specific honorandi, it locates them in a larger tradition and in the process defines the group present at the event, in this case the whole *polis* (at least in theory). It thus becomes an act of collective self-definition and self-assertion. This is the task of persuasion for the speaker of the funeral oration. He must present that collective self-image in a way that is inherently convincing and so conducive to the general sense of identity and of shared purpose. To be effective, praise must be specific, and so the funeral oration has a pronounced narrative element. All societies have their myths about their past and about their defining values. And such elements of self-definition are especially important in times of war and consequent loss, to assert the value of the culture for which the war is fought and confirm that the price paid by the dead and the living is worth paying.²⁴ In the case of the *epitaphios logos* this involves a narrative which combines events from the mythic past with events from (predominantly fifth century) history, both told to create a coherent image and therefore both in essence mythical, since not only is the historical past filtered for suitable events but those events in turn are told in a way which by selective treatment conforms with the message of the encomium.

There are certain elements that recur, sometimes in a perfunctory way, sometimes treated at greater length. Among the mythic events favoured, the invasion of the Amazons recurs often (Isoc. 4.68, 70, 12.193, Pl. *Menexenus* 239b, Lys. 2.4–6, [Dem.] 60.8). Unsurprisingly, the story is never taken back to possible antecedents, always instead commencing with the Amazon attack on Athens to make them invaders. This invasion is sometimes complemented by the attack of the Thracians under Eumolpus (Isoc. 4.68, 12.193, Pl. *Menexenus* 239b, [Dem.] 60.8). Also popular are myths that present the complementary side of Athens (equally popular in tragedy) as protector of the weak, the episode of the bodies of the heroes who fought in the expedition of the seven against Thebes (Lys. 2.7–10, Pl. *Menexenus* 239b, [Dem.] 60.8), and the protection of the children of Heracles (Lys. 2.11–16, Isoc. 4.56, 12.194, Pl. *Menexenus* 239b, [Dem.] 60.8). When the narrative moves on to the historical period, again we find favoured incidents. The Battle of Marathon of 490 recurs (Lys. 2.20–26, Isoc. 12.195, Pl. *Menexenus* 240c, etc.),²⁵ unsurprisingly, since already in fifth century comedy it is semi-mythologized. The Battle of Salamis of 480 is found at Lysias 2.27–43 and Plato, *Menexenus* 241a, etc., and that of Plataea in 478 at Plato, *Menexenus* 241c and Lysias 2.46–47. Beyond this point there is more divergence over specific incidents selected for treatment. Thus the civil war of 403 is used at Lysias 2.61–65 and Plato, *Menexenus* 244a, but not by other sources. These two speeches contain a more substantial narrative of fifth century history, embracing the so-called Fifty Years (between Plataea and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 (Pl. *Menexenus* 241e ff., Lys. 2.48–53)²⁶ and even the Peloponnesian war itself, though Lysias 2 views the war solely through the implications of Athens' defeat while Plato includes specific incidents. It is important here to note that apart from the individual desire for originality each speech is shaped by its period. At the end of the fifth century and into the fourth the defeat at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 with its aftermath was one of the great defining events.

In addition to recurrent incidents, we find recurrent topics of praise. The tendency to place the freshly buried in the context of a larger tradition means that explicit praise of the ancestors (beyond the narration of specific incidents) figures prominently.²⁷ This is also implicit in the praise of the dead for their nature, *physis* (Pl. *Menexenus* 239a, Lys. 2.20, Hyp. 6). Another recurrent theme is autochthony (Lys. 2.17, 43, Pl. *Menexenus* 237b, Isoc. 4.24, 12.124, Hyp. 6.7, [Dem.] 60.4), with the native soil of Attica as mother, sometimes elaborated by the expansion of the notion of earth as nurturer of the Athenians and more generally of the human race (Lys. 2.18, Pl. *Menexenus* 237b–c, [Dem.] 60.5, Isoc. 4.25).²⁸ The Athenians prided themselves on having always been there. The democratic constitution is praised (Thuc. 2.37, Pl. *Menexenus* 238b–e, Lys. 2.17–19, [Dem.] 60.27) and this is coupled with or regarded as the process of education that shaped those praised. Just as the Athenian constitution is idealized, so their foreign policy both in myth (see above) and in recorded history is presented as altruistic, based on protecting the weak from oppression (Thuc. 2.40, 4, Isoc. 4.42, Hyp. 6.4–5). Athens is persistently presented as liberator (Lys. 2.25, 35, 41, 42, 44, 47, 55, 60, 68, Isoc. 4.42, 83, 95, Hyp. 6.10, 11, 16, 19, 24, 34, 39, 40, [Dem.] 60.23).

Other themes which occur are (inevitably at a funeral) consolation for the living on their loss, which may include both a firm statement of the renown and honour won by the dead and a reminder of the care the city takes of the orphans (Thuc. 2.44, Pl. *Menexenus* 247c, Hyp. 6.41–45, Lys. 2.70–80, [Dem.] 60.32–37). In the same vein, the dead are often congratulated on the manner of their death (Thuc. 2.44.1, Lys. 2.79–81, Hyp. 6.28–31, [Dem.] 60.32–3). The renown won by the dead makes explicit the heroizing tendency of the event as a whole. Isocrates in the *Panegyricus* compares the Athenians who fought against Asia (favourably) with the heroes of the Trojan War (4.83), a comparison picked up by Hyperides (6.35–36) who applies it specifically to those who died in the Lamian War. Almost as explicit is Lysias 2.78–79, where the inevitability of death, even for those who shun battle, echoes the famous speech of Sarpedon to Glaucus in *Iliad* 12.322–328:

Man, supposing you and I, escaping this battle,
 would be able to live on forever, ageless, immortal,
 so neither would I myself go on fighting in the foremost
 nor would I urge you into the fighting where men win glory.
 But now, seeing that the spirits of death stand close about us
 in their thousands, no man can turn aside or escape them,
 let us go on and win glory for ourselves, or yield it to others (trans. Lattimore).

Also inspired by epic is the eternal renown which the dead win,²⁹ an echo of the *kleos aphthiton* ('fame undying') won by Achilles in exchange for his short life.

This is only a partial list of the recurrent features of the genre. But a brisk glance at this brief survey indicates that as with most literary genres the *epitaphios logos* is a flexible medium,³⁰ reshaped by each exponent, though always signalling the generic affiliation. The need for and claims of originality are constant themes. We find some particularly bold experiments on occasion, of which the two boldest are Hyperides and Thucydides' Pericles. The funeral oration is a collective tribute to the collective dead. Consequently the general trend is to treat current and past dead each as an

anonymous group (these men, the men lying here, the ancestors, etc.). As scholars have repeatedly emphasized, Hyperides breaks with this tradition in singling out the general of the Lamian War, Leosthenes, not merely for individual praise but as the focus for much of his speech. His awareness of the boldness of this approach is indicated by the fact that Hyperides goes out of his way to justify it (6.15–16). Equally bold is his favourable comparison (Hyperides 6.35–36) with the heroes of Troy (his probable model, Isocrates, made his comparison in a written essay, not a public oration), and with the heroes of Marathon and Salamis (6.37) in a genre that usually assimilates the current dead into the tradition rather than making them stand out in relief against it. A little over a century before, Pericles is presented by Thucydides as explicitly curtailing the praise of the achievements of previous generations (2.36.4) to focus on the Athenian constitution.

The style appropriate to oratory varies according to context and speaker. Judicial oratory for private cases avoids overt elaboration – at least from the end of the fifth century. Deliberative oratory and judicial oratory involving politically prominent people can afford to be more elaborate, most notably in its use of metaphor; but even here there is a tacit sense of a limit to audience tolerance. But epideictic oratory – and above all the funeral oration – has more freedom. Since it is written as a performance, it can afford to put on display the verbal craftsmanship that produced it. This is particularly the case with the *epitaphios logos*. The affinities of the *epitaphios logos* with the lyric *thrēnos* becomes explicit both in the self-referentiality of the genre, as the speaker constantly muses on the task of praise in a manner reminiscent of verse panegyric and especially Pindar, and in the recurrent comparison of the speaker's task with that of the poet (Lys. 2.2, Isoc. 4.82, [Dem.] 60.9). It is also visible in the space given to myth, which aligns the funeral oration with poetry (epic, lyric, tragedy) and distinguishes it and epideictic oratory more generally from other oratorical forms. The language of the funeral oration is often 'marked' to a degree not found in (most) courtroom or Assembly speeches. Thus ornate or hyperbolic metaphors which would be out of place in other contexts are freely used, as in the elaboration of the notion of the soil as mother (noted above), or when in Lysias 2.60 we are told that Greece should cut its hair in mourning for the Athenian dead of the Peloponnesian War and that the liberty of Greece was buried with them, or at [Demosthenes] 60.24 that the courage of the dead men was the 'soul' or 'life force' (*psychē*) of Greece. The same hyperbole is present (this time in a simile) when Hyperides (6.5) compares Athenian intervention in the cause of justice to the sun that sheds its light over the whole world. Sentence structure is also often more overtly elaborate. The tone is set by Gorgias' ripe style in his model speech:

What did these men lack which men should have; what did they have which they should not have. Might I have the ability to say what I want to and might I want to say what I should, evading divine anger and avoiding human resentment.

And here, approximately a hundred years later, is Hyperides (6.40):

How noble beyond belief was the boldness these men practised, how honourable and magnificent the moral choice they made, how surpassing the courage and manliness in times of danger, which these men contributed to the common freedom of the Greeks . . .

Elaborate syntax is not an absolute rule and is not pursued consistently. But freed from the need to create a façade of amateurism (as in most judicial oratory) or extemporaneity (as in deliberative oratory), epideictic was able to put its craftsmanship (as its name suggests) on display.

4 Praise, Blame and Fictive Trials

This element of overt skill is also marked in the other categories of epideictic oratory practised in classical Athens. One way both of offering instruction and (in written form) of advertising one's teaching was to produce model speeches or sections of speeches. This could take the form of speeches for fictive cases or overt exercises in praise or denigration without a fictive *mis-en-scène*. Fictive speeches generally took one of two forms, either speeches ostensibly for trials in contemporary courts or speeches for trials for celebrated mythical figures. How many examples of the former survive is uncertain, since modern arguments for the fictive status of certain speeches are both subjective and contested.³¹ The only unambiguous examples we have are Antiphon's *Tetralogies*, which betray their function as demonstration pieces by their condensation and brevity, their neat balance of contradictory arguments, their overt ingenuity and the absence of names or other personal details. They straddle the boundary between epideictic and judicial. They adopt the issues and mode of argumentation of the forensic speech, but like the funeral oration they have no immediate practical purpose.

Fictive speeches relating to notorious historical figures occupy the same ambiguous terrain. Isocrates certainly regards Polycrates' celebrated speech for the prosecution of Socrates³² as being in the same category of speech as his defence of Busiris (11.11). This and the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon are if anything more display pieces than the funeral oration, since their main purpose is to demonstrate the writer's skill, where the funeral oration had a larger social function. In these and the fictive speeches written for mythic situations and in the speeches of praise and blame for which we have evidence, the nature of the task of persuasion is different not only from forensic and deliberative oratory but from the funeral oration, all of which are seeking to impose or validate a particular view. In this category however the aim is not to convince the audience of the truth of the specific case but to prove the skill of the writer and to demonstrate techniques of persuasion.

This aspect of the writer's task is very visible in the choice of themes. In the case of Antiphon's *Tetralogies* the skill is visible in the ability (so typical of its age) to argue a case from opposing sides. The speeches for mythical trials meet the demand for cleverness in a different way. The choice of high profile figure like Palamedes who notoriously lost to a man known for his speaking skill offered an excellent opportunity to show just what could be done. This demonstration of what might have been aims at plausibility, credibility, not a decision from the hearer that Palamedes was innocent or guilty. Likewise, a speech for the prosecution by Odysseus features a notoriously bad (though successful) prosecution, an opportunity to present a poor case plausibly.

The search for a challenging theme is often visible also in a related category of epideictic speech, and one that firmly fits Aristotle's epideictic category, the encomium. The prose encomium is another area in which oratory is the successor to lyric

poetry. The great panhellenic lyric poets composed both specific songs of praise for athletic victories and more general songs either directly in praise of or composed in honour of kings and aristocrats. It was natural for oratory to seek to occupy this space. We know that Gorgias composed an encomium in praise of Elis (Arist. *Rhet.* 1416a). The lyric precedents suggest that this was a commissioned work. The permeability of the boundary between defence (as with *Palamedes*) and praise is seen in Gorgias' *Helen*, characterized at the outset as a defence of Helen (*Helen* 1–2) and at the close as both defence and encomium (*Helen* 21). Isocrates' *Helen* is more straightforwardly encomiastic. Helen had enormous appeal for someone looking for a challenge. Not only was she for many the archetypal bad woman but also the poetic tradition about her was so varied that a praise of her offered an opportunity for deft selection from the stories available. The encomia to Busiris by Polycrates and Isocrates in very different ways attempt to rehabilitate a notorious mythic criminal.³³ This tendency in this category of display oratory to invert common evaluations in an overt way is noted by Cleon at Thucydides 3.38, where he stresses the argument of a paradox as one of the defining features of sophistic performance.³⁴ The search for a seemingly unpromising subject, one that presents a very obvious challenge for skill in argument, is as marked in some of the encomia we know to have been written in the fourth century.³⁵ Polycrates wrote a speech in praise of mice, which among other things argued the paradox that a species regarded as destructive was actually beneficial. It included (as we know from Arist. *Rhet.* 1401b, who singles it out for comment) the incident of the gnawed bowstrings that Herodotus mentions (2.141.5). Isocrates speaks slightly of a treatise that argued that the life of a beggar or exile was superior (10.8). In the same vein, Alcidas wrote a praise of poverty, another of death, yet another in praise of a dog.³⁶ A praise of salt is mentioned by Plato (*Symposium* 177b) and Isocrates (10.12). Another such calculated choice of a trivial subject, praise of bumble bees, is noted by Isocrates (10.12). Other more obvious themes for praise occur. Plato, *Symposium* 177b notes that Heracles was a popular theme (singling out Prodicus' account of Heracles' choice, preserved in Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34). Here the challenge consisted (like the *epitaphios logos*) in finding new things to say on an established theme.

From the *Symposium* of Plato we get the impression that encomia could be delivered for fun by amateurs (though in this case the encomia are an elaborately staged introduction to the serious philosophical arguments of Socrates). A term sometimes used in modern discussions for exercises such as the praise of salt is *paignion*, 'toy', 'game', 'sport'. As a term for a speech as intellectual exercise the label goes back to Gorgias, who uses it to describe his praise of Helen (*Helen* 12). Certainly amusement is one of the effects sought by (at least some of) these exercises. We have to remember always that most people probably encountered these texts in performance. Entertainment value must have been an important factor in performance for an audience. But since Gorgias uses his praise of Helen to make some important (and programmatic) statements about the art of the *logos* that he professed, this should not be taken as indicating lack of seriousness. The self-deprecating term *paignion* draws attention to the wit employed and suggests that the writer has not brought all his ability to bear. Some pieces of this sort were susceptible to the charge of trivialization lodged by Isocrates at 12.7–12. But since (as Isocrates insists), the writers of the published (both by performance and in writing) exercises in praise of

trivial subjects are generally rhetoricians drumming up custom, like Gorgias they are not just having fun. The logic is given by Isocrates (10.8): 'if they can say something on base subjects, they will easily have much to say about noble themes'.

Closely related to the kind of encomia we have been discussing is the speech attributed to Lysias in Plato's *Phaedrus*. Few regard this as the genuine work of Lysias, but it can reasonably be taken to represent another use of epideictic oratory. The speech (which Phaedrus has in written form) is addressed to a boy and purports to be delivered by a man who wants to enjoy him but claims not to be in love with him. His argument – that it is better to choose a suitor who is not in love with you in preference to one who is in love – is among other things an exercise in paradox of a sort we have seen in the encomia. An *Erotic Essay* survives as Speech 61 in the modern editions of Demosthenes, almost certainly not his work. Again the authenticity is highly questionable, at best. This text, which seems to be heavily dependent on Plato, combines an encomium of Epicrates (at whose house Phaedrus claims to have read the speech of Lysias in Plato) with an encomium addressed to a boy.

Thus far I have treated epideictic oratory largely in Aristotelian terms as a distinct category. But literary genres are never hermetically sealed entities. Internally they shift and evolve in the hands of different exponents, while at the same time they interact with each other. We often find the themes of the *epitaphios logos* in other oratorical forms. Though Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1358b) divides up the oratorical kinds according to time-reference (past for judicial, future for deliberative, present for epideictic), he also notes that these references are not exclusive. The past is useful in both deliberative and judicial oratory not merely (as Aristotle suggests) for the sake of precedent but also for its ethical and emotional value. The sense of communal pride and shared purpose engendered by the funeral oration made its themes an ideal means in other contexts for creating division and isolating opponents, as well as allowing the speaker to strike a statesmanlike and patriotic pose. The most extensive use of such motifs in a forensic context is in Lysias' speech *Against Leocrates* (1), which because of its themes (the alleged desertion of the city after the Battle of Chaeronea) has an obvious excuse to expatiate on patriotic themes. Such themes were also used in political debate, especially at moments perceived as critical, as we can see from Aeschines 2.74 and Demosthenes 19.16.

A further qualification is needed. One context for epideictic oratory identified above was the panhellenic festivals. Isocrates (4.3) remarks that a stock theme in such contexts was Greek *homonoia* – concord – and Plutarch confirms this for Gorgias (*Advice on Marriage* 144b). Isocrates in a tract written for a reading rather than a listening audience which utilizes the form of a festival speech (*Panegyricus*) enlivens this tradition by calling for a panhellenic campaign against Persia. The effect is to exploit the context and themes of epideictic oratory for essentially deliberative ends. A similar appropriation takes place in Lysias 33. In his essay on Lysias, Dionysius of Halicarnassus introduces this speech with an explanation that it was delivered at Olympia and was designed (as it actually did) to stir up hostility against Dionysius of Syracuse and to urge the liberation of Sicily. The story is also told by Diodorus Siculus 14.109 and [Plut.], *Moralia* 836d. Though Lysias as a Syracusan had every reason to embroil himself in the city's politics, we cannot be sure of the authenticity of the speech and therefore of the historicity of the incident. But if our sources are accurate, we have another example of the exploitation for practical political ends (however unrealistic) of an occasion meant for oratory as display.

5 And After

Epideictic oratory had a lasting influence on both the rhetorical and the oratorical traditions. The preliminary exercises (*progymnasmata*) which formed the cornerstone of rhetorical training in the Roman period included both praise (*enkomion*) and invective (*psogos*), refutation (*anaskeuē*) and confirmation (*kataskeuē*) of a range of issues. Though only encomium and *psogos* would have been recognized as epideictic, all are ultimately and unmistakably descended from the epideictic oratory of the fifth and fourth centuries. The same is true of the Roman and Greek declamations; thus Libanius' defence speech for Socrates (fourth century AD) visibly belongs to the same tradition as Polycrates' accusation centuries before, as for instance do the various speeches for imaginary political occasions composed by Libanius' contemporary Himerius.

The zenith of epideictic oratory under the Roman empire was the second century AD, the period of the classicising movement known as the Second Sophistic. In this period we find a renewed confidence in Greek writers, alongside a passion for both the oratory and the dialect of the Athenian orators of the classical period. Part of that renaissance is the emergence of public orators who attracted large audiences to speeches on social, ethical and political themes. We have only a single (spurious) speech purporting to be the work of Herodes Atticus and except among cultural historians his name survives more for the Odeum on the Acropolis at Athens which bears his name. But he is spoken of with great enthusiasm by Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists* and the *Suda* speaks of the lofty sentiments expressed in his work. Two declamations attributed to the celebrated rhetorician Polemon survive, in which two fathers compete under a (fictitious) law to deliver a funeral oration each for his own son. The balanced and contrasting speeches are in the same tradition ultimately as the *Tetralogies* of Antiphon. Better represented are two of their contemporaries, Dio of Prusa and Aelius Aristides. Aelius' work has a very wide range. It includes prose hymns, which in their occupation of the position traditionally assigned to verse reminds us of the earliest period of Greek sophistic activity, as do several compositions of Himerius in the fourth century, such as his prose celebration of the wedding of Severus (Speech 9), an area occupied by lyric poetry in the archaic and classical period. It includes fictive speeches linked to real occasions, such as the speech (supposedly) addressing the Athenian Assembly in response to Nicias' request for reinforcements in Sicily. It also includes speeches engaging with longstanding debates, such as Plato's attack on rhetoric. Dio's work is still more variegated. Often what we have would be better described as sermons, moralizing essays of a generalizing nature, sometimes appended to allegedly autobiographical experiences. As in the classical period, this remains a profoundly serious activity.³⁷

Bibliographical Essay

The study of literary genres has changed significantly over the last few decades. Scholarship in the latter part of the twentieth century defined genres largely in terms of objective rules operating virtually unchanged over time; see in particular

F. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh: 1972). Recent scholarship has tended to view them less as fixed entities than as flexible modes of communication with permeable boundaries; see in particular M. Depew and D. Obbink (eds.), *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons and Society* (Cambridge, MA: 2000). A dedicated study of the evolution of epideictic oratory is still awaited. For the Athenian funeral oration the most important work still is N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA: 1986). J. Herrman, *The Athenian Funeral Orations* (Newburyport, MA: 2004), provides a collection of surviving examples (often of contested authenticity but all informative on the audience expectations). For the broad study of oratorical forms in the classical period, G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963) remains useful. Epideictic oratory is also dealt with briefly by S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), pp. 349–352. For Greek rhetoric under the Roman empire, including both the Second Sophistic and the declamations of the fourth century writers, see G.A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), pp. 201–256.

Notes

- 1 *Rhet. Alex.* 1.1, Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b. The types are *dikanikon* ('for trials/lawsuits'), here translated 'judicial', *dēmēgorikon* (literally 'for addressing the people') or *syμβουλευτικόν* ('advisory'), here 'deliberative', and *ἐπιδεικτικόν*.
- 2 For the secondary nature of the compilation of the 'grammar' of literary genres in relation to genres as practice, see M. Depew and D. Obbink (eds.), *Matrices of Genre: Authors, Canons and Society* (Cambridge, MA: 2000), pp. 2–6, G. Most, 'Generating Genres: The Idea of the Tragic', in Depew and Obbink, *Matrices of Genre* (cited this note), pp. 14–17.
- 3 The Mytilene debate is treated at greater length by S. Usher, Chapter 15 and by Ian Worthington, Chapter 17.
- 4 Cf. *Rhet. Alex.* 35.
- 5 S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), pp. 349–352, uses the term 'ceremonial' for *ἐπιδεικτικόν*; this is applicable to the funeral oration but misleading as a general term for the genre.
- 6 For Isocrates' claims for his educational system, see T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6, p. 000; see also S. Usher, Chapter 15.
- 7 See on this subject T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991), p. 75.
- 8 M.L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* (Oxford: 1971; repr. 1989–92).
- 9 For the role of model speeches in the training offered by the early rhetoricians, see A. Gercke, 'Die alte Technē Rhetorikē und ihre Gegner', *Hermes* 32 (1897), pp. 341–381, G.A. Kennedy, 'The Earliest Ehetorical Handbooks', *AJP* 80 (1959), pp. 169–178, Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric*, Chapter 5, and Usher, *Greek Oratory*, pp. 1–4.
- 10 For private performances of rhetorical works, cf. *Isoc.* 15.147.
- 11 For the probability that Antiphon published his speeches, see C. Carey, 'Observers of Speech and Hearers of Action', in O. Taplin (ed.), *Literature in the Greek and Roman Worlds* (Oxford: 2000), p. 176.
- 12 See C. Carey, 'Propaganda and Competition in Athenian Oratory', in K. Eenenkel and I.L. Pfeijffer (eds.), *The Manipulative Mode: Political Propaganda in Antiquity. A Collection of Case Studies* (Leiden: 2005), pp. 97–99.

- 13 For speechmaking more generally as a competitive activity, see J. Roisman, Chapter 26.
- 14 The anxiety about one's inability to rise to the theme is an example of the *aporia* ('being-at-a-loss') motif, whereby the speaker lists the difficulties he faced. This particular version is a commonplace in the funeral oration (cf. Hyp. 6.1, Pl. *Menexenus* 236e, 246b, [Dem.] 60.1), derived ultimately from the traditions of lyric praise poetry. But commonplace or not, it does accurately reflect the burden of the occasion for the speaker.
- 15 Reading was never a mass pastime in classical Athens, so most people did not read speeches, even if they were literate. The general impression made by a speech would presumably survive (as in Eupolis' statement that Pericles 'left his sting in his hearers', *Demes* fr. 94.7), even though most of the details and perhaps much of the substance would fade (as Thucydides stresses, 1.22.1). But we know that, though he left no written speeches, Pericles' similes and metaphors were remembered long after his time: Arist *Rhet.* 1411a, 1365. The latter is especially interesting as it is taken from a real funeral oration by Pericles (not the Thucydidean construct).
- 16 The allegation is false; what interests me here is the cultural assumptions underlying it.
- 17 Dion. Hal. *Isocrates* 10, Cic. *Orator* 176, Quint. 3.1.13.
- 18 The most important modern study of the Athenian funeral oration is N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA: 1986); see also J.E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (New York: 1981), and most recently J. Herrman, *The Athenian Funeral Orations* (Newburyport, MA: 2004).
- 19 For the identification of Peloponnesian War dead in part of the *dēmosion sēma* see <http://www.archaeology.org/online/features/athens/index.html> (*Archaeology*, February 2000).
- 20 For a similar argument with reference to the deliberative oratory attributed to Lysias, see S. Usher, Chapter 15.
- 21 Demosthenic authorship is accepted by Usher, *Greek Oratory* p. 351, Herrman *Athenian Funeral Orations*, pp. 5, 63, Ian Worthington, 'The Authorship of the Demosthenic *Epitaphios*', *Museum Helveticum* 60 (2003), pp. 152–157, and by J. Roisman, Chapter 26.
- 22 I deal below with motifs from the funeral oration deployed in other types of speech, deliberative or judicial.
- 23 Noted already by Euripides, *Trojan Women* 1246–1250 (I owe the reference to M. McDonald).
- 24 Made explicit by Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address: 'It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced'. For the debt of modern funeral orations to the Athenian models, cf. Ian Worthington, Chapter 17, p. 268.
- 25 That the victories against the Persians were an established theme in fifth century panegyric of Athens is demonstrated by Pericles' explicit refusal to address them in the funeral oration in Thucydides (2.36.4); see further below.
- 26 Again the topical nature of this theme by the late fifth century is indicated by Thucydides 2.36.4.
- 27 Inflections of the word *progonos*, 'ancestor', are frequent (Lys. 2: 10 times, Pl. *Menexenus*: 8 times, [Dem.] 60: 5 times). Thucydides' Pericles and Hyperides are the exceptions, with only one instance each; see further below for the distinctive nature of their funeral orations.
- 28 The adjective *autochthōn* means more than 'native'; it means something like 'born from the earth'.
- 29 Their memories – *mnēmai* – are ageless – *agēratoi*, Lys. 2.79; the memory – *mnēmē* – of the Athenians who fought against Persia is deathless – *athanatos*, Isoc. 4.84; the city will never cease to honour the dead, Pl. *Menexenus* 249b; they leave a glory – *eukleia* – which is ageless – *agēros*, [Dem.] 60.32; they have won ageless renown – *eudoxian agēraton* – and

those who had no children leave behind the praise of the Greeks as their immortal children – *paides athanatoi*, Hyp. 6.42; they have won deathless renown – *athanatos doxa*, Hyp. 6.24. Cf. also Abraham Lincoln, Gettysberg Address: ‘The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here.’

- 30 Usher, *Greek Oratory*, p. 349, overstates the rigidity of the medium. In fact, no two orations are ever identical or even nearly identical; all are variations on a set of themes.
- 31 Thus Usher, *Greek Oratory*, pp. 106–110, argues that Lysias 24 is a rhetorical exercise, not a speech written for a real hearing, while noting opposing views.
- 32 For the nature of this speech, see Carey, ‘Propaganda and Competition’, p. 98 with n. 47.
- 33 Though Isocrates is critical of his predecessor, he fulfils his task by ignoring the established tradition about Busiris, which Polycrates had tried to counter head-on.
- 34 See also Menander Rhetor, *Epid.* 3.346.9–18 in L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* 3 (Leipzig: 1853–56).
- 35 Such encomia are parodied by Lucian in his *Praise of the fly*.
- 36 See preceding note. The influence of this mode of oratory can be seen in the self-defence of Poverty (*Penia*) in Aristophanes’ *Wealth*.
- 37 I am grateful to Bill Fortenbaugh, Marianne McDonald, Yossi Roisman and Ian Worthington for comments on this chapter from which I have profited.

PART IV

**Rhetoric: Political, Social and
Intellectual Contexts**

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Rhetoric and Politics in Classical Greece: Rise of the Rhētores

Ian Worthington

1 Democracy and the Rise of Rhetoric

The development of democracy in Greece brought with it a rise in the number of people who became actively involved in the political life of their cities. In Athens (from where almost all of our literary evidence is derived), the legislation of Ephialtes in 462 created a direct democracy, meaning that the people were sovereign in the state.¹ The main decision-making body in the Athenian democracy was the Assembly, at which citizens (i.e., men over the age of eighteen who held the franchise) would meet to debate all matters of domestic and foreign policy.² It was, according to Aristotle, the supreme democratic body (*Politics* 1299a1). Although there were public officials who performed various important administrative and military duties,³ the people in the Assembly – often numbering in their thousands⁴ – voted on proposals put before it, and so made policy. As a result, democracy also brought with it a corresponding rise in the number of public speakers who addressed their fellows at Assembly meetings, and these men soon achieved political ascendancy. Of course, public speaking existed before the rise of democracy, and it can be found in works as early as the Homeric poems.⁵ However, it was very much the preserve of the aristocrats, and the ordinary folk, even well-to-do ones, knew their place in society. The rise of democracy would change all that.

All of this had taken time. Solon had fundamentally begun the democratic process in 594/3 when he ended the aristocratic monopoly of power by making wealth and not birth the prerequisite for political office (cf. *AP* 7–8). Before Solon, the archons and the Areopagus Council (composed of ex-archons), drawn from only the wealthiest families, had ruled as a matter of course, and the non-aristocrats had little to no political (or judicial) rights. Solon divided the people into four groups based on wealth, of which only the top two could stand for the archonship. Over several generations ordinary people gradually acquired the necessary wealth to stand for office and more legislation (that of Cleisthenes in 508 being the most influential) furthered the democratic process.

However, the Persian Wars of 480–478 brought with them a return to the *status quo* as the Areopagus appears to have regained much of its earlier political influence in the state (cf. *AP* 25). Aristocratic families continued to use their family ties and friendships to gain influence, and thus continued to dominate politics. They were concerned more with promoting the expansion of Athenian power in the Greek world, and hence the well-being of the city, rather than with the prosperity of the mass of people. For example, in the late 490s and 480s Themistocles had used the reputation he gained from being a general as a stepping stone into political life. He persuaded the Athenians to build a substantial fleet, and engineered the Greek victory over the Persians at the Battle of Salamis in 480 during the Persian Wars. Athens' role in the eventual defeat of the Persians enabled it to create the Delian League (in 478), which soon grew into an empire (lasting until 404) based on its fleet. Themistocles was ostracised in 472, and Cimon, the son of Miltiades (who defeated the Persians at the Battle of Marathon), rose to prominence. For much of the 460s, he worked to increase the size of the Delian League and to promote closer ties with Sparta. However, his opposition to the reforms of Ephialtes in 462 led to his ostracism the next year.

The imperialistic policy of these political leaders did indeed expand Athens' power greatly but – and this was not their intention – it also increased the power of the poor. The Delian League was a naval empire, but ships without rowers were useless, and at this time the rowers were predominantly thetes, from the poorest stratum (Solon's fourth group) in society. These people wanted greater political power, and the fact that Athens' fleet and by extension its empire were ultimately reliant on them gave them a voice. We can see this in the production of Aeschylus' *Persians* in 472, which celebrated the Greek victory over the Persians at the Battle of Salamis. This battle was a naval one and hence the play champions the thetic element in Athenian society. However, the one thing hindering the people's ability to take part properly in the democratic process was the re-emergence of the power of the aristocratic Areopagus, which was seen as something of a bastion of oligarchic power. That changed in 462 with Ephialtes, whose radical democracy remained in force (apart from two brief oligarchic interludes in 411 and 404/3) until the Macedonians abolished it in 322.

Exactly what Ephialtes did is unknown, but the core of his legislation dealt with the Areopagus (*AP* 25). He conducted a purge of it in order to rid it of corrupt members, and removed its political power, including its jurisdiction over public officials, which he transferred to the Assembly, Boule (which numbered 500 and originally drew up the Assembly's agenda and had an advisory role) and law courts. This resulted in a significant increase in the workings of these bodies, and by extension of people from all strata of society in the democracy. While the Assembly continued to meet roughly four times a month, the Boule and courts met far more regularly, and by the fourth century the Boule was of paramount importance in the democracy.⁶ It supervised a number of 'boards' or sub-committees charged with the daily running of the state, from administering festivals, building programmes and the dockyards to supervising the *poletae* who placed state contracts of all kinds, and all financial matters. Political debates did take place in the Boule of course, but we know next to nothing about them. They also took place in the courts, in which *rhētores* were active in the political *eisangelia* and *graphē paranomōn* suits.⁷ However, it is the Assembly, in which the mass of citizens met and the *rhētores* reigned supreme, that is the focus of my chapter.

Ephialtes died in 461, leaving Pericles as the city's foremost politician. He had already earned renown as a general, and from now until 429, when he died from the plague that had afflicted the city for a year, he dominated political life. Thus, like the majority of his predecessors, he was a general who went on to exploit his military reputation for political ends. Unlike his predecessors, he was the first to address the people directly in the Assembly, and so started a trend that his successors, the more 'notorious' demagogues, would follow (see below). Pericles advanced Athens as a cultural and intellectual centre but he also led the city into a series of military disasters, of which (in my opinion) the Peloponnesian War (431–404) was the greatest. In 432/1 he persuaded the people to reject a Spartan ultimatum that meant war between the two states. His power was so great that, says Thucydides, 'Athens, though in name a democracy, gradually became in fact a government ruled by its foremost citizen' (2.65.9).⁸

The statement is a startling reflection on Athenian democracy: in a state in which the people were supposedly sovereign, real power, it appeared, lay in the hands of a small number of individuals. How did they come to exercise that power, why did they seek it, how well did they exercise it, how important was rhetoric in it, and were the people really so beguiled by the rhetoric of the speakers?

2 Rhetoric and Politics in Action

It was in the immediate aftermath of the Periclean era that a new type of public speaker came to political prominence. He was new for several reasons. He came from a non-aristocratic background, he had none of the family ties that aristocrats had drawn on as a matter of course,⁹ he was wealthy but had accumulated that wealth largely through business and trade, he (like Pericles) spoke directly to the people, and he had not held a military command. These 'new' speakers were given the common name *rhētores* (orators) because they literally relied on their speaking ability not merely to address their peers in the Assembly but to persuade them to vote for their proposals.¹⁰ Over time, other terms came to be used, mostly in a pejorative sense, including demagogue (*dēmagōgos*), adviser (*politenomenos*, *sumboulos*), and (a phrase that has existed for some time but takes on a more odious meaning now), leader of the people (*prostatēs tou dēmon*).¹¹ The *rhētores* were also responsible for the introduction of new vocabulary, such as *philodēmos* ('friend of the people'), *misodēmos* ('enemy of the people'), *philopolis* ('friend of the city') and *misopolis* ('enemy of the city'). Again, to judge by references to such terms in writers (Aristophanes, for example), these new words were not exactly welcomed, and they deliberately cast aspersions on the characters of the speakers.¹²

Solon's goal of the ordinary people advancing politically was apparently realised, but not in the way he envisioned, for political power had come to rest not on office *per se* but on popular support in the Assembly. One reason for this switch was the move from election to the selection of archons by lot in 487 (*AP* 22.5), which made offices less attractive and reduced arenas for nobles to exercise sway over mass audiences. However, the primary reason was rhetoric. The Athenian elite knew about rhetoric of course before the later fifth century, but they were concerned more with it as an intellectual pursuit. The sophistic movement, with its emphasis on the art of speaking, and especially the visit of the philosopher and rhetorician

Gorgias (483–378) from Leontini in Sicily in 427 was as much a turning point in the political exploitation of rhetoric and the rise of orators as the creation of radical democracy (Thuc. 3.86, Diod. 12.53). Gorgias came to request Athenian support in his city's struggle against Syracuse. The Athenians were then in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian War and were still recovering from a catastrophic plague that had killed about a quarter of the population including Pericles. In such circumstances, Gorgias' mission ought to have been unsuccessful, but he apparently dazzled the Assembly with his speaking ability and his request was granted. After all, he believed that arguments based on probability (*eikota*) carried more weight than the truth (Pl. *Phaedrus* 267a–b), and the people were evidently putty in his hands.

Gorgias later returned to live in Athens. There, and elsewhere in Greece, he taught rhetoric in return for payment (Pl. *Hippias Major* 282b4–c1). It soon became a fundamental part of education, as T. Morgan describes in Chapter 20. Indeed, it grew into what Aristotle would call a *technē*, and was the art of thinking and speaking. As J.A.E. Bons discusses in Chapter 4, Gorgias taught rhetoric as a means to an end, namely to give his pupils the ability to convince an audience on any subject regardless of whether they (the speakers) had expertise in it. His teaching involved learning literary passages and perhaps even allusions to past events in order to appeal to the emotions of the listeners. For Gorgias, the greatest good for men in which he claims expertise is not knowledge or morality, but the ability to use rhetoric to persuade an audience at the public or civic level. He makes this point clearly to Socrates in an exchange between the two of them as given to us by Plato in his *Gorgias* (452e4):

- Gorgias: I mean, Socrates, what is in actual truth the greatest blessing, which confers on everyone who possess it not only freedom for himself but also the power of ruling his fellow countrymen.
- Socrates: What do you mean by that?
- Gorgias: I mean the ability to convince by means of speech a jury in a court of justice, members of the Council in their Chamber, voters at a meeting of the Assembly, and any other gathering of citizens whatever it may be. By the exercise of this ability you will have the doctor and the trainer as your slaves, and your man of business will turn out to be making money not for himself but for another; for you, in fact, who have the ability to speak and to convince the masses.¹³

In his speech *Against Timocrates* of 355, Demosthenes said that Athenian democracy was compassionate for the weak, that it prohibited strong and powerful individuals acting violently towards others and that it refused to condone venal treatment of the masses by influential speakers (24.171). This may have been true in theory, but the reality was quite different. For many decades before and after Demosthenes delivered his speech, speakers in the Assembly pursued their own agendas (not always against the best interests of the state), and in the process clashed with each other. They were able to do so because non-aristocrats in particular seized upon the use of rhetoric that Gorgias advocated and exploited it for reasons that had nothing to do with education. (Thus we can understand Plato's criticism of the sophists.)

Such ambitious men realised that a much faster path to success lay not in standing for public office or winning military renown (and being *stratēgos*) but in using their

oratorical abilities to manipulate the people in the Assembly. More than that, political success elevated their social standing. They were much looked down upon by the aristocratic stratum of society, regardless of how much wealth they might accumulate, given the social snobbery that existed. Political power redressed that imbalance for them. Hence their aim in entering political life was not necessarily to do well for their state and its people, but for themselves. Rhetoric gave them the means to this end, and they crafted their use of language specifically for the political arena, as A. López Eire so ably demonstrates (Chapter 22).

The first demagogue, to use that term, was Cleon, and as such he warrants more attention than others in this chapter. Aristophanes made Cleon out to be a sleazy tanner, but this seems to have been a deliberate slur on his character – and the same slurs may apply to the references by trade of all of the demagogues in order to make them out to be cheap workers with no social status. Cleon came from a wealthy family. His father owned a factory that turned hides into leather, and an indication of his wealth is that he may have performed a liturgy (a public service for the state).¹⁴ Cleon was different from his predecessor Pericles not only as far as his social background was concerned but also in the way he addressed the people. He was quick to criticise them for their shortcomings, and almost brutal in some of his comments, and this starts a pattern to which all the *rhētores* conformed.

Cleon first properly attracts our attention in Thucydides' account of the Mytilene debate of 427 (3.36–48). In the previous year, Athens' ally Mytilene, a major naval power on the island of Lesbos, revolted from the Delian League. The timing of the revolt coincided with the aftermath of the crippling plague, in Athens, when the city was in dire straits. Despite their predicament, the Athenians besieged Mytilene and after some time it capitulated. An Assembly was then held to decide the fate of the Mytileneans. Cleon proposed to kill all the male Mytileneans and to sell the women and children into slavery. This harsh treatment was, as S. Usher says in his treatment of the debate (Chapter 15, p. 223), a 'brutal version of Pericles' brand of justice', but understandable in the circumstances. The Athenians needed to maintain control of their empire at all costs, especially given the city's current plight, hence it was necessary to set an example in order to prevent other allies from revolting, and so affect Athenian security and prosperity. The people voted in Cleon's favour, but overnight they had a change of heart, and they held an extraordinary Assembly the next day. Cleon proposed the same penalty for the same reasons as the day before. As on the previous day, a certain Diodotus, arguing on grounds of expediency and that it would be more just to execute only the ringleaders, opposed him. This time Diodotus' recommendation was approved, but only by the narrowest of margins (Thuc. 3.49.1).

Thucydides says next to nothing about the first meeting, but he supplies the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus from the second. What he gives us is hardly verbatim.¹⁵ Indeed, the speeches in Thucydides' narrative are rhetorically crafted to reflect his views on the nature of Athenian imperialism, human personal ideologies, and the misuse of rhetoric in a political setting (see further, M.A. Fox and N. Livingstone, Chapter 35). It is unfortunate that we do not have any speeches by popular leaders such as Pericles or Cleon that exist independently of Thucydides' account as we do of the Attic orators (beginning with Antiphon in the late fifth century and extending to Dinarchus in the late fourth century). The speeches from the Mytilene debate are stirring, and it is easy to see how in the emotionally charged

atmosphere of the Assembly they would affect the people. A few relevant extracts from Cleon's speech will suffice:

What you do not realise is that your empire is a tyranny exercised over subjects who do not like it and who are always plotting against you; you will not make them obey you by injuring your own interests in order to do them a favour; your leadership depends on superior strength and not on any goodwill of theirs. And this is the very worst thing – to pass measures and then not abide by them ... Now, to act as they acted is not what I should call a revolt (for people only revolt when they have been badly treated); it is a case of calculated aggression, of deliberately taking sides with our bitterest enemies in order to destroy us. And this is far worse than if they had made war against us simply to increase their own power ... They made up their minds to put might first and right second, choosing the moment when they thought they would win, and then making their unprovoked attack upon us ... Let them now therefore have the punishment which their crime deserves. Do not put the blame on the aristocracy and say that the people were innocent. The fact is that the whole lot of them attacked you together, although the people might have come over to us and, if they had, would now be back again in control of their city. Yet, instead of doing this, they thought it safer to share the dangers, and join in the revolt of the aristocracy ... Punish them as they deserve, and make an example of them to your other allies, plainly showing that revolt will be punished by death. Once they realise this, you will not have so often to neglect the war with your enemies because you are fighting with your own allies.

Diodotus, while acknowledging the Mytileneans had done wrong and needed to be punished, differed greatly from Cleon's 'might is right' argument:

I have not come forward to speak about Mytilene in any spirit of contradiction or with any wish to accuse anyone. If we are sensible people, we shall see that the question is not so much whether they are guilty as whether we are making the right decision for ourselves ... One of Cleon's chief points is that to inflict the death penalty will be useful to us in the future as a means of deterring other cities from revolt; but I, who am just as concerned as he is with the future, am quite convinced that this is not so ... at the moment, if a city has revolted and realises that the revolt cannot succeed, it will come to terms while it is still capable of paying an indemnity and continuing to pay tribute afterwards. But if Cleon's method is adopted, can you not see that every city will not only make much more careful preparations for revolt, but will also hold out against siege to the very end, since to surrender early or late means just the same thing? This is, unquestionably, against our interests – to spend money on a siege because of the impossibility of coming to terms, and, if we capture the place, to take over a city that is in ruins so that we lose the future revenue from it. And it is just on this revenue that our strength in war depends ... We should be looking for a method by which, employing moderation in our punishments, we can in future secure for ourselves the full use of those cities which bring us important contributions.

Cleon lost this debate, but his influence in political life continued to grow. At an Assembly in 425/4 he criticised the general Nicias' handling of the siege of a few hundred Spartans on the island of Sphacteria (Thuc. 4.27–28). The clash between the two men grew more heated, with the people egging each man on by shouting and so behaving, says Thucydides, 'in the way that crowds usually do'. When Nicias unexpectedly handed over his command to Cleon, the latter found himself suddenly faced

with the prospect of showing in actions what he was saying with words. He requested the help of the general Demosthenes and proclaimed that he would return within twenty days with the Spartans as captives. This 'mad promise' appealed to the people, according to Thucydides, for they knew that if Cleon succeeded they would gain a valuable advantage over the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War, and if Cleon failed he would be dead. In fact, to everyone's (especially, we imagine, Nicias') amazement, Cleon fulfilled his promise, and the Spartans immediately sued for peace (see below). The success led to Cleon's election as general for the next year (thus reversing the pattern of those who used military office as a means of entry into political life), and his political ascendancy was now assured. He died in battle at Amphipolis in 422 (Thuc. 5.10). Even in death, Thucydides had nothing good to say about Cleon, who, he alleges, 'had no intention of standing his ground; he immediately took to flight and was overtaken and killed by a Myrcinian peltast'.

There is much personal bias in Thucydides' portrayal of Cleon.¹⁶ The first time we meet him, in the context of the Mytilene debate, he is described as 'the most violent of the citizens' (Thuc. 3.36.6), and even the manner of his death was cowardly. Thucydides has various reasons for why he depicts Cleon as he does. For one thing, the latter may well have been responsible for his exile in 421, when he failed to save the Athenian colony of Amphipolis from the Spartans. For another, there is the social snobbery directed against someone who was not an aristocrat and who dared to address and guide the people. Cleon, like the demagogues after him, may well have been very wealthy, but that meant nothing. That power could be the hands of an influential few, or even of one man, as Thucydides' statement on Pericles (quoted above, p. 257) would suggest, was acceptable if those men came from the right (aristocratic) background. Certainly, Pericles had his brushes with the Assembly, which on occasions deprived him of his generalship, but he always bounced back thanks to his reputation, not to mention his oratorical prowess. However, it was one thing for the 'right' people to sway the Assembly, but quite another when those from the wrong side of the tracks did so, and their critics cared about only that.¹⁷

Of course, many of these 'new men' proved adept and wise advisers because they had to claw their way to the top. Whether Cleon had any sort of rhetorical education is unknown, but I think it unlikely, or at least that he had little (in contrast to the demagogues after him, perhaps with the exception of Aeschines).¹⁸ T. Morgan takes me to task for my view here (Chapter 20, n. 5); however, it is hard to see exactly what such education involved. Gorgias came to Athens in only 427, by which time Cleon was already politically active (he was a member of the Boule in 428), and it seems clear that the latter's visit (in the same year as Cleon dominated the first Assembly on Mytilene; see above) was what led to rhetoric becoming a formal part of education. I suspect that Cleon simply found he had the talent to speak well by attending assemblies and listening to how things were done before he spoke. His membership of the Boule would have greatly enhanced his knowledge of the workings of the state, not to mention his political savvy. Thus, in 424, when the Athenians took the Spartan soldiers from Sphacteria to Athens as prisoners-of-war (see above), the Spartans immediately sued for peace on terms, but Cleon blocked their proposals, and the war continued. In hindsight, he was right to do so, for he realised that the Spartans wanted only to secure the return of the prisoners, and thus that any peace agreed to at that time would have been ephemeral. It is important to note that Thucydides has no

praise of Cleon's success at Sphacteria, and he also laments the lost opportunity of making peace with Sparta at that time. Further, Cleon is denigrated in another contemporary source, Aristophanes' *Knights*.¹⁹ Aristophanes, like Thucydides, has his axes to grind against Cleon and his new use of rhetoric,²⁰ and in his comedy he casts him as a Paphlagonian slave that has bewitched the people, characterised as the old man Demus, and who stole success at Sphacteria from the generals Nicias and Demosthenes. The one person who ought to be criticised in the whole affair is Nicias, who handed over his command to Cleon seemingly on a whim, yet he was not indicted for his action or for any dereliction of duty. However, he was an aristocrat, and a general, and hence escapes blame. Perhaps this is why Thucydides tells us about the Assembly clash between Cleon and Nicias in reported speech and more briefly in order to deflect attention from the seriousness of Nicias' action.

The remainder of the classical period was the age of the *nouveaux riches* or 'commoner' *rhētores*. Significant figures in the fifth century included Hyperbolus the lampmaker and Cleophon the lyremaker (both of whom may have owned factories making these products and so, like Cleon, may have been rich). They dominated political life for what would be only short periods of time, however. The fourth century, on the other hand, was different in that individual *rhētores* dominated political life for greater stretches of time. In the 350s, one such man was Eubulus.²¹ By this time, Athens was in severe economic straits, its annual revenue reduced to a mere 137 talents from the 1,000 talents it had in 431, at the start of the Peloponnesian War (Dem. 4.37). Eubulus organised the Athenian budget in such a way that part of the surpluses from the various accounts were paid into a Military Fund to help pay for war efforts (these being the largest drain on the city's finances). He also created the Theoric Fund, into which was paid the annual budget surpluses. Its treasurer came to wield great political power because of the fund's huge resources, and in some respects the office was as much a stepping stone to political power as that of the generalship in the fifth century. Later, the treasurer Lycurgus was so influential that even after his tenure of power ended in about 332 he continued to dominate political life from behind the scenes.²²

Perhaps the greatest Greek *rhētōr*, and certainly the most well-known, was Demosthenes, a contemporary of Eubulus and Lycurgus.²³ Demosthenes made a name for himself writing speeches for the law courts (and in some cases delivering them himself) before his entry into public life in the 350s. He also came from a well-to-do but non-aristocratic background.²⁴ His father had died when he was seven, leaving an estate of almost fourteen talents. However, the guardians to whom it and his son were entrusted squandered the money, and only 7,000 drachmas were left when Demosthenes turned eighteen in about 366. Faced with financial ruin, Demosthenes sued the guardians in about 364.²⁵ He won his suit, but probably got back only part of the lost estate. That success earned him enough of a reputation to pursue a career in oratory, specifically as a speechwriter (*logographos*) who wrote court speeches for others (for a fee). Intent on a political career, he successfully worked to overcome a speech disability by practising speaking with pebbles in his mouth (Plut. *Dem.* 11.1).

Demosthenes' first political speeches were failures, and it was not until he turned his attention to Philip II, beginning with his first *Philippic* in 351, that he began to find success. By 346, he was a dominant force in Athenian political life, and he was instrumental in wrecking negotiations with Philip after the Peace of Philocrates of

346 that would lead to another war in 340. Indeed, in the later 340s Demosthenes' anti-Macedonian policy became that of the city. It would end in disaster, however, at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338, when Philip defeated a Greek army led by Athens and Thebes and imposed Macedonian hegemony on Greece. Thus, Demosthenes ultimately misjudged the political situation. Perhaps he did so for all the 'right' reasons; in other words, that he saw in Philip a threat to Greek freedom and urged resistance to him at all costs, whatever the outcome. On the other hand, his Macedonian stance may have been merely to further his own political agenda, and hence power in Athens, for it is significant that success came to him only when he focused on Philip as the enemy of Greece.²⁶

3 *Rhētores* and the People

Not every citizen attended the Assembly (or law courts, for that matter), and many of those that did attend might never have addressed their peers or moved proposals.²⁷ However, some did take advantage of the new democracy and the opportunity for political advancement, although the number was relatively small. If one looks at the statistics compiled by M.H. Hansen, for example, the same people who move decrees appear time and time again, just as the same names who advise on policy crop up in oratory.²⁸ Presumably this sort of statistic indicates that people were generally satisfied with their lot in the life and were not as intent on upward mobility (socially or even politically) as today.

Moreover, speaking and performing skills went as hand in hand in an Assembly as in the law courts (see below). Not everyone, we can imagine, could successfully master these skills and/or have the self-confidence to address an audience of several thousand people during an Assembly meeting that usually started about dawn and lasted at most until about the early afternoon (cf. Aristoph. *Ecclesiazousae* 306–308).²⁹ Many speakers must have addressed the Assembly over the years and have failed miserably in attempting to persuade the people to adopt their proposals or even to pay them attention. Many indeed may not have had the stentorian voices (a necessary part of performance) needed to command attention. The Assembly met on a large rocky outcrop called the Pnyx, close to the Acropolis. There was no public address system, as there is today, so that those seated towards the rear of several thousand citizens could hear clearly what speakers at the front were saying. As a result, much of a speech must have been lost on a large part of the audience, which, as noted in the clash between Nicias and Cleon over Sphacteria above, and as we shall see below, did not sit in silence but interrupted speakers and raised all sorts of uproar. The physical location of the Assembly is something that is not always taken into consideration when assessing what it takes to be a *rhētōr*. It has been suggested that in the 'best possible conditions perhaps one fifth of the audience could not have heard well enough to have understood more than about 85 percent of what was said'.³⁰

The power that these individuals exercised in the Athenian democracy is obvious. Also obvious seems to be the apparent naïveté of the people, who were unable to process what they heard properly in order to vote in any informed manner, and so ended up voting for the man who delivered his speech the most persuasively rather than for the one who performed less well but whose policy may have been better for

the city in the long term. Thus we have the fundamental flaw in the direct democracy, and it is therefore hardly surprising that the people made disastrous choices when they were swayed more by emotion than reason.

In reality, however, the reverse was the case. The people were quite aware of the cynical exploitation of rhetoric for political purposes since it was trumpeted by their contemporaries. One of the earliest and most telling instances is found in Cleon's speech in the second Mytilene debate (Thuc. 3.36–48). After talking about different speakers at assemblies in general, he says to the assembled people:

You have become regular speech-goers, and as for action, you merely listen to accounts of it; if something is to be done in the future you estimate the possibilities by hearing a good speech on the subject, and as for the past you rely not so much on the facts which you have seen with your own eyes as on what you have heard about them in some clever piece of verbal criticism. Any novelty in an argument deceives you at once . . . The chief wish of each one of you is to be able to make a speech himself, and, if you cannot do that, the next best thing is to compete with those who can make this sort of speech by not looking as though you were at all out of your depth while you listen to the views put forward . . . You are simply victims of your own pleasure in listening, and are more like an audience sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament discussing matters of state . . . As for the speech-makers who give such pleasure by their arguments, they should hold their competitions on subjects which are less important, and not on a question where the state may have to pay a heavy penalty for its light pleasure, while the speakers themselves will no doubt be enjoying splendid rewards for their splendid arguments.

Diodotus also cautions the people to beware of speakers in his speech:

In this way successful speakers will be less likely to pursue further honours by speaking against their own convictions in order to make themselves popular, and unsuccessful speakers, too, will not struggle to win over the people by the same acts of flattery . . . a state of affairs has been reached where a good proposal honestly put forward is just as suspect as something thoroughly bad, and the result is that just as the speaker who advocates some monstrous measure has to win over the people by deceiving them, so also a man with good advice to give has to tell lies if he expects to be believed.

This type of criticism did not exist in a vacuum; it also permeated other genres, such as tragedy (see M. McDonald, Chapter 31). For example, in 428 Euripides has Hippolytus say the following in his play of the same name (986–989):

Though before crowds I am no clever orator
Among a few, my equals, I can show more skill.
And this is natural; for those speakers who appear
As fools among wise men, the crowd finds eloquent.

The people attended assemblies, the theatre and the law courts, so the dangers of rhetoric were common knowledge. Of course, the people did make rash and/or bad decisions based on a lack of expertise. In 415 Alcibiades (an aristocrat but, given his youth, alleged venality and thirst for glory, as much a demagogue as any of his ignoble predecessors, according to a biased Thucydides) urged at an assembly that the

Athenians send a huge armada to Sicily (Thuc. 6.15–18). The people could not evaluate the pros and cons of the expedition in any informed manner, but Alcibiades' rhetorical prowess – not to mention Nicias' bungling attempt to rebut his arguments (Thuc. 6.19–23) – convinced them to vote for him.³¹ Three years later the Athenian fleet and all the men serving with it were annihilated. The Sicilian expedition had grave repercussions for the Athenian war effort and for the democracy attempting to run it, and it was one of the major factors in the establishment of an oligarchy in 411.

However, certainly in the fourth century, the people had acquired more than a passing knowledge of current affairs and the like from their participation in political life, either as members of the Boule, Assemblymen, or as jurors in the law courts.³² As far as the last arena is concerned, forensic speeches could be as political as those delivered in the Assembly, especially if the case involved a public matter, and the same people who sat as jurors attended the assembly. Street-talk permeated Athens when the city faced any major event or danger. Further, given the difference between ancient and modern democracy, there was almost always full disclosure of topics under discussion at assemblies and meetings of the Boule, and never the 'need to know' basis that so often comes out of the mouths of our elected elite today in an effort to maintain confidence and support.

The people thus expected the speakers to exploit rhetoric, and were prepared for it, so much so that they were able to introduce a dynamic into the relationship of speaker to audience in which speakers had to conform to audience expectations in order to win approval. In other words, the people opened the door to the manipulation of rhetoric because of what they expected from speakers. They performed, as Aristotle would have it, not the role of spectators but that of judges. This is a very different image from Cleon's tirade against the people's shortcomings in the Mytilene debate (see above).

The argument that the (mis)use of rhetoric undercut democratic ideology and that leaders exploited popular ideologies has been vigorously proposed by J. Ober, whose methodology is, generally speaking, to apply our societies' attitudes and experiences to the ancient world in an effort to better understand it and its people.³³ Relating the modern world to the ancient can be beneficial, but it can also be dangerous, not least because this approach can affect our interpretation of the source material – and nothing should be more important than the sources that we have. Thus, Ober has had plenty of critics, especially those who work on democracy by analysing its institutions as opposed to the dictates of the people.³⁴

This is not the place to argue whether the institutional or ideological approach to the democratic *polis* is better, or indeed whether (and how) both can be complementary. The problem in trying to understand, or even identify, the relationship of speaker to audience, and thus by extension the importance and use of rhetoric in political advancement, is our lack of source material. The only Assembly speeches that have survived are those by Demosthenes, written during Philip's reign, and then only sixteen at that (of which some are spurious).³⁵ He must have given more during a career in politics of over thirty years. We have none from the time when Alexander the Great was king (336–323), although we know that he delivered speeches in the Assembly and was influential in Athenian political life.³⁶ However, there is a body of contemporary evidence that provides much information, but is often not plumbed: the Demosthenic *prooimia*, or rhetorical openings to political speeches.³⁷

The *prooimion* (prologue) was an integral part of any speech, for it did not merely foreshadow what was to come but had the rhetorical function of gaining the goodwill of the audience (*captatio benevolentiae*).³⁸ There are 56 *prooimia* that have survived in the corpus of Demosthenes (some of which correspond to some of his extant speeches),³⁹ although their authenticity has been disputed. The glimpses they afford us of Athenian democracy are especially important for the relationship of speaker to audience in the Assembly and the expectations of that audience as far as the overall performance was concerned. Assembly meetings lasted less than a day, perhaps sometimes no more than a few hours, during which time much business could be conducted, and time was of the essence.⁴⁰ Thus, in these prologues we see, for example, the restlessness of the people and their penchant to heckle speakers who talked for too long (4, 21, 26, 36, 46), their boredom from listening to speeches (29, 34), their quickness in forcing speakers not to go off at tangents (56), and the expected level of decorum.⁴¹ Thus, from *Prooimion* 4 we have:

Gentlemen of Athens, since it is in your hands to choose whichever proposal you wish, it is right that you listen to all of them. For it often happens that the same man speaks incorrectly about one thing but not another; so that by shouting him down when you are annoyed with him you may lose many beneficial ideas, but by listening properly and quietly, you will adopt every good measure, but if you think someone is speaking stupidly you will ignore him. Now, I am not accustomed to making long speeches, and even if that had been my custom on a previous occasion, I would avoid it at this time, but I will tell you in as few words as I am able, what I consider is in your best interests.

And from 56.1–2:

I think that, if you are willing to take my advice today, you will be better able to choose the best policy and you will make the speeches of those who climb up shorter. What, then, do I advise? (2) First, gentlemen of Athens, ask the man who steps forward to speak only about the issues under consideration. For someone may include many other matters in his speech and make many funny remarks, especially if he is a clever speaker as some of these men are.

There was to be no personal abuse against other speakers in a speech, for such denigration was a disservice to the people and it reflected badly against the speakers (11, 20, 31, 52, 53). It is interesting that, if we can believe the likes of Aristophanes in the *Wasps* of 422, for example, the people who sat as jurors in courts enjoyed seeing defendants squirm and listening to the character denigration that permeated the typical forensic speech.⁴² The Assembly was a very different arena. Speakers who were disorderly or behaved in other improper ways could be evicted from an Assembly (Aristoph. *Ecclesiazousae* 142–143) or were subject to a fine of fifty drachmas (Aes. 1.35). A century after Thucydides, the *Athenian Constitution* criticises Cleon thus: he was ‘the first person to use bawling and abuse on the rostrum and to gird up his cloak before making a public speech, all other persons speaking in orderly fashion’ (AP 34.1), and Cleophon was wont to make overly dramatic entrances (cf. AP 34.1).

The *prooimia* show us that *rhētores* were not allowed to act as they saw fit, and this clearly affected their overall performance (and hence chances of success).⁴³ However, many of the *prooimia* warn the people about venal speakers who operate at the

expense of the common good and even favour oligarchy, a form of government that the Athenian democracy detested the most (2, 5, 6, 12, 17, 24, 26, 31, 32, 35, 40, 42, 53, 55). In doing so, they show that the people were far from ignorant of the rhetorical dexterity of speakers, even though they might fall under a speaker's rhetorical spell. For example, from *Prooimion* 2.1–2:

You call our constitution a democracy, as you all know, but I see some listening favorably to those who oppose it. (2) I wonder what their motive can be. Do you think they say this without recompense? The leaders of oligarchies, on whose behalf these men are speaking, may well give them more on the side. Have you decided that what they say is better than the others? Then oligarchy looks better to you than democracy! Do you think the speakers are better men? Who could you reasonably consider honorable, when he speaks publicly against the established constitution?

Number 17 has this to say:

Perhaps, gentlemen of Athens, it is right for someone who wants to give you advice to try to speak in such a way that you can agree with him, but if not, to disregard all the other topics and advise only on the situation at hand, and this in the fewest words possible. For it seems to me that it is not from any dearth of speeches that you now see all your affairs in ruin, but because some are speaking and acting publicly for their own gain, and others who have not yet shown evidence of this, prefer to be considered clever speakers rather than to bring about some beneficial act by what they say. And in order that I do not contradict my own advice, and say more about other matters than those I stood up to discuss, I will ignore all other topics and will attempt to tell you what I advise.

And 32.1–3 this:

I wish, gentlemen of Athens, that some of the speakers showed the same zeal for voicing the best advice as they do for their reputation as speakers; if they did, then they would be considered honest rather than clever speakers, and your affairs, as is fitting, would be better. But instead, I think that some are very pleased with their reputation as speakers and show no concern for how the consequences affect you. (2) And indeed I wonder whether speeches such as these are able to deceive the speaker in the same way as their audience, or whether these men knowingly give advice contrary to what seems to them to be best . . . I will not be turned from speaking what I have in mind, although I see you have been put under a spell, for it would be foolish, since you have wrongly been bewitched by a speech, for the man who intends to give better and more advantageous advice, to be afraid.

4 Conclusions

As rhetoric became an integral part of Greek education, its exploitation for political gain in the Assembly or success in the law courts grew dramatically. Rhetoric and politics were meshed together, and Athenian society and political life would never be the same again. Power became concentrated in the hands of individuals, though with the seeming acquiescence of the people acting as the audience in the Assembly and the jurors in court. Without the rise of democracy that helped to feed the rise of

rhetoric, *rhētores* would never have come to dominate political life as they did. For more than a century rhetoric offered the chance for ambitious, competent men to bypass the traditional generalship or formal political office and soar to power in the Assembly, and thus in the state. In the process, the *rhētores* put the intellectual side of rhetoric to a practical usage that gave it and themselves a bad name.

Of course, the use of rhetoric to shape a society was not localised to Athens and developed elsewhere in the Greek world (such as Rhodes thanks to the work of Eudemus). In the Hellenistic period, as A. Erskine shows (Chapter 18), rhetoric flourished in places far removed from Greece thanks in no small part to Alexander's conquests. Later, in Rome, for example, Cicero could whip up a crowd with the same ease as Demosthenes could, and rhetoric's influence – as well as that of the *rhētores* – can be seen in many other societies, western and eastern, from antiquity to the present day.⁴⁴ Two of the more famous speeches in recent history are those of Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg (in 1863) and of Bill Clinton at the United States National Cemetery at Omaha Beach (in 1994) to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Normandy landing. The similarity of both to Pericles' epideictic funeral oration, delivered at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.35–46), is not coincidental.⁴⁵

The use of rhetoric today has changed from the classical period, for now the emphasis is less on performance and more on understanding and interpretation. Yet the *rhētores* of classical Athens have left a legacy that modern politicians (and their speechwriters) do not hesitate to use when the occasion demands, good or bad.⁴⁶

Bibliographical Essay

Numerous books on Athenian democracy exist, but by far the best is M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*² (Norman, OK: 1999). Hansen published a flood of specialist articles on the workings and composition of the Assembly, many of which are collected in his *The Athenian Ecclesia* 1 and 2 (Copenhagen: 1983 and 1989). For a more general treatment of the Assembly (which takes into account all his earlier work), see his *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: 1987). W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton: 1971), is still, I think, the most accessible and best account of the role of rhetoric and the *rhētores* in Athenian political life. More detailed is H. Yunis' study of political rhetoric in *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: 1996). More controversial is J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: 1989), which looks at the practical dynamic between speakers and the mass of people arising from the former's exploitation of political and civic ideology. P.J. Rhodes, 'Political Activity in Classical Athens', *JHS* 106 (1986), pp. 132–144, considers, among other things, how politicians marshalled support, a question impossible to answer precisely. Discussion of the orators mentioned in this chapter, as well as of symbouleutic oratory, is best found in G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963) and now S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999). For more information on Demosthenes, see the various essays in my *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000).

Notes

- 1 On Athenian democracy, see M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*² (Norman, OK: 1999); cf. the succinct comments of H. Yunis, *Taming Democracy* (Ithaca: 1996), pp. 2–7. Rather than cite copious references to scholarly works in this chapter, I refer several times to Yunis' book; readers will find in it full references to other relevant works.
- 2 See in detail M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: 1987).
- 3 In the military sphere, the professional office of general (*stratēgos*) was introduced by Cleisthenes in 508 although the first general was not elected until 501 (*AP* 22). The office quickly eclipsed the military function of the polemarch archon.
- 4 On attendance, see M.H. Hansen, 'How Many Athenians Attended the *Ecclesia*?', in his *The Athenian Ecclesia* 1 (Copenhagen: 1983), pp. 1–23.
- 5 See H.M. Roisman, Chapter 28.
- 6 On which, see P.J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford: 1972), *passim*.
- 7 On which procedures, see M.H. Hansen, *Eisangelia* (Odense: 1975) and S. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford: 1993), pp. 113–115 (*eisangelia*), 159–160, 298–299 (*graphē paranomōn*). On rhetoric and law, see J.P. Sickinger, Chapter 19.
- 8 Penguin translation; all translations are taken from the Penguin Classic series, except where indicated. On the 'casting' of Pericles by Thucydides, see Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 59–86.
- 9 See in detail, W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton: 1971); on the phrases, see his pp. 108–119.
- 10 Cf. J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: 1989), pp. 104–112 and Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 7–15. On the rhetorical exploitation of language, see A. López Eire, Chapter 22.
- 11 See Hansen, *Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes*, pp. 50–63.
- 12 See further, Connor, *New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, pp. 99–108.
- 13 That rhetoric can make slaves of those who listen to it is repeated in Plato, *Philebus* 58a8–12.
- 14 On the wealth of the demagogues, see Connor, *New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*, pp. 151–163; on Cleon's family and fortune, see in detail J.K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford: 1971), pp. 318–320.
- 15 On the debate, see in more detail A. Andrewes, 'The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3: 36–39', *Phoenix* 16 (1962), pp. 64–85 and M.C. Leff, 'Agency, Performance, and Interpretation in Thucydides' Account of the Mytilene Debate', in C.L. Johnstone (ed.), *Theory, Text, Context. Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory* (New York: 1996), pp. 87–96.
- 16 See in more detail, A.G. Woodhead, 'Thucydides' Portrait of Cleon', *Mnemosyne*⁴ 13 (1960), pp. 289–317, A.W. Gomme, 'Thucydides and Cleon', in his *More Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford: 1962), pp. 112–121, and Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 87–103.
- 17 See the discussion of Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 59–116, on Thucydides' reaction to Pericles and his 'bad' demagogic successors and their use of rhetoric.
- 18 Cf. G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), p. 237.
- 19 See further, T.K. Hubbard, Chapter 32.
- 20 Cf. Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 50–58.
- 21 See further, G.L. Cawkwell, 'Eubulus', *JHS* 83 (1963), pp. 47–67.
- 22 On Lycurgus, see F.W. Mitchel, 'Lykourgan Athens: 338–322', *Semple Lectures* 2 (Norman, OK: 1973).

- 23 See further, R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time* (Oxford: 1993) and Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), especially the chapters by Badian, Ryder, Worthington, and Buckler on Demosthenes' political career; for his public speeches, see the chapter by Milns. Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 237–277, discusses Demosthenes' use of political rhetoric and how it was crafted to fit the audiences that he faced. See also S. Usher, Chapter 15 on Demosthenes' public speeches.
- 24 See further, Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families*, pp. 113–139.
- 25 The speeches against Aphobus and Onetor (27–31) have survived, although there are doubts as to their authenticity.
- 26 Cf. E. Badian, 'The Road to Prominence', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 9–44.
- 27 See M.H. Hansen, 'The Athenian "Politicians"', 403–322 B.C., in his *The Athenian Ecclesia 2* (Copenhagen: 1989), pp. 1–24.
- 28 See M.H. Hansen, 'The Athenian "Politicians"', 403–322 B.C., 'Rhetores and Strategoi in Fourth-Century Athens' and 'The Number of Rhetores in the Athenian Ecclesia, 355–322 B.C.', in his *The Athenian Ecclesia 2* (Copenhagen: 1989), pp. 1–24, 25–72 and 93–127, respectively.
- 29 On speaking effectively and responsibly before such large audiences, see especially Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, *passim*.
- 30 See further, C.L. Johnstone, 'Greek Oratorical Settings and the Problem of the Pnyx: Rethinking the Athenian Political Process', in C.L. Johnstone (ed.), *Theory, Text, Context. Issues in Greek Rhetoric and Oratory* (New York: 1996), pp. 97–128. The quotation is on p. 122.
- 31 See Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 103–109; cf. S. Usher, Chapter 15.
- 32 Cf. P.E. Harding, 'Rhetoric and Politics in fourth-century Athens', *Phoenix* 41 (1987), pp. 25–39.
- 33 See especially Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens*; cf. his 'Power and Oratory in Democratic Athens: Demosthenes 21, *Against Meidias*', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric In Action* (London: 1994), pp. 85–108.
- 34 For a good overview of the approaches of modern scholars and a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses, see P.J. Rhodes, *Ancient Democracy and Modern Ideology* (London: 2003).
- 35 I do not believe that Andocides 3 was ever given in an Assembly.
- 36 See Ian Worthington, 'Demosthenes' (In)activity During the Reign of Alexander the Great', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 90–113.
- 37 Much of the following discussion is taken from my 'Oral Performance in the Athenian Assembly and the Demosthenic *Prooimia*', in C.M. Mackie (ed.), *Oral Performance and Its Context* (Leiden: 2004), pp. 129–143. These works are also discussed by Yunis, *Taming Democracy*, pp. 247–257. A translation of all of the prologues with notes will appear in my *Demosthenes, Speeches 60 and 61, Prologues and Letters*, *The Oratory of Classical Greece Vol. 10* (Austin: 2006), from which the following translations are taken.
- 38 Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14, *Rhet. Alex.* 29, and Quint. 4.1. See further, M. de Brauw, Chapter 13, pp. 191–193, 197.
- 39 Thus, Number 1 and Dem. 4 (*Philippic* 1), Number 3 and Dem. 1 (*Olynthiac* 1); Number 7 is almost exactly the opening of Dem. 14 (*On the Symmories*), Number 27 of Dem. 15 (*For the Liberty of the Rhodians*), and Number 8 of Dem. 16 (*For the People of Megalopolis*).
- 40 Some prologues indicate that hasty decisions were sometimes made because of the rushed order of business; for example, 21.3: 'Gentlemen of Athens, you are accustomed to deliberate in the same way as someone would rightly deploy a military force – with

speed. However, you ought to deliberate leisurely, but execute your decisions with zeal' (cf. 18 and Thuc. 1.70.1).

- 41 See further, J. Roisman, *The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 2005), pp. 135–139; cf. his Chapter 26 (in this volume).
- 42 Cf. T.K. Hubbard, Chapter 32 and J.P. Sickinger, Chapter 19.
- 43 Cf. C. Cooper, 'Demosthenes, Actor on the Political and Forensic Stage', in C.M. Mackie (ed.), *Oral Performance and Its Context* (Leiden: 2004), pp. 145–162.
- 44 Cf. R.T. Oliver's books, *History of Public Speaking in America* (Boston: 1965), *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China* (Syracuse, NY: 1971), *Leadership in Asia: Persuasive Communication in the Making of Nations, 1850–1950* (Newark, NJ: 1989), and *The Influence of Rhetoric in the Shaping of Great Britain* (Newark, NJ: 1986).
- 45 Cf. the interesting collection of essays in M. Edwards and C. Reid (eds.), *Oratory in Action* (Manchester: 2004), which stretch from Demosthenes to Margaret Thatcher. Influences on Lincoln's speech are also outlined by C. Carey, Chapter 16, p. 243 with notes 24 and 29.
- 46 I am grateful to Andrew Erskine, Bill Fortenbaugh, Yossi Roisman and Jim Sickinger for their comments on a draft of this chapter.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

Rhetoric and Persuasion in the Hellenistic World: Speaking up for the *Polis*

Andrew Erskine

1 Classical Rhetoric and the End of the *Polis*

Rhetoric, the art of public speaking, developed out of the *polis*, or more precisely the democratic *polis*. Public speaking was fundamental to the ideology of the emerging democracies of the fifth century, of which Athens was at the fore. Here in the Assembly, the Council or the lawcourts a citizen could address his fellow citizens and try to persuade them to follow his favoured course of action. Modern scholarship may debate the point at which rhetoric became organised and systematised but this political context was essential to its initial development.

Since antiquity the study of Greek oratory has tended to focus on the classical period of the fifth and fourth centuries. The *Lives of the Ten Orators*, a series of biographies wrongly attributed to Plutarch, begins with Antiphon and ends almost as a postscript with a brief life of Dinarchus, thus just edging into the third century. In between come Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, Aeschines, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, and Hyperides. These ten, reproduced in a number of lists with occasional variation, formed the canon of Attic orators to be read and imitated. A substantial number of their speeches survive, the majority of which were written for delivery in the lawcourts, but they also include other genres such as some of Demosthenes' symbouleutic speeches addressed to the Assembly.¹ All this is in striking contrast to the emptiness of the three Hellenistic centuries that follow.²

In the Greek imagination it is Demosthenes and his age that embody the essence of Greek oratory, and modern scholars have followed accordingly.³ Numerous images come to mind: Demosthenes' advocacy of the Olynthian cause in the Athenian Assembly; his impassioned speeches against Philip II of Macedon; his wearing of white to celebrate Philip's death, even though his own daughter had only recently

died; the longstanding and often vituperative rivalry between him and Aeschines, at times acted out in the courts before the assembled jurors of Athens; finally in 322 the execution of Hyperides and the suicide of Demosthenes after the failure of the revolt against Macedon, marking the symbolic end of the great age of Classical oratory.⁴ Demosthenes himself has come to represent not merely Greek oratory, but the very idea of the *polis*, the Greek city-state. More than a failed defence of Athens against Macedon he has represented in the eyes of many the failure of the *polis* against monarchic rule.⁵

When Demosthenes began his political career in the 350s Macedon was a relatively small kingdom in northern Greece, but by the time of his death the Macedonians under the leadership of Alexander the Great had overthrown the Persian Empire and become rulers of the Eastern Mediterranean. Alexander's vast empire subsequently fragmented into separate kingdoms, each ruled by dynasties established by leading figures in the Macedonian military – the Antigonids in the Macedonian homeland, the Seleucids in Asia, and the Ptolemies in Egypt. This new world order brought not only Greco-Macedonian kings but also an extension of Greek culture as new Greek cities were founded and developed far from Greece itself, cities such as Alexandria in Egypt, Antioch on the Orontes and Seleucia on the Tigris. The cultural transformation that was taking place is exemplified by the presence of the world's largest collection of Greek books not in Athens but in the new library of Alexandria. The Hellenistic age traditionally begins with the death of Alexander in 323 and closes in 30 with the suicide of the last Hellenistic monarch, the Ptolemaic queen Cleopatra, although by then the Roman rule of the Mediterranean was long established.

The *polis* has often been held to have died with Demosthenes, a view that recent scholarship has shown to be untenable. Advocates of this position argue that with the rise of these kings the *polis* was no longer the independent entity that it had once been. It is, however, only a misplaced focus on Athens that leads anyone to suppose that independence should be treated as a defining characteristic of the *polis*. It is true that many cities may have found their freedom constrained by these new monarchies but many too had suffered similar restrictions when faced with the power of Athens and Sparta in earlier centuries. Attention instead needs to be directed towards the thousands of inscriptions published from the cities of the Hellenistic world that together reveal the tremendous vitality of civic life in this period.⁶

The Hellenistic period may be much written about as a time of systematisation and theory in rhetoric,⁷ but the practical side of rhetoric as a fundamental of Hellenistic politics is often neglected. This is due in part to the lack of surviving speeches and in part to a general prejudice about the ineffectiveness of the Hellenistic *polis*. Yet it was in the Hellenistic period that rhetoric and oratory became essential elements of any satisfactory Greek education, creating a world in which the use of rhetorical technique was widespread.⁸ Out of this would emerge the Roman orators trained in Hellenistic rhetoric, men such as Gaius Sempronius Gracchus and Marcus Tullius Cicero.⁹ It is the practical application of rhetoric that is of interest here. The present chapter explores the role of oratory in the Hellenistic context, first among cities, then in the relationship between city and king, and finally in its place in the formation of Greek identity.

2 Oratory and Civic Life

Public speaking was a vital component of political life throughout the Hellenistic period and into the Roman empire. The *Rhetoric for Alexander*, a handbook dating from the latter part of the fourth century, may have come down to us addressed to a king but its instruction was directed towards those seeking success and influence within the *polis*.¹⁰ Some four or five hundred years later when Plutarch wrote his *Precepts of Statecraft*, a volume of advice to a young man embarking on a political career, the *polis* was still fundamental, although by this time Hellenistic kings had given way to the Roman empire. Plutarch lamented the restrictions that Roman rule placed on the civic elites of his own day but he still considered eloquence to be a very necessary attribute for an aspiring politician and it features prominently in his advice. In some ways it was more important than it had been. Now that war was no longer the responsibility of the *polis*, the ambitious needed to make their mark elsewhere, for instance in the lawcourts or on an embassy to Rome ([Plut.], *Moralia* 805a–b, 814e–f).

The Hellenistic world does not offer the wealth of evidence for rhetorical practice that classical Athens does. What it offers instead is sketchier but as a result of epigraphic discoveries broader-based. Rhetoric and oratory emerge not only as central to the internal working of Greek cities and federations through their role in public debate but also as crucial to a city's self-presentation in its interaction with other cities and with kings.

The centrality of oratory in the public life of the *polis* is reflected in the important role given to speeches in ancient historiography. Polybius, the second-century Achaean historian who himself had considerable political experience, identified three types of speeches to be found in the writing of history. These can be roughly grouped as addresses to assemblies and councils, exhortations such as might be given by a general to his soldiers, and the speeches of ambassadors.¹¹ Polybius' own history conforms to this pattern; Philopoemen speaks before the Achaean Assembly (24.13), Ptolemy IV and Antiochus III both encourage their troops before the battle of Raphia (5.83), and Callicrates on an embassy to Rome addresses the Senate (24.9). A history such as that of Polybius will tend to have more to say about war than other aspects of civic life but his text does nonetheless give a valuable insight into the wide-ranging importance of oratory at this time. A significant omission in Polybius' categories is that of forensic oratory, but that is an omission that reflects the demands of history-writing rather than the Hellenistic *polis*. What follows in this section will focus on civic and diplomatic speeches, though due to the limitations of the evidence forensic oratory will again be omitted.

The numerous decrees that survive on stone today are a testament to the energy of the assemblies and councils of the Hellenistic cities; their inscription is an assertion of civic pride and unity. They present an image of consensus but they are a product of debate and often no doubt disagreement. Advocates of a moribund *polis* might see the assemblies as redundant institutions but where evidence exists for attendance or voting, as it does from cities in Asia Minor, it suggests on the contrary that the assemblies were well-attended and played a vital part in the running of the city.¹² Here the leading citizens would put their rhetorical education to use and lay claim to primacy within the community, but what they said is largely lost. That there was at

times considerable public debate behind the outward consensus is evident from writers such as Polybius who reports the varying points of view of speakers in meetings of the Achaean League. This was a forum he knew well and on occasion it is the arguments of his own father and his father's opponents that he recounts. Thus his father Lycortas argued in the late 180s that the laws and constitution of the Achaean League should take precedence over any Roman requests, whereas Calliocrates and Hyperbatus favoured obedience to the requests regardless, a theme that recurs in Polybius' history (24.8; cf. 24.11–13 on Philopoemen and Aristaeus). Polybius also gives a vivid picture of the rabble-rousing oratory of Critolaus, whose misguided anti-Roman stance led to the Achaean War and the destruction of Corinth in 146 (38.12.7–9):

[Critolaus] attacked the authorities and inveighed against his political opponents, and used the utmost freedom of language regarding the Roman legates, saying that he wished to be friends with Rome, but that he was not at all minded to make himself subject to despots. The general tenor of his advice was that if they behaved like men they would be in no want of allies, but if they behaved no better than women they would have plenty of lords and masters (trans. W. R. Paton).

Of course the assemblies and councils would have been more active at some times and in some places than others, a difference that might reflect political circumstance. Striking, for instance, is the huge rise in epigraphic evidence for activity in the Athenian Assembly in the years immediately following the overthrow of the tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum.¹³

Polybius attached considerable importance to the speeches of ambassadors; not only did he put them in a category of their own, but also he reported a fair number. That some owe their survival to a Byzantine anthology, 'On Embassies', should not detract from this conclusion.¹⁴ The evidence of epigraphy confirms this impression of extensive diplomatic activity. Ambassadors are honoured as civic benefactors, panhellenic festivals are established, visiting embassies are received, conflict between cities is arbitrated upon by others, disputes between citizens are resolved by foreign judges, assistance is given at times of crisis, and kings are approached. The need to take account of the great powers, whether they be kings or Rome, is a feature of this activity but it does not explain it. What the inscriptions reveal is a world in which cities are interacting with other cities, often interactions that are as much about international partnership and community as about the more familiar goals of war and aggression. This sense of community among Greek cities may be a peculiarly Hellenistic phenomenon, brought about as Alexander's conquests fractured the traditional insularity of the Greek city, but it is important to remember that our image of earlier centuries may be distorted by the shortage of epigraphic material, comparable or otherwise.¹⁵

It is epigraphy that tells of a major diplomatic campaign undertaken in the late third century by the city of Magnesia on the Maeander. Its purpose was to establish a panhellenic festival in honour of Artemis Leucophryene and to have the city recognised as sacred and inviolable. Some twenty groups of Magnesians ambassadors were sent around the Greek world as far afield as Sicily and Iran. At each city and court the ambassadors spoke in favour of the proposal and sought to persuade their audience to

support it. None of this was a formality. This was their second attempt to establish the festival; their first, little more than a decade earlier, had been not been a success. Many of the replies to this second campaign were inscribed in the Magnesian Agora. Few give us much indication of what the ambassadors may have said to persuade their listeners but there is an occasional glimpse. It is the reply of the Epidamnians that reveals most, because it summarises what the Magnesian ambassadors said, although, as often in such documents, it is not clear whether this reports a single speaker or a group of speakers:

[the ambassadors] spoke at length themselves, relating the appearance of Artemis and the previous help given by their ancestors to the sanctuary at Delphi, when they defeated in battle the barbarians who attacked with the intention of plundering the wealth of the god, and the benefit they accomplished for the *koinon* of the Cretans, when they settled their civil war; and they related also their previous benefactions to the rest of the Greeks, by reference to the oracles of the gods and the poets and the writers of history and those who have compiled the deeds of the Magnesians; and they read out the decrees applying to them in the various cities in which are inscribed both honours and crowns relating to the glory of the city; . . . and they call upon us, being kinsmen and friends, to accept the sacrifice and the sacred truce and the contest, crowned and of Pythian rank in its honours.¹⁶

As befits the establishment of a panhellenic festival they stress what they have done on behalf of the Greeks. Their contribution to the defence of Delphi against the barbarian Celts not only serves to remind the Epidamnians of Magnesian piety but also emphasises the community of Greeks to which both cities belong. The claims of the ambassadors are given a secure basis with the production of evidence, both literary and documentary. Contact between the two cities, one on the Adriatic coast of the Balkans, the other in Asia Minor, must have been negligible. Nonetheless the Magnesian ambassadors conclude with an appeal to kinship and friendship, a point that would probably have been made more fully at the beginning of the speech.

Appeals to kinship and friendship occur frequently in the epigraphic records of diplomatic exchanges, but for the most part the nature of these relationships is left undefined and little space is devoted to explicit reporting of the speeches of the visiting ambassadors. An exception comes from Xanthus in Lycia, which around the same time as the Magnesians were sending out their embassies received an embassy from Cythinium in Doris in mainland Greece. The people of this city were visiting kindred cities to raise funds for the rebuilding of their city walls. The Xanthian decree in response was not content to allude to the speeches of the ambassadors, instead it reports them at length:

[The ambassadors] asked us to remember the kinship that we have with them through gods and heroes and not to be indifferent to the destruction of the walls of their native city. For Leto, the founder of our city, gave birth to Artemis and Apollo here among us. Asclepius, son of Apollo and of Coronis, who was daughter of Phlegyas, descendant of Dorus, was born in Doris. In addition to the kinship that they have with us through these gods they recounted their intricate descent from the heroes, tracing their ancestry to Aeolus and Dorus. They further pointed out that Aletes, one of the Heraclids, took care of the colonists from our city who were sent by Chrysaor, son of Glaucus, son of

Hippolochus. For Aletes, setting out from Doris, helped them when they were under attack, and when he had freed them from the danger that surrounded them, he married the daughter of Aor, son of Chrysaor. After demonstrating with additional examples the goodwill based on kinship which has joined them to us from ancient times, they asked us not to remain indifferent to the obliteration of the greatest city in the Metropolis but to give as much help as we can to the building of the walls, and make clear to the Greeks the goodwill that we have towards the *koinon* of the Dorians and the city of the Cytinians, giving assistance worthy of our ancestors and ourselves; in agreeing to this we will be doing a favour not only to them but also to the Aetolians and all the rest of the Dorians, and especially to King Ptolemy who is a kinsman of the Dorians by way of the Argead kings descended from Heracles.¹⁷

Here the ambassadors draw attention to the relationship that has existed between the two states since heroic times. Such an invocation of a shared mythical past was not unusual in ancient diplomacy and helped to establish a bond that made the approach that much more acceptable.¹⁸ But it appears to be more than a straightforward diplomatic manoeuvre. The Xanthians are not merely listening to the request of a visiting embassy but are appreciating a performance. The mythological complexity of the account makes this as much a display of genealogical learning as a diplomatic appeal. A few years later the Xanthians would honour a certain Themistocles of Ilium for an impressive display of rhetorical skills, which may have taken as one of its subjects the kinship between Xanthus and Ilium.¹⁹ But the Cytinian speech is not only about the mythical past. Their embassy is also concerned to remind the Xanthians to live up to the reputation of their ancestors and to think about the consequences of any response in the present.

These two documents give us a listener's perspective on the speeches of the visiting ambassadors, shaping the report according to their own priorities. Unfortunately no full text of an ambassador's speech is extant from either the classical or the Hellenistic period but one ambassador has left us a summary of his speech. In 343 Aeschines was defending his role in the embassy to Philip II that led to the Peace of Philocrates of 346. In his defence speech, *On the Embassy*, he outlines the speech he says he gave before Philip (2.25–34). First he reminded Philip of the longstanding friendship between the two states, then he began a historical review of Athens' relationship with Macedon and produced documents to confirm this. Later he focussed on the specific question of the Athenian claim to Amphipolis that he traced back to the sons of Theseus and argued for the justice of that claim, again producing documentary evidence. The summary, of course, is concerned to bolster Aeschines' own defence, but it nevertheless offers a valuable complement to the epigraphic material considered above. Several factors emerge from these examples: the need to establish some basis for a relationship, whether friendship in the past or kinship, an emphasis on the justice of the appeal, the use of supporting evidence, the use of myth if necessary, all combined in what could be a tightly constructed and complex argument.²⁰

The speeches of the ruling elite of the Greek cities of the Hellenistic age may not survive but there is significant indirect evidence for political debate and for diplomatic activity. Taken together this shows a widespread and sophisticated rhetorical culture that grew out of the needs of the cities themselves, both in terms of self-government and in their relations with other cities. This, however, was a world not only of cities but also of powerful kings whose kingdoms could encompass a multitude of cities.

3 Kings and Cities

In the speeches of Demosthenes the king and the barbarian fell outside the world of the *polis*, the battleground of the orator, the one incompatible with the institutions of the *polis*, the other simply not Greek and condemned accordingly. For Demosthenes at least it was the person of Philip II that combined these two characteristics, at once barbarian king of Macedon and natural enemy of the Greek *polis*.²¹ Greek reservations on both counts may have continued into Hellenistic times, but while the barbarian remained excluded the king came to be incorporated. The Hellenistic world saw the co-existence of *polis* and king.²² The Magnesians sent ambassadors not only to cities but also to all the leading kings, Ptolemy IV, Attalus I, Philip V, and Antiochus III and his son. The Cytinians informed the Xanthians that if they acceded to their request they would be doing a favour not only to the Cytinians and all the Dorians but 'also to King Ptolemy who is a kinsman of the Dorians by way of the Argead kings descended from Heracles'. Thus the Cytinian ambassadors embraced contemporary kings in their web of kinship. Acceptance of kingship operated not only at a political level but also at a religious one. With the development of ruler cult, kings came to be incorporated into the very structure of Greek civic life, whether that was in mainland Greece or further East.²³

This co-existence, however, was not unproblematic. Suspicion remained, as a debate of the Achaean Assembly reported by Polybius indicates. Should the League accept a gift of 120 talents from King Eumenes to be used to subsidise the running of its council? The debate prompted vigorous anti-monarchic sentiment. According to one speaker, Apollonidas of Sicyon, the affairs of democracies and kings were by nature opposed and the Achaeans should not only reject the gift but also hate Eumenes for offering it (Polybius 22.7–8, cf. the Rhodians at 21.22.8). On the other hand it is easy to overstress the novelty of monarchic power for Greeks. It is true that the Greeks of the mainland had had little experience of subjection to kings, but the same was not true of Asia Minor where many of the Greek cities had been subject to the Persian king. When Alexander the Great arrived in Ilium, for example, he found a toppled statue of the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes, its new condition symbolic of the change of masters (Diod. 17.17.6).

The opposition between king and *polis* was no longer as sharp as it had been in the oratory of Demosthenes. It is the fourth-century rhetorician, Isocrates, who prefigures the Hellenistic model. Passionately opposed to the Persian Empire, Isocrates wrote a series of pamphleteering letters to kings such as Philip of Macedon to encourage them to launch a panhellenic campaign against the Persian king.²⁴ Similarly Hellenistic cities and their politicians, rather than voicing opposition to monarchy *per se*, tended to align themselves with one king against another. In the Chremonidean War of the 260s, for instance, Athens took the side of Ptolemy against Antigonus Gonatas of Macedon.²⁵ Leading citizens too often had allegiance to one or other king and could be numbered among the 'friends' (*philoí*) of a king, a formal title designating membership of the circle around the king rather than a sign of special personal intimacy.²⁶ Their standing in the city would be related to their closeness to the king, the one reinforcing the other. Their ability to persuade the king gave them power and influence within the city, and that in turn strengthened their position with

him. An Athenian decree of 283/2 honours Philippides, the comic poet and 'friend' of Lysimachus, for interceding with the king on behalf of the city. Personal contact is emphasised; he had 'spoken with the king' about a range of issues from assistance with the Athenian grain supply to considerate treatment of Athenians taken prisoner at the Battle of Ipsus in 301. Here honours for Philippides are also an indirect way of honouring the king. Consistent with his relationship with Lysimachus is his opposition to the Athenian award of divine honours to Demetrius Poliorcetes.²⁷ That Athens should honour kings or supporters of kings is something that would hardly have pleased Demosthenes, had he still been alive to witness it.

The citizens of Greek cities made speeches in order to persuade, whether they were speaking as participants in a debate in the Assembly or as representatives of their city elsewhere. The words of a king, however, had a very different force. On occasion a king might himself enter the civic space and speak directly to the Assembly or Council of a city. Thus Antiochus III addressed the people of Teos as recorded in two honorific decrees of that city, dating from around 203. He told of benefits he was granting them, that their city and territory be sacred, inviolable and free from tribute, and benefits he would arrange, that they be released from the contributions they paid to King Attalus. Significantly, however, it was the very act of speaking that created these benefits, a circumstance reflected in the way that Antiochus is honoured. When the Teians voted to dedicate a bronze statue of the king in the *bouleuterion*, the site of his address, they did it 'in order that the place be consecrated to King Antiochus the Great where he accomplished some of the favours and promised others that he accomplished later'.²⁸ This is not speech as persuasion but speech as accomplishment, as completed act – and the Teians are sensitive to this distinction, the one the mark of a citizen, the other of a king.

A revealing passage in Strabo's *Geography* puts the distinction more directly (9.2.40):

We say that kings have the greatest power (*dunasthai*); and for this reason we call them dynasts. They are powerful in leading the masses in the direction they want, whether through persuasion or force. Above all they persuade through the bestowing of benefits (*euergesia*); for persuasion through words is not kingly but rather it is characteristic of an orator, whereas we say persuasion is kingly whenever they win men over to their desired course by the granting of benefits. They persuade people by means of the granting of benefits but they force them by means of arms.

The king's superiority makes rhetoric unnecessary for him. The powers to bestow benefits and to inflict violence on others are both expressions of this superiority. The king can act uninhibited by the confines of the *polis*, but rhetoric, the art of persuasion by means of words, requires the *polis* and an understanding that, however powerful an individual citizen might be, as citizens all are equal.

Even at a distance a royal utterance still had the capacity to transform. When the Attalid king Eumenes II received an embassy from a Phrygian community requesting that it become a *polis*, complete with gymnasium and its own laws, the king sent two letters in reply. The first began 'King Eumenes to the inhabitants of the Toriaians, greeting' and granted the ambassadors their request. The second, sent at the same time as the first but intended to be read second began, 'King Eumenes to the *boule*

and the *demos* of the Toriaians, greeting'. Eumenes has made his own decision fact and the Toriaians have achieved *polis* status.²⁹ Merely speaking conferred a benefit.

At other times the very structure of communication can assert a complex hierarchy of power. Illuminating here is a stone *stèle* from Mysia, which records a royal edict (*prostagma*) issued by Antiochus III in distant Iran in 209. The edict takes the form of a letter to Zeuxis, the Seleucid viceroy of Asia Minor, about the appointment of Nicanor as high priest in the region. Its basic points are straightforward: Nicanor should be given any necessary assistance, his name should be included in contracts and public documents and Antiochus' letter should be inscribed and set up in the most prominent sanctuaries. But what Antiochus does in practice is to order Zeuxis to order others to see that this is carried out. The inscription itself embodies this hierarchy of orders. It is not simply Antiochus' edict that is inscribed; the edict is itself preceded by Zeuxis' letter to his subordinate Philotas, and before Zeuxis' letter comes one from Philotas to his subordinate Bithys, who is ordered to 'give out orders to carry them out as it is ordered'. Anyone reading this dossier of royal documents, inscribed in a now unknown sanctuary in Mysia, could not help but be impressed by and persuaded of the pervasive power of the Seleucid king, communicated both by the language itself and the manner of presentation. This would have been but one of many variations on the same dossier, multiplying Antiochus' command as it worked its way down the hierarchy.³⁰

Kings and cities may both have been players in the complex interactions of the Hellenistic world but their approaches were very different. A king persuaded by making people believe in his power. By presenting himself as benefactor, war leader and source of authority he created an image of power that may have appeared to be more comprehensive than in practice it was. Cities, in contrast, were weak and sought strength in the rhetorical skills of their elite, who would act as representatives of the city to the king. Even when cities combined together into a large federation such as the Achaean League the resulting union continued to operate as if it were an extended *polis* (cf. Polybius 2.37.11). Rhetoric reflected the importance of dialogue and debate in the Greek city, whereas the king's preference for persuasion by benefaction and violence, actual or implied, reflected the absolute nature of his power.

4 Rhetoric and Greek Identity

The Magnesian ambassadors who travelled to Epidamnus highlighted their city's role in defending Delphi against marauding barbarians intent on plundering the sanctuary of Apollo (quoted above). The opposition between Greek and barbarian was a staple of Greek political rhetoric. By invoking it the Magnesians were placing themselves within a longstanding tradition as defenders of the Greeks against outsiders, in this case the Celts. This was a strategy that both excluded and included, affirming the shared Greekness of those who were not barbarians. The Magnesians' proposed panhellenic festival was for all Greeks and their conduct in the past justified their claim to hold such a festival. Nonetheless the term 'barbarian' was rather more flexible than such rhetorical conventions might suggest, its exclusiveness depending as much upon the insider as the outsider.

The recurring theme of the menace of the barbarian can be traced back to the fifth century and the Greek victory over the invading Persians. Then it not only underpins the anti-Persian stance of the Delian League but also finds expression in some of the key literary works of the period, Aeschylus' *Persians* and Herodotus' *Histories* for instance. The identity of the barbarian may change but the threat persists. For Isocrates the struggle between Greek and barbarian had been under way since the Trojan War and now it was necessary to launch a panhellenic campaign against the Persians.³¹ Demosthenes, on the other hand, advocated Greek unity in the face of the barbarian Macedonians under Philip.³² By the late fourth century the Persian empire had ceased to exist and the Macedonians were the rulers of a Greek East. Conveniently around 280 Celtic incursions into mainland Greece and Asia Minor created a new barbarian menace and one that was quickly absorbed into the repertoire of anti-barbarian rhetoric. Comparisons between victory over the Celts and victory over the Persians were explicit and widespread.³³

A more formidable non-Greek people was soon to appear, the Romans. Again, those opposed to the growing influence of this new power sought to build unity by stressing the barbarian character of the Romans.³⁴ Polybius presents a fascinating debate at Sparta in 210 not long after the Aetolian League had made an alliance with Rome. Chlaeneas, an Aetolian ambassador, addresses the Spartans, seeking to persuade them to align themselves with Aetolia and Rome against Macedon while his Acarnarnian counterpart, Lyciscus, warns against such a course (9.28–39). Chlaeneas reminds his audience how the Aetolians alone had resisted the Celtic invasion, 'the attack of Brennus and his barbarians'.³⁵ In response Lyciscus acknowledges this but turns it around. Whatever their past achievements the Aetolians are now allied to a barbarian people who are a threat to Greece, and the Spartans who had themselves defeated the barbarians in the Persian Wars should remember their ancestors and reject the Aetolian offer; it was not Aetolia who was the saviour of Greece against the barbarians, he argued, but Macedon itself. The reliability of these Polybian speeches might be questioned but they give a sense of the way that the Greek–barbarian opposition continued to play a major role in Greek political debate.

Greek rhetoric may have posited a sharp divide between Greek and barbarian but in practice matters were rather hazier than this. Rhetoric itself promoted Greekness. It was conducted in Greek and practised by the Greek-speaking elite of the Eastern Mediterranean, but, although it joined Greeks together, it was not exclusive. It was a skill that could, with effort and expenditure, be acquired, and thus it offered a means of becoming Greek to those who wished to participate more fully in what was now the dominant culture of the East. Only the Romans were to adopt rhetoric and remove it from this Greek context, creating instead a Latin rhetoric but still bringing with it the notion of the 'barbarian'.³⁶ Something of the flexibility of the concept of Greekness can be seen in the example of the Lycians who were discussed above. They were a non-Greek people from southern Asia Minor with their own language, funeral practices, and religious customs, but one that increasingly borrowed from their Greek neighbours with the result that in the Hellenistic period Lycian public inscriptions were in Greek.³⁷ When the Lycians of Xanthus gave praise to Themistocles, the visiting speaker from Ilium, for his rhetorical skills, they were not only honouring him but also saying something about themselves: that they could appreciate rhetoric and share in things Greek. It is this same concern that led them to inscribe the

complex genealogical arguments of the Cytinian ambassadors that wove the Lycians into the community of Greeks and gave them a Greek heritage. All this highlights the ambiguous character of Greekness; it is both an ethnic designation and something that can be acquired, and rhetoric, in spite of its emphasis on the opposition between Greek and barbarian, is one of the entry points.

Rhetoric in both Classical and Hellenistic times was bound up with the *polis*. Far from marking its end the Hellenistic period might even, paradoxically, be considered the age of the *polis* as Alexander and his successors extended the *polis* beyond its traditional confines. New cities were eager to embrace the central elements of Greek civic culture, both its physical manifestations, such as the gymnasium requested by Toriaians above, and the more abstract, the practice of rhetoric in particular. Both allowed cities, old and new, to share in the community of Greeks, a community that, however imagined it may have been, was especially active at this time. Rhetoric played its part in not only the internal affairs of the cities but also the extensive interaction between cities, as the elite of one city visited and addressed their counterparts elsewhere.

Rhetoric and oratory flourished in this Hellenistic world. Indeed they may even have been more necessary than before as the rise of the kingdoms limited the means of persuasion available to a city-state. In a powerful *polis* such as fifth-century Athens the form of persuasion varied with context; rhetoric would be used in the Assembly or the courts, and also when Athens sent embassies abroad, but Athens had no qualms about threatening force against those weaker than it as Thucydides' Melian dialogue starkly demonstrates (5.84–116). This latter role, however, came to be largely taken over by the Hellenistic king, leaving rhetoric for the *polis*. Only with the arrival of Rome does a single city-state effectively combine the practice of rhetoric with the persuasive power of force, but Rome is something very different. For the rest rhetoric became an essential part of civic life and self-representation.³⁸

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Notes

- 1 On the rhetoric and law, see J.P. Sickinger, Chapter 19, and on Assembly speeches, see S. Usher, Chapter 15.
- 2 G.A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), pp. 64–65, R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginning to the End of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford: 1968), pp. 206–208.
- 3 Cf. S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999).
- 4 See further, Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000) and R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time: A Study in Defeat* (Oxford: 1993). On Demosthenes' speeches, cf. S. Usher, Chapter 15 and Ian Worthington, Chapter 17.
- 5 T. Habinek, *Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory* (Oxford: 2005), pp. 77–78.
- 6 R. Billows, 'Cities', in A. Erskine (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: 2003), pp. 196–215, G. Shipley, *The Greek World after Alexander 323–30 BC* (London: 2000), p. 35, J. Ma, *Antiochos III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor* (Oxford: 1999), p. 25 and *passim*, E.S. Gruen, 'The Polis in the Hellenistic World', in R. Rosen and J. Farrell (eds.), *Nomodeiktēs: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald* (Ann Arbor: 1998), pp. 339–354, P. Gauthier, 'Les Cités Hellénistiques', in M.H. Hansen (ed.), *The Ancient Greek City-state* (Copenhagen: 1993), pp. 211–231.
- 7 Cf. Kennedy, *New History*, pp. 81–101, and the more substantial S.E. Porter, *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 BC–AD 400* (Leiden: 1997), though with a rather broader interpretation of 'Hellenistic'. For some discussion of the contexts of Hellenistic rhetoric, see L. Pernot, *Rhetoric in Antiquity*, trans. W.E. Higgins (Washington DC: 2005).
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- 9 D.H. Berry and M. Heath, 'Oratory and Declamation', in Porter, *Handbook*, pp. 393–396.
- 10 See P. Chiron, Chapter 8.
- 11 Polybius 12.25a.3; cf. 25.1.3, on that see F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* 2 (Oxford: 1967), p. 385.
- 12 Gruen, 'The Polis', p. 354.
- 13 C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, trans. D.L. Schneider (Cambridge, MA: 1997), p. 71.

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- 15 A. Giovannini, 'Greek Cities and Greek Commonwealth', in A.W. Bulloch, E.S. Gruen, A.A. Long and A. Stewart (eds.), *Images and Ideologies: Self-definition in the Hellenistic World* (Berkeley: 1993), pp. 265–286, is an important exploration of this theme. For the persistence of local inter-*polis* warfare, see J. Ma, 'Fighting *Poleis* of the Hellenistic World', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London: 2000), pp. 337–376, P. Baker, 'Warfare', in A. Erskine (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: 2003), pp. 373–388, especially pp. 380–385.
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- 21 As barbarian: Dem. 3.16, 24, 9.29–31, 45; enemy of the *polis*: Dem. 1.5, 6.25, 8.39–43.
- 22 On Hellenistic kings, see J. Ma, 'Kings', in A. Erskine (ed.), *Blackwell Companion to the Hellenistic World* (Oxford: 2003), pp. 177–195.
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- 24 Habinek, *Ancient Rhetoric*, p. 10; on Isocrates, see T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6.
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- 27 Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, no. 374, trans. Bagnall and Derow, *Hellenistic Period*, no. 13, Plut. *Demetrius* 12; cf. honours for Callias, an Athenian adherent of Ptolemy, T.L. Shear, *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 BC*, *Hesperia* Supplement 17 (Princeton: 1978), pp. 2–4, trans. M.M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest* (Cambridge: 1981), no. 44.
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 - 35 For the Aetolian manipulation of this, see C. Champion, 'Polybius, Aetolia and the Gallic Attack on Delphi (279 BC)', *Historia* 45 (1996), pp. 315–328.
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 - 37 T.R. Bryce, *The Lycians in Literary and Epigraphic Sources* (Copenhagen; 1986), especially pp. 42–54 with 214–215.
 - 38 My thanks to Ian Worthington for making me think about this subject and to Mike Edwards for making me think about it again.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

Rhetoric and the Law

James P. Sickinger

Each year the Athenians chose six thousand citizens over the age of thirty to serve as jurors, or dicasts (*dikastai*), in their city's courts. Early in the year those six thousand went to the Ardetto Hill, located just outside the city walls in the southeast part of Athens, and swore an oath, the heliastic or dicastic oath, in which they promised to follow certain principles when they voted on cases. A text of what purports to be that oath is preserved in Demosthenes' speech *Against Timocrates* (Dem. 21.149–151), and although scholars have raised questions about the authenticity of several of its clauses, there is little question that the oath included a provision in which dicasts swore to reach their decisions 'according to the laws and decrees of the city', and in cases where there was no applicable law in accordance with what seemed to them to be 'most just'.¹

To what extent, however, dicasts actually remembered and respected the oath's stipulation that they judge cases by the city's laws is more difficult to determine, as litigants often employed rhetorical tactics above and beyond the law to influence the votes of dicasts. The Socrates of Plato's *Apology* (34c–d) says that unlike other litigants he will not parade his wife and children before the court to win its sympathy; we do not know how common such emotional appeals were, but Socrates is not the only one to mention them.² The courtroom speeches of the Attic orators likewise develop other *topoi* that were, strictly speaking, unrelated to the main legal issue of a case. Speakers make elaborate arguments based on probability, remind dicasts of their own past services to the city, and pillory the behavior and character of their opponents, all in an attempt to sway their audiences to vote for them or against their adversary. Given the presence and prominence of these *topoi* in some speeches, it is not surprising that modern scholars have sometimes questioned just how central a role the law actually played in Athenian litigation.³

Even so, courtroom speakers do not neglect the law entirely, and in this chapter I shall consider some of the ways that orators sought to influence their audiences through citations of laws and arguments based on them. Both Aristotle in the

Rhetoric and Anaximenes in the *Rhetoric to Alexander* recognized the importance of law to forensic oratory, and each rhetorician offers specific advice on how speakers might exploit the law to their advantage. More important, the speeches of the Attic orators contain numerous citations of individual statutes and sometime fairly sophisticated legal arguments, proof that the theoretical interest of Aristotle and Anaximenes had its counterpart in actual practice. Curiously, the ways that orators manipulate and mold their presentations of laws do not conform exactly to the advice proffered in the handbooks. This divergence is indicative of the manifold legal strategies that were available to speakers, but it also indicates how realities of the courtroom were not always conducive to rhetorical theory.

The Athenians had possessed written laws since the end of the seventh century when, they believed, the lawgiver Draco had issued laws on homicide and other subjects. Draco's laws were said to have been repealed, with the exception of those on homicide, about a generation later by Solon, who was active early in the sixth century. Fourth-century Athenians sometimes attributed all of their city's laws to Solon, even ones clearly of later date, and that practice makes it difficult to know with any certainty what exactly Solon had done. Nonetheless, his legislation was probably far-reaching and certainly touched on many topics, ranging from debts to inheritance.⁴ We hear little of new Athenian legislation later in the sixth century or early in the fifth, but the number of laws must have grown significantly from the middle of the fifth century, when the administration of Athens' overseas empire and the creation of radical democracy by Ephialtes increased the amount of business handled by the Athenian Assembly. By the end of the fifth century the number of Athenian laws and conflicts among them convinced the Athenians to undertake a review of their existing legislation. That process was interrupted by the regime of the Thirty Tyrants in 404/3 but was resumed with the restoration of the democracy in 403 and completed by 399. One result of this review was that the Athenians henceforth drew a sharp distinction between laws (*nomoi*) and decrees (*psēphismata*). Laws were superior to decrees and were general rules with permanent validity that applied to the entire citizen body. They were enacted by special procedures and subject to occasional review to remove inconsistencies and contradictions. Decrees were more limited in scope, often temporary in nature, and could not conflict with existing laws. The Athenians also decided that magistrates would from now on apply only laws written down and included in the newly revised code (Andoc. 1.85). In order to ensure access to these laws, some were inscribed in and around the Royal Stoa, where laws of Solon were also displayed. But texts of all laws were available in the state archives in the Metroon, which was probably first organized around this time.⁵

This review and revision of the city's laws may have been part of an overall attempt to check the unbridled power of the people and Assembly and to establish the sovereignty of laws.⁶ It certainly reflects a concern for the state of Athens' laws and probably a desire to see that they were applied and obeyed. Pericles had already boasted in a well-known passage of his funeral oration of the Athenians' reverence for both written and unwritten laws (Thuc. 2.37.3), and obedience to law was reinforced at Athens through various oaths sworn by citizens and magistrates alike. Each year newly enrolled ephebes, young men who had reached the age of eighteen, swore to obey the city's magistrates and its existing laws. The nine archons, who had chief responsibility for overseeing Athens' courts, also swore when they took office

that they would serve according to the city's *nomoi* (AP 55.5; cf. 7.1). Magistrates, as we have seen, were permitted to use only the written laws of city (Andoc. 1.85), and they could be held accountable for their violations of laws at the end-of-office accounting (*euthynai*) to which all officials had to submit.⁷ The law also had a special place in Athenian courts where the dicasts who sat on Athenian juries swore, as noted above, to judge the cases before them according to the city's laws. Frequent reminders of this obligation in the courtroom speeches of the orators imply some communal expectation that they would abide by it.⁸

Applying the law in individual court cases, however, was not a simple, straightforward matter, and several features of the Athenian legal system gave litigants ample opportunity to manipulate and exploit the law to their own advantage. First and foremost among these was the amateurish nature of the Athenian legal system.⁹ Court officials were not legal experts or professionals, but citizens chosen by lot to serve in a magistracy for a single year. They did not issue judgments, make rulings, or decide on the applicability of individual laws to specific cases but simply presided over a trial in an administrative capacity. Nor were there public prosecutors or defense attorneys to conduct cases. Instead, private citizens had to take the initiative to commence legal proceedings and follow suits through to their conclusion. As both prosecutors and defendants, these private citizens had complete responsibility for preparing a case for trial. This entailed gathering all relevant pieces of evidence, seeking out witnesses, and finding potentially relevant laws. All these items were then woven together into a speech that litigants were expected to deliver, in person, to a court. Wealthy litigants could hire *logographoi*, speechwriters, to help them prepare their cases and write their speeches, and anyone could enlist the support of relatives and friends to appear as witnesses or supporting speakers (*synēgoroi*). But it was illegal to pay someone else to speak on one's behalf (Dem. 46.26).

The manner in which litigants presented their cases was heavily influenced by the makeup of Athens' courts, which were manned by large, popular juries of citizen dicasts who served as both judges and jurors. Originally, aristocratic magistrates had decided legal cases at Athens, but Solon granted citizens the right to appeal decisions to a popular court called the Heliaea.¹⁰ By the middle of the fifth century, and perhaps as a result of the reforms of Ephialtes, magistrates had lost the power to issue verdicts entirely (except in cases involving very small amounts). They held preliminary hearings but then passed cases on to court for trial. Several courts were in session on any given day, each consisting of panels numbering from 201 to 501 dicasts (and sometimes more). Because magistrates were primarily administrative officials, dicasts alone were the ultimate arbiters on all questions of both fact and law. They decided not only whether the law had been broken in a particular case, as do jurors in modern courts, but also how, if at all, particular laws applied in those cases, a duty reserved for judges in modern legal systems. Dicasts, however, were not legal professionals, and although they may have possessed some knowledge of the city's laws from prior experience as a juror, they had to rely largely on the laws and legal arguments presented to them to understand the legal questions involved in a case. For litigants, this non-professional status of dicasts meant that their speeches and their presentation of legal issues had to be not only convincing but also intelligible to large, non-specialist audiences.¹¹

The form of Athenian laws also affected the way in which they were presented to juries. Aristotle believed that good laws should be defined as narrowly as possible so as to leave as little discretion as possible to judges (*Rhet.* 1.1.7; cf. 1.13.3). Many Athenian laws, however, failed to live up to this standard. Statutes tended to identify offenses without defining them in detail, so that dicasts had considerable discretion in deciding whether a particular law was relevant to a case.¹² Moreover, the same act could be prosecuted by several different procedures each of which was defined by a different law. That gave litigants considerable leeway in deciding what laws to cite in support of their cases and how to explain their relevance. A prosecutor could argue for an extremely broad interpretation of a law to ensure that the alleged acts of his opponent fell within its scope. Defendants might define a law very narrowly and argue that its terms did not apply to their case. This uncertainty had the potential of weakening the authority of the laws, since advocates theoretically could argue for any interpretation, and because dicasts, faced with competing viewpoints, might choose to ignore the law entirely and base their decisions on other considerations.

And yet litigants' freedom to advance novel interpretations and exploit ambiguities was not unlimited. However imprecisely laws may have been framed, litigants and dicasts shared basic assumptions about the meaning of words, and interpretations of laws that defied common sense or flouted conventional values were unlikely to carry weight. The Athenians were also suspicious of legal expertise and excessive quibbling over meaning; charges that a speaker's opponent twists the law to his own advantage are not uncommon (e.g., *Ant.* 5.15) and testify to an aversion towards over-interpretation, and litigants themselves appear reluctant even to admit that they have studied laws relevant to their cases (*Hyp.* 3.13).¹³ In such an atmosphere, attempts to apply overly subtle interpretations or to advance radically new readings of laws were liable to create anxiety, if not hostility, among dicasts, and litigants had to walk a fine line between establishing a legal foundation and standing accused of sophistry.

How then was a litigant to proceed? Both Aristotle and Anaximenes recognized that litigants had to deal with the law in their speeches, and their rhetorical handbooks offer several pieces of advice on handling laws in different situations. Aristotle's main treatment of the law occurs within his discussion of the *atechnoi pisteis*, the non-artistic proofs available to a speaker (*Rhet.* 1.15.1–12). The non-artistic proofs included laws, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths and were means of persuasion that, unlike artistic proofs based on emotion, character, and rational argument, an orator did not invent himself but found already existing (*Rhet.* 1.2.2; cf. 1.15.1–2).¹⁴ The mention of laws alongside other forms of evidence may strike the modern reader as puzzling, since we are accustomed to think of laws as the actual rules or norms upon which a case is decided, not as pieces of evidence to be cited in support of a case like witness testimony. Nonetheless, Aristotle's categorization reflects the practice of his day. In the absence of prosecuting attorneys or real court officials with judicial powers, litigants were responsible for searching out and selecting which laws, if any, they wanted dicasts to consider in a case, just as they had to gather witnesses, documents, and other pieces of evidence. In addition, all the items categorized as non-artistic proofs were usually read out to a court by a clerk. From a logistical perspective, laws were no different from other forms of documentary evidence and that fact governs Aristotle's treatment.¹⁵

Aristotle's advice on dealing with laws is simple. A litigant who found the law against him should challenge the legitimacy of written law itself and appeal to the higher authority of universal law (*koinos nomos*) or the abstract concept of fairness (*epieikeia*) (*Rhet.* 1.15.4). He might urge dicasts to use their 'best judgment' as opposed to a specific written law (*Rhet.* 1.15.5); point out that universal law and fairness were, unlike written laws, constant and unchanging, and therefore worthy of more respect (*Rhet.* 1.15.6); and argue that justice was true and advantageous, while written law might only appear to be so, and so could be ignored (*Rhet.* 1.15.7). Other possible tactics included exploitation of contradictions or ambiguities, or suggestions that a law was obsolete and therefore no longer applicable (*Rhet.* 1.15.9–12). When, however, the law supported one's case, a speaker must argue, according to Aristotle, that dicasts were bound to follow it closely when they cast their votes (*Rhet.* 1.15.12). The clause of the dicastic oath that permitted them to use their 'best judgment' was intended only to keep them from committing perjury when they did not understand a law; it did not grant them license to reject law altogether. Moreover, appeals to universal law and fairness ought to be considered with suspicion, since people only argue for what is good for themselves, not for abstractions. Aristotle further suggests that speakers could point out that having laws but not using them was the same as having no laws at all, and that for dicasts to consider themselves wiser than the laws (by ignoring them) was forbidden in laws that were praised (*Rhet.* 1.15.12).¹⁶

Anaximenes does not use include laws in his discussion of 'supplemental proofs' (*epithetoi pisteis*), which correspond to Aristotle's non-artistic ones, but he does offer advice elsewhere on how to deploy laws in forensic speeches, and his advice shares many features with that of Aristotle.¹⁷ Courtroom speakers should argue that the laws they adduce are just, good, and advantageous, and that any their opponents may cite are the opposite (*Rhet. Alex.* 36.20). If a litigant finds himself opposed by laws he considers bad, he ought to argue that enforcing them amounted to lawlessness (*anomia*), since the purpose of law was not to harm but to help a city (*Rhet. Alex.* 36.22). Speakers should also remind dicasts that they will not be acting unlawfully if they cast a vote against a law, but actually legislating against the use of bad laws (36.23). On the positive side, it is suggested that ambiguities can be exploited by arguing for broad interpretations of a law when that strategy suits a speaker's case or for a narrow one when that tack is advantageous (*Rhet. Alex.* 36.24).

What is striking about the suggestions of both handbooks is the degree to which they fail to find full expression in the speeches of the Attic orators.¹⁸ Forensic orators at Athens praise laws, exploit ambiguities in their texts, and even suggest that dicasts should act as legislators by reaching a particular verdict in a case. But they do not attack or reject the validity of individual laws. Sometimes a speaker may accuse an opponent of manipulating the meaning of a law or of applying an inappropriate statute to a particular case. Criticism of individual laws or of the law in general, however, is avoided. Nor do the orators suggest that dicasts should privilege universal or unwritten laws over written ones; they often ask jurors to vote for what is just, and occasionally in accordance with fairness, but their speeches tend to regard the laws as tools of justice, not obstacles to its implementation. Law and justice went hand in hand in the rhetoric of the courts.¹⁹

The attitude toward the law adopted by the orators is in fact almost universally positive. Speakers describe themselves as individuals who act according to the laws (Lys. 23.3) and obey them (Dem. 47.19). The laws routinely stand on a speaker's side (Dem. 44.62), and both prosecutors and defendants can describe themselves as defenders of the law (Aes. 1.2, Lys. 1.26). A speaker's adversary, almost by definition, behaves in the opposite fashion. He has broken the laws in the past (Dem. 58.29), and in the present case he is attempting to deceive the dicasts in defiance of the laws (Is. 11.4). Opponents generally lack any respect for the laws (Dem. 21.61) and may even despise them (Lys. 1.27). As a result, it was necessary for the dicasts themselves to defend the laws and come to their rescue. Not only are they reminded of their oath to decide cases in accordance with the city's laws,²⁰ they are also called upon to defend, uphold, or confirm the validity of the laws with an appropriate verdict (Dem. 22.219–224). A vote against a speaker's case can be construed as a vote against the laws or as granting license to wrongdoers to do as they please (Lys. 10.3). It is also a betrayal (Dem. 25.98), an act of impiety (Din. 1.86), or tantamount to the physical destruction of the laws themselves; if the dicasts do not reach a verdict in accord with the laws, they might as well not exist (Lys. 1.48). These types of general appeals to the law often appear in speeches that also feature more detailed discussions of particular statutes, but their purpose is not principally one of strengthening a speaker's legal position. Instead, litigants speak a generic language of law in order to elicit goodwill for themselves, incite anger against and mistrust of their opponents, and inspire in dicasts a sense of obligation to vote in their favor – since the law naturally stood on their side.²¹

But the law also figured in the rhetoric of the courts more directly through the citation and discussion of specific statutes, especially when speakers sought to offer a legal basis for their acts or positions.²² Sometimes a litigant will introduce a law by paraphrasing or quoting from its text in the body of his speech (Lys. 3.41). The more common practice was for a speaker to interrupt his delivery and ask a courtroom clerk to read aloud portions of a law that he himself had provided. These readings can occur anywhere in a speech. In one speech of Isaeus, *On the Estate of Hagnias* (11), a litigant has a statute read to the court before he even begins his speech; in the Demosthenic speech *Against Phormio* (35) the speaker concludes his case by asking a clerk to read out a statute. Usually, texts of laws are introduced somewhere in the body of a speech, where their deployment is governed by the particular demands of the case and the personal preference or style of a speaker or speechwriter. Aeschines chose to present laws and legal arguments early on in two of his speeches, *Against Timarchus* (1) and *Against Ctesiphon* (3). But Lysias in the speech *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* (1) and Andocides in *On the Mysteries* (1) postpone the introduction of legal texts and argumentation to the 'proof', the later section of a speech that comes after a fuller narrative of events.²³

Citations of laws are especially common in cases whose main issue was a point of law. For example, in the procedure known as *paragraphē* a defendant could challenge the legality of a suit brought against him on the grounds that it was inadmissible for reasons specifically defined by laws, such as the expiration of a statute of limitations or a previous release from future claims²⁴ Once such a challenge had been lodged, the original suit was postponed and a separate trial held to decide the question of its legality. Eight speeches delivered in *paragraphai* cases are preserved, and in seven of

them (Isoc. 18; Dem. 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38) the speakers cite and have read to the court the specific law or laws under whose terms the suit was or was not, in their view, admissible. In the one speech that does not formally cite a law or have its texts read out, the speaker still mentions the law under whose terms he first sued his opponents (Dem. 35.3); it may be that his opponent, who spoke before him, had already had its text recited to the court, thereby freeing the speaker of the necessity of doing so himself.

Another class of suits that addressed legal questions and cited laws with frequency were ones used to challenge the constitutionality of proposed decrees (*graphē paranomōn*) and laws (*graphē nomon mē epitēdeion theinai*). Legislative proposals could be deemed unconstitutional for technical reasons: they might contradict an existing law or their proposer might have failed to follow the proper legislative procedure. But a motion could also be challenged based on its substance, on the grounds that its specific contents were inexpedient or contained false statements.²⁵ Assessments of a pending decree's expediency or falsehood were open to widely different interpretations and depended ultimately on political rather than legal considerations; thus, speeches delivered in these types of suits routinely devoted extensive attention to non-legal matters.²⁶ Even so, points of law were not avoided, as is well illustrated in the speeches of Aeschines *Against Ctesiphon* (3) and Demosthenes *On the Crown* (18). The case for which these speeches were composed grew out of the long enmity between Aeschines and Demosthenes, which culminated in 330 when Aeschines challenged in court the legality of a motion by Ctesiphon, first proposed some six years earlier, to honor Demosthenes for his services to Athens.²⁷ Aeschines' main objection to Ctesiphon's motion was that it included a false statement in its claim that Demosthenes 'always spoke and acted in the best interest of the Athenian people' (3.49), and most of his speech is devoted to demonstrating that Demosthenes' career and policies had done more harm than good to Athens. But Aeschines does not ignore the more technical issue of the decree's legality, and he produces two laws that, he argues, Ctesiphon's proposal contravened (3.9–31, 32–48). The first prohibited the crowning of an official still in office and before he had submitted his accounts for approval. Demosthenes had been a *teichopoios*, an official responsible for the city walls, at the time that Ctesiphon made his proposal and so was not eligible (according to Aeschines) to be crowned. The second law violated by Ctesiphon was one that allowed the proclamation of honors granted by the Council and Assembly only in the Council or Assembly; Ctesiphon's proposal, however, called for announcement of Demosthenes' crown in the Theater of Dionysus. Demosthenes, for his part, questions Aeschines' interpretation of these laws (18.110–125). He claims that because Ctesiphon's decree did not honor him for his official activities as a magistrate, he was not subject to the law Aeschines cites, and he himself cites several decrees in which state officials had been honored while in office (18.115–116). He also produces a law that, he claims, allowed the proclamation of honors in the theater when the people explicitly allowed it (18.120–121). Which party, Aeschines or Demosthenes, was technically correct on these legal questions cannot now be resolved, and it may be that the laws on crowns were vague enough so that different interpretations were possible. What is significant from a rhetorical perspective is that even in the most politically-charged of cases, the opposing parties still felt a need to produce laws and legal arguments to buttress their positions.

Litigants also sought out and cited laws in cases in which technical points of law were not the central issue. Prosecutors in all sorts of suits routinely cite laws that their opponents have allegedly violated. Apollodorus charged the courtesan Neaera in a *graphē xenias* with falsely claiming to be an Athenian citizen, and he begins his speech with a reading of the relevant law ([Dem.] 59.16–17). Epichares accused Theocrines of conducting prosecutions even though he was a state debtor and therefore debarred from doing so, and he produced several laws by which this indebtedness was incurred ([Dem.] 58.5–21). A client of Lysias prosecuted Theomnestus for slander (*kakēgoria*) and cited the law on slander in support (10.14). Defendants too adduce laws to justify their actions. Euphiletus, the speaker of Lysias 1, cites several laws to justify his killing of Eratosthenes, who had seduced his wife (1.28–32). Andocides in the speech *On the Mysteries* defends himself against charges of impiety not only by claiming that he was innocent, but also by offering several laws and decrees under whose terms the charges of impiety were invalid (1.71–91). And Euxitheus, the speaker in Antiphon's speech *On the Murder of Herodes* (5) asserts that his opponents have prosecuted him by an inappropriate procedure. He does not have any laws read out to the court but he does quote from the texts of several to support his legal argument (5.8–19).

Of course, the simple reading of a law was by itself not likely to convince a jury of the legal merits of a speaker's case. What relevance individual statutes had to the specific facts at issue required explanation and elaboration, all the more so when an opponent could offer a different interpretation of the same laws, cite different laws on the same issue, or discount the relevance of the laws cited by a speaker altogether. So litigants regularly supplemented the reading of one or more laws by a court clerk with their own interpretations and elucidation of their meaning and relevance. In this way they could emphasize specific statutes that favored their case or gloss over or ignore other laws or sections of laws that might weaken it. Lysias' speech *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* offers an impressive illustration of just this practice.²⁸ Euphiletus portrays himself as a defender of the city's laws who had little choice but to put Eratosthenes to death for his conduct, and he introduces three laws to justify this position. Closer inspection of Euphiletus' arguments, however, reveals that his description of these laws is not complete or entirely accurate.²⁹ Athenian law certainly permitted a husband to kill a man he caught in sexual relations with his wife, but it did not require it, as Euphiletus suggests, and several other procedures and penalties for dealing with an adulterer were available. These points, however, may have been lost on the dicasts listening to the speech. They will have heard the laws that Euphiletus cites only once, and their understanding of them will have been conditioned by his one-sided discussion of them.

Andocides employs similar tactics in his speech *On the Mysteries*, delivered in 399. He was charged with violating the decree of Isotimides, which prohibited anyone who had committed impiety and confessed from entering the Agora or religious sanctuaries. The decree had been enacted in 415, in response to scandals surrounding profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries and the mutilation of the Herms, and it was almost certainly aimed at Andocides himself because he had secured release from prison by revealing what he knew of those scandals and by naming others involved. Andocides went into exile after the decree's ratification, but he returned to Athens after the Peloponnesian War and the restoration of the democracy, when a series of legislative measures offered an amnesty to citizens for past actions. But in 400 he

participated in the Eleusinian Mysteries, and he was subsequently charged with violating Isotimides' decree.³⁰

Andocides' defense is twofold. He provides in the first part of his speech an account of the events of 415 when he claims that he was actually not guilty of impiety (1.5–70). He then turns to his specific legal arguments and tries to show that even if he were guilty, the decree of Isotimides was no longer valid. He first discusses and cites the decree of Patrocleides, enacted in 405, which restored full citizen rights to certain classes of disfranchised citizens and called for the erasure of those documents, including decrees, by which they had lost their rights (1.71–75). The implication of his argument, although Andocides does not say so explicitly, is that his rights too had been restored and that the decree of Isotimides had likewise been repealed. Andocides then turns to the revision of the laws that occurred after the democracy's restoration in 403. He cites the decree of Tisamenus, which reinstated the laws of Draco and Solon, called for a review of other existing laws, and prescribed publication, in what form is not entirely clear, of laws that passed the review at the Royal Stoa; its text is read to the court (1.81–84). Andocides goes on to refer to and have read out several other laws. One barred officials from using laws that were not published (1.85–86); others gave laws greater authority than decrees, prohibited laws from being directed at individuals, affirmed the validity of all judgments decided under the democracy, and instructed officials to enforce the laws from the archonship of Eucleides (1.87). By these measures, according to Andocides, decrees enacted before 404/3, including that of Isotimides, were no longer valid (1.89).

We have, however, only Andocides' word to go on, and the situation may not have been so simple.³¹ It is not clear, for example, that the amnesty of Patrocleides' decree extended to individuals guilty of impiety, and therefore to Andocides, and a text of that decree inserted in the speech makes no mention of individuals who had lost their rights for that reason (1.77). Andocides' account of the review of the laws is also tendentious. The Athenians did scrutinize their laws and publish the results, and magistrates were bound to use those published laws. But the decree of Isotimides was a decree, not a law, and despite Andocides' claims to the contrary, we cannot be certain that the review of the laws was intended to nullify all past acts of the Assembly that were embodied in decrees. These fine details, however, are buried under the barrage of texts and explanations that Andocides provides, and dicasts almost certainly will have had difficulty making fine distinctions in the limited time they had to judge the case.

Both Andocides and Euphiletus present laws and legal texts to defend themselves, and the stance both adopt is that their meanings are clear and straightforward, so that the dicasts simply need to follow the letter of the law and acquit them. Other litigants call upon juries to enforce not the letter but the spirit of the law. In Lysias' *Against Theomnestus* (10), the unnamed speaker relates that he had appeared as a witness in a previous suit against Theomnestus, where Theomnestus accused him of killing his own father (10.1).³² The speaker brought suit against Theomnestus for slander because it was illegal to call another citizen a murderer (*androphonos*). He alleges that Theomnestus will argue in his defense that he had not actually used the word for murderer specified in the law, but that he had only said that the speaker had killed his father (10.6). That is, Theomnestus will claim his innocence on the grounds that he had not violated the precise wording of the law. Lysias' client urges the dicasts to

reject this anticipated argument and to concern themselves not with specific words but with their meanings (10.7). The lawgiver, he points out, had been unable to include every conceivable word for every slanderous offense so he used one specific word to cover all words of the same meaning: to accept Theomnestus's argument would, if applied more generally, make a mockery of the law on slander. A person could work from the words and phrases mentioned in the law on slander and, by using terms that differed only slightly from them, still make slanderous statements otherwise prohibited by law (10.8–14). We do not know how the jury voted in this case or if they accepted these speakers' arguments, and in the absence of any formal jurisprudence to guide them the dicasts were free to vote as they pleased. It is noteworthy, however, that Lysias' client does not base his argument about the applicability of the law on slander on interpretation alone. He also cites and quotes from a series of other laws that contained archaic words no longer in current use. One law referred to confining prisoners in the 'stocks' (*podokakke*), while current usage spoke of binding them in or on a 'plank'; another law used outdated terms for swearing oaths, and yet another employed obsolete phrases for prostitution (10.15–20). But, the speaker argues, the meaning of these laws was not in doubt, and the same ought to apply to the phrases found in the law on slander.

Epicrates, a young client of Hyperides, cites several laws for similar reasons in the speech *Against Athenogenes* (3).³³ He had purchased from the metic Athenogenes three slaves and a perfumery. The sale was confirmed by a written contract, but after taking possession Epicrates learned that the perfumery was deep in debt, far in excess of what he had been led to believe (3.9). As their owner he was legally responsible for those debts, so he sued Athenogenes and sought to nullify the contract. Since Athenian law made agreements between two parties binding, and since Epicrates conceded that his contract with Athenogenes mentioned unpaid loans of unspecified amounts (3.6–7, 10–11), his case was a difficult one. He proceeds, however, by arguing that the law on agreements applied only to *just* contracts, and that it made unjust contracts void (3.13). There is some uncertainty whether the law actually included such a provision, and Epicrates does not produce its text.³⁴ What he does is turn to several other laws to support his claim that unjust contracts were not binding. One law forbade lying in the Agora (3.14). Epicrates had not made his purchase in the Agora, but he implies that it was analogous to a deceptive sale in it because Athenogenes had deceived him by not revealing fully the debts owed by the perfumery. He then cites a second law, one requiring the seller of a slave to disclose any infirmities the slave may have; failure to do so allowed the buyer to return the slave (3.15). In the same way, according to Epicrates, Athenogenes ought to be responsible for taking back the wrongs he had inflicted on the speaker (3.15). Epicrates then cites another law that made children of lawfully betrothed women legitimate (3.16). Lawful betrothal at Athens involved a pledge (*engue*) between a bride's father and her groom, in which a father gave his daughter in marriage 'for the production of legitimate children'. The pledge served as a contract between father and groom, and Epicrates notes that if it was made under false pretenses, the betrothal was invalid.³⁵ The implication of his argument is that the same principle should apply to his contract with Athenogenes. Finally, Epicrates turns to the law on wills (3.17–18). It allowed a man to dispose of his property as he wished, unless he suffered from extreme old age, illness, compulsion, or the undue influence of a woman. Wills made under such

circumstances could be voided. So Epicrates suggests that just as 'unjust' wills could not be enforced, so too his contract with Athenogenes ought to be invalidated: not only was it unjust but also he had agreed to it under duress and the influence of the courtesan Antigone (3.18).

Aristotle had suggested in the *Rhetoric* that litigants who found the law opposed to their case could appeal to the concept of fairness (*epieikeia*) as overriding written law. Epicrates found himself in a somewhat similar situation; it seemed that his opponent would base his argument on a law making contracts between two parties binding (3.13). Epicrates, however, does not follow Aristotle's advice and argue for the rejection of this law in favor of fairness; on the contrary, he tries to establish that fairness was an inherent principle of Athenian laws on sale by examining what were in his view related statutes.³⁶ Since these voided agreements concluded with deceit, based on incomplete or false information, or made under some form of duress or mental defect, he maintains that the dicasts should support his case and, in conformity with the laws, nullify his contract with Athenogenes.

At one point in his discussion Epicrates attributes the law on betrothal to an unnamed lawgiver (Hyp. 3.16), and later he refers to two others laws that he attributes specifically to Solon (3.21). Allusions to an unnamed lawgiver, or to Solon in particular, occur frequently in the speeches of the orators, and they play an important role in the use of laws by litigants. Solon, as we have seen, had promulgated laws for Athens early in the sixth century, and in the fourth century the Athenians were fond of attributing to him many or all of their laws, even in cases where a law was clearly later in date. Such attributions served largely rhetorical functions,³⁷ but they were especially useful in providing speakers with an intermediary figure through whom they could present their own interpretations of different statutes.³⁸ In Lysias' speech *Against Theomnestus* (10), the speaker suggests that it was too difficult for the lawgiver (later identified as Solon, 10.15) who drafted the law on slander to include every potentially slanderous word, so he had subsumed all related words by mention of a single one (10.7). Lysias' client certainly had no idea of the intentions of the legislator who had drafted this law or whether he intended it to apply to more terms than those he specifically named. He has credited the lawgiver with his own interpretation of the law. Similarly, Euphiletus in the speech *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* claims that the legislator responsible for the law on justifiable homicide had imposed the death penalty on the seducers of both concubines and wives because he believed death was the most appropriate penalty (1.31). He also attributes to the same unnamed legislator the view that rape was less serious than adultery (1.33). Those arguments are one-sided, as we have seen, because they offer an incomplete picture of the legal avenues available to the aggrieved husband. But Euphiletus conceals the bias of his interpretations by assigning them to someone else. By so doing, he absolves himself of possible charges of twisting the law but also invests his one-sided explanations with greater authority, since they are said to be the views of the lawgiver himself.

Citations of specific laws and a lawgiver could also help define an opponent's character. If labeling a law Solonian heightened its stature, then that same attribution ought to have increased the importance of upholding that law, or to have intensified the severity of transgressing it. Epicrates' attribution of two laws to Solon has that effect. He notes that Solon had passed a law making owners responsible for crimes or

expenses incurred by their slaves (Hyp. 3.22). He accuses Athenogenes of breaking this law, and he goes on to mention that Solon had not allowed even just decrees to have greater authority than a law. This second reference to Solon actually describes fourth-century legislative procedure, which prescribed that no decree could override a law. Epicrates' point, however, is to contrast Athenogenes with Solon: Solon passed good laws, which Athenogenes now violates, and Solon tried to preserve the authority of the laws, while Athenogenes seeks in the present case to make the laws subordinate even to private contracts – and unjust ones at that (Hyp. 3.22).

Laws were in fact frequently cited to make arguments about the character of litigants.³⁹ Aeschines exploits this technique masterfully in the speech *Against Timarchus* (1). He was prosecuting Timarchus under a procedure called the *dokimasia tōn rhētoron* ('scrutiny of public speakers'), which allowed citizens to challenge the right to speak in the Assembly of those who had prostituted themselves. He discusses this procedure (1.28–32), but he also introduces other laws that regulated conduct in schools and gymnasia (1.9–12), protected children from prostitution and sexual assault (1.13–16), and provided criminal procedures for use against male prostitutes who entered public life (1.17–21). These laws were unrelated, but Aeschines links them together by emphasizing their attention to proper sexual conduct. Although he claims that Timarchus had broken only the third of these laws (under whose terms was not actually prosecuting him), Aeschines argues that Timarchus' life was entirely opposed to them (1.8) and thereby disparages Timarchus's character before the court.⁴⁰

Aeschines is quite explicit that he is citing several laws to make not a legal argument but a statement about the character of his opponent; other litigants are more subtle. In the speech *Against Theocrines* ([Dem.] 58) the speaker Epichares charges that Theocrines owed money to the state but continued to initiate prosecutions against others, even though that right was denied to state debtors. Epichares is not satisfied, however, with citing only one law that made Theocrines a debtor; he introduces four under whose terms Theocrines owed money to the state (58.5–6, 11–12, 14, 19–21). These laws may have been the source of Epichares' prosecution, but his intention in producing so many reflects more than legal concerns. Their number backs up his claim that Theocrines was a chronic lawbreaker (58.5) who believed he was superior to the city's laws (58.15). Indeed, his transgression of all these laws shows that Theocrines deserves no leniency: if anyone should be forgiven, it should be those inexperienced with the law and not individuals who, like Theocrines, betray the laws for money (58.24).

The citation of multiple laws against an opponent was also made possible by the form of many Athenian statutes. As we have seen, offenses were not closely defined in Athenian laws, and it was sometimes possible to prosecute the same act by several different ones. This procedural flexibility was well recognized by ancient authors, who offer several explanations for it.⁴¹ Whatever its origin and purpose, procedural flexibility enabled prosecutors to accuse their opponents of violating several laws in a single act, thereby heightening the gravity of their crime. Demosthenes makes this argument against Meidias in his speech *Against Meidias* (21.35), but it is best illustrated in his *Against Conon* (54).⁴² In that speech Ariston was suing Conon in a *dikē aikeias*, a private suit for battery, after an altercation between the two men. Ariston, however, begins his speech by recalling advice he had received according to

which Conon's actions made him susceptible to arrest as a cloak-stealer or to prosecution for the offense of *hubris* (54.1–2), both of which brought more severe penalties than a simple suit of battery. Ariston returns to this argument later in his speech, and eventually has the laws on cloak-stealing and *hubris* read out to the court to show that Conon's behavior (as he described it) was liable to prosecution under both (54.24). Ariston maintains that his decision to prosecute Conon for a less serious offense ought to be testimony to his moderation, but that it should not diminish the wickedness of Conon's behavior (54.24). If anything, Conon was getting off easily, and Ariston notes that had he died from his wounds, Conon would have been guilty of murder (54.25).

There was, however, a flip side to such arguments. The procedural flexibility of Athenian law also allowed defendants to charge their opponents with prosecuting them under an incorrect procedure and, therefore, of misusing the laws.⁴³ We encounter this argument first in Antiphon's speech *On the Murder of Herodes* (5), when Euxitheus criticizes his accusers for trying him for murder not by the laws on homicide but under the law on *kakourgoi* (5.8–19). It also occurs in two speeches of Hyperides, in each of which the speaker attacks his opponent for applying the law on *eisangelia*, which covered serious crimes against the state, to offenses not defined in the law or for which it was not intended (Hyp. 1.12, 4.4–10). These arguments about proper procedure do not provide an actual defense against the charges at issue; they do, however, allow speakers to depict their opponents as lawbreakers (Hyp. 1.12) or to accuse them of misusing the law to their own advantage (Ant. 5.15, Hyp. 4.3). In similar fashion, Theopompus, the speaker of Isaeus 12, *On the Estate of Hagnias*, protests that his opponents have indicted him for maltreatment of an orphan by the law on *eisangelia* when several other procedures were more appropriate. If the orphaned boy had had a legitimate claim to the estate in question, his guardians ought to have applied to the archon, 'as the laws order' (12.33). If they believed that Theopompus had agreed to share the estate with the boy but had gone back on that agreement, they should sue him for breach of contract (12.33). The law, he maintains, offered specific private suits for the crimes of which he is accused; his opponents' prosecution of him by the public action of *eisangelia* testifies to their lawlessness and their misinterpretation of the law (12.36).

In short, laws could be used in multiple ways by courtroom speakers: to establish legal claims, interpret statutes, and to make arguments about character. Unfortunately, we do not know the outcome of the vast majority of cases in which the speeches of the Attic orators were delivered, and that ignorance keeps us from appreciating how much weight dicasts put on the laws and legal arguments presented in most speeches. Even when we do know the court's decision, as in Aeschines' suit against the decree of Ctesiphon, we cannot be certain what role, if any, the laws cited by either speaker played in helping dicasts make up their minds. Litigants repeatedly cite their services to the city, cast aspersions on the characters of their opponents, and manipulate the values they shared with citizen juries in an effort to win the votes of their audiences. They produce witnesses, issue challenges, and appeal to historical *exempla* to back up and reinforce their claims. And they construct elaborate arguments based on probability to convince dicasts to accept their versions of events. Any of these factors, or any combination of them, may have proven decisive in winning a dicast's vote.⁴⁴

But we should not ignore that law too played a role in the arguments that speakers advanced, and, what is more important, that the law had a privileged place vis-à-vis the other rhetorical strategies available to litigants: dicasts swore to decide cases according to the city's laws, not the social standing of litigants, and litigants themselves urge their listeners to vote according to the laws, not by their social values. The lengths to which litigants work laws, into their speeches and make arguments based on them indicates that general appeals to the law were not hollow slogans; they reflect instead the high esteem in which the law was held: dicasts expected litigants to provide their cases with some legal foundation. Often the rhetorical use of laws seems abusive and nothing more than wanton manipulation and distortion. But to think in that way is to apply modern standards to an entirely different context. The tactics of litigants and their rhetorical treatment of laws are readily comprehensible within a legal system whose laws did not define offenses precisely and in which state-sanctioned guidance was not offered or available on the meaning or scope of individual statutes. Law and rhetoric had no choice but to work hand in hand in the legal system of Athens, and courtroom speakers exploit that characteristic to its fullest.⁴⁵

Bibliographical Essay

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Notes

- 1 On the oath, see most recently S. Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy. The Consequences of Litigation in Ancient Athens* (Austin: 1999), pp. 33–42.
- 2 Dem. 43.81–84, Aristoph. *Wasps* 568–574.
- 3 See D. Cohen, *Law, Violence and Community in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: 1995), especially pp. 181–194.
- 4 On the laws of Draco and Solon, see J.P. Sickinger, *Public Records and Archives in Classical Athens* (Chapel Hill: 1999), pp. 14–34. M.H. Hansen, ‘Solonian Democracy in Fourth-Century Athens’, *Cl.&Med.* 40 (1989), pp. 71–99, discusses the fourth-century practice of attributing all laws to Solon, regardless of their date.
- 5 On the revision of the laws and distinction between laws and decrees, see M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (London: 1991), pp. 161–177. On the availability of laws in the Metroon, see Sickinger, *Public Records and Archives*, pp. 114–187 and ‘The Laws of Athens: Publication, Preservation, Consultation’, in E.M. Harris and L. Rubinstein (eds.), *The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece* (London: 2004), pp. 159–171.
- 6 M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1986), R. Sealey, *The Justice of the Greeks* (Ann Arbor: 1994).
- 7 On the ephobic oath, see now P.J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404–323 BC* (Oxford: 2003), no. 88, pp. 440–449. On obedience to law at Athens, see E.M. Harris, ‘Law and Oratory’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 132–137.
- 8 This point is sometimes denied, but see C. Carey, ‘*Nomos* in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory’, *JHS* 116 (1996), p. 34 n. 8.
- 9 See S. Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law* (Oxford: 1993), pp. 77–97.
- 10 *AP* 9.1 with P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford: 1981), pp. 160–162.
- 11 On the challenges faced by litigants in presenting a speech framed to the mindset of the dicasts, see also C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 205–210.
- 12 On the form of Athenian laws, see C. Carey, ‘The Shape of Athenian Laws’, *CQ* 48 (1998), pp. 93–109; the impact of this feature on the use of laws in speeches is discussed by E.M. Harris, ‘Open Texture in Athenian Law’, *DIKE* 3 (2000), pp. 27–78.
- 13 M. Christ, *The Litigious Athenian* (Baltimore: 1998), pp. 197–208, discusses this aversion to legal expertise in more detail.
- 14 On artistic proofs, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9.
- 15 For further discussion of the non-artistic proofs and their use by Demosthenes in particular, see D.C. Mirhady, ‘Demosthenes as Advocate: The Private Speeches’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 181–204.
- 16 For detailed analysis of Aristotle’s arguments in this section, see D.C. Mirhady, ‘Aristotle on the Rhetoric of Law’, *GRBS* 31 (1990), pp. 393–410 and C. Carey, ‘*Nomos* in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory’, *JHS* 116 (1996), pp. 33–46.
- 17 On the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, usually attributed to Anaximenes, see P. Chiron, Chapter 8; on Anaximenes’ discussion of supplemental proofs and their relationship to Aristotle’s non-artistic *pisteis*, see D. Mirhady, ‘Non-technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes’, *AJP* 112 (1991), pp. 5–28. Anaximenes’ discussion of laws is also examined by Carey, ‘*Nomos* in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory’, *passim*.
- 18 See especially Carey, ‘*Nomos* in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory’, pp. 35–43.
- 19 Carey, ‘*Nomos* in Attic Rhetoric and Oratory’, p. 37, Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy*, pp. 40–42.

- 20 Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy*, pp. 33–42, Harris, ‘Law and Oratory’, p. 133.
- 21 See also C. Cooper, Chapter 14, who emphasizes a speaker’s need to create in his audience the right frame of mind.
- 22 A large number of speeches do fail to cite laws or discuss them only briefly. This omission, however, should not be understood as an admission that the law was unimportant; more often it was due to other factors: Harris, ‘Law and Oratory’, pp. 134–135.
- 23 On the different parts of a speech and the use of laws, especially as part of the ‘proof’, see M. de Brauw, Chapter 13.
- 24 On the *paragraphē*, see S. Isager and M.H. Hansen, *Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century B.C.*, trans. J.H. Rosenmeir (Odense: 1972), pp. 123–131.
- 25 See M.H. Hansen, *The Sovereignty of the People’s Court in Athens in the Fourth-Century BC and the Action against Unconstitutional Proposals* (Odense: 1974) for known cases and discussion of procedures.
- 26 On the interplay of legal and political questions, see H. Yunis, ‘Law, Politics, and the *Graphē Paranomon* in Fourth-Century Athens’, *GRBS* 29 (1988), pp. 361–382.
- 27 On the development of the conflict between Aeschines and Demosthenes, see J. Buckler, ‘Demosthenes and Aeschines’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 114–158; cf. Harris, ‘Law and Oratory’, pp. 140–148, who offers detailed discussion of the legal arguments of each side.
- 28 For discussion of the entire speech, see C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 211–214.
- 29 See especially E.M. Harris, ‘Did the Athenians Regard Seduction as a Worse Crime than Rape?’, *CQ* 40 (1990), pp. 370–377; the legal questions of the speech are treated in full by E. Carawan, *Rhetoric and the Law of Draco* (Oxford: 1998), pp. 284–299.
- 30 On the background to the speech, see D.M. MacDowell, *Andokides. On the Mysteries* (Oxford: 1960) and W.D. Furley, *Andokides and the Herms: A Study of Crisis in Fifth-Century Athenian Religion*, *BICS* 65 (1996), especially pp. 49–71.
- 31 On Andokides’ manipulation of the various documents he cites, see MacDowell, *Andokides*, pp. 200–203, N. Robertson, ‘The Laws of Athens, 410–399 BC: The Evidence for Review and Publication’, *JHS* 110 (1990), pp. 45–52 and 60–65, P.J. Rhodes, ‘The Athenian Code of Laws, 410–399 B.C.’, *JHS* 111 (1991), pp. 95–100 and E. Carawan, ‘The Athenian Amnesty and the Scrutiny of the Laws’, *JHS* 122 (2002), pp. 1–23.
- 32 On this speech and its arguments, see M. Hillgruber, *Die zehnte Rede des Lysias: Einleitung. Text und Kommentar mit einem Anhang über die Gesetzesinterpretationen bei den attischen Rednern* (Berlin: 1988).
- 33 On this speech, see Harris, ‘Open Texture’, pp. 47–54 and Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy*, pp. 28–30.
- 34 D. Whitehead, *Hypereides. The Forensic Speeches* (Oxford: 2000), pp. 305–306, suggests it did not whereas Harris, ‘Open Texture’, pp. 49–50, accepts that it did.
- 35 On the *engquē* as a contract, see R. Sealey, *Women in Greek Law* (Chapel Hill: 1990), pp. 25–26.
- 36 Harris, ‘Open Texture’, pp. 50–54.
- 37 M.H. Hansen, ‘Solonian Democracy in Fourth-Century Athens’, pp. 71–99, R. Thomas, ‘Law and Lawgiver in the Athenian Democracy’, in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (eds.), *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis* (Oxford: 1994), pp. 9–31.
- 38 See especially Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy*, pp. 25–33.
- 39 M. de Brauw, ‘“Listen to the Laws Themselves:” Citations of Laws and Portrayal of Character in Attic Oratory’, *CJ* 97 (2002), pp. 161–176.
- 40 For discussion of the laws in this speech and of Aeschines’ manipulation of them, see N. Fisher, *Aeschines. Against Timarchos* (Oxford: 2001), pp. 125–164 and de Brauw, ‘“Listen to the Laws”’, pp. 170–174.

- 41 For modern discussions, see R. Osborne, 'Law in Action in Classical Athens', *JHS* 105 (1985), pp. 40–58 and C. Carey, 'Offence and Procedure in Athenian Law', in E.M. Harris and L. Rubinstein (eds.), *The Law and the Courts in Ancient Greece* (London: 2004), pp. 111–136.
- 42 For Demosthenes' use of this argument in *Against Medias*, see C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 207–208. On the speech *Against Conon*, see most recently Johnstone, *Disputes and Democracy*, pp. 21–22 and 42–44, de Brauw, '“Listen to the Laws”', pp. 163–165 and C. Cooper, Chapter 14, pp. 208–209.
- 43 For further discussion, see Christ, *Litigious Athenian*, pp. 208–212.
- 44 On these and other *topoi* used by litigants, see especially C. Cooper, Chapter 14 and J. Roisman, Chapter 26.
- 45 I am grateful to Ian Worthington for the invitation to contribute to this volume and for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

CHAPTER TWENTY

Rhetoric and Education

Teresa Morgan

For almost any cultural activity, Greeks throughout antiquity liked to be able to cite Homer as a precedent, authority or model, and the teaching of rhetoric is no exception. Book Nine of the *Iliad* provides the earliest reference to someone being taught to speak in the Greek world. Achilles is sulking in his tent, and an embassy is sent to persuade him to return to battle. One of the ambassadors is the horseman, Phoenix, who describes how Achilles' father sent him with Achilles to join Agamemnon: 'You were a child, knowing nothing yet of war which pits men against each other, nor of debate, where men make their reputations. Because of which, he sent me with you to teach you everything, to make you a speaker of words and a doer of deeds' (9.440–443).¹

Phoenix does not specify what he taught Achilles nor how, though later rhetoricians identified examples of almost every type of rhetoric and every style, argument and arrangement of words in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. One thing that is clear, however, is that in Homer's world, speaking persuasively in public is the preserve of kings and heroes. In the *Iliad*, only one man outside the group of leaders tries to influence the Assembly of the Achaeans: 'big-mouth Thersites', who criticizes Agamemnon's leadership of the Trojan expedition (2.211–277). He is described as ugly, abusive, insubordinate and generally hated, and to the delight of everyone else gets beaten up by 'godlike Odysseus' for making trouble. The implied moral will form an important theme in the history of education: the purpose of rhetoric is to teach those at the top of society how to stay there by controlling the rest.

Some centuries later, it is the needs of education that encourage the development of rhetorical theory. Our earliest information comes indirectly from Aristotle's lost *Synagogē Technōn*. The *Synagogē* identified the founder of rhetoric as a man named Corax, who was living in Syracuse when it became a democracy in 467. To teach people how to speak persuasively in the city's new democratic assembly, Corax analysed speeches into three parts: introduction, *agōn* (action) and epilogue.² Corax had a pupil called Tisias who failed to pay his fees; Corax took him to court

but the court threw them both out for making specious arguments. Another tradition claims that Corax and Tisias collaborated in writing a handbook on how to win court cases for the recovery of property confiscated under Syracuse's recent tyrants (Cic. *Brutus* 46–48). Modern scholars suspect that Tisias-Corax may have been one person, but either way, events at Syracuse initiated what would become another central principle of Greek education: the purpose of rhetoric is to teach people to win.

We do not know how Tisias-Corax taught, but we can make an educated guess about whom he or they taught. Syracuse was not a radical democracy, like Athens. To become a general or a magistrate you had to belong to one of the old-established citizen families (not the new ones created by the tyrants). Officials were elected rather than chosen by lot (Athenians regarded this as aristocracy by the back door) and there was no pay for public office, which discouraged participation by the poor.³ In addition, to make it worth learning forensic oratory, you had to have lost enough property to be worth suing over, and have enough left to finance your rhetorical instruction and possibly also your court case. It seems unlikely that a rhetorical education in Syracuse was pursued by any but the rich.

We know more about the teaching of rhetoric once it arrives in Athens, traditionally with the Sicilian Gorgias of Leontini, who came to Athens on embassy in 427 (though this may not have been his first visit).⁴ Gorgias travelled extensively and taught for a fee in many cities besides Athens (Pl. *Hippias Major* 282b4–c1). Plato attributes to him the view (*Gorgias* 452e9) that rhetoric can make one persuasive on any subject and in any context, but especially in politics and the lawcourts, and that it is unique in making willing slaves of those whom it addresses (*Philebus* 58a8). According to Aristotle (*Sophistical Refutations* 184a–b), Gorgias's teaching method was to make pupils memorize specimen speeches, or sections of speeches, and two examples survive of speeches which may be such specimens: the *Encomium of Helen* and the *Defence of Palamedes*. Gorgias may also have written a *Technē* of rhetoric, which may be the same as his attested *Peri Kairou, On the Right Time*. Aristotle was dismissive of Gorgias's educational technique, which he characterized as showing people the finished product rather than teaching them how to make it.

It is doubtless an over-simplification to regard Gorgias as the first teacher of rhetoric in Athens. Since the end of the sixth century, the most important decisions of state had been taken, after debate, by vote in the *Ekklēsia*, the 6,000-strong Assembly of male citizens. Since 462, most of Athens' legal business had been conducted by *dikastēria*, popular courts with juries of anything from 51 to 501, and occasionally of thousands, chosen by lot from among adult male citizens. In both these arenas debate and persuasion were crucial. It seems highly unlikely that young men from wealthy and aristocratic families – the men who in the early and middle part of the century tended to become generals and politicians – had no kind of training or practice in public speaking. We also know that at least one older sophist, Protagoras, had made periodic visits to Athens, perhaps from as early as 460. Protagoras published *Antilogies*, 'contradictory arguments', and he claimed to teach the art of government (Pl. *Protagoras* 318e5–319a7), which in Athens would certainly include the art of persuading people to follow your advice.

In the second half of the fifth century, however, the demand for public speakers, and teachers to equip them, burgeoned. This was probably partly because, as both speakers and audiences became more experienced, speeches needed to be better to be

successful. It was also because the demand for speakers was increasing, their turnover accelerating and the pool of aspirants increasing. For these developments, Athenian democracy and the Athenian empire were jointly responsible. In 479, in the aftermath of a surprisingly successful war against Persia, Athens had found herself heading a defensive alliance of Aegean and Ionian states. In the next fifty years, she gradually converted the alliance into an empire, which brought her unprecedented wealth and power (and eventually frightened her mainland rivals into declaring war). The empire made fortunes and greatly increased the pool of Athenian *nouveaux riches*, who in many cases were anxious to make their mark in politics. At the same time democracy, which taxed the rich heavily, and war, took its toll of the aristocratic families who had ruled Athens hitherto. By the 420s, there was plenty of room in the Assembly and the lawcourts for newcomers to move in. Sophists like Gorgias were on hand to equip them with the tools of persuasion.

A string of high-profile politicians emerged in the last third of the century from non-aristocratic backgrounds. Cleon's father, for instance, owned a tannery, while Cleophon's had a lyre-making business.⁵ Their sons had in common that they were brilliant speakers in the Assembly and the lawcourts, and they had a profound influence both on government and the course of the Peloponnesian War. We do not know for certain what kind of education Cleon, Cleophon and their like received. The comic poet Aristophanes tells us twice that Cleon did not have an old-fashioned aristocratic education, and could not play the lyre (*Knights* 118–119, *Wasps* 959–961). He could, however, Aristophanes says, read and write, which suggests that he had some form of the new education. Given his family's social aspirations, his political ambitions and his success, it seems likely that he learned rhetoric.

The combination of new men and new education was dramatic, and it provoked a backlash, apparently, from two different groups of people: aristocratic intellectuals and ordinary citizens. Aristophanes (himself an aristocrat) wrote as if from the standpoint of the latter.⁶ In a string of plays in the 420s, he attacked the new politicians for being not only uncultured but vulgar crowd-pleasers, immoral, sycophantic and decadent, catamites and drones, and as incapable of guiding the state in peace or war. In *The Clouds*, produced in 423, he set his sights on the new education that was helping to produce such men.

The Clouds begins with a parsimonious old countryman, Strepsiades, who is in danger of being ruined by his extravagant social-climber of a son, Pheidippides. Strepsiades decides his only hope is a sophistic education, which he says will teach him to 'speak unjustly and win' (115) and enable him to defeat his son's creditors in court. He enrolls at a *phrontistērion* ('thinking-shop') that is run by Socrates. The *phrontistērion* sells a glorious farrago of subjects: logic, mathematics, natural sciences, astronomy, geometry, map-making and theology as well as rhetoric. (In reality, no teacher we know of taught all of these at Athens, though many taught more than one.) Delighted by what he learns, Strepsiades tries to persuade his son to enrol too, but Pheidippides has a natural talent for logic-chopping – not to mention physical violence – with which he attacks his father and make him see how foolish his education is.

In the middle of the play, Aristophanes stages a debate between Better Logic (standing for old-fashioned education) and Worse Logic (standing for new). Better Logic reminisces about the old days, when young men were taught to sing, play the

lyre, respect their elders, handle their weapons and be modest. Nowadays, he says, the young spend all their time in the market place or the public baths, running after dancing girls and arguing. He concludes, 'If you indulge these newfangled ways you'll have a pasty face, narrow shoulders, weak chest, big tongue, small buttocks, long shanks and a great big – vote. He [Worse Logic] will persuade you that everything bad is good and good is bad and fill you with unnatural lust like Antimachus' (1015–1023).

This speech epitomizes what it was about the new education, and above all about rhetoric, that Aristophanes found so threatening. It taught people how to exercise power over their fellow citizens, without giving them what Aristophanes claims are the traditional accompaniments of power: military training, self-control, modesty and respect for one's betters. And it taught anyone who could pay, whatever their origins.

We may wonder whether Aristophanes was really speaking here for the ordinary Athenian. For one thing, the old-fashioned education he describes, with its lyre playing and training for hoplite warfare, was that of the well off and the aristocracy, not the majority of Athenians. For another, it is clear that Cleon, Cleophon and their like were highly popular in the Assembly and the lawcourts. But Aristophanes does at least illustrate one possible reaction to the new education: nostalgia for the good old days before it existed.

Before we turn to the responses of others, it is worth summing up what we can say about the content and place of rhetoric in education in the fast-changing intellectual environment of the late fifth century. Fifty years earlier, as Aristophanes attests, education had probably consisted largely of *mousikē paideia*, learning to recite poetry, to sing and play the lyre, which went with one's moral education because that came largely from the poets, and *gymnastikē paideia*, physical training. In the course of the fifth century it became more common to learn to read and write, which was known as *grammatikē paideia*.⁷ In Plato's *Protagoras*, which is set in the late fifth century, Protagoras describes how children are sent to school to learn their letters, then read and memorize the works of poets, learn to play the lyre and get a physical training (325d–326c). Education was in no way compulsory: there was no state education in Athens, and no regulation of teachers. Education was therefore restricted to those who could and would pay for it. It is likely that at least 10% of men (probably far fewer women) could read and write in Athens, perhaps rather more; but anything above basic literacy – certainly anything like rhetoric or philosophy – was restricted to the much smaller percentage of the really well off.

A teacher of rhetoric advertised himself by giving exhibition speeches – sometimes at a panhellenic festival, where people from many cities were gathered, sometimes in a new city when he arrived there, perhaps bringing his existing pupils from other cities (Pl. *Protagoras* 313d, 315a). Hippias, for instance, performed at the Olympic games, offering to speak on any of a prepared list of subjects and answer questions (Pl. *Hippias Minor* 363c7–d4). Gorgias is said, as a publicity stunt, to have offered to speak on anything at all at Athens.⁸ Both of them sometimes wore the purple robes of professional rhapsodes to enhance their glamour.⁹ Pupils agreed to pay for anything from a single lecture to a course lasting three or four years. Fees varied widely. Prodicus apparently charged 50 drachmas, at a time when one drachma was a skilled worker's daily wage.¹⁰ Protagoras is supposed to have charged 10,000 drachmas for a course. Zeno is also supposed to have charged Plato's aristocratic kinsman and friend

Callias 10,000 drachmas.¹¹ In the early fourth century, Isocrates charged 1,000 drachmas and complained that some people were teaching for as little as 300 ([Plut.], *Moralia* 837, Isoc, 13.3); on the other hand, he also says (15.155–156) that most teachers lived moderately or poorly. Figures in ancient sources are notoriously unreliable, and it may well be that the sums we hear about are both grossly inflated and were originally the ones which seemed shocking to people at the time. But it is clear that only the very wealthy could even hope to learn rhetoric from a high-profile teacher like these.

As well as giving pupils whole speeches to memorize, sophists seem to have given out parts of speeches, which implies that they also taught the analysis of speeches. They taught people to identify and use different arguments, especially the argument from probability that was traced back to Tisias-Corax. The three *Tetralogies* of Antiphon that survive give an example of his teaching methods: they are imaginary court cases that raise various issues and demonstrate ways of arguing for and against them. Did the defendant do what he is accused of doing? Are the legal consequences claimed by the prosecution appropriate? Is the accused justified in claiming self-defence? and so on. Several teachers are also said to have written theoretical handbooks, presumably primarily for their pupils, but these handbooks may have had a wider circulation in time since Aristotle was able to make a collection of them. About the detail of what happened between teachers and pupils, however, we are frustratingly ignorant; we have to wait till the Roman period for even a sketchy picture.

When aristocrats and intellectuals like Aristophanes, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato or Isocrates attacked the new education of the fifth century, and above all the teaching of rhetoric, they put themselves in an awkward position, since the intellectual developments of the late fifth and fourth centuries are unimaginable without the sophists. Their real target was the relationship between education, society and democracy. Thucydides and Xenophon ended their lives in exile, sniping at democratic Athens from a distance. Plato and Isocrates remained in the city, but withdrew from public life. They both founded schools, which were best known for teaching princes and future tyrants from other states. Both developed new and radical views of the place of rhetoric in education.¹²

Plato did not teach rhetoric in the Academy, taking the view that a wise man should not need its deceitful tricks, and the unwise should not have access to them. Isocrates taught mainly rhetoric, and he too was deeply interested in wisdom and truth. In *Against the Sophists* (13), Isocrates attacks other teachers on the grounds that they teach people to tell persuasive lies (1), and oversell their teaching as the path to all wealth and success (3).¹³ They are ignorant of the truth themselves (9) and their teaching systems fail to take account of the differences between occasions and people, and so promise more than they can deliver (12–13). Isocrates stresses the importance of natural ability (15), of learning all the different kinds of discourse and practising them (17), and he does not claim that what he teaches can teach people to be virtuous (21). In Chapters 16–18 he comes as close as he ever does to describing how he teaches. Students need to grasp the elements of speeches, identify the right subject matter and how to join subjects together. They must arrange their subjects properly and ornament the whole with striking and appropriate ideas and dress it in eurhythmic and musical language. Students must not only learn but practice but also teachers must lecture on the principles of rhetoric and act as a model for their pupils. Though

in *Against the Sophists* (19) Isocrates attacks the writers of handbooks, he apparently wrote a handbook himself, which Aristotle mentioned in the *Sunagôgê* and which, according to Plutarch, Demosthenes acquired illegally and used to teach himself to speak (*Demosthenes* 5.5).

A generation later, Aristotle founded his own school, where he certainly lectured on rhetoric, though he may not have taught its practice. Towards the beginning of his *Rhetoric* (1.1.11–13), he says that rhetoric is useful because it helps just men to articulate their case convincingly, helps people to understand difficult material (such as scientific material), helps to counteract false arguments, and helps good men to defend themselves when attacked. This is a notably limited series of claims. In particular, Aristotle would rather that political power and influence came from other sources, such as wisdom, high birth and all-round culture (*Politics* 7.9–10, 14–17, 10 *passim*). As far as we can see, Aristotle taught rhetoric, if at all, by analysing it. Such was his prestige, though, especially as the teacher of Alexander the Great, that it is no surprise to find a practical treatise attributed to him. The *Rhetoric to Alexander* probably dates from the fourth century (cf. P. Chiron, Chapter 8). Its author is much happier than Aristotle to see rhetoric deciding affairs of state, but it is significant that the word he uses for rhetoric, *logos*, can mean both speech and reason. This looks like a deliberate equivocation to encourage people to believe that those who speak persuasively are also the city's wisest, most intelligent and most rational counsellors.

All these teachers tried to distance themselves from fifth-century rhetoricians, in each case by some form of the claim that they were committed to the truth and to wisdom, not only to manipulating words and minds. Plato, in the *Apology*, tries to exonerate Socrates too from any likeness to the sophists, and from the claim that he was also one of those who 'made the weaker argument the stronger' (18b8). Xenophon was another pupil of Socrates who was anxious to distance both Socrates and himself from sophism, as this passage of *The Huntsman* shows:

most [sophists] say that they teach the young virtue, but they do the opposite ... their writings do not make men good ... their language is strained and nowhere are there the *gnomai* which might teach the young virtue ... For words will not educate, but proverbs will, if they are good ones ... Avoid the sophists.¹⁴

We do not know how Plato, Isocrates or Aristotle chose their students nor how much Plato or Aristotle charged (if anything); we only know that aristocratic students came to them from all over the Greek world (two at least of Plato's, remarkably, were women).¹⁵ They cannot have hoped to stop other people using rhetoric in politics and the courts, nor did they; rhetoric was firmly established in Greek education and culture. In the Hellenistic period, it would become more systematized and a more standard part of the education of the young.

With the conquests of Alexander the Great and the establishment of his successors in kingdoms stretching from North India to Greece and North Africa to the Danube, the scope of the Greek world and the meaning of Greekness changed dramatically. Greeks and Macedonians formed a tiny minority in most of their new states, and one of the ways they sought to maintain power was by acculturating members of the previous ruling elites. Indians, Persians, Egyptians and many others began to learn to speak Greek and often to read and write Greek and adopt Greek culture as their own. 'Greek'

culture meant disproportionately the culture of Athens, of which the Macedonians were highly appreciative (a compliment which the Athenians did not return), and it was therefore the education that had developed in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries that became the basis of the education of the Macedonian-ruled world.

It was also exported to states with whom the Macedonians came into contact. According to Suetonius in *On Grammarians and Rhetors* (25), the study of Greek rhetoric arrived in Rome in the second century and was received with suspicion, being banned twice, in 161 and 92. Despite this shaky start it persisted, and numerous Greek rhetoricians worked in Rome well into the imperial period. It became fashionable for Latin speakers to study rhetoric in Greek from Greek speakers: Cicero, for instance, had a Greek rhetoric teacher named Molon in Rome (*Brutus* 307–312) before going east to Rhodes and Athens to study further. Julius Caesar appointed Apollodorus of Pergamum to teach rhetoric to his adopted son Octavian, the future Augustus, in 45 (Strabo, *Geography* 13.625) and Theodorus of Gadara taught the future emperor Tiberius (Suetonius, *Tiberius* 57). Suetonius tells us that teachers argued about the best teaching methods (*Rhetors* 25.4), but his sketch of the content of their exercises fits what we shall see below was typical; it included the study and composition of fables, narratives, eulogies, invectives and arguments for and against a thesis, and the staging of debates.

The unregulated range of practices attested in classical Athens developed in the Hellenistic period to form what came to be known as *enkyklios paideia*, the cycle of education or ‘ordinary education’, including rhetoric. The term *enkyklios philosophēmata* goes back to Aristotle (*On the heavens* 1.279a30), but for most of the Hellenistic period literary evidence for education, as for so many aspects of cultural life, is almost non-existent. We have to wait for the first century and Diodorus Siculus (33.7.7) for a reference to *enkyklios paideia* and to the early first century AD for a description of it. Philo gives an account of what he calls *mesē paideia*, the middle part of education after learning to read and write and before the study of philosophy (*On mating with the preliminary studies* 11–18, 74–76, 142, 148–150). It includes grammar, geometry, astronomy, literature, music theory, rhetoric and dialectic. Philo’s description fits well with what Quintilian (1.10.1) calls *enkyklios paideia*, which includes reading and writing, grammar, literature, geometry, astronomy, music theory, logic and rhetoric. After Quintilian, *enkyklios paideia* becomes the standard term for this range of practices in Greek. The practices themselves, it is clear, were already understood as standard by the end of the Hellenistic period. Much of the rhetorical element of *enkyklios paideia* goes back to the mid-fourth century, though according to Quintilian (2.4.41) the practice of declamation – writing and performing speeches on fictitious legal or deliberative themes – was introduced by Demetrius of Phalerum around the turn of the fourth to the third.

Along with the standardized range of subjects there developed a range of specialized teachers. Ideally, a *grammatistēs* or *grammatodidaskalos* taught elementary literacy, a *grammatikos*, grammar – the relatively high-level analysis of language, along with preparatory exercises for rhetoric – and a *rhētōr*, rhetoric.¹⁶ There were also specialized teachers for geometry and gymnastics. In practice, probably only the wealthy in the major cities of the Roman Empire had such specialized teachers. In towns and villages, it is more likely that one or two teachers covered whatever was locally learned.

The curriculum was not taught *in toto* everywhere. In particular, rhetoric remained accessible mainly to the rich and upper class. Apart from literary texts like Quintilian's *Training of an Orator*, our most informative source for the content of *enkyklios paideia* is a body of around four hundred written remains from the deserts of the Eastern Mediterranean, especially Egypt. Excavated in towns and villages on the fringes of the desert and dating from the third century BC to the eighth century AD, these texts include teachers' handbooks and children's exercises, scribbled on pieces of (often reused) papyrus, wooden boards, wax tablets and fragments of broken pottery. They give us a remarkable insight into education in practice at a much humbler level than that of the literary sources. One of the conclusions they support is that what was taught, and the order in which it was taught, was much the same in the smallest, most isolated Egyptian village as it was in Rome. The main difference is that in Egyptian towns and villages most people do not seem to have acquired much more than basic literacy. There are plenty of elementary writing exercises – alphabets, syllabaries and wordlists. There are numerous fragments of literature used for reading and writing practice. Grammatical texts are noticeably fewer, and rhetorical texts are fewer still. Less than one educational text in twenty from Egypt comes from the rhetorical stage of education. The main reason is no doubt that small towns and villages housed fewer wealthy people. Students typically did not start studying rhetoric until their mid-teens, when children of poorer families would already be out at work, and it seems clear that only a fraction of literates had any rhetorical education.

Even those who did not have access to rhetoric proper, were left in no doubt of the importance of the spoken and written word. As part of their elementary education, children (or adults) often read and copied collections of gnomic sayings from poets, proverbs and riddles, a number of which concern speech. 'What's strong in life?' asks a third-century school riddle, and offers two answers: 'Man. Word'. 'A man's stamp is known by his speech' is common in gnomic collections, and cited by Quintilian as a proverb too. 'A lie dirties life', claims another school text, picking up the philosophers' concern with speech and truth, while another turns that concern into scepticism about the law courts: 'Do not assume that an accusing speech is trustworthy'.¹⁷

Those who could not study rhetoric may still have had the opportunity to read some. Quintilian, outlining what children should read, lists various kinds of poetry, history and finally the 'vast band of orators', especially the ten great Athenian orators who formed the rhetorical section of the literary canon, and among these, especially Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lysias, Isocrates and Demetrius of Phalerum (10.1.76–80). Quintilian's is an idealized picture, but papyri from Egypt show that there, too, people read both the orators and treatises on rhetoric, and even children in schools read at least parts of speeches. Among the 24 school texts of orators identified so far are fragments of speeches by Demosthenes, Hyperides and Isocrates.¹⁸

In an ideal environment, learning rhetoric might begin even before one started to study with a *rhētōr*. Our earliest account of education that deals with both rhetorical and earlier education is again that of Quintilian.¹⁹ Although he wrote in Latin and probably primarily for a western audience (he had been tutor to the Emperor Domitian's nephews), Quintilian was deeply informed about Greek rhetoric. He

recommends that children learn to speak Greek before Latin, and all his prescriptions of what they should read and study include Greek and Latin authors and exercises in parallel, with Greek first (1.4.1–2). He is, therefore, something of an honorary Greek *rhētōr*, and since he claims no originality for himself but only a high degree of systematization, it is reasonable to assume that what he says about preparatory exercises for the school of rhetoric will have been recognizable to Greek *rhētores* elsewhere in the first century.

The training for oratory begins as soon as the pupil arrives in school. He must learn first to develop his memory (1.3.1). As he reads, he learns about grammar and about the music of words, about solecisms and usage and orthography, about how to arrange words and clauses for greatest effect and how to choose the appropriate style for the subject matter and audience (1.4.6–7.35). By practising reading aloud, the child is already learning to pitch and articulate well (1.8.1).

Rhetoric proper begins with the student learning the characteristics of historical narrative, reading and practising them (2.4.2–4). Quintilian devotes some space to the question at what age pupils should go to the *rhētōr* and complains that many only arrive on the verge of manhood, which is too late: they should come as soon as they have mastered reading and grammar (2.1–3). It is important, though, not to be too dry in teaching or too harsh in criticizing the young, for they must not get discouraged (2.4.8–12): ‘Sometimes it will be useful for the teacher to dictate whole themes himself, so that the boy may imitate them . . . but if his pen has been so negligent that it cannot be corrected, I have sometimes found it useful to tell him to write a theme I have given him from scratch, because he can do it better’ (2.4.12–13). From composing historical narratives, boys go on to confirmations or refutations of narratives (2.4.18), and from there to composing praise or denunciations of famous men (2.4.20). Then there are *topoi*, commonplaces, where the pupils speak on behalf of some standard fictional character – an adulterer, a gambler, a pimp and so on (2.4.22), and theses, in which the pupil debates questions such as ‘Whether town or country life is better’ or ‘Whether the life of the soldier or the judge is more praiseworthy’ (2.4.24). There follows the discussion of laws (2.4.33). Teachers are also recommended to lecture on the history of rhetoric (2.5.1), read speeches which are stylistically bad to give their pupils practice in criticism (2.5.10), and to test pupils periodically on how much of what they have learned they remember (2.5.13). Finally, pupils learn to declaim: to compose and deliver practice speeches on imaginary legal cases.

Books Three to Eleven deal with the history of rhetoric, the different kinds of speech, parts of a speech, types of proof and witnesses, pathos and ethos, use of humour, points of law, logic, style, figures of thought and speech, rhythm, writing, the training of memory, delivery, posture, gesture and dress. His ideal pupil should be fully versed in them all.

We can compare the early part of Quintilian’s curriculum with several handbooks of preliminary rhetorical exercises which survive from the Roman empire, most of which are in Greek. These handbooks, called *Progymnasmata*, are designed to be used by teachers of grammar to prepare pupils for the rhetorician.²⁰ The earliest is by a *rhētōr* called Theon, who may have worked in Alexandria and probably flourished in the first century AD, making him a near contemporary of Quintilian. Theon begins (with a genuflexion to the more elitist fourth century philosophers):

The ancient rhetoricians ... did not think that one should come to rhetoric at all before grasping philosophy to some extent and acquiring the elevation of mind that gets it fulfilment from philosophy. Now, however, most students are so far from appreciating such studies that they rush into public speaking without even getting a knowledge of what are called general studies; and what is most boorish of all, they proceed to debate judicial and deliberative hypotheses without having been practiced in the proper way.²¹

Theon blends social and educational conservatism in a manner familiar since the end of the fifth century, but his exercises are altogether more up to date. The pupils begin by reading and memorizing *chreiai*, short stories of the sayings and doings of the wise, fables, simple narratives (*diēgēseis*), maxims (*gnōmai*) and myths (Theon gives a number of examples: 'Bion the Sophist said that the love of money is the mother city of all evil', or 'Plato the philosopher used to say that the sprouts of virtue grow with sweat and toil'). They read excerpts from famous authors that illustrate common-places (*topoi*), character-sketches (*ēthopoeiai* or *prosopopoeiai*), excursus (*ekphrasis*), theses and antitheses, and practise writing their own in imitation. Then they move on to encomium and invective, to making comparisons (*synkrisis*), discussing laws, paraphrasing others' writings (Homer was a favourite subject here) and elaborating or compressing them. Finally Theon recommends that pupils practise attacking another's discourse to undermine its credibility. When they have done all that – and practised plenty of reading aloud to strengthen and modulate their voices – pupils are ready to go to the *rhētōr*. It is clear that Theon and Quintilian are describing a common system, though the elements are not always in the same order and Quintilian covers far more ground in more detail.²²

Theon does not only claim to prepare the pupil to speak in the lawcourts, deliberate in the town council or flatter visiting dignitaries, crucial skills though those were in the towns and cities of the early empire. He has wider educational aims. Reading good authors teaches one to appreciate beauty. Practising narratives teaches one to write history, personifications, poetry. *Chreiai* teach wisdom and moral guidance (1, 3, 5, 8.). Quintilian's aims are more ambitious still.

In Book Twelve of the *Institutio Oratoria*, Quintilian returns to a question he had raised towards the end of Book Two: the point of rhetoric. He defines the orator as *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, 'a good man skilled in speaking'. A 'good man' must be just, brave and self-controlled (1 pr. 9–13); he must be good in the same sense that philosophers talk about goodness, since, in Quintilian's view, philosophy and rhetoric are complementary practices (1 pr. 13). He must, in other words, be wise, and it is striking how the concerns of fourth century philosophers, filtered especially through Stoic schools in the Hellenistic period, still affect writers on rhetoric. For Quintilian, however, the orator differs from the philosopher in being educated to rule (12.2.7), and here we see the other long-time concern of rhetoric still flourishing. The orator is expected 'to rule cities with his counsels, establish laws, regulate judgements ...'. He rules the Senate with advice and the people by guiding them to better things (1 pr. 9–13). He inspires his troops in war (12.1.28), and controls the crowd, quelling unrest (12.1.27). Nothing highlights the importance of power to Quintilian as much as his attitude to truth. In general, the orator, being a wise, philosophical and statesmanlike figure, should know and tell the truth. If it is necessary for political

purposes or to control the crowd, however, he may lie (12.2.5). The whole equivocal nature and reputation of rhetorical education glares out of those words.

Some philosophers had continued to object to rhetoric, and Quintilian feels obliged to respond to their criticisms. He reports that the Academic Carneades called rhetoric false and artificial (2.16–17) and that others regarded it as not an art or a system that could be taught. There were, after all, said philosophers, orators before there was education, as in Homer (though as we saw and as Quintilian points out, Phoenix apparently taught Achilles to speak). Certain well-known Classical Athenian orators like Demades and Aeschines were not known to have been taught (though the father of Aeschines, at least, was a teacher). Rhetoric has no proper subject matter; you cannot follow the rules and always get a good speech (equally true of any skill, one might think) and above all, rhetoric can be used for wrong ends, which should not be true of an art. Quintilian responds with both Greek and Roman examples of times when public speaking has decisively affected the course of history. He defends its reputation as an art and points out that the divine gifts of reason would be little use to human beings without the ability to speak, and to speak effectively. He concedes that it is possible to misuse rhetoric, but claims that the well-taught orator will always know the difference between right and wrong.

Despite Quintilian's powerful defence of rhetoric, it is worth remembering that not everyone who had a good education in the Hellenistic and Roman periods need have studied rhetoric at all. Some educational works, like Pseudo-Plutarch's *On the Education of Children* do not mention it, emphasizing the study of philosophy instead. Wealthy young men could very likely choose what they studied; some may have chosen to study both rhetoric and philosophy, and maybe also astronomy or music, but some will probably have chosen only one or two of the available possibilities.

Quintilian's picture of the ideal orator is in one respect paradoxical in the social and political context of the early Empire. This was a world in which one man had absolute power, and held it by almost every means *except* public speaking. Supported by an army, a bureaucracy, an elaborate edifice of religion, ideology and public spectacle, there was little need for any emperor to be a convincing orator. Many other people, on provincial and Roman stages, at various levels of government, with varying degrees of influence, could make use of rhetoric, but they had no expectation of achieving the kind of power by it that Quintilian sketches for his ideal orator. We do not know enough about Quintilian to guess how he intended his *magnum opus* to be read, but one possibility is that it was a veiled act of protest against the declining place of public debate in decision making.

If others shared Quintilian's concerns, it did not prevent them learning and practising rhetoric with as much vigour as ever. Nor was rhetoric only for practical use. It was also a leisure pursuit among *literati* in both east and west, and here educational meets recreational rhetoric. A number of declamations-for-pleasure survive by the fourth century AD Greek *rhētōr* Libanius of Antioch. His speeches were probably written partly as exercises for himself, partly as models for students and partly as public entertainments. They include a defence for Socrates at his trial, a speech by a bad-tempered man to his City Council in which he tries to get a divorce from his wife, and a speech by a miser who is outraged by the request by his war-hero son for an olive wreath instead of a financial reward from his city.

Such pastimes were for the rich and highly educated. If we return to school texts on papyrus, we find texts that give a slightly different picture of the aims of rhetorical education at a lower social level. Educational papyri provide abundant evidence of those earliest proto-rhetorical exercises that overlap with learning to read and write and learning grammar. Gnomic quotations from the poets, fables and chreiai occur individually, as writing exercises, and in anthologies. We can only identify a handful of more advanced exercises, however. One or two may be historical narrations – one is about Alexander the Great (*P. Oxy.* 79). Some seem to retell episodes from myth in their own words, like this, in which Odysseus has just returned to Ithaca:²³

That you may not be mistrustful, thinking that Odysseus has not returned, you see the scar that not even Penelope has seen. Leave your stable now, Philoetius: I will release you from the fear of the suitors that you may go your own way with your cattle. I will set up your house in freedom. But you others, arm yourselves at my side against Eurymachus and the other suitors; you too have known their evil ways, like Telemachus and faithful Penelope.

Many exercises are close paraphrases of Homer. Bodleian Greek Inscription 3019, for instance, dated to the third century AD, paraphrases the first few lines of the *Iliad*:

I shall begin, Muse, holding fast to this hypothesis from you: for standing by me yourself, Mistress, telling of the anger of Achilles and the disasters which came to the Greeks as a result of it ... For it was for this reason that many and numberless men suffered the end of their lives, with the result that on account of the number of dead they abrogated the rule of burial for some ... In order that I may accurately lay hold of the whole hypothesis of the matter, tell me which of the gods first drove Agamemnon and Achilles to this quarrel from the start.

The pupil uses the word *hypothesis* three times to stress that he is laying out the order of events in a scientific manner and talks of ‘expounding’ the story and ‘laying hold of’ its hypothesis as if he were formulating an argument. He slightly alters Homer’s order of events to emphasize the chain of causality, and asserts his control over the material with repeated use of the first person. Anything less poetic can hardly be imagined, but there is the odd attempt at a rhetorical effect, in the ‘many and numberless men’, and the quarrel which was ‘born from no-one other than Apollo himself’.

This text is a particularly good example of the characteristics of rhetorical school texts on papyrus. Some of the pupils who read or composed them may have gone on to study rhetoric proper in the nearest big town or city.²⁴ Many more probably did not. What the latter seem to have learned is primarily to read and analyse a text, reorder it logically and paraphrase it clearly and (more or less) concisely, perhaps with the odd flourish to show that they were educated men. As a rhetorical education, this is minimal, but it may have been just what men of middling social rank needed. We can imagine such people as the big fish of small towns and villages – the men who held minor government offices and ran small businesses or farmed modest amounts of land. Such men are not likely to have performed on large public stages, but they needed to be able to conduct business, draft and analyse legal documents, decipher government demands and pass them on. The skills that the earliest rhetorical exercises taught them may have been just the ones they needed.²⁵

We are sadly short of descriptions of education in progress in the ancient world. Quintilian says that when young men are listening to each other recite, they should not be allowed to jump up from their seats and applaud, for it gives them an inflated idea of their abilities and makes for an undisciplined school (2.2.9–10). We may imagine him teaching in something like the lecture theatres which have been excavated all round the Roman Empire, an oblong space with tiers of benches round three sides, though his description would also fit a room in a private house or imperial palace. Perhaps our most vivid picture of a school room comes from a bilingual Greek–Latin school text which survives only in a mediaeval manuscript, but which probably derives from third or fourth century AD Gaul. It describes scenes from a child's day – getting up, going to the baths and the forum, being introduced to his parents' guests at dinner – and includes two school scenes, the first of which takes place in an elementary school and the second in what seems to be the school of a grammarian who was teaching some basic rhetoric:

We enter the Greek school and the grammar teacher's auditorium. I have learnt my lesson. If I am well prepared, I deliver it at once; if not, I read it again. [There follows a list of words to do with reading.] I take the lesson – verses and glosses. An unfamiliar book or an unfamiliar word is explained to me. I go back to my place and some people deliver an extempore [speech] with me, others a prepared one. The young ones learn wordlists and syllabaries, conjugate verbs.²⁶

There follows a list of grammatical vocabulary and a list of authors read, which includes Cicero and Demosthenes. Both school rooms in these stories seem to be informal places: the first in a private house, the second in a public auditorium. Pupils come and go at no set time; there may be more than one teacher in the room; pupils work with the teacher or with each other and at one point they declaim to one another. The informal nature of the scene fits what we deduce from other sources. As far as we know, there were no designated school buildings, no formal school year, term or day (though Quintilian does say that pupils should be allowed a holiday periodically, to stop them getting stale). There was no legal requirement for anyone to be educated.

At a higher level, Philostratus, in his *Lives of the Sophists*, gives occasional thumbnail sketches of the way professional sophists and *rhētores* taught in the second century. When Adrianus of Tyre, for instance, was a pupil of Herodes Atticus in Athens (arriving at about the age of eighteen), Herodes gave a public lecture during the day, to which his pupils would listen along with others. After this, ten pupils who had distinguished themselves (presumably by making speeches of their own on another occasion) would be taken to drink with the great man. This symposium would be timed by a water-clock (*klepsydra*), from which it got the name, a Klepsydrion. Herodes would spend the time lecturing on verses from literature, and did not allow applause (585–587). Pliny the Younger, writing at the end of the first century, thinks that the life of a teaching and exhibition *rhētōr* must be a pleasant one. A man like that model of Attic speech, Isaeus, he says, with nothing to do all day but practice rhetorical exercises and teach them to others, reaches heights of technical perfection and effectiveness to which mere working orators can hardly aspire (*Letters* 2.3).

There was a certain amount of state and local official interest in education from the Hellenistic period, which became gradually more extensive under the Roman empire. A number of cities established posts for professional rhetoricians, who might give public displays of rhetoric, deliver speeches in honour of visiting dignitaries, and teach.²⁷ In the 70s AD the Emperor Vespasian gave tax exemptions to some teachers (*Digest* 15.4.18.30, Dio Cassius 53.60), and according to Suetonius, he was the first emperor to give teachers of both Latin and Greek rhetoric an annual salary from the public purse (*Vespasian* 18); he certainly gave Quintilian a salary in AD 71. Emperors could also interfere in local appointments: Antoninus Pius, for instance, gave the sophist Lollianus a chair of rhetoric at Athens (Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists* 23). Antoninus also issued an edict giving teachers of rhetoric, along with grammarians and doctors, relief from taxes, in numbers up to five in provincial capitals, four in cities with a lawcourt and three in other places (*Digest* 27.1.6). In AD 301 the Emperor Diocletian, in a doomed attempt to stem inflation across the empire, published a price edict in which an enormous array of goods and services were given what were intended to be fixed prices. Among them (7.66–71) were prices for teachers of reading and writing (50 denarii per pupil per month), arithmetic (75), shorthand (75), grammar (200), geometry (200) and rhetoric (250). (This nicely shows the relative value ascribed to these elements of education.) The fifth-century AD Theodosian Code laid down that salaries should be paid to certain rhetoricians by their local town or city, and that they were exempt from public office and court summonses (13.3). In the mid-sixth century AD, however, the Emperor Justinian abolished payment for publicly-appointed teachers and diverted the money to the imperial treasury (Procopius, *Secret History* 26.5–6). All this is fairly slender evidence of official involvement in educational activities over a long period, and one of the most remarkable things about education, including rhetorical education, across the greater part of antiquity, is how stable it was in content and delivery, despite (or conceivably because of) the absence, in general, of governmental control.

Rhetorical education flourished till the end of the Roman empire (see J. Connolly, Chapter 11) and beyond (see E. Jeffreys, Chapter 12). Even after the Christianization of the empire, many people continued to be highly educated in the traditional manner and wrote rhetorically accomplished prose. Ambrose and Augustine are among those who made careers as *rhētores* before they became Christians, while Jerome had such a passion for Latin prose that he dreamed he was turned away from heaven as being more Ciceronian than Christian (*Letter* 22.30). The study of rhetoric does not seem to have aroused as much debate among Christians as, for instance, the study of pagan poetry; as Augustine put it (*On Christian Education* 4.2.3): ‘Since rhetoric is used to give conviction to both truth and falsehood, who could dare maintain that truth, which depends on us for its defence, should stand unarmed in the fight against falsehood?’²⁸ Augustine’s concern with truth reminds us of the objections of fourth century Athenian philosophers to rhetoric, and it is striking how much less the Roman Empire, and Christians within it, seem to have worried about the power of rhetoric, especially in the wrong hands, to disrupt politics and society. It is a measure of how much less real power rhetoric had in a monarchical state.

In the course of this brief account, I have touched on a number of themes that would repay further investigation. In recent years, scholars have worked intensively

on the technicalities of rhetoric, on the self-presentation of orators and on certain aspects of their role in society, especially in Classical Athens and in the late Roman Republic and early Empire. Assessing the role of rhetoric in education raises more questions. What did rhetoric teach all those who studied it without becoming political leaders, famous speech writers or performing sophists? Was it genuinely useful for emperors, administrators, soldiers or women, or just a conventional, decorative accomplishment? In what ways does rhetoric train one to think, to analyse, to criticize? How did it affect the cognitive development of those who learned it or their sense of identity? Can we do more to link intellectual developments, particularly in rhetoric, with trends in political change, in the way that G.E.R. Lloyd, for example, has suggested links between the intellectual developments of early Greek science and philosophy and political change?²⁹ Why, finally, do Christians seem to have been so much less concerned about the powers of rhetoricians than of grammarians to corrupt the mind? In its early days, as we have seen, the study of rhetoric attracted far more criticism than any other part of education, and it is far from obvious that rhetoric is a more benign, value-neutral discipline or body of material than literature or grammar. Our rich collection of surviving evidence provides material, I suspect, to answer all these questions and more.

Bibliographical Essay

Fundamental to the study of rhetoric in education, as in general, is the work of G.A. Kennedy, especially his *Quintilian* (New York: 1969) and *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric* (Leiden: 2003). The principal monographs on education that deal extensively with rhetoric are H. Marrou, *Histoire de l'Éducation dans l'Antiquité*⁷ (Paris: 1975), S.F. Bonner, *Education in Ancient Rome* (London: 1977) and T. Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge: 1998). R. Cribiore, *Writing, Teachers and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt* (Atlanta: 1996), includes a catalogue of rhetorical exercises on papyrus. Especially helpful are R.A. Kaster (ed.), *Suetonius 'De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus'* (Oxford: 1995) on early teachers of rhetoric at Rome, D.A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge: 1983) and his *Libanius, Imaginary Speeches* (London: 1996). R.F. Hock and E. O'Neil (eds.), *The Chreia and Ancient Rhetoric. Classroom Exercises* (Leiden: 2002) is the second of their two splendid volumes on *chreiai*. C.A. Gibson, 'Learning Greek History in the Ancient Classroom: The Evidence of the Treatises on *Progymnasmata*', *CP*99 (2004), pp. 103–129, examines what one learns through rhetoric apart from rhetoric itself.

Notes

- 1 See further, H.M. Roisman, Chapter 28.
- 2 H. Rabe, *Prolegomenon Sylloge* (Leipzig: 1931), no. 4, p. 25. Elsewhere, though, Aristotle talks of Tisias 'following the first inventors' of rhetoric (*Sophistical Refutations* 183b32). On these developments, see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3.

- 3 Diod. 11.72–76; cf. Arist. *Politics* 1304a17, where he calls Syracuse a *politeia* rather than a democracy; M.I. Finley, *Ancient Sicily*² (London: 1979), pp. 61–63.
- 4 Diod. 12.53; see further, J.A.E. Bons, Chapter 4.
- 5 See Ian Worthington, Chapter 17, p. 261, who thinks that some of the earlier *nouveaux riches* (e.g., Cleon) might not always have had a rhetorical education. I think it more likely that they did, in order to compete both socially and politically with aristocrats, which is partly why the number of teachers of rhetoric increased so much.
- 6 See further, T.K. Hubbard, Chapter 32.
- 7 T. Morgan, 'Literate Education in Classical Athens', *CQ*² 49 (1999), pp. 46–61.
- 8 H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶ (Berlin: 1951), 82A1a – hereafter D-K.
- 9 D-K 84B8.
- 10 Arist. *Rhet.* 1415b16, D-K 84a11.
- 11 [Pl.] *Alcidamas* 1.119a1–6, D-K 82A2.
- 12 On their theories in general, see H. Yunis, Chapter 7 and T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6.
- 13 T.L. Papillon's chapter (6) on Isocrates discusses these ideas in more detail.
- 14 13.1, 3, 5, 9. (Interestingly, though Xenophon calls himself a philosopher, it is *gnomai*, maxims or quotations from the poets, he invokes here as teaching virtue.)
- 15 Diog. Laert. 3.46, Themistius, *Oration* 295e.
- 16 T. Morgan, *Literate Education in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge: 1998), pp. 28–30, R. Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: 2001), pp. 50–59.
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- 18 For example, J.C. Shelton *et al.* (eds.), *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 62 (London: 1995), no. 4321, S.A. Stephens, *Yale Papyri in the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library* 2 (Chico, CA: 1985), no. 135, A.S. Hunt (ed.), *Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester 1: Literary Texts* (Manchester: 1911), nos. 58, 59, K. Kunst (ed.), *Berliner Klassikertexte 7: Rhetorische Papyri* (Berlin: 1923), pp. 4–13 (Demos-thenes), H.J.M. Milne (ed.), *Catalogue of the Literary Papyri in the British Museum* (London: 1927), no. 133 (Hyperides) and no. 255, A. Wifstrand (ed.), *Aus der Papyrussammlung der Universitätsbibliothek in Lund* 1 (Lund: 1934–35), no. 3, F.A.G. Hoogendijk *et al.* (eds.), *Papyri, Ostraca, Parchments and Waxed Tablets in the Leiden Papyrological Institute* (Leiden: 1991), no. 15, F. Preisigke *et al.* (eds.), *Sammelbuch griechischen Urkunden aus Aegypten* 25 (Strassburg: 1915), no. 15905 (Isocrates).
- 19 On the Roman debt to Greek rhetoric in general, and developments in the empire, see J. Connolly, Chapter 11.
- 20 The term goes back at least as far as the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1436a25).
- 21 Chapter 1, translated in G.A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata* (Leiden: 2003).
- 22 Later *Progymnasmata* survive by Hermogenes of Tarsus in the second century, Aphtho-nius the Sophist in the fourth, Nicolaus of Myra in the fifth and John of Sardis some time after that. They show minor variations in order, but cover the same ground as Theon's. That of Aphtho-nius seems to have become the most popular in late antiquity.
- 23 C.H. Roberts (ed.), *Catalogue of the Greek Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester 3: Theological and Literary Texts* (Manchester: 1938), no. 487 (third–fourth century), editor's translation, modernised. The narrative uses no distinctively Homeric vocabulary and is not close to any episode in the *Odyssey*.
- 24 J.A. Crook, *Legal Advocacy in the Roman World* (Ithaca: 1995), Chapter 3, analyses the rhetoric of a number of surviving lawcourt speeches on papyrus and shows that some, at least, employ relatively sophisticated formal rhetoric.

- 25 We know of no Greek-speaking women receiving a rhetorical education, but some very likely did; Valerius Maximus (8.3) reports three women speaking in the Roman lawcourts, of whom one (Hortensia) is almost certain to have been trained. What was true of Latin speakers at this date was probably true of Greek speakers, too.
- 26 C. Dionisotti, 'From Ausonius' Schooldays? A Schoolbook and its Relatives', *JRS* 72 (1982), pp. 83–125.
- 27 For example, C.F.W. Dittenberger (ed.), *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (Leipzig: 1883), nos. 577 (Miletus, 200–199) and 714 (Eretria); *IG* 12.9.235 (Eretria, c. 100).
- 28 Trans. R.P.H. Green, *De Doctrina Christiana. St. Augustine* (Oxford: 1995).
- 29 G.E.R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience* (Cambridge: 1979), Chapter 4.

CHAPTER TWENTY ONE

Rhetoric and Religion

Ken Dowden

Religion is nothing if not a system of communication – if rather a special form. It is apparently designed to communicate with beings who are on the one hand invisible and on the other hand so categorically different and superior that normal communication is impossible. However, from a more sceptical, or sociological, point of view, although religion may indeed be *thought* to address scientifically unverifiable beings, in fact – with the important exception of purely private occasions – religion is a complex performance in which the participants address each other and address the secondary audience of non-participants. So a public prayer is a sort of fictional speech of persuasion in front of an appreciative audience. And a festival like the Great Panathenaea at Athens¹ maybe communicated in a special way with the goddess, but more visibly it served to communicate to its participants their place in an organised and advanced society and to their onlookers the strength, confidence and energy of the Athenian state. Procession above all showcases the inner energy and external accoutrements of the religion according to a particular rhetoric.

In the most immediate meaning of the term ‘rhetoric’, prayer requires a carefully chosen vocabulary and a particular persuasive format.² But gesture too is part of the science of rhetoric and so we can look out from the words (*legomena*, ‘things said’) to the actions of religious performances (*drōmena*, ‘things performed’) and their style. Greeks, after all, recognised that performances could be done especially well, and states strove, as we can see from inscriptions, to put on festivals of particular opulence and excellence of organisation. It is hard to know where to stop: ritual is a language and all rituals can be defined in terms of a ‘rhetoric’. Indeed, it must be possible to conduct a sort of rhetorical criticism of any ritual performance. The danger of shading into ‘mere’ metaphor is indeed always present, but even language when deployed for rhetorical purposes depends heavily on ‘psychological and aesthetic strategies’ (see A. López Eire, Chapter 22), which are of course the mainstay of non-linguistic ritual.

Thus, we will concentrate first on prayer because it shows rhetoric at work more clearly, or at least more conventionally, than any other part of religion. Secondly we

will look at hymn, the transposition of prayer into a slightly different rhetorical register. And finally we will break free of the spoken word into the persuasive and impressive world of processions.

1 Prayer

1.1 *The evidence*

Descriptions, or explicit records, of prayer are less common than one might imagine in our evidence.³ There is no book of prayers as used in Greek religion. Even if you cast the net wider to include hymns, which I shall mention later (Section 2), there are few authentic hymns preserved from antiquity. For the most part our evidence consists of dramatic enactments of prayer or hymn in the course of literature – drama, epic, history or lyric poetry. In addition there are largely literary collections of hymns – notably by ‘Homer’ (most written before the fourth century), apparently a set of preludes to recitals of epic poetry together with some freer, more extended pieces, by Callimachus (third century), highly literary, and by ‘Orpheus’ (though in fact 2nd–3rd century AD), rather offbeat and dangerous as evidence of anything normal. Other poets in the Hellenistic Age and later, including Romans, sometimes do a piece in Greek hymn form or parodying hymn form. A few inscriptions survive of special hymns, that are ‘real’ in the sense that they were genuinely used in cult, and some, very few, include a record of prayers or vows made.

This sort of difficulty for the study of religion can be turned to advantage for the study of rhetoric and literature. Prayer and hymn are predominantly in our evidence not factual things but ‘moves’ – a style or a discourse adopted in literature, whose rhetorical colour we can explore here. Given the limits of our evidence, the relationship of the colours we can detect to the reality of prayer may not be 100%. But we can say enough to capture some pictures of real interest.

In passing we can note that the nature of the evidence in Rome presents similar problems, but it is rather different for ancient Indian tradition, where the Vedas lie at the heart and origins of that classical literature. The *Rig Veda* is a huge and ancient collection of hymns and prayers and is these days easily available on the Internet in both Sanskrit and English.⁴ The interested reader will find much to compare with Greek prayer in these texts, partly because of the common nature of paganisms and partly because Greek and Indian traditions, like the Roman too, will have inherited something from their distant, but common, origins in Indo-European culture.

1.2 *The context*

It is elementary that there is no point in sacrifice without prayer.⁵ Conversely no prayer – other than the spontaneous expression of a wish directed to a god⁶ – would normally be made without an offering, typically a libation (e.g., Homer, *Iliad* 16.230–231) or sacrifice, or the promise of an offering. Thus the natural situation of prayer is as an episode within a larger religious structure. The clearest scenes come from Homer, where for instance we may look at the prayer that the priest Chryses makes to Apollo when the Greeks bring a hecatomb, a ‘hundred oxen’, to make

amends for their mistreatment of his daughter (Homer, *Iliad* 1.436–474). This scene gives us the following structure:

1. *Setting the scene.* The cattle are arranged around the altar; the men wash their hands; they take up barley grains in their hands.
2. *The prayer.*
3. *The action.* The grains are thrown down; the animals are sacrificed.
4. *The conclusion.* The community feasts on the sacrificed animals; songs ('hymns') are sung to Apollo (and he enjoys them).

The prayer, though encapsulating the objective of this exercise (to return the Greeks to favour with the God), is in a sense a preamble to the main action, and looked at in the sense of a normal forensic speech may not get very far beyond the *prooimion*, the opening section. It is, however, the only part of the ritual, other than hymn, that consists of words and those words are sculpted by a Homer who well understood linguistic register and its rhetorical possibilities (as can be seen in detail in H.M. Roisman, Chapter 28).

1.3 *The divine persona*

In this instance the divine audience, Apollo, is very real, as we expect in epic, which presents its discourse about the action of the divine in the world through a strongly anthropomorphic model. Homer the narrator is in no doubt (*Iliad* 1.43–51) that Apollo has been shooting plague arrows, that Chryses actually addresses him, and that he is pleased by the ritual. And according to the rhetoric of prayer, the god arrives in person at a sacrifice. Whether those who prayed in reality took such a concrete view of the divine, as they gazed into the skies with arms uplifted, we may wonder. But the traditional rhetoric that they employ in a prayer signs up to the epic model. The audience is an awesome being who may be conceived of as a personality.

Communicating with a superior is always dangerous, as can be seen from the delicate ways in which ancient authors discussed kingship (Dio Chrysostom, *Discourses* 1–4) whilst thinking about emperors. But gods are especially dangerous, as their power is practically unlimited, and to achieve communication with them we must cross a boundary not just of status and wealth, but of existence itself. The only means to deal with such superiority is by recognition of the status of the superior person, something in which superior people take pleasure, and through the medium of praise. Just as in the case of emperors there is a role for panegyric and flattery, so in the case of gods there is need to praise them and to demonstrate one's awareness of their power.

1.4 *The orator: identity and demeanour*

When more than one person is present, 'the most senior or most sacred person present'⁷ officiates, performing the sacrifice, formulating the prayer, and, unless a herald is needed, delivering it too – though a priest has precedence the more official an occasion is. The officiant, almost always male, is effectively the orator for the community in their appeal to the god. He is chosen on the basis of his authority and experience, like the orators that Greek cities sent to Rome to make cases before the Senate or, later, the Emperor.

Clothing matters too and is part of the rhetoric of performance. Cleon, the Athenian popular politician of the late fifth century, indicated the forcefulness of his oratory by girding up his clothing (*AP* 28.3) – an effective move to judge by the horror of those offended by it. And those who wished to stir pity, or be exhibited to stir pity, would dress in appropriate rags as part of the rhetoric of the scene. Rhetoric is a version of acting – the term for rhetorical ‘delivery’ and ‘acting’ is the same (*hypokrisis*) – and costume is part of this.⁸ The drama of prayer must be similarly enacted: the officiant must enter the sacred world by washing, wearing clean clothes, wearing a wreath or holding a small branch decorated with wool.⁹

He must also assume the correct posture: as far as we can tell he normally faces east (unless cursing, when he faces west).¹⁰ If he is performing at the altar in front of a temple, which also faces east, he will be looking away from the temple and the god’s statue will be watching him, and his performance, from behind.¹¹ One might have expected the officiant to address the statue, as people did on more personal occasions, or at least use it as a focus for his prayers, not least because the temple is notionally the house of the god. It is true that in Herodotus (9.61) the Spartan general Pausanias turns in the direction of the Argive Heraion to appeal for help.¹² But this is an exception and the Olympian audience for the performance of prayer is generally deemed to be in the skies and that is where the officiant looks, raising his hands:¹³ ‘for all us men stretch up our hands to the heaven when we pray’ ([Arist.], *De mundo* 400a16–17). As a result the officiant is in fact facing the human audience, the sociological audience for prayer and ritual, though he looks up and above them. One presumes that the officiant is very fixed in his proper location and unwavering in terms of where he looks (cf. Quint. 11.3.127). He must also assume a particular expression, presumably varying according to occasion; it is suggestive that we hear of such a thing as a ‘suppliant’ expression in the repertoire of the orator (Quint. 11.3.72).

1.5 *Prooimion* (introductory section)

Before the prayer, there is a call to *euphēmein*, ‘speak well’. Though Greek sacral vocabulary does not have quite the force of vibrant Roman words like *fas* (‘religiously right’), the word *eu* (‘well’) is not negligible and tends to be the safe and proper word to use in dangerous religious contexts (*may the eu win through, may it be eu*, etc.).¹⁴ In this context what is meant is that one should say only that which is clearly appropriate to the religious occasion and absolutely nothing else.¹⁵ For many this will mean silence, but it also delimits the bounds within which the prayer itself may be composed¹⁶ – its vocabulary, phrasing and content. It is a call for an exclusively religious register.

For us prayer is typically a quiet or at least restrained mode of speech. And in most forms of oratory one would hesitate to begin loudly – or to be loud too often, like Cleon: ‘what is less pleasant than shouting at the beginning of a case?’ ([Cic.] *Ad Herennium* 3.22). It is different in the case of prayer. There may be occasions when you ‘pray (*euchesthai*) silently by yourselves’ (Homer, *Iliad* 7.195), or when you jointly say a prayer (Homer, *Iliad* 3.297), possibly, but only possibly, mumbling. However, the principal word used in Greek is *euchesthai*, a word elsewhere used to mean ‘boast’, or ‘do a victory cry’. It by its nature denotes a

verbal performance that is loud, clear and demonstrative in its standard form, as one might expect anyway in public gatherings. This is clear when Chryses in Homer's *Iliad* (1.450) literally 'prayed big', i.e., prayed very loudly:¹⁷ 'And amidst them Chryses prayed loud, raising his hands'. It follows from the loudness of the normal prayer that its clauses and phrases will be short, simply because of the greater need to take breath.

1.6 *Invocation and imperative*

The format of a prayer, at least in Homer, has been analysed since Ausfeld in 1903 as consisting of three parts: invocation, argument, request.¹⁸ The prayer of Chryses opens (Homer, *Iliad* 1.451–452):

Hearken (*klythi*) to me, silver-bowed, who have stood over Chryse
and holy Cilla, and rule Tenedos mightily!

You invoke a god by loudly calling his or her name, and by an imperative verb, in effect ensuring that the divine audience is *attentive*. As with so much else in religious rhetoric this requires a particular style, both in sentence rhythm and in vocabulary (*lexis*). Just as you *euchesthai*, rather than just 'say' or 'ask', you tend to ask the god to hearken (*klythi*!) rather than to hear (*akouson*!). Imperatives are quite standard, and so are their to our English ear rather peremptory, instant, here-and-now forms – grammatically, these are in the aorist tense, or aspect, rather than the present. They must *grant*! (*dos*!), *accept*! (*dexai*!), *be gracious*! (i.e., be nice to us, *hilēthi*!), *come*! (*mole*!, or more plainly *baine*!, *hikou*! or *elthe*!), *appear*! (*prophanēthi*! or *phanēthi*!).¹⁹ And amongst these forms is a good dose of archaic –*thi* endings, a bit like theeing and thouing in English. Modest doses of archaism make your discourse sound more sacred and more awe-inspiring (*sanctiorem et magis admirabilem*, Quint. 8.3.24). Though Latin has a larger place for archaism than Greek, this is not a factor to be ignored in Greek. It is interesting that the Greek word *klythi* has an exact equivalent in the Sanskrit *śrudhī* in the *Rig Veda*,²⁰ which makes it a tempting thought that this had been the *mot juste* since the common origin of the two languages, thousands of years back, in Indo-European.

A lot of care is taken too over specifying, or rather proliferating, the appropriate epithets (sub-names) of the god and the locales with which he or she is associated. Until fairly recently the primitivising thought of the old scholars from the turn of the twentieth century prevailed: this was an attempt to *compel* the attention of the god, as though the prayer was a spell cast by a magician on a demon. This is quite unlikely and in any case in historic times it is simply the appropriate style to develop the opening section of a prayer, appealing to the god's *amour propre*.²¹ Indeed Usener once observed that a plethora of epithets corresponds to the perceived power of the god.²² This is summed up by Plato (*Cratylus* 400e) in what we may view as a rhetorical rule:²³ 'In our *euchai* it is customary for us to *euchesthai* that we may apply the same names and origins as they like to be named by'.

We have, then, a stereotype courtesy to the gods, reflecting their remarkable scope and the variety of their, as it were, country estates, and ensuring their goodwill – as

we must do at the beginning of any speech (*Rhet.* 1415a, *Rhet. Alex.* 1436a). This leads in prayers to a particular stylistic turn, the *whether ... or ...* turns of phrase: *Hearken to me, N, whether you rejoice in being called a or b, whether you inhabit x or y.* Here is an example from a third century AD collection (*Orphic Hymn* 49, to Ipta, lines 4–6):

Hearken to me as I pray, mother earth, queen,
Whether you are holding the holy mountain of Ida in Phrygia
Or Mt Tmolus delights you, lovely place for Lydians to gather.

This had become a familiar and enjoyed part of prayer and hymnic style,²⁴ as can most delightfully be seen from Horace's mock-hymn to his wine-jar (*Odes* 3.21).²⁵ And of course it serves the poets well in other places where they wish to make an exhibition of their knowledge. But it is also the convincing aura of authentic 'prayer'. These enduring rules are still being obeyed, in the second century AD, by the great public speaker Aelius Aristides in his innovative prose hymn to Zeus (Aelius Aristides, 43 (*To Zeus*) §6 Keil):

Well then, Muses children of Zeus, I do not know when would be a better occasion to invoke you than now, whether you are on Olympus singing the divine ode with Apollo Muse-leader, hymning your father and the father of the universe, or whether Pieria is your very own home, or whether you are dancing on Boeotian Helicon.

Indeed, so prominent is the *whether ... or ...* expression in prayer that some analysts had assigned a special sub-variety of hymn to it, the *aporetic* hymn, or hymn 'of puzzlement'.²⁶

The variety of titles and places cited corresponds also to a tendency to abundance in pagan prayers. This has been treated as a question of triple structures (Chryse ... Cilla ... Tenedos), on the basis that a regular use of tricolon (three clauses at a time) may even go back to Indo-European times.²⁷ However this may be, the tendency to abundance is clear enough. This may underlie Jesus' reported criticism of pagan prayer (*Matthew* 6.7–8):

When you are praying do not twitter on (*battologeîn*, 'stammer-speak') like the pagans: they think that they will be heard if they say a lot. Don't be like them – the Father knows your needs before you ask him.

This is often thought to refer to repetition, but it could equally well correspond to the internal proliferation and wordiness within many traditions of pagan prayer, including the Greek. It is, incidentally, an interesting exercise to see how far the Lord's Prayer, which follows this passage, corresponds to Greek principles. Finally, the grammatical means of proliferation are worth quickly enumerating. In addition to simple lists of epithets, and accumulation by 'and', there is a propensity for relative clauses (*who* have stood over Chryse) and for participial constructions (*dwelling* on your Olympian seat, *ruling* over the ridges of Atabyrios, *being lord* over Parnassus, and *loving* the spring of Castalia).²⁸

1.7 *Argument*

The next task after gaining the attention of the god is to make the god inclined to grant your request. From the perspective of a prayer this is an ‘argument’ (Homer, *Iliad* 1.453–455):

As certainly previously you heard me praying,
honouring me and you smote the army of the Achaeans,
so even now fulfil this wish for me.

The rhetoric of the situation is that the worshipper, like a Roman client, has no compelling hold over the god. Thus we should not be crude about the *do-ut-des* view of ancient religion (‘I give so that you may give’), as though the worshipper purchased services from the god.²⁹ What the worshipper does is seek to win goodwill and credibility by reference to the exchange of service and benefaction in which he has been engaged, much as a rhetorical author might suggest leaning on ‘ancestral friendship’ at this point.³⁰

This section has only two possible starting points, the actions of the god (the notional audience) or the actions of the worshipper (the litigant). It is therefore an argument *a persona*, starting from a person, in which ‘we look at what has been done and said previously, because the present is usually judged on the basis of the past’.³¹ This then is why the worshipper refers to instances of his own pious deeds – or to the track record of the god in acknowledging that he is worth support. These arguments both have something of the flavour of an *a fortiori* argument, and tend to be formulated with *if ever*: *if ever I have done x, y, and z, then help me now; if ever you have helped me in the past, then help me now*. They are classified in modern writers as *da quia dedi* (‘give because I have given’) and *da quia dedisti* (‘give because you have [previously] given’), respectively.

This section is, however, not compulsory. Priam washes his hands, stands centrally, evidently holds his hands up, looks into the sky and prays (Homer, *Iliad* 24.308–310):

Zeus father, ruling from (Mt) Ida, most glorious most great,
grant that I may come to Achilles accepted and pitied,
and send a bird, swift messenger . . .

He proceeds straight from the address to the request for safe arrival and confirmation by the sending of an omen. If there is any argument, it is a mere implication that Zeus should recognise his obligations to local Trojan people as a result of ruling from Mount Ida.

1.8 *Request*

All that is left is to make the closing request (Homer, *Iliad* 1.456): ‘Now then fend off the horrible plague from the Danaans’. Thus we return to the world of the imperative, sometimes with the instruction to come or appear here, and in any case seeking to drive home what the rest of the prayer has been heading towards.³² In the

prayer of Chryses at *Iliad* 1.37–42, the imperative is that the god, now with an especially resonant local title, Smintheus, should *grant!* a wish, which is then spelt out:

Hearken to me, silver-bowed, who have stood over Chryse
and holy Cilla, and rule Tenedos mightily,
Smintheus! If ever I roofed over your lovely temple
or if ever I burnt for you the fatty thighs
of oxen or goats, grant this my wish:
may the Danaans pay for my tears with your weapons!

The first two lines are in common with his other prayer we have looked at. Perhaps this is just how epic works, with formulaic prayers as it has formulaic scenes. We should not, however, overlook the possibility that prayers actually *were* formulaic and that these, according to the local expertise of the priest Chryses, are the words with which you shall invoke this Apollo. The usual view, however, is that the Greeks, unlike the Romans, did not have a formulaic religious language.³³

2 Hymn

... and there was a sort of song consisting of prayers to the gods, but which were called 'hymns' (Plato *Laws* 700b).

Hymn, by which we mean song to the gods, is closely related to prayer.³⁴ It may even be sung to the *kithara* by a chorus standing around an altar – something which Proclus thought of as the standard form of hymn and which is called a *parabōmion* ('by-the-altar piece') though in effect it is a *stasimon*, a 'standing-piece'.³⁵ Equally it can be found in other contexts, particularly procession, which may be viewed as an 'approach' to the sacred site, and this type of hymn, sung to the *aulos*, is accordingly categorised as a *prosodion* ('approach-piece'). This rich variety of contexts is reflected in the apparently original and innovative rhetorical treatment of a genre of hymn found in the text of Menander Rhetor.³⁶ Here we find these types: *klētikoi*, *apopemp-tikoi*, *physikoi*, *mythikoi*, *genealogikoi*, *peplasmēnoi*, *euktikoi*, *proseuktikoi*, *apeuktikoi* – to be sung when concerned respectively with invocations (all those that demand that a god *come!* from a location that can then be dwelt on in more poetic hymns), departures, the connection of the gods with natural science, telling myths, theogonies, personifications (e.g., of Tomorrow, or of Hesitation), prayers for something to happen, or not to happen. This division is not executed in a particularly interesting or useful way by this limited author, but he does serve to show the perceived variety of hymns and their closeness to prayer.

In Menander Rhetor's classification, hymns are a particular subdivision of epideictic rhetoric – to be precise, they are 'epideictic rhetoric: praise: gods' (331). Thus the underlying purpose of a hymn is to secure the active goodwill, the *charis*, of the god. This can be done with a very similar rhetorical design to prayer. So it is that Furley is able to discuss the design of a genuine hymn to Apollo of the year 138 or 128 (inscribed on stone), an approach I develop a little further here.³⁷ This hymn can be seen as displaying the three sections identified by Ausfeld:

- 1 The Muses are called upon and identified by their location (Helicon of the deep glens) and their relationship to the greatest god, mightily-thundering Zeus is stated. They are to help sing of Apollo (the indirect object of the invocation),³⁸ who is then described relative to the location, Delphi, and the local cult of the Thyiads – which presumably the Athenian party has arrived to join, as we know they did.
- 2.1 Attention is drawn to the splendour and generosity of the ritual, especially the sacrifice of the animals that have been, or (if a *prosodion*) *are*, part of the procession. The song-group draws attention also to itself. The rhetorical function is to achieve goodwill by merit and this corresponds directly to the statement of past sacrifices, or of having decorated the shrine of the god (as in one of Chryses' prayers above).
- 2.2 Reference is now made to the mythic feats of the god, the slaughter of the primal dragon Python and the (now mythic) driving back of the Gauls as they invaded Delphi in 279. Literary hymns often elaborate this part substantially and it becomes a mainstay of the longer *Homeric Hymns* in the epic metre and manner.³⁹ This is why Ausfeld called the second part the 'epic part'. Its function is to please the god with the recall of his great achievements, and to entertain both him and the audience with the cultural pleasure of hearing mythology stylishly rehearsed or alluded to. Furley also argues with good reason that mythical benefactions rehearse the *da quia dedisti* method ('give now because you have given in the past'), as we have said above when discussing prayer.⁴⁰
- 3 As the damaged inscription peters out, the hymn appears to be moving towards closure, with presumably an address to the god and a request for him to be kindly. It could also close with a simple greeting, a *chaire!* (hail!), as so many do – even Aratus' hymn to Zeus with which he opens his great poem, the *Phaenomena*. However slight this part of a hymn is, it is officially the meat, as we can see from the parallel of prayer: this is where the attitude of the god is pinned down. If it does not occupy a large proportion of the hymn, that is because the hard work is done by the act of persuasion and the real audience for the hymn is in a sense the human audience.

The use of the Greek word *chairein* is worth observing: the god is instructed to *chairein* – he should 'rejoice/be well/feel himself greeted' (it is a very Greek word) – and the human worshippers are simultaneously in several hymns said to be in this same state, *chairontes*, 'rejoicing'. What has happened is that a reciprocal relationship of well-being, *charis*, has been set up between the two audiences by the act of song or prayer.⁴¹ Or rather, the sociological function of song and prayer is laid bare.

The little *Homeric Hymn* 16, to Asclepius, exemplifies much of this structure in microcosm and can act for us as a primer in religious rhetoric:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. <i>invocation</i> | Healer of diseases Asclepius I begin to sing, |
| 1a. <i>divine status</i> | Son of Apollo whom divine Coronis bore |
| 1b. <i>appropriate location and colour</i> | On the Dotian Plain, daughter of King Phlegyas, |
| 2. <i>achievements, dedisti</i> | A great joy to men, a soother of evil pains. |
| 3. <i>closure by greeting</i> | So hail (<i>chaire!</i>), you too, Lord! I pray to you in song. |

3 Procession

Moving from prayer to hymn, we gain sight of the larger festival in which these performances take place. It is the whole festival that is designed to be persuasive to the god and to serve as a rhetorical exhibition, an *epideixis*, of the community. Nowhere is this more evidently expressed than in the *procession*: 'The greatest show in the festivals was the procession, which was probably never missing'.⁴² The importance of its ulterior purposes can also be seen from the fact that a procession is functionally unnecessary (you could all make your way separately to the target place). It is therefore an act of advertisement, a 'statement', that aims to change views. It must be 'read' and must work its effect on the reader.

We can take a preliminary look at procession in the very opening of Plato's *Republic*, where Socrates has been to the *Bendideia*, the new festival of the Thracian goddess Bendis (327a):

I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon son of Ariston to pray to the goddess and simultaneously wishing to see in what way they would conduct this festival, seeing that it was the first time they were doing so. The procession (*pompē*) of the local people (Athenians) seemed handsome (*kalos*) to me; but the one the Thracians performed seemed to be no less magnificent (to *prepein* no less). So, praying and viewing, we went back to the city.

Praying, then, and viewing are both integral to the performance of the religion. The procession is not simply a matter of participation but of being watched by an audience, who are forming judgments about it. There are two processions in this passage, or two parts of a procession, articulated into a presentation by Athenians and a presentation by Thracians. Socrates judges the former *kalos*, aesthetically good; and the latter in his judgment does what Greek describes as *prepei*, i.e., it is of appropriate magnificence and by implication comfortably acquits the state of its obligations towards the goddess. Two acts of persuasion have been performed, one on Socrates, the other on the goddess.

Processions were not exclusively a religious phenomenon – there was a type of procession where you *escorted* someone. So for instance Themistocles, after the triumph at Salamis in 480, was received at Sparta, given a magnificent carriage, praised (the verbal component), and escorted on his way as far as the border by 300 Spartiate 'Knights', a unique honour (Herodotus 8.124). Similarly the Macedonian courtier Apelles was met on his arrival at Corinth in 219 by the massed soldiers and 'after an entrance like something out of tragedy due to the great number of leaders and soldiers that turned out to greet him, he arrived directly from his journey at the royal quarters' (Polybius 5.26.8–9). From these human instances we can see that it is an honorific and eloquent performance to do an effective 'escorting', as it also is in the more specialised cases of marriage processions and funeral processions. To join the procession is to praise and to pay tribute by the gestural and behavioural language you adopt: it is the epideictic rhetoric of action.

Why this matters for religion is because the word for a procession, as we see in Plato, has been from classical times onwards a *pompē*, an 'escorting', something which

presumably is to be explained by the role of portable statues – the ancient equivalent of icons – in some processions. Processions themselves obviously go back into the depths of history – you can see one, for instance, on the Hagia Triadha sarcophagus (c. 1450/1400). Oddly, though, Homer does not seem to know the word (gods are more likely to escort *you* in his language)⁴³ and it may be that the idea of the procession in some sense moved on during the late archaic period – the same time-frame within which public performances evolved and the science of rhetoric was ‘discovered’. What makes a religious procession into an effective act of praise is not very different from what makes a good speech of praise. It is a question of choice of ‘lexical’ items in the appropriate register and their correct disposition, both in their immediate context and in the context of the whole structure. Thus a procession has an order from beginning to end, and orderliness internally, and eye-catching ‘festival’ items. Typically it consists of animals for slaughter, and the privileged worshippers, selected and often classified in some way. They are dressed ready for the sacrifice, and may have specific objects to carry.⁴⁴ Those who process are distinguished ‘from the amorphous crowd’ as Burkert puts it but are also, as he notes, the object of its attention.⁴⁵ The action is designed, as we see from the passage above, as persuasive to a god, and simultaneously a showpiece for the human audience.

With this in mind, I turn finally to the complex of the Eleusinian Mysteries and in particular the role of the trainee youth, the ‘ephebes’, a body of 18-year olds. This is displayed vividly in an inscription of around AD 220 (*IG* ii² 1078, lines 9–30):

That with good fortune it has been decided by the People [of the Athenians] to instruct the *Kosmētēs* (‘Organiser’) of the Ephebes in accordance with ancient practice to lead the ephebes to Eleusis on the 13th of Boedromion with the usual dress for the procession with the holy objects, so that on the 14th they may escort the holy objects as far as the Eleusinion below the Acropolis, so that there may be a fuller magnificence and greater guard for the holy objects when the *Phaidyntēs* (‘statue-cleaner’) of the Goddesses announces in accordance with ancestral practice to the priestess of Athena that the holy objects and escorting army have come; and in the same way on the 19th Boedromion to instruct the *Kosmētēs* of the ephebes to lead the ephebes back to Eleusis with the same dress escorting the holy objects ... and that all the ephebes should escort, wearing full armour, crowned with a myrtle crown, marching in order and, since we instruct the ephebes to travel so long a route, it is right for them to participate in the sacrifices, libations and pians on the route.

The ephebes are to form a procession because they are an important category for display. A sort of prelude on the 13th takes them, anticipating the theme of the next day’s procession, dressing and kitted out in the appropriate ‘register’, from Athens to Eleusis, a distance of around 15 km. On the 14th, they are to be seen honouring the *hiera*, the mysterious ‘holy objects’, by ‘escorting’ them from Eleusis to Athens. This persuades the divinities of their piety and of the piety of the state, the *polis* of the Athenians, which officially undertakes these arrangements and, if you like, ‘utters’ the procession. With the formal announcement to the Priestess that the *hiera* have arrived, the next section may take place. For on the 15th the whole mystic community will join in the ‘Gathering’ (*Aggyrmos*) to hear the ‘Proclamation’, which must be delivered in the *Stoa Poikile* (‘Painted Stoa’). This constitutes the beginning of the main section, to which the whole 30 km parade to and fro of the ephebes – a long

distance as the decree recognises – may be regarded as something between a *prooimion* (introductory section) and a *prolalia* (warm-up talk). The ‘Gathering’ of those who will attend the Mysteries, the *mystai*, now creates an internal audience for the discourse on its day to day progress, whilst others will during this period attend to the entirely separate rites of Asclepius which take place on 17th and 18th complete with their own processions, building quite a complex of audiences and onlookers. Indeed, during these two days the *mystai* mark a recess in their own role in this display by retiring to their homes.

I pass over the piglet-washing of the 16th and the parade to the sea that this involves and now turn to final integration of the ephebes with the whole community of *mystai* on the 19th. This is when the great Iacchus Procession makes its way to Eleusis for the climactic ceremony – with ‘sacrifices, dances and many sacred activities on the road’, as they escorted, or ‘drove’, Iacchus, the personified cry (*Iō!*) of the procession (Plut. *Alcibiades* 34). This was a procession so vibrant that some swore they heard its phantom presence when in 480 Xerxes had driven the Athenians out of their city far from any procession. This procession takes place on the same day as the ephebes of our inscription march the *hiera* back to Eleusis. These are obviously not separate events but belong in an accelerating and diversifying development section building a weight of activity in a rich variety of media, so that cumulatively the whole procession may certainly be said to *prepein* (cf. above). The sacrifice, dance, and other ‘sacred activities’ are clearly the same as the ‘sacrifices, libations and paian’ (a *paian* is a particular type of joyous hymn to a divinity) in the decree and constitute not only relief and diversion for those doing another 15 km, but also ornament the argument paraded before the watchful eyes of the divinity.

So, it is not too unrealistic and not entirely metaphorical to view this linear, 2-D, procession, or rather sequence of processions, doubtless improved and rewritten over the centuries, as a sequence of sentences, paragraphs and sections articulating an emphatic speech of praise. It is composed in a restrained, ‘Attic’, style, in its emphasis on order and control. Indeed in the exceptional conditions of the dying days of the Peloponnesian War, in 407, Alcibiades bravely led it through enemy-infested territory with *kosmos* (order), Plutarch tells us (*Alcibiades* 34), and silence – something which restored Athenian morale and must have had its effect on an enemy audience. But in normal conditions it also had an ‘Asianic’ exuberance from its music, dance, songs, sacrifice and even dirty jokes (*gephyrisms*), which coloured the sequential action of specially dressed people intent on a religious target and attempting to do a procession more impressively and more persuasively, with greater *epideixis*, than ever.

4 Final Notes

Here we have looked at some of the things that make Greek religion rhetorical – prayer, hymn, procession. Prayer is self-evidently a specially formatted set of words and therefore undeniably is in some sense rhetorical – even the mesmeric, legalistic style of Roman prayer is a rhetoric. But it is too narrow just to look at the words and at the structure they build, because prayer is part of a total rhetoric and constitutes an element in the rhetoric of religion, often preceding the most powerful argument in Greek religious rhetoric, the bloody killing of animals to the howling of women: in a

word, 'sacrifice'. We need to be alert not only, then, to the verbal dimension but to a performative dimension, embracing costume, formation, gesture and every manner of behaviour, impacting on the emotions that are so central to the purpose of rhetoric (on which, see D. Konstan, Chapter 27). All these activities are performed before the twin audiences of humans and gods, where humans ritually adopt the fiction that they are listening to a discourse directed to others. This becomes a little clearer in the instance of 'hymns', the celebratory songs in praise of a god, a sort of human panegyric whose poetic and musical register is the appropriate category of speaking for a divine audience, though sophists on earth before mass human audiences might in later centuries experiment with prose hymns (if performed in rather a sing-song tone).

But once we reach the procession, the words take a back seat. Praise in words is something that might happen in one language – the language of words – whilst the total package is largely delivered in the language of ritual, the *drōmena* rather than the *legomena* (see p. 320). At the same time, the two-dimensionality of procession, its essentially linear nature, encourages a more than metaphorical view of it as rhetoric.

Much could be said beyond this. A different rhetoric applies to magic, to curses and curse-tablets – and the rhetoric of privacy, of concealed performance, is a whole new topic. Likewise the procession too belongs to a family of performances, which embrace also the *theōriai*, religious delegations to other states to 'view' (*theōrein*) their ceremonies, and the acts of pilgrimage that individuals performed to notable ancient sites – normally oracles. It was Homer who thought that the gods had a different language. And oracles, we may suppose, are a place where they spoke it. What we have done here is to open up the topic of religion as rhetoric. It is for the reader to carry it forward.

Bibliographical Essay

Greek religion is quickest understood from J. Bremmer's concise and stimulating *Greek Religion* (Oxford: 1994). Fuller, and authoritative, is W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* (Oxford: 1985). First port of call for Greek prayer is S. Pulleyn, *Prayer in Greek Religion* (Oxford: 1997). For hymns, other than the big literary collections, we have W.D. Furley and J.M. Bremer, *Greek Hymns: Selected Cult Songs from the Archaic to the Hellenistic period*, 2 vols. (Tübingen: 2001), where the first volume has a fine introduction and the hymns in English translation. The *Homeric Hymns* are available in several English translations; for example, M.L. West, *Homeric Hymns. Homeric Apocrypha. Lives of Homer*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: 2003), J. Cashford, *The Homeric Hymns*, Penguin Classics (London: 2003), D.J. Rayor, *The Homeric Hymns* (Berkeley: 2004) and M. Crudden, *The Homeric Hymns*, Oxford World's Classics (Oxford: 2001). The hymns of Callimachus are available in F. Nisetich, *The Poems of Callimachus* (Oxford: 2001), S. Lombardo and D. Rayor, *Callimachus: Hymns, Epigrams, Select Fragments* (Baltimore: 1988) and A.W. Mair, *Callimachus: Hymns and Epigrams*, Loeb Classical Library (London: 1955). Processions have never received single-minded attention except, in a pioneering piece of coverage in the great German encyclopaedia, by F. Bömer, 'Pompa', *RE* 21.2 (1952), cols. 1878–1994. Otherwise English readers should turn to W. Burkert, *Greek*

Religion: Archaic and Classical (cited above), pp. 99–102, J. Bremmer, *Greek Religion* (cited above), pp. 39–40 and more generally to H.W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London: 1977), which is good for the data though rather basic in interpretation. The details of Eleusis can be found in G.E. Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton: 1961), Chapter 9. Good starting points for magic are J.G. Gager, *Curse Tablets and Binding Spells from the Ancient World* (New York: 1992) and D. Ogden, *Magic, Witchcraft, and Ghosts in the Greek and Roman Worlds: A Sourcebook* (New York: 2002). Oracles are adequately dealt with for general purposes in H.W. Parke, *Greek Oracles* (London: 1967) and R. Flacelière, *Greek Oracles*, trans. D. Garman (London: 1965).

Notes

- 1 For details, see H.W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London: 1977), pp. 29–50.
- 2 W.D. Furlley and J.M. Bremer, *Greek Hymns: Selected Cult Songs from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Period* 1 (Tübingen: 2001), p. 50, speak of a ‘rhetoric of prayer’, in inverted commas.
- 3 Lack of authentic cult prayers, see S. Pulleyn, *Prayer in Greek Religion* (Oxford: 1997), p. 149.
- 4 At the commendable site, <http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/rigveda/>.
- 5 Statements of such basic points are hard to find – in this case we must turn to Pliny the Elder, *Natural History* 28.10.
- 6 ‘Free’ prayer is sufficiently evidenced but problematic; cf. Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, pp. 9–15.
- 7 Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, p. 166, building on L. Ziehen’s treatment of prayer in ‘Opfer’, *RE* 18 (1942), cols. 579–627, at cols. 604–609.
- 8 Delivery: Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1. In Rome the orator does well to take care over his toga (Quint. 11.3.137–149).
- 9 P. Stengel, *Die griechischen Kultusaltertümer*³ (Munich: 1920), pp. 79–80.
- 10 Cf. [Lys.] 6.51 (the public curse on Alcibiades), Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, p. 174.
- 11 W. Burkert, *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical* (Oxford: 1985), p. 92.
- 12 This is the argument of Stengel, *Kultusaltertümer*, p. 80.
- 13 This is not the only possible gesture – there are depictions of persons raising the right hand, spreading the fingers out, as they confront the altar or the statue (Stengel, *Kultusaltertümer*, p. 80 and Ziehen, ‘Opfer’, cols. 608–609).
- 14 On these expressions, see Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, pp. 146–147; these examples are from Aeschylus, *Agamemnon* 121 and 217. *Eu* is part of the Indo-European word stock with a direct equivalent in the Sanskrit *su*.
- 15 Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, p. 184.
- 16 E. von Severus, ‘Gebet I’, in T. Klauser (ed.), *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 8 (Stuttgart: 1972), pp. 1134–1258, at p. 1136.
- 17 Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 73 on loudness. It does not mean only that he prayed ‘aloud’ (which Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, p. 185 implies), otherwise there would be no point in saying it.
- 18 K.F. Ausfeld, ‘De Graecorum Precationibus Quaestiones’, *Neue Jahrbücher*, Supplementband 28 (Leipzig: 1903), pp. 505–547, Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, p. 16. Note that Ausfeld’s original term for the second part was *pars epica*, the epic part.

- 19 E. Norden, *Agnostos Theos: Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede* (Leipzig and Berlin: 1913), p. 148, highlights 'come!' words; Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, pp. 218–220, lists 'common words in Greek prayers'. His Appendix 2 looks at the aorist issue.
- 20 Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, pp. 135, 147.
- 21 Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, Chapter 6, is extremely balanced on this question.
- 22 'Für die religiöse empfindung spricht sich daher die machstellung des gottes in der fülle der zunamen aus' ('For the religious sensibility, the make-up of the god is expressed in the volume of his epithets'): H. Usener, *Götternamen: Versuch einer Lehre von der religiösen Begriffsbildung*³ (Frankfurt: 1948, but 1st edition Bonn: 1896), p. 334.
- 23 Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, p. 145, Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, p. 102.
- 24 For an early example, see Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 292.
- 25 I treat Horace here as evidence for later *Greek* literary tradition, following the (full) treatment of this passage and the style in Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, pp. 143–147, going back to Usener, *Götternamen*, p. 336 and n. 11. Poscidippus, *Anthologia Graeca* 5.135 is, according to Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, p. 147, the inspiration for Horace and others.
- 26 Menander Rhetor 343. On Menander Rhetor, see D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford: 1981). For von Severus, 'Gebet', p. 1137, this is a 'durchgehendes Motiv' ('a constant theme').
- 27 Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, pp. 145–146.
- 28 Style and examples: Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, pp. 166–176; participial examples are from Pindar, see Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, p. 167 n. 1.
- 29 On reciprocity between man and god, see W. Burkert, *The Creation of the Sacred: Tracks of Biology in Early Religions* (Cambridge, MA: 1996), Chapter 6.
- 30 *Philia patrōa*, [Cornutus], *Ars Rhetorica* 15 = L. Spengel, *Rhetores Graeci* 1 (Leipzig: 1894), p. 355.
- 31 Arist. *Rhet.* 1415a, Quint. 5.10.23; quotation from Quint. 5.10.28 (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1416a 3.15.4–5).
- 32 This point is made well by Furley and Bremer, *Greek Hymns* 1, p. 60.
- 33 M.P. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* 1³ (Munich: 1967), p. 458.
- 34 Furley and Bremer, *Greek Hymns* 1, pp. 3–4, offer a very rational analysis.
- 35 Proclus in Photius, *Bibl.* 319b18–20, W.D. Furley, 'Praise and Persuasion in Greek Hymns', *JHS* 115 (1995), pp. 29–46, at p. 32, Furley and Bremer, *Greek Hymns* 1, p. 32. I have introduced the term *stasimon* (from tragedy).
- 36 Menander Rhetor 333–344; see Pulleyn, *Greek Prayer*, p. 48, R. Volkmann, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer: in systematischer Übersicht dargestellt*² (Leipzig: 1885), p. 332, following the ascription of the discussion of hymns to Genethlios, and M. Heath, *Menander: a Rhetor in Context* (Oxford: 2004), pp. 79, 127–131. Russell and Wilson, *Menander Rhetor*, p. 230, think the classification is 'in large part original' to Menander.
- 37 Furley, 'Praise and Persuasion', pp. 33–37.
- 38 Furley and Bremer, *Greek Hymns* 1, p. 52, treat the invocation of the Muse as an initial part of the opening section, a 'self-exhortation'.
- 39 K. Dowden, 'The Epic Tradition in Greece', in R. Fowler (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Homer* (Cambridge: 2004), pp. 194–195.
- 40 Furley, 'Praise and Persuasion', p. 43.
- 41 Furley and Bremer, *Greek Hymns* 1, pp. 62–63, citing a *paian* from Erythrai, the end of Theocritus 15, and the end of *Homeric Hymn* 26 to Dionysus.
- 42 Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* 1³ p. 829.
- 43 F. Bömer, 'Pompa', *RE* 21.2 (1952), cols. 1878–1994 at cols. 1879–1881.

- 44 The carrying of objects is in itself a demonstrative action, displaying dutifulness and a special role relative to the god. -*phoroi* (-carriers) is the ending to watch for: you might see for instance virgin *kanēphoroi* (carriers of baskets) or the daughters of metics carrying trays in the Great Panathenaea; in later processions of Dionysus, heavily compartmentalised and reflecting in its role-play the special involvement and commitment of the worshipper of this particular god, you would find *kistophoroi* (carriers of chests) and *liknophoroi* (of winnowing-fans).
- 45 Burkert, *Greek Religion*, p. 99.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

Rhetoric and Language

A. López Eire

The Greeks discovered the ‘rhetoricity’ of language, as I shall demonstrate. In other words, they discovered that language is especially useful in the realm of social-political life, where one citizen can influence his fellow-citizens through his speech. In his *Encomium of Helen* the sophist Gorgias of Leontini praised the power of *logos* (speech), which can achieve most godlike works (*Encomium of Helen* = B11, 8 in H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁷ [Berlin: 1954] – hereafter D-K). This power of *logos* is so great, says Gorgias’ pupil Isocrates, that nothing done with intelligence by men is done without speech, for human beings use it for persuading each other, for setting up laws and inventing arts, and, to sum up, for living together in a socio-political community (Isoc. *Nicocles* 5–9, 15.253–257). Thus, the Greeks, in discovering the ‘rhetoricity’ of language, invented the art of persuasion through an oral discourse addressed to the fellow-citizens of a community. Having discovered ‘rhetoricity’, they consequently invented rhetoric as the art of civic discourse.

‘Rhetoricity’ means that language is not well equipped for reproducing and transmitting reality, which once and again escapes the minds of the philosophers, who nevertheless think with language, as does everyone (cf. J. Allen, Chapter 23, p. 350). According to Gorgias, it is impossible to communicate reality with words inasmuch as a perception with the sense of sight, for instance, cannot be transformed as easily as we imagine into an acoustic perception. Moreover, Gorgias questions himself as follows: ‘If we can forge with words stories that we know are pure fiction, how can we be confident in the absolute capacity of those words for transmitting truth? Not everything we think about or communicate has to really exist’ (*On Not-Being or On Nature* = B3, 78–80 D-K). Therefore, due to its incapacity to reproduce sensations of other senses and, on the contrary, to its great capacity for creating fiction, language – according to this sophist – is not trustworthy as a means for discovering reality and transmitting truth understood as the identification of the word with the thing to which it refers (cf. T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24, p. 368). Hence, ‘rhetoricity’

means that the real aim of using language is not the reproduction of reality or the conquest of truth, but the simple fact of influencing the actions of others in the best interest of the user of the words.

Language never achieves the target of giving a satisfactory and definitive account of reality. Examples are cited by Gorgias from scientific writings, from political debate and from philosophical disputation that make incredible things seem absolutely real and for ever true (Gorgias, B11, 13 D-K). For a sophist such as Protagoras of Abdera in Thrace language is, likewise, only useful as an instrument for political and social action, but it is of no value for knowing reality or solving such difficult problems as, for example, the existence or nature of the gods (B4 D-K). His famous dictum 'Man is the measure of all things' (B1 D-K) means that truth is not the result of language reproducing reality but of language being accepted by a socio-political community. Thus, Protagoras held that the most appropriate realm of action for language was not philosophy but politics, the art that enables democratic citizens to participate in political debates. Accordingly, he claimed to know the art of politics and how to make good citizens, as well as how to teach how to conduct debates or how to profit from the 'occasion' or 'right moment' (*kairos*) (Diog. Laert. 9.52). He declared himself competent also in demonstrating the incapacity of language for correctly depicting reality, and consequently the capacity of every citizen, if endowed with rhetorical ability, for 'making the weaker cause seem to be the stronger' (Arist. *Rhet.* 1402a23).

The sophists as a group were sceptical about the possibility of acquiring immutable knowledge or absolute truth by means of language. On the contrary, according to them, human knowledge is mere opinion and is therefore subjected to continuous change. Opinions change so easily that one feels inclined to think that the real world is an illusion, which was the attitude of Gorgias in his work entitled *On Nature*, and subtitled *About the Non-Existent*.

An anonymous treatise of the late fifth century entitled *Dissoi Logoi* or 'Two-fold Arguments', written in literary Dorian (Dorian *koina*), provides examples of how to argue both sides of the same issue. The foundation of this practice is the doctrine that, as long as we think and communicate with language, the same thing can be good or bad, honourable or disgraceful, just or unjust, true or false (B90 D-K). For instance: to 'take a bath' in the wrestling-school is decent for men but indecent for women. To 'take a bath' is decent for women if they take it at home. To 'take a bath' is always decent for men. Therefore, it is clear that two contradictory speeches can be pronounced about the decency of 'taking a bath', both being equally true: 'for women to take a bath is decent' / 'for women to take a bath is indecent' (B90, 2, 3 D-K). Moreover, a statement (for example, 'someone committed a temple-robbery') can be true or false, but the judges can condemn the accused of temple-robbery as much if the words are true as if they are false, and in both cases the words used in the accusation will be the same (B90, 4, 2 D-K). Therefore language is untrustworthy. It has nothing to do with reality.

If – as Gorgias shows – language can neither correctly depict reality nor reconstruct past facts nor guess the future, because everything we think of or communicate is not a thing but a mere word (*On Not-Being or On Nature* = B3, D-K), then a speaker has to endeavour only to persuade his hearers. This is the most profit he can gain from his use of language. Likewise, in Protagoras' opinion, language cannot achieve reality

because it does not coincide with it. Otherwise, how could Homer, the best of poets, use the feminine words *mēnis* ('wrath') and *pēlēx* ('helmet'), which according to him should naturally be masculine, to judge from their meaning? (Arist. *Sophistical Refutations* 173b 17). If things as aggressive as 'wrath' and 'helmet' are feminine, language is more akin to rhetoric than to philosophy.

Questions of this kind were not uncommon in the sophistic circles of Athens, as is shown in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, produced in 423. In the play, the comic character Socrates – who really embodies Protagoras and other sophists – is shown reflecting about the asymmetry of language and reality. For example, Socrates on the use of *alektruōn*, the common word in Attic-Ionic of the fifth century for both 'cock' and 'hen'. Since Nature – so argues the sophistic Socrates – distinguishes very clearly between male and female in this species of birds (*Clouds* 666), the language is here wrong, and consequently two different names should be invented, one for 'cock' and another one for 'hen'. Further, if language was symmetrical to Nature, then Cleonymus, a well-known homosexual citizen of Athens who used to practise the female role in sexual intercourse, should not be named with that masculine name ('Cleonymus'), but with a feminine one, 'Cleonyma', comparable to other proper names of the same gender, as, for instance, Sostrata (*Clouds* 680).

In Greece at this time there was a keen interest in the study of etymologies, the aim being to find out if there was some natural root meaning in the sounds of words. If the names with which we call the different things show a true connection with the things they name, that is, if the names express truth about the reality they point to (that is the etymology of the Greek word 'etymology'), then we can be confident in language as a means of philosophy. But if, on the contrary, the sound of a word bears no connection whatsoever to the nature of the thing it names, then language is completely a rhetorical tool.

According to Democritus of Abdera in Thrace (born 460), words are mere shadows of the reality of things or facts (B145 D-K) and 'truth is in an abyss' (B117 D-K). Thus, for instance, in an analysis of the Greek word *mēden* ('nothing'), Democritus claimed that the second syllable, *den*, is not more coincident with reality than the entire word *mēden*, 'nothing' (B156 D-K). In ancient Greek *mē* meant 'no', and, therefore, if language were logical, *den* in the word *mēden* ('nothing') should mean 'anything'. But that is not the case. Language, therefore, is full of defects and faults that prevent us from reproducing reality and consequently reaching truth by thinking and communicating with it. These defects are 'polysemy', 'identity of meaning', 'metonymy' (for instance, the use of nicknames) and 'lack of name'. Thus, language is not 'by nature', but a matter of conventional or arbitrary usage (Democritus, B26 D-K), and by using it for thinking and expounding theories we really do not know anything that could be held as true, because 'truth lies in depths' (Democritus, B117 D-K).

Ancient Greeks were aware of the errors which one can make when using language and of its absolute dependence on usage. They were acquainted, for instance, with the fact that the sentence pronounced by the Cyclops Polyphemus in Homer's *Odyssey*, 'Nobody is slaying me' (9.408), could theoretically be interpreted in two absolutely different senses, if there were such a proper name as 'Nobody'. But practically – since this proper name did not exist – there could be only one meaning of the sentence. Given that Cyclopes were not a cohesive group, a barbarous, savage and asocial

creature such as Polyphemus was so unacquainted with language that he held that the word 'nobody' could also be a personal name. Had he been a social and civilized Greek, he would have understood that language is merely a matter of usage and that consequently a non-existent proper name, 'Nobody', was clearly a linguistic trick.

There is no guarantee of the existence of reality outside the pronounced words. Moreover, as there is no symmetry between language and reality, words are a mere matter of usage and consequently can often become a blatant piece of trickery. The relation of a society and the language it speaks and the sort of language gods use and the relation between a name and the object it describes were questions that had occupied the Greeks since Homeric times. Debate on the comparative claims of nature versus custom or convention concerning language gave rise, after Homer, to further developments in the history of the discovery of the 'rhetoricity' of language. Thus, the sophists and Democritus defended that language was a matter of conventional usage that had no relation whatsoever with nature. Hence, only one conclusion could be drawn: language is not fit for producing true and absolute knowledge, but only relative and changeable belief. This very fact was the foundation of the 'rhetoricity' of language (Pl. *Gorgias* 458e8).

Language is able to deal only with opinions, not with scientific and true knowledge. In fact, scientific theories are nothing more, according to Gorgias, than mere opinions continuously following and replacing one another and seeming to be evident and true only if looked into with the eyes of opinion (Gorgias, B11, 13 D-K). 'Being' can neither be thought nor communicated through language (Gorgias, B3, 82–83 D-K), hence the possibility of trusting language as a bearer of truth is excluded.

Even in Homeric times, the Greeks believed that the language of the gods was much more accurate than that of men. For instance, gods accurately called a hundred-handed giant *Briareos*, that is, 'Strong', whereas men called him *Aegaeon* (*Iliad* 1.403; cf. Vergil, *Aeneid* 10.565), a name merely connecting him with the Aegean Sea and Aegae, where his father-in-law Poseidon had his palace. The divine name, therefore, was no doubt much more exact and accurate than the human, regarding the definition of the named giant (*Iliad* 1.403–404). The same could be said of the Trojan river that men called *Scamander* (*Iliad* 5.36, 77, 774), but the gods, defining it much more exactly, called *Xanthos* or 'Reddish Yellow' due to the unmistakable colour of its waters (*Iliad* 20.74). The names that the gods use are more fitting to the nature of the reality they refer to than the human ones, and consequently are more true.

Several centuries later, in the Platonic dialogue *Cratylus*, Socrates adopted an intermediate position between that of Cratylus, who defended that language was the true reflex of nature, and that of Hermogenes, for whom words were merely conventional and had no connection whatsoever with the true nature of the things they named (*Cratylus* 384d). He tried to show that words, inasmuch as they are 'imitations' (*mimēmata*) or copies of the things they refer to (*Cratylus* 431a), can be more or less faithful to the originals they imitate (*Cratylus* 430a–431c). This assertion unmistakably meant that we are able to say true things with language as much as false ones (*Cratylus* 431b1). If, consequently, language cannot be trusted as a means of reproducing reality, then how are we able to persuade an audience by discourse? The answer is to resort to psychological-aesthetic strategies, in which the 'rhetoricity' of language mostly consists. As language is basically political and does not reproduce

faithfully reality nor generate immutable or everlasting knowledge, it is only correctly, duly and properly used if the speaker employs both psychological as well as aesthetic strategies in order to persuade or influence his audience.

According to Gorgias, the force of language consists in its being like a drug to the soul. Consequently, if a speech were adapted to the manifold variety of life and to the psychology of the hearers, it would have extraordinary persuasive effects on them by profiting from its emotional force and its irresistible attraction proper of an incantation (Gorgias, *Defense of Palamedes* = B11a, 14, 22 D-K). Thus, the effectiveness of a speech based on the 'rhetoricity' of language is based especially on its alignment with the hearers through psychological and aesthetic strategies.

Homer, for example, is to be criticized, according to Protagoras, for having *ordered* the Muse to sing the wrath of Achilles, an attitude a man is not allowed to assume if addressing a goddess (Arist. *Politics* 456b15). The orator has to deeply know language and its proper use in order to apply its psychological and aesthetic features to persuading his hearers. The sophist Prodicus of Ceos (a contemporary of Socrates who studied synonymy with a special interest in the correct use of words and the distinction of near-synonyms) was aware of the importance of maintaining the attention of an audience. In fact, whenever he observed that the hearers of his discourse were relaxing their attention, he used to intersperse in it a very beautiful and perfect speech composed by himself that was known as the 'fifty drachmas speech' (Arist. *Rhet.* 1415b15). The correct expression, the beautiful words and the attention and pleasure of the hearers are basic aspects of the 'rhetoricity' of language.

Another sophist, Hippias of Elis (a younger contemporary of Protagoras), used to boast about always saying something new in order to attract and keep the attention of his hearers (A16, 6 D-K). Hippias was a connoisseur both of grammar and poetry, and in Plato's *Protagoras* there is a masterly imitation of his style in a speech attributed to him, in which he lectures on the art of discourse by employing metaphors such as 'to slacken the reins to the speech' or 'to run the ship of the speech before the wind'. These are excellent examples of his method of always producing interest and enchantment in his hearers, even when treating scientific subjects (*Protagoras* 337e–338b).

Yet another sophist and a well-known politician, who was famous as Socrates' opponent in defending the thesis that justice is only the interest of the stronger, was Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (*fl.* 430–400). He wrote some treatises on rhetoric in which he paid special attention to the elaboration of an appeal to the emotions by means of elocution as well as delivery, and to the development of an elegant prose style. The latter dealt with rhythm (he began the use in prose of 'paeon', a succession of three short syllables and one long at the end of clauses and sentences) (Arist. *Rhet.* 1409a1), the avoidance of hiatus (the cacophonous harshness from having a word end in a vowel and the next one begin with a vowel), and the careful composition of periods (Pl. *Phaedrus* 271a4–8).

To sum up, as put forward by Gorgias, the most effective strategies for persuading the hearers are psychological and aesthetic: accordingly, an orator has to arouse passions and emotions (on which see D. Konstan, Chapter 27), provoke laughter (which is an important means of refutation) (Arist. *Rhet.* 1419b3) and 'bewitch' his hearers, because there is no other difference between prose and poetry than metre (Gorgias, B11, 10 D-K). Even 'fictionality' (the capacity for fiction) and other

psychological and aesthetic strategies do not belong exclusively to poetry but to language in general (Gorgias, B11, 8–9 D-K and B3, 80–83 D-K).

Gorgias, indeed, regarded an orator as a ‘leader of souls’ (*psuchagōgos*) through a kind of incantation similar to a spell or enchantment and therefore very close to poetry. In this way he described the ‘power of *logos*’, the capacity (*dunamis*) of speech, or the ‘rhetoricity’ of language. His purpose was to make clear that language has the power or capacity of influencing the hearers through psychological and aesthetic strategies. Thus, it is not strange that Socrates, a firm believer in absolute truth, would describe rhetoric as a form of flattery and a counterpart to cookery (Pl. *Gorgias* 463b–c), an art that should be rejected if not used for the sake of justice (Pl. *Gorgias* 527c3–4). However, it is, at the same time, refreshing to hear Socrates say that rhetorical discourse should be a kind of ‘leading of the soul’ (*psuchagōgia*) (Pl. *Phaedrus* 261a7–9) and that it should be coherent like a living thing, with head, body and feet well adapted each into the whole (Pl. *Phaedrus* 264c2–5). Such claims imply the belief, though not confessed, that in the ‘rhetoricity’ of language an orator has to attract and lead the souls of the hearers and, as an important part of this process, to give a logical and well-ordered structure to his speech as the first step in his attempt to compose an aesthetic discourse.

The sophists would, then, have agreed with Plato on those terms, but then he went further. In his opinion, the good orator could not be content with knowing what *seemed* true but needed to know what *was* in fact true (cf. H. Yunis, Chapter 7, p. 77). The discrepancies between rhetoric and philosophy (see further, J. Allen, Chapter 23, p. 358) concern this very claim. Can we reproduce reality and consequently attain truth by means of language? The sophists’ answer to this question was ‘no’, that of Plato and Aristotle was ‘yes’. One has, therefore, to choose between using language to acquire true knowledge or to persuade other people.

According to the doctrine of the sophists, language is not fully opportune for philosophy or science, but it is appropriate for convincing people in a political community for it employs psychological (‘psychagogical’, as they used to say) and stylistic strategies. As a matter of fact, when Gorgias compared the power of speech to the effect of drugs on the body, he was referring concretely to its charms and its power over the passions of the soul. In fact, it can banish fear, remove grief, instil pleasure, enhance pity, bewitch, persuade, and change opinions (*Encomium of Helen* = B11, 8. B11, 10 D-K). This can be explained by the fact that human beings, lacking knowledge, must rely on opinion, and consequently the most effective strategies for persuading their fellow-citizens are not so much the rational as the psychological and stylistic ones. These strategies are both present in poetical as well as rhetorical expressions of language (cf. M. McDonald, Chapter 31 and A. Mori, Chapter 30). The difference between poetic and rhetorical language is only one of frequency: poetic language can be defined as the exploitation at the highest level of the ‘rhetoricity’ of language. Thus, according to Gorgias, poetry is speech submitted to the recurrence of metre (*Encomium of Helen* = B11, 9 D-K).

All this doctrine about the ‘rhetoricity’ of language, as drafted by the sophists, explains the fact that Aristotle, who represents the zenith of Greek rhetoric, connected language with the social-political nature of man (*Politics* 1253a) and rhetoric with the deliberation and examination of human actions (*Rhet.* 1357a24) and that, among the three kinds of rhetoric he established (deliberative, judicial and epideictic),

he gave place of pride to deliberative rhetoric (see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9, p. 111). It also explains why he devoted special attention to the psychological and aesthetic strategies of language shared by poetry and prose in his *Rhetoric* and *Poetics* (cf. *Rhet.* 1404a8).

According to Aristotle, man as a socio-political animal has been endowed by Nature with language for maintaining socio-political and psychological relations with his fellow-citizens. These relations consist not merely in feeling and transmitting the sensation (*aisthēsis*) of ‘pain’ and ‘pleasure’ (including also animals) but in ‘showing’ (*dēloūn*) what is ‘convenient’ or ‘harmful’ and ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’ for the community (*Politics* 1253a14). This is the first feature of the ‘rhetoricity’ of language according to Aristotle: that language is particularly useful for making things in the realm of the social-political life. In fact, the subjects of our deliberation and examination through a rhetorical speech are mostly human actions, that is, political actions (*Rhet.* 1357a24).

Furthermore, Aristotle says that an orator who delivers a speech to his fellow-citizens is conscious of ‘doing’ something, of performing a political task (*ou lanthanei ge ho poiōi ton legonta*, ‘the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing’). For that reason he is able to perceive the acceptance or rejection of his audience and therefore he should rebuke himself in advance if he believes that he will not adapt himself to circumstances, to ‘opportunity’ (*kairos*) (*Arist. Rhet.* 1408b1). We can see examples of rebukes and of taking into account audience expectations in the Demosthenic *prooimia* (see Ian Worthington, Chapter 17, pp. 265–267).

Concerning the second feature of ‘rhetoricity’, namely, that language is not well endowed for reproducing and transmitting reality, we have to point out that, although Aristotle, as a good student of Plato, is sure of the capacity of man for capturing truth (*Rhetoric* 1355a15) – and consequently concedes to rational argumentation an important place in his *Rhetoric* –, he states in this same work that rhetorical arguments concern matters that always admit being otherwise (*endeckhetai kai allos ekhein*, *Rhet.* 1357a24). He thus distinguishes the rhetorical discourse from the scientific one (see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9, p. 110). Further, he admits that, for constructing a rhetorical discourse – dealing with questions that always admit being treated otherwise (the majority of human questions are this way: *Rhet.* 1357a4. 1357a14) –, we have to profit from the ‘rhetoricity’ of language, that is, from its capacity to employ psychological and aesthetic strategies, something that is completely out of the question when dealing with scientific discourse. Delivering a rhetorical discourse, states Aristotle, is not the same thing as teaching geometry (*Rhet.* 1404a11). ‘Rhetoricity’ at its highest level would result in passionate discourse as well as in fiction and poetry (pathetic style is appropriate and closely akin to poetry, ‘for there is something inspired in poetry’, *Rhet.* 1408b19). These two features, fiction and poetry, should be absolutely discarded from the teaching of geometry or any scientific subject.

One has, therefore, to admit that ‘rhetoricity’ does not fit in with objective truth. In fact a rhetorical discourse aims, first, to put the judge (that is, the hearer) in a certain frame of mind using pathetic and stylistic strategies, secondly, to profit from the apparent moral character of the orator, and, last, to prove or seem to prove (*Arist. Rhet.* 1354b20. 1356a3. 1403b15). None of these aims is compatible with scientific discourse. Moreover, says Aristotle, the demonstration we put forth in a rhetorical

speech (as produced by the speech itself, that is, by mere language) can be true or apparently true (*Rhet.* 1356a19). Plato had already stated that rhetoric could be defined as a facet of flattery that, just like poetry, seeks the pleasure and gratification of the hearers (*Gorgias* 502e). Indeed, in opposition to the language employed in an objective discourse of science, the capacity of language to move and delight the hearers of a speech plays a decisive role in a rhetorical discourse. Although Aristotle believed in the possibility of attaining truth through speech, in his opinion, the aim of a rhetorical discourse would only be 'to prove or *seem to prove*' or 'to point out truth or *something resembling truth*' (*Rhet.* 1356a4. 1356a19. 1356a35. 1356b29), in opposition to scientific discourse, which is exact and is the basic matter of learning (*Rhet.* 1355a26).

Furthermore, as proofs in a rhetorical discourse Aristotle prefers the use of 'common notions' that can be accepted by everyone or the wisest of men over scientific explanations (*Rhet.* 1355a24, *Topics* 100b21). He states, moreover, that the rhetorical arguments will be for the most part not *necessarily* true but only *generally* true. The reason for this is that they all are about probabilities (a probable fact only happens generally, not always) or about things that can be other than they are (*Rhet.* 1357a30). Rhetoric will cease to be rhetoric if it moves from what is generally acceptable to the first principles of a given science (*Rhet.* 1358a23–26, 1359b2–16).

Aristotle believes in the capacity of man to reach truth (and therefore the moral truth) but affirms that the real object of rhetoric is probability or plausibility (*Rhet.* 1355a3). As a Platonic student, he firmly believes in the fact that the true and the better are naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade than their opposites (*Rhet.* 1355a37). The means by which men deliberate are useful; what is useful is good (*Rhet.* 1362a21), and virtues must be good for it is by possessing them that men are in good condition (*Rhet.* 1362b2–4). Notwithstanding this, he advises us to employ non-logical strategies in a rhetorical discourse because of the 'depravity' of human beings (*Rhet.* 1404a7).

'Rhetoricity' is the quality or capacity that persuades listeners through a logical but not necessarily strict or true argument, and especially with psychological and aesthetic strategies based on language in action and derived from language itself. The logical weakness of 'rhetoricity' as well as its proclivity to lie can be shown by the example of Hermes, the patron-god of rhetoric. He was the interpreter and the messenger of the gods and, at the same time, the instigator of all kinds of fraudulent businesses and deals (Pl. *Cratylus* 407e). It was he who instilled in Pandora, the first woman of mankind (a venomous gift of Zeus to men), 'lies, crafty words and a deceitful character' (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 78).

The Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* of the sixth century tells us that when Hermes was only a baby he stole the oxen attended by his brother Apollo. He attempted to defend himself before Zeus by using an example of the 'rhetoricity' of language, that is, of its capacity of producing counterfeit statements that seem logically acceptable or true: 'Can a newborn baby steal cattle?' (265). If Hermes' question is held as a general one, the answer would undoubtedly be 'No', but if individually applied to his own divine nature of infant god, the answer would have to be 'Yes'. The 'rhetoricity' of language is self-evident as a consequence of its own nature. To employ it can be useful, as shown. However, it does not necessarily imply either the truth or the logical demonstration of an alleged statement. Thus, Odysseus, who was well versed in

'rhetoricity', continuously pronounced forged discourses in order to better help him achieve his goals. Athena used to laugh at his continuously telling lies (*Odyssey* 13. 287); however, she (who often disguised her shape and her words) knew that the aim of rhetorical language was not to tell true things but to shoot winged words as effectively as shooting arrows (cf. *Iliad* 1.201, 5.171), as H.M. Roisman, Chapter 28, pp. 429 and 434, discusses.

The aim of language, then, was not to reproduce reality and so state the truth but to influence others in the interest of the speaker. This influence can be achieved by logical arguments (more or less stringent), but especially by psychological and aesthetic strategies, as we have stated before. In the case of poetry, for example, the delight provided by poetic fiction was of the utmost importance: it used language mixed with music and dance in the days before writing, and the Muses themselves admitted that they could proclaim true facts as well as false things similar to true ones (Hesiod, *Theogony* 27). Thus, it is clear that what counts in language is not so much its capacity for establishing the truth of a statement but its 'rhetoricity', namely, its proclivity for merely approaching truth or transmitting plausible facts and favourably exciting the hearers by emotions and delights. Aristotle gives us clues about how to profit from the meanings of certain words that are close in nature, so that we can, for instance, call someone who is 'frank' and 'open' a 'choleric' and 'passionate' man and present 'foolhardy' as 'courageous'. Thus, when a man risks his life when there is no necessity most people will think that he is either 'foolhardy' or 'courageous', depending on the motive (*Rhet.* 1367b2).

There are a lot of fallacies installed in language that are sometimes difficult to detect, such as fallacies by omission (see further, J. Allen, Chapter 23, pp. 353, 356). One can say that Paris had a right to carry off Helen for her father had given her the choice of a husband. This is a fallacy by omission of the circumstances (similar to that of Hermes' response when accused of stealing the oxen). Helen's father had indeed given her a choice of husband, but only before she married Menelaus, not after this wedding had taken place (Arist. *Rhet.* 1401b34). Language continuously and naturally is flawed by fallacies. When it is impossible to argue the actual things under discussion, we are forced to use names, which are mere symbols, imitations or copies, in the place of the things. However, names are finite, whereas things are infinite and so we often use the same word for different things. Hence, the asymmetry between words and things is beyond reasonable doubt (Arist. *Sophistical Refutations* 165a6). There are verbs such as 'to flourish', that is, 'to be healthy', that signify an action which is not of the same kind in other verbs like 'to build'. The former denotes, in fact, a quality and a certain disposition, whereas the latter denotes a mere action (Arist. *Sophistical Refutations* 166b16).

By virtue of this asymmetry of words and reality, language also provides us (according to Aristotle) with the possibility of constructing or destroying by exaggeration, irony or interrogation. We not always accept the exact meaning of the words we hear because we often employ words ironically. For example, Aristotle tells us the following anecdote: when a swallow let fall its droppings upon Gorgias, he looked at the bird and exclaimed in his best tragic style: 'Shame on You, Philomela' (*Rhet.* 1406b14). Philomela, daughter of King Pandion of Athens, was a mythological heroine transformed into a swallow. By mixing irony and interrogation an adept orator could defeat his opponent by saying: 'He said this, I answered that; what would he have done, if he had proved this and not simply that?' (Arist. *Rhet.* 1420a2).

Another example is when a lawyer exaggerates the alleged crime of his client, for the listeners' general impression will be that the accused is not guilty because the lawyer exaggerated the alleged felony (Arist. *Rhet.* 1401b3).

Amplification, indeed, is a facet of the 'rhetoricity' of language and can be held as one of the most important strategies of rhetoric. According to Aristotle, we have to employ amplification in epideictic speeches, where, as in poetry, proofs of the stated facts are never given. For instance, we could amplify our statements by employing asyndeton ('I came, I conversed, I besought') in order to give the hearer the impression we had many things to say. Thus, when the words are pronounced with the same tone and character and if all of them were in the same clause, it can seem that many things take place at the same time. On the other hand, the use of a connecting particle can make many things seem as one (Arist. *Rhet.* 1413b29). Aristotle urges us to use amplification or depreciation as soon as something has been proved.

There are many linguistic strategies that can help to amplify or to depreciate something. Diminutives, for example, make the good and the bad appear less (Arist. *Rhet.* 1405b29). The use of a description instead of the name of a thing is a strategy of amplification, whereas to give the proper word for something rather than describe it is a case of conciseness (Arist. *Rhet.* 1407b26). Two actions can be expressed in order to seem two different actions (what could be considered a case of amplification) as, for instance: 'having gone and having conversed with him'. On the other hand, one can present the two actions as being really only one and the same, as for instance, 'having gone, I conversed with him' (Arist. *Rhet.* 1407b37). One can also amplify an object by describing qualities that it does not possess, in which case this amplification can be carried on to infinity (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a1).

If this notion of the 'rhetoricity' of language is correctly explained, we can understand why Aristotle dedicated a greater number of pages to both psychological and stylistic strategies than to logical ones, despite his statement that the most important convincing strategy in a rhetorical discourse is the one based on logical argumentation (*Rhet.* 1354a15). Although he vehemently criticized his predecessors for their use of psychological strategies such as arousing the emotions of the judge (*Rhet.* 1354a14) or stylistic strategies such as poetically recharging the diction (*Rhet.* 1406a5), he still studied and recommended a moderate use of them (cf. W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9, pp. 107–108).

Aristotle justified his change of attitude by arguing that, given the purpose of rhetoric was to influence the opinions of fellow-citizens, it should be achieved by always considering the facts alone, by rejecting everything that is not demonstrable, and by doing everything in a spirit of justice. However, as in real life the 'depravity' of the hearers is an undisputable fact, one has to rely on psychological and stylistic strategies, which consequently cannot be held as superfluous but as necessary. These psychological and stylistic strategies of language are crucial because of their ability to convince the hearer.

For Aristotle, the hearer is a kind of 'judge' who is able to form an idea of the 'moral character' (*ēthos*) of the speaker from listening to his discourse. At the same time he can be influenced by the rhetorical discourse in such a way that it can arouse 'emotions' (*pathos*) and produce aesthetic delight in his soul due to the excellent and beautiful 'style' (*lexis*) of the very speech. In fact, the good character of the speaker, reflected in the language used in his speech, is often a sure means of persuading the

judge-hearer. The speaker has to present himself, in the very way he speaks, as an upright person who is worthy of trust (Arist. *Rhet.* 1356a2–13). Aristotle stated at the start of the *Rhetoric* that the most fundamental rhetorical proofs are the logical argumentations called ‘enthymemes’ or ‘rhetorical arguments’, on which see the discussion of W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9, pp. 110–111. However, Aristotle later wrote that the strategy based on the speaker’s character is the most effective of all persuasion strategies (*Rhet.* 1354a13 and 1356a13). Everyone likes good, virtuous and philanthropic men, because truth and justice are by nature stronger than their contraries (*Rhet.* 1355a21).

This is the reason why good sense, virtue and goodwill in the speaker are extremely important qualities that become rhetorical strategies for inducing belief. But the impression of having a good ‘moral character’, which the speaker makes on his audience, must be due to the speech itself and not to any preconceived idea (Arist. *Rhet.* 1356a8). That means that the orator has to profit from the ‘rhetoricity’ of language in employing this strategy. Consequently, the good orator has not to speak from an intellectual standpoint but to have a moral purpose: he has to present himself in his speech as being of a certain character.

One way of attaining this objective is to use moral maxims or to change enthymemes or logical arguments into moral maxims. For instance, the sentences ‘I gave him the money, although I know that *one ought not to trust*’, or ‘I have been wronged giving him money, so that *his is the profit, mine is the right*’ express the moral character of the speaker because they contain a moral maxim, namely, a statement of the general moral opinion of a society. When an orator uses a moral maxim in his speech, he expresses himself in the general terms and preconceived moral opinions of his fellow-citizens. That is the reason why it is useful for the speaker to change enthymemes into moral maxims. Indeed, whereas demonstration involves neither moral character nor moral purpose, maxims, on the contrary, declare the moral preferences of those who utter them (Arist. *Rhet.* 1395b1, 1417a1, 1418b33). On the other hand, an emotion like pity when aroused in the hearer can also be of help in securing a favourable verdict. In fact, nobody judges the same way when influenced by sorrow, joy, love or hate (Arist. *Rhet.* 1356a15).

Language, indeed, is rich in pathetic strategies, for we normally speak with the anger of wanton outrage, with the indignation of impious things, with the admiration of praiseworthy facts, and with the lowliness of pitiable actions. Aristotle’s conception of emotions was cognitive in the sense that they were understood as knowledge-related and, consequently, as a verbal medium in forensic and deliberative contexts. Moreover, the general ancient Greek understanding of the emotions was rhetorical rather than psychological (see further, D. Konstan, Chapter 27, p. 416). Sometimes we try to impress our hearers by even only slightly mentioning an action that we try to present as impious. In fact, language allows us to pass on (as in an infection through contagion) our emotion or passion (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a16–25). Pathetic strategies are closely akin to poetry, and may be inspired by it. Compound words, for instance, are appropriate for an emotional speaker. In fact, when an orator is enraged, it is excusable for him to call an evil ‘high as heaven’ or ‘stupendous’ (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408b11–13). Enthusiastic orators prompt their hearers emotionally to accept easily what they say in a sympathetic spirit. Sometimes, even, pathetic orators confound their hearers by mere noise (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a24).

Pathetic strategies help the orator to persuade his audience. The same could be said about the stylistic or aesthetic form that a rhetorical discourse adopts. Style has to be clear (clarity enjoys place of pride for oratory is a form of communication), has to avoid meanness or undue elevation and has to be appropriate to its subject (Arist. *Rhet.* 1404b1–5, 1414a23–4). A discourse, if correctly written, appropriately embellished with stylistic devices and beautifully delivered (delivery is a very important part of rhetorical action and should be a subject of rhetorical investigation) produces a high degree of persuasion in the hearer (Arist. *Rhet.* 1403b20–2).

Language is also rich in strategies contributing to the embellishment of a speech, many of which are common to poetry and rhetorical discourse (Arist. *Rhet.* 1403b15). These strategies must be duly combined in order to form the ‘appropriate style’ (*oikeia lexis*) that plays a crucial role in what a rhetorical discourse is supposed to achieve (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a20). The good rhetorical discourse is the one whose ‘diction’ or *lexis* is fit or well adapted to the facts mentioned, to the character of the speaker and to the passions aroused by the matter of the speech itself (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a10–37). There must be a connection between the speaker’s character and the content of the speech. In that way, the listener learns that the character is good not from any preconceived ideas but from the speech (Arist. *Rhet.* 1356a8). The same can be said about the raising of emotions: there has to be total conformity of the emotion of the speaker with his performance of the speech. When, on the contrary, an orator expresses mild sentiments harshly or harsh sentiments mildly, he can be sure that his speech lacks a persuasive quality (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a25).

The requirements for building the ‘appropriate style’ of a discourse are, therefore, to control the appearance of truth in all the dimensions of the speech (the orator’s character, the expression of the emotion and the conformity of the matters exposed with reality), and to employ an intelligible and dignified language (Arist. *Rhet.* 1404b1). ‘Appropriate style’, says Aristotle, makes all the facts mentioned in the speech appear credible by means of language. ‘Appropriateness’ as the aim of rhetoric is the consequence of the ‘rhetoricity’ of language: if language is needed to influence its listeners, but is not entirely appropriate for reproducing reality, every displayed discourse or speech, including religious prayer (as K. Dowden shows in Chapter 21, pp. 320–321), must be clearly ‘appropriate’ to the ‘occasion’ or the ‘right moment’ (*kairos*). Thus we arrive at the point at which I aimed: the Greeks’ discovery of the ‘rhetoricity’ of language. The capacity of language is what allows an orator to elaborate and to deliver speeches in order to construct basically psychological and stylistic strategies.

There are strategies in language filled with ‘rhetoricity’. One of them, for instance, is the ‘rhetorical question’, a question that suggests – with its mere statement – an obvious answer that is shared by the speaker and the hearer. It creates a psychological bond between the orator and his audience. Thus, when Achilles explained his resentment towards Agamemnon for having seized Briseis from him for the Ambassadors, he asked the following ‘rhetorical question’: ‘Do they alone of mortal men love their wives, these sons of Atreus?’ (*Iliad* 9.340–341). According to Aristotle, the only kind of sentence that carries truth or falsity is the ‘proposition’, which we say to express an affirmation or a negation of something, and inasmuch as it is a ‘proposition’, it can be said it is true or false. However, not every sentence is a ‘proposition’. A prayer, for instance, conveys neither truth nor falsity. We could say the same about a command, an order, a supplication, a request, a polite expression, an invitation, a question, an

exclamation, an interjection expressing an emotion, and the like. Consequently, all these expressions, in Aristotle's opinion, belong much more to poetics and rhetoric than to philosophy as they are more psychological than logical (*On Interpretation* 17a).

Another rhetorical strategy based on language is that of repeating the same word(s) in similar places in a period or in a group of consecutive sentences. Achilles will not be persuaded by Agamemnon, '*not though* he gave me ten times all that he now has ... *not though* it were all the wealth that goes to Orchomenus ... *not though* he gave me gifts in number as sand and dust' (*Iliad* 9.379–385). Such wording is natural, for repetition is much more a psychological strategy of magnifying a statement than a logical way of information. At the same time, repetition produces a delightful and enjoyable effect such as rhythm, and it therefore elevates language to the category of poetry, which, according to Gorgias, is speech subjected to the recurrence of metre (*Encomium of Helen* = B11, 9 D-K).

The use of psychological and aesthetic strategies is based, first, on the fallacy of the linguistic sign, for not being the same thing that the reality it names, and, secondly, on the fallacy of 'what follows something is the effect of this'. Indeed, Aristotle says that the reason why persuasion derives from psychological and stylistic strategies is a 'paralogism' or fallacy in both cases. We instinctively think that the orator that shows us a certain emotion or trait of character through his speech, when he employs the appropriate style, is really endowed with it. An appropriate style, well adapted to the emotion of the audience or the character of the speaker, can make a fact credible. The hearer, indeed, will be under the impression that the orator is speaking the truth, when his linguistic signs correspond exactly with the facts they describe. Hence the hearer thinks, consequently, that in such circumstances his own feelings or reactions would be the same (Arist. *Rhet.* 1408a16).

The Greeks discovered the 'rhetoricity' of language: they discovered that language was composed of signs and that these signs cannot be confused with the real things they point out. As Democritus put it, 'truth is in an abyss' (B117 D-K); in other words, there is not truth in language. Consequently, these same signs are very useful for making jokes and confounding opponents' earnest remarks with jocular comments and their jokes with earnest comments, following Gorgias' advice (Arist. *Rhet.* 1419b3). They are very useful, in general, for building up fallacious arguments based on psychological and aesthetic strategies or on logical arguments that *seem* to be true. These arguments, as fallacious as they may be, nevertheless achieve the most important function of language, namely, that of influencing the members of a socio-political community (cf. Ian Worthington, Chapter 17, p. 257).

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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

Rhetoric and Logic

James Allen

Logic was the property of the philosophers, and it is to those philosophers who also interested themselves in rhetorical argument that one must turn in order to explore the relations between logic and rhetoric in Greek antiquity. Though it has roots in Plato and Aristotle, the division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics seems first to have been made explicitly in the second half of the fourth century, after which time it became standard (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.16). In the Stoic version of the division, which was especially influential, the logical part of philosophy was further divided into rhetoric and dialectic, and some Stoics also made a place for a separate part concerned with definition and another concerned with canons and criteria, i.e., epistemology (Diog. Laert. 7.41). The connecting thread is a common concern with *logos*, and the variety of items encompassed by the ancient discipline of logic reflects the range of the term *logos*, which can mean a word, a proposition, a definition, speech, a speech in the sense of an oration, an argument or the faculty of reason. These were seen to form a unity because speech and thought were regarded as two aspects of *logos*. Speech is external *logos*, thought internal *logos*, according to the Stoics, who are in accord with older views like that of Plato, who defined thought as internal speech (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 8.275; Pl. *Sophist* 263e).

The central concern of logic as it is understood in the present day, and for our present purpose the most important of the concerns that fell under the broader ancient discipline of logic, is the study of argument and the conditions that an argument must satisfy in order to be valid. An argument is a system of propositions one of which is the conclusion while the others are premisses, and a valid argument is one whose conclusion must be true if its premisses are. Arguments serve as instruments of persuasion because anyone who takes an argument to be valid and accepts its premisses as true is bound on pain of irrationality also to accept its conclusion.

Not any kind of interest in valid argument amounts to logic, however. Someone with a good feel for valid arguments, for example, is not yet a logician. Logic aims at a

perfectly general understanding of valid argument, something that qualifies as a *theory* of valid argument. To this end, it studies the form of valid arguments in abstraction from their content. We get a sense of what this means from the commonplace expressions ‘by your logic’ or ‘by the same logic’ as they are used in the everyday practice of objecting to the arguments of others. Confronted by an argument, we may say that by the same logic such and such a conclusion would have to be true given such and such premisses. This objection will be effective if the argument that we have contrived is of the same form as the argument to which we object yet plainly invalid. The – usually unstated – idea behind the objection is that if two arguments share the same form, one can be valid only if the other is.

Aristotle was the first to represent the form of an argument by using letters to stand in for the content, Take for example the argument:

<i>Premise₁</i>	All squares are rectangles.
<i>Premise₂</i>	<u>All rectangles are plane figures.</u>
<i>Conclusion</i>	Therefore all squares are plane figures.

This is a valid argument of the form:

<i>Premise₁</i>	P belongs to all M.
<i>Premise₂</i>	<u>M belongs to all S.</u>
<i>Conclusion</i>	Therefore P belongs to all S.

Not only the sample argument above, but every argument of this form, i.e., any argument that results from replacing the letters P, M and S with concrete terms, is valid.

Logic is not content with piecemeal observations like this, however. A logical theory properly speaking aims to be systematic and complete. Its ambition is to give a rigorous account of valid argument that applies to all arguments, or at any rate to large, rigorously specified classes of them. Formalization serves this end by making possible precise characterizations of arguments and their components, which in turn makes it possible to back up claims about whole classes of arguments with proof.

But before we look in more detail at ancient formal logic, and the use philosophers made of it when they turned their attention to rhetoric, we should place their logical inquiries in context. Formal logic did not spring fully formed from Aristotle’s brow, and interest in valid argument long preceded the appearance of logical theories.

The division of the logical part of philosophy into rhetoric and dialectic furnishes an important clue. When we speak of Stoic logic we usually mean the discipline that the Stoics called ‘dialectic’. They defined dialectic in several ways. According to one, probably earlier, definition, dialectic is the science of correct discussion in arguments by question and answer (Diog. Laert. 7.42). According to another, probably later, definition, it is the science of what is true, false and neither (Diog. Laert. 7.42, 62). The second definition points toward logic, for dialectic’s interest in truth is not like a special science’s interest in the truths that belong to its subject matter. Rather it is interested in what it is for a proposition to be true and how truth is preserved in valid argument.

The first definition seems to have a different kind of discipline in view, however, namely an art or method corresponding to a particular practice of argument. The

practice is familiar to Aristotle and Plato, who depicts Socrates as a master of it. It has two participants, an answerer and a questioner. An episode begins when the former undertakes to defend a thesis, say 'all pleasures are good'. The task of the questioner is to put questions requiring a yes or no answer to the answerer from the latter's answers to which he attempts to construct an argument to the contradictory of the thesis. The task of the answerer is to defend the thesis, not by any means, but so as to ensure that, if he is refuted, it is owing to the weakness of the thesis and not his own (Arist. *Topics* 8.4, 159a20–24).

Though the evidence has to be used with caution, Plato's dialogues present Socrates not as the inventor of dialectic, but as an especially accomplished practitioner of an already extant practice. Thus in the *Protagoras*, which though written in the fourth century some years after Socrates' death has a dramatic date some time in the previous century when Socrates was still a relatively young man, the contrast between dialectical and rhetorical *logoi* is familiar to all the dialogue's characters. Dialectic is said to be Socrates' forte while Protagoras is supposed to be equally at home in both forms of *logos* (328e–329b, 334c–336d).

As the art or method of this argumentative practice, the discipline of dialectic should unite the elements essential to success in it. Issues having to do with valid argument will be of interest to dialectic to the extent that they contribute to this end, as they will be to any discipline that makes use of argument. But dialectic will also contain elements that are of little interest outside specifically dialectical discussion. The adversarial dimension of dialectical encounters, for instance, means that the discipline gives tactical advice about how to argue with another that will not be of interest to people constructing arguments on their own and for their own satisfaction (cf. Arist. *Topics* 8.1 155b7–10).

Nonetheless it seems that philosophers first seriously pursued questions about how to construct and evaluate valid arguments in connection with the practice of dialectic and that they came to view the discipline of dialectic as the home of such questions. The two Stoic definitions of dialectic are evidence of a development that saw the study of valid argument displace the original object of dialectic, which was to supply the practice of dialectical argument with a method, as the principal focus of the discipline. This development is an example of what sometimes happens when an inquiry originally undertaken with one end in view is obliged, to that end, to tackle issues of wider significance. Compare geometry, whose name refers to the discipline's original concern with the measurement of land. There is even evidence of a school or circle of philosophers active in the late fourth and early third century who were named Dialecticians because of the intensity with which they pursued logical questions (Diog. Laert. 1.17–19).¹

Aristotle followed a different path. Though he composed a massive manual for the practice of dialectic, later divided by tradition into the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*, and has much to say of broadly logical interest there, Aristotle did not consider his formal logical theory the property of dialectic. Instead, he appears to have called the discipline to which it belongs, *analytic* (*Rhet.* 1.4, 1359b10; cf. *Metaphysics* 4.3 1005b2–5). As the inventor of logic, Aristotle is something of a special case, however. There is broad agreement that the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations* are among Aristotle's earliest treatises, pre-dating the *Prior Analytics*, where his formal logical theory is set out. And there is also reason to believe that the *Topics* were not merely

composed earlier than the *Prior Analytics*, but belong to a phase of Aristotle's thinking about argument that occurred before he conceived the idea and worked out the details of his formal logical theory. If this conclusion is on the right lines, although Aristotle invented logic, in the strict sense of a formal logical theory, his interest in argument and in broadly logical issues did not begin with that invention. Before then he tackled these issues as part of dialectic.

The aim of the *Topics* is to furnish a method of *sylogizing* in dialectic (1.1 100a1–3). So far I have spoken of argument, but Aristotle's attention is focused on the syllogism, which he defines as 'an argument (*logos*) in which, certain things being laid down, something different from them follows of necessity by their being so' (*Topics* 1.1 100a25–27; *Prior Analytics* 1.1 124b18–20). The definition marks off a subset of valid arguments, in the broader sense of 'argument' with which we began, that might be of use to someone actually making an argument in the sense of presenting a case. Thus the clause requiring the conclusion to be different from the premisses excludes arguments, however valid, whose conclusion already figures among their premisses. Such arguments would furnish reasons for accepting a conclusion only to people with whom there is no point in arguing because they already accept the conclusion.

The *Topics* contains some discussion of the different uses to which syllogisms can be put and the kinds of syllogism that answer to these different purposes. It has a good deal to say about the premisses and conclusions of syllogisms, though in a way that is peculiarly adapted to the kind of dialectical arguments which are Aristotle's main focus. The skills and the knowledge that a dialectician must dispose of in order to succeed in such arguments are explained, and the eighth and last book gives advice about how to conduct oneself as a questioner or answerer in an actual dialectical encounter. But much the largest part of the work is devoted to invention, the method by which syllogisms can be discovered. The elements of the method are *topoi*, i.e., roughly speaking, convenient recipes which, applied to the conclusion for which the questioner must argue, yield syllogisms for that conclusion.

At first it is surprising, even disturbing, to find Aristotle appending a method for the invention of sophistical or fallacious argument in the *Sophistical Refutations*. But he holds that the ability to construct valid arguments and evaluate an argument for validity is inseparable from the ability to construct fallacious arguments. One must know how fallacious arguments arise if one is to detect and solve them, that is reveal why an apparently valid syllogism is in fact invalid (*Sophistical Refutations* 24 179b23–24). Hence knowledge of fallacious argument is part of the dialectician's expertise (*Rhet.* 1.1 1355a29–33, *Sophistical Refutations* 9 170a36–38, b8–11, 11 172b5–8, 34 183b1). Indeed Aristotle maintains that dialectic and sophistry have the same power or capacity and differ only in the purpose that that power is made to serve (*Rhet.* 1.1 1355b17–18, *Metaphysics* 4.2 1004b22–25).

The *Rhetoric* makes frequent reference to dialectic and to the *Topics*. It contains two short passages that may be later insertions based on the *Prior Analytics*' reflections about forms of argument that are prominent in rhetoric, though this is controversial (1.2 1357a22–58a2, 2.25 1402b13–1403a16).² Either way, the bulk of what Aristotle has to say about logic and rhetoric and the relevance of logical considerations to rhetorical argument is found in his discussions of the relation between rhetoric and dialectic.

Aristotle insists on the close relation between rhetoric and dialectic and rightly takes this to be the most distinctive feature of his rhetorical theory. His position is a reaction to Plato's very different views (cf. H. Yunis, Chapter 7). Plato frequently contrasts rhetoric with dialectic, usually at the expense of the former. In the *Protagoras*, dialectic's superiority is not logical, i.e., not a matter of superior fidelity to valid argument. Rather, long continuous speeches, which do not give the audience an opportunity to raise questions or the speaker an opportunity to respond, are said to be inferior as a means of pursuing genuine understanding (*Protagoras* 329a–b). Elsewhere, however, it is plain that Plato thinks rhetoric is partial to fallacious argument because, to his way of thinking, it is concerned merely to persuade and is indifferent to truth. His treatment of the probability arguments of Tisias, the supposed founder of technical rhetoric, is a case in point (*Phaedrus* 273b–c; cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 2.24 2402a15–20).³ To be sure, it is possible to argue fallaciously in arguments by question and answer, but this, according to Plato, is eristic, whose participants pursue victory by any means available, not dialectic, which is governed by a regard for truth and is, we may assume, therefore committed to valid argumentation.

The *Gorgias* contains Plato's most sustained examination of rhetoric, which culminates in Socrates' devastating judgement that rhetoric is not an art at all but rather the counterpart of cookery (463a–466a). Two arts, or would-be arts, are counterparts by standing in the same relation to their respective objects, here the soul and the body. Thus justice is the counterpart of medicine because it stands in the same corrective relation to the soul that medicine stands in to the body. Rhetoric is the counterpart of cookery, according to Socrates, because it is a counterfeit of justice in the way cookery is of medicine, aiming at pleasure rather than the good of the soul and relying on mere experience rather than knowledge.⁴

One part of the argument that prepares the way for this conclusion is especially important. Early in the dialogue Gorgias is asked to say what the art of rhetoric is about (449d). His answer is that it is about *logoi*. But this apparently promising idea is not developed as one would expect. Instead Socrates leads Gorgias to agree that each special science or art will be both about the object proper to it and the *logoi* that are themselves about that object, leaving nothing for rhetoric to be the art of in its own right (449e–450b). The suggestion that rhetoric be viewed as an art of *logoi*, which is not in competition with the special sciences but might even complement the substantive knowledge they command, also makes an appearance in the *Phaedrus*, where it does not fare any better (260d). There Plato defends a philosophical rhetoric, very different from that of the orators and rhetoricians, which would to be sure make its masters supremely persuasive in speech, but only on the basis of a deep understanding both of the matters about which they speak persuasively and of the souls of the people to whom they address their speeches (cf. H. Yunis, Chapter 7).

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* begins with the bold declaration that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic (1.1 1354a1). Rhetoric and dialectic are counterparts by standing in the same relation, that of supplying an art or method to different practices of argument.⁵ According to Aristotle, then, rhetoric is an art of *logoi*. That there can be such an art is shown by the existence of dialectic. And certain of the charges brought against rhetoric, for example that it lacks a subject matter of its own and that it furnishes its practitioners with the ability to argue on one side of a question

just as much as the other, can be leveled with equal justice against dialectic. They can count against one discipline no more and no less than against the other (*Rhet.* 1.1 1355a29–35).

But if Aristotle's conception of rhetoric is, at a certain level, the same as that attributed to Gorgias by Plato, the form this idea takes for Aristotle is very different from what Gorgias and like-minded rhetoricians likely had in mind. By making rhetoric the counterpart of dialectic, Aristotle means to emphasize that it ought to be concerned, above all, with argument, or rather with *enthymemes*, for that is what he calls rhetorical syllogisms (*Rhet.* 1.1 1354a14–15, 1355a6–8, 1.2 1355b3–5, 17, 2.22 1395b22–24). If the *logoi* of which rhetoric is the art are speeches, they ought to be speeches whose most important element is argument. And Aristotle follows his implicit correction of Plato with some strongly worded criticisms of the rhetoricians of his day. To his way of thinking, they neglect enthymemes in favor of appeals to the emotions and discussion of the parts of an oration, which are at best of secondary importance (1.1 1354a13–18, b16–22).

The fact that in Aristotle's early thinking about argument logical issues were the special concern of dialectic explains another feature of rhetoric as he conceives it. Though it is the counterpart of dialectic, rhetoric is not entirely autonomous, but depends on dialectic for its understanding of argument. Aristotle tells us that it is the task of dialectic to study syllogisms in general, without entering into the peculiarities that may attend their use in one sphere or another, and adds that the orator who combines a grasp of the syllogism with an understanding of the effects on syllogisms of rhetorical subject matters and conditions will be best able to produce enthymemes (1.1 1355a8–14; cf. 2.22 1395b22–26).

Thus Aristotle characterizes rhetoric not only as a counterpart of dialectic, but also as an offshoot of it and, since it also makes use of appeals to the emotions and the presentation of the speaker's character (*ēthos*), of ethics or politics as well (*Rhet.* 1.2 1356a20–33; cf. 1.4 1359b9–12).⁶ The *Rhetoric* contains many traces of the discipline's dependence on the discipline of dialectic as it is expounded in the *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*. The *enthymēmē* is defined with reference to the syllogism and argument by example with reference to induction, an auxiliary method of proof, for discussion of both of which we are referred to the *Topics* (*Rhet.* 1.2 1356c35–b9). Like the *Topics*, the *Rhetoric* expounds a method of invention whose elements are *topoi* (2.23). And, on the model of the *Sophistical Refutations*, the *Rhetoric* expounds *topoi* of the merely apparent or fallacious *enthymēmē*, most likely with the same end in view, viz., to prepare the orator to confront his opponent's fallacious arguments (2.24).

But what are the effects on syllogisms of rhetorical subjects and occasions and how do enthymemes differ from the syllogisms used by dialectic? The most obvious effect is the advisability in rhetorical contexts of omitting premisses with which the audience can be assumed to be familiar (1.2 1357a16–22, 2.22, 1395b24–25). Later tradition made the omission of premisses the defining feature of the *enthymēmē*, but Aristotle seems to have viewed it instead as a fact about the way enthymemes are typically presented. Harder but more important is the question whether Aristotle relaxed the standard applying to syllogisms so that arguments whose conclusions are not necessitated by their premisses, and which are therefore not syllogisms, may nevertheless qualify as enthymemes.⁷ It is undeniable that Aristotle analyzes several forms of

rhetorical argument that are invalid. The question is whether he does so because he views them as forms of sharp practice that require study since they are, perhaps regrettably, part of rhetorical practice or because he views them as legitimate means of persuasion.

On the latter view, departures from the strict syllogistic requirements prevailing in dialectic are required because the kind of matters with which rhetoric has to deal, for example whether the accused is guilty or innocent or which courses of action are most likely to be to a city's advantage, frequently do not lend themselves to resolution by conclusive argument. In this way, they are like the matters that fall under practical reasoning (*Rhet.* 1.2 1357a1–7, 13–15). As Aristotle famously remarks in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, it is as much of a mistake to demand scientific proofs from an orator as it is to accept merely plausible arguments from a mathematician (1.3 1094b23–27). To this way of thinking, orators who knowingly use arguments in the invalid forms are not necessarily trying to trick their auditors into taking invalid for valid arguments. Typically they are advancing considerations that, though not conclusive, nevertheless make the conclusion a reasonable thing to believe in the absence of any more compelling evidence.

These forms of argument are tackled together with valid forms both in the section of the *Prior Analytics* dedicated to arguments that are prominent in rhetoric as well as in the two passages in the *Rhetoric* that may be later additions inspired by the *Prior Analytics* (2.27; cf. 2.23 68b8–14, *Rhet.* 1.2 1357a22–58a2, 2.25 1402b13–1403a16). They can be discussed without the benefit of Aristotle's formal logic, which is used in the *Prior Analytics*' analysis of them but not in the *Rhetoric*'s. Nonetheless since that analysis affords the best opportunity to see how Aristotle applied formal logic to rhetorical argument, this is a good time to look in a little more detail at his formal theory.

Aristotle recognizes four forms of proposition corresponding to four relations of predication, represented in later tradition (though not by Aristotle) with lower case vowels: belongs to all = a, belongs to none = e, belongs to some = i, and does not belong to some = o. Let us call propositions in which a term is predicated of another in one of these four ways a categorical proposition. Thus the argument form we considered above and illustrated with a sample geometrical argument is represented as follows:

PaM MaS
PaS

In the now traditional terminology, this is the first *mood* of the syllogism. We know it by the name 'Barbara', the mnemonic given to it by the medievals (note the vowels a a a). Arguments of this form contain three terms, two of which, P and S, occur in the premisses and conclusion and one of which, M, occurs only in the premisses. Ignoring certain complications, we can say that the predicate of the conclusion is the major term, the subject of the conclusion the minor term, and the term occurring in the premisses but not the conclusion the middle term. Arguments from pairs of categorical premisses in which the major term is predicated of the middle and the middle of the minor belong to the first figure. Barbara is the first of four moods in the first figure.

But Aristotle also recognizes two other figures. In the second the middle term is predicated of both major and minor terms in the premises, for example *Cesare*:

MeP MaS
PeS

In the third figure both the major and the minor terms are predicated of the middle term, for example *Darapti*:

PaM SaM
PiS

Enthymemes, Aristotle says, are from likelihoods and signs (*Rhet.* 1.2 1357a32–33, *Prior Analytics* 2.27 70a9–11). Likelihoods (*eikota*) are generalizations that admit of exceptions and that are familiar to the audience, e.g., ‘young people are quick tempered’. Enthymemes of this kind work by bringing a particular under the generalization, e.g., Paul is a young person, therefore he is (likely to be) quick tempered. Aristotle notes that it is always possible to object to an argument from likelihood that, though most instances the subject term of the generalization also fall under the predicate, this does not show that the instance in contention must fall under it. He insists, however, that this is an apparent not a real objection, as it shows only that the conclusion is not necessary (i.e., does have to obtain if the premises are true), not that it is not likely (*Rhet.* 2.25 1402b21–32). Because of the nature of the matters with which it deals, rhetoric must rely to a great extent on arguments that only make their conclusions likely (1402b32; cf. 1.2 1357a22–27).

Sign arguments come in three forms, one in each of the figures. Aristotle gives the following as an example of the first figure sign argument:

Premise₁ All those who have fever are unwell.
Premise₂ This man has fever.
Conclusion Therefore he is unwell.

Here *having fever* is the middle term, which is predicated of the minor term, this man, and is the subject of the major term, being unwell. The following is an example of the second figure sign argument:

Premise₁ All those who have fever breathe roughly.
Premise₂ This man breathes roughly.
Conclusion Therefore he has fever.

In this argument *breathing roughly* is the middle term predicated of both major and minor terms in the premisses. An example of the third figure sign argument is:

Premise₁ Pittacus is wise.
Premise₂ Pittacus is good.
Conclusion Therefore the wise are good.

Pittacus, the middle term, is subject to both the major and minor terms in the premisses.

A glance should suffice to show that only the first figure argument is valid, and Aristotle bestows the term *tekmerion* on the sign arguments in this figure to mark them off from the others (*Rhet.* 1.2, 1357b8–17, *Prior Analytics* 2. 27, 70b1–3). Nonetheless he maintains that signs are such as to be necessary (i.e., valid) or reputable (*Prior Analytics* 2.27 70a7, b4–5). This lends support to the thesis that Aristotle accepted invalid sign arguments as legitimate means of persuasion, capable of furnishing considerations that, though inconclusive, may nevertheless serve to make a conclusion a reasonable thing to believe. If Aristotle accepted invalid sign arguments as genuine enthymemes, it was presumably for the same reason that he gave to explain rhetoric's reliance on argument from likelihood, viz., the need to make the best use of the limited evidence that is typically available. If the passages in the *Rhetoric* which discuss these forms of argument are later insertions based on the corresponding discussion in the *Prior Analytics*, the idea that Aristotle's attempt to work out a rigorous formal theory of valid argument helped him appreciate the value of invalid but reputable argument becomes attractive.⁸

Not all the evidence supports the view that Aristotle had such a receptive attitude toward invalid sign arguments, however. Elsewhere in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle treats invalid sign arguments as examples of the merely apparent or fallacious *enthymēmē* (2.22 1401b9–14). To be sure, this is in the chapter on *topoi* of the apparent *enthymēmē*, and there is no question that invalid signs can be used to deceptive ends. The persuasive effect a valid argument should have is completely insensitive to context. If the premisses are true, the conclusion must be as well, and any rational being who accepts the premisses must also accept the conclusion. The same is not true of arguments from likelihood or signs. An argument that represents the best case that can be made in conditions of limited information and that deserves acceptance for that reason may, when more information becomes available, furnish an exceptionally poor reason for accepting the conclusion. Suppose, for example, it is discovered that Paul, the young person in the sample argument from likelihood above, has a balance of humors that makes people even tempered, then the argument based on his youth, which gave us a good reason so far as it went to think he was quick tempered, will be of little value. Someone who suppresses this information and makes the first argument anyway will be guilty of sharp practice, even though he is using an argument that in other hands or on other occasions deserved to win assent.⁹

Before leaving Aristotle's logic, it remains to explore its strengths and limitations in a little more detail. Aristotle takes the moods of the first figure as self-evidently valid or perfect and rigorously proves that the moods of the second and third figures must be valid if the moods of the first figure are. This he calls reducing the latter to the former or perfecting the latter through the former. Formalization makes this kind of proof possible, and it is chiefly because of proofs like these that modern logicians recognize Aristotle as one of their own. Contemporary logicians have in particular been moved to admiration by the fact that Aristotle sketches a proof of completeness in the modern technical sense for his theory. Roughly speaking, a logical theory is complete in this sense if every valid formula in the domain of the theory is provably valid with the resources of the theory.

Aristotle deserves all the admiration he has received for these feats, but it is important to realize that the claim of completeness that he made for his system is still more ambitious than this. It is that every syllogism can be reduced to a mood of the figures or consists of parts that can be so reduced. Such is the influence of Aristotle's pioneering efforts in logic that modern languages tend to use the term 'syllogism' to mean something like categorical argument of the kind Aristotle studies in the *Prior Analytics*. But Aristotle's definition, which very likely predates his formal logical theory, makes no reference to that theory. If we call syllogisms that belong, or consist of parts that belong, to the moods of the three figures *categorical* syllogisms, Aristotle is claiming that every syllogism, in the broad sense of the definition, is a categorical syllogism. The *Prior Analytics* takes its name from the operation of analysis by which arguments in ordinary language are brought into canonical categorical form by rearranging premisses, supplying implicit but unstated premisses and eliminating superfluous matter (1.32 46b38–47a2). Aristotle holds that every syllogism in the broad sense can be shown by analysis to be a categorical syllogism. This is an astonishingly bold and ambitious claim.

So understood, Aristotle's claim is not true, or is true only granted substantial and highly contentious assumptions. Present-day students of logic are likely to be introduced to the idea of formal validity with arguments of the following forms rather than a syllogism in *Barbara* (note that the upper case letters now stand for propositions and not, as above, terms):

If P, then Q; but P; therefore Q. (*modus ponens*)

If P, then Q; but not Q; therefore not P. (*modus tollens*)

As long as we ensure that P and Q are distinct propositions, arguments of these forms would seem to be syllogisms according to Aristotle's definition. But they are not categorical syllogisms and cannot as a rule be reduced to them.

Aristotle did not simply overlook arguments of this kind, however. Recall that he takes propositions to be categorical propositions, i.e., simple subject-predicate propositions of a, e, i or o form. Arguments of the two forms given above crucially depend on a propositionally complex proposition, i.e., a proposition which contains other propositions as parts joined by a propositional connective. Here it is a conditional, i.e., a proposition in which the antecedent (P) is joined to the consequent (Q) by the connective 'if ... then'. Aristotle several times discusses types of arguments that seem like these, namely so-called syllogisms on the basis of a hypothesis.¹⁰ His remarks about them are brief, and his promise of a fuller discussion is unfulfilled (*Prior Analytics*, 1.23 41a37–b5, 29 45b15–20, 44 50a16–b4). It is plain, however, that he did not regard so-called syllogisms on the basis of a hypothesis as forming a coequal genus on a level with the categorical syllogism. This is because he seems not to have considered conditional propositions, i.e., propositions of the form 'if P, then Q', as proper propositions, but to have viewed them instead as *ad hoc* agreements to accept a proof of P in lieu of a proof of Q. On this view, categorical syllogisms remain primary and real proofs must be accomplished by means of them.

The way this idea was developed and defended by Aristotle and his successors in opposition to the views of the Stoics forms an important chapter in the history of

logic. For our purposes what matters is that Aristotelian logic, for all its path-breaking brilliance, was not adequate to the task Aristotle set for it. Many types of valid argument routinely employed by orators, dialecticians, mathematicians and others cannot be analyzed as categorical syllogisms, most obviously those whose validity depends on the relations between the propositions in propositionally complex propositions. Many if not most of the arguments formed by following the instructions contained in the *topoi* of the *Topics* and the *Rhetoric* are of this kind.

There was considerable interest in rhetoric in the Academy, Plato's school, during its skeptical phase, which extended from the first part of the third century until the school's dissolution in the first century.¹¹ Philo of Larissa, head of the school from c. 110 to c. 79, taught rhetoric. And Cicero, who was both an orator and follower of the Academy, regarded dialectical argument on both sides of the question as practiced in the Academy as ideal preparation for oratory (*Tusculan Disputations* 2.9). But to judge by the evidence available to us, the Academics did not do original work in logic or develop a distinctive position about logic and rhetoric. The other main Hellenistic school, the Epicureans, dismissed logic as a waste of time and seem to have been hostile towards rhetoric as well, though Philodemus (first century) defended the view that so-called sophistic rhetoric, which is responsible for epideictic or display speeches, is an art and was recognized as one by Epicurus and his original followers. Apart from Aristotle, it was the Stoics, the other great logicians of antiquity, who brought logic to bear on rhetoric.

As we have seen, studies corresponding to logic were only a part of Stoic dialectic, which was eventually divided into a part about voice or things that signify and a part about things that are signified (Diog. Laert. 7.43, 7.62). The first embraces topics that we are likely to assign to grammar, e.g., phonology and the parts of speech and others that might seem more at home in rhetoric such as the virtues of speech, good usage, clarity, concision and so on as well as style (Diog. Laert. 7.55–62). Things signified are *lekta* or sayables. The most important species of sayable is the proposition. Propositions are not the same thing as the spoken (or written) sentences by which they are expressed nor should the uttering of the latter be confused with the saying of the former (Diog. Laert. 7.57). One can say the same thing by uttering different sentences in the same language or in different languages. Arguments, like the propositions of which they are composed, fall under the head of things signified. Despite the surprising range of topics dialectic covers, argument remained its principal focus. An understanding of argument and argumentation presupposes knowledge of the many subjects encompassed by dialectic, many of which are, to be sure, also highly relevant to non-argumentative forms of discourse as well.

While Aristotelian logic is a logic of terms, Stoic logic is a logic of propositions. All the forms of valid argument in the Stoics' logical system depend crucially on propositionally complex propositions. We have already touched on two these, *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*. Thus Stoic dialectic attends not only to simple propositions, which do not contain other propositions as proper parts, but also to non-simple or complex propositions and the propositional connectives by means of which they are formed out of other propositions. In addition to 'if ... then', they recognize conjunction ('and') and a form of disjunction (exclusive and exhaustive 'or'). (The Stoics do not treat negation in the way modern logic does as forming a complex proposition when applied to a simple proposition.)

Like Aristotle, the Stoics' motive for logical inquiry was an interest in real practices of argument and proof. Unlike Aristotle, however, they did not begin by restricting the inquiry to arguments of the kind that could serve the purposes of someone engaged in these practices, i.e., to syllogisms as defined by Aristotle's definition. Instead they make valid arguments quite generally their point of departure. The Stoics' use of the term 'syllogism' is different from Aristotle's. According to them, a syllogism is, in effect, an argument that is formally valid according to the rules of their system. This of course raises difficult questions about why the Stoics constructed their system so as to capture these arguments and how they viewed valid arguments that, though valid, are not syllogistic in their sense of 'syllogistic', e.g., the categorical syllogisms of Aristotelian logic.¹²

The system identifies a small number of argument-forms, the arguments belonging to which qualify as indemonstrables, i.e., are evidently valid without proof. In the classical Chrysippean version of Stoic logic there are five, with the first two of which we have already met:¹³

1. If P, then Q; but P; therefore Q.
2. If P, then Q; but not Q; therefore not P.
3. Not both P and Q; but P; therefore not Q.
4. P or Q; but P; therefore not Q.
5. P or Q; but not Q; therefore P.

The Stoics define a syllogism as a valid argument that is either indemonstrable itself or such that it can be reduced to indemonstrables by certain rules or *themata* (Diog. Laert. 7.78). And like Aristotle, they used the term 'analysis' of the operations that reveal the syllogistic character of an argument (Diog. Laert. 7.195).

Again like Aristotle, the Stoics put rhetoric and dialectic side by side. Each is a discipline oriented toward a different kind of *logos*. According to them, rhetoric is the science of speaking well in continuous discourses and dialectic, as we have seen, that of correct discussion in arguments by question and answer (Diog. Laert. 7.42). Zeno of Citium, the school's founder, is credited with a famous remark about the differences between the two (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 2.6–7). Closing and then opening his fist, he compared dialectic to the closed fist, rhetoric to the open hand. Plainly this gesture was meant to contrast the open and extended character of rhetorical speeches with the compactness of dialectic's questions and answers. But it also seems to mean that rhetoric's task is to present in continuous form the same things that are presented in question and answer form in dialectic, namely arguments. Since logical reflections about argument were the special concern of the discipline of dialectic, both when it stood in a special relation to the practice of dialectical argument and after that relation began to weaken, rhetoric depended on dialectic for its understanding of argument.

The emphasis on the central importance of argument in rhetoric is likely to have been even more pronounced among the Stoics than in Aristotle. They could not make a place for appeals to the emotions as he did. Behind their exceptionally austere vision of rhetoric was a set of distinctive philosophical theses that set them apart from Plato, Aristotle and others (cf. D Konstan, Chapter 27). In the tradition of Socrates, as they interpreted him, the Stoics took happiness to depend solely on virtue, and

they held that virtue is wisdom, a purely intellectual condition. In opposition to the Platonic–Aristotelian tradition, they did not accept that the soul comprised emotional and desiderative parts as well as reason. Emotions are not in their view, as they were for Plato and Aristotle, a permanent part of human nature that can take good as well as bad forms. Rather, the Stoics held that states of the soul are states of reason, i.e., judgements. Emotions are false judgements that can and should be eliminated by the correct exercise of reason. The Stoics were also distinguished by their tendency to set standards as high as possible. To be wise, according to them, is to be completely immune to error. As a result, a wise person is as rare as the phoenix. Even so, it is impossible, they maintained, to discharge the duties of, for example, a ruler without being wise, so that only a wise human being can be a true ruler. And they hold that the same is true of the orator.

The few reports, mostly in Cicero, that have reached us about Stoic oratory and the orators who tried to practice in the Stoic manner should be read in the light of these distinctive attitudes. Cicero's most famous remark was that, though the Stoics Cleanthes and Chrysippus wrote arts of rhetoric, they did so in such a way that their books would make ideal reading for someone set above all on falling silent (*De finibus* 4.7). This may be an allusion to the astonishingly high standards the Stoics set for the true orator: one would be prevented from speaking by the realization that one could not possibly meet them. But presumably Cicero also meant that the Stoics' single-minded commitment to unadorned argument in accordance with the most rigorous strictures of dialectic led them to dispense with so many of the techniques essential to the orator's persuasive task that they were effectively left with nothing to say that answered for rhetorical purposes. Cicero's complaint against the Stoics is that they failed to do justice to the features of rhetorical speech that set it apart from dialectic.¹⁴ Cicero mentions a number of orators who strove to apply Stoic rhetorical teaching, all of whom he found wanting except Cato, who, however, learned his rhetoric from the rhetoricians and not exclusively from his Stoic masters (*Brutus* 118).

Our ability to evaluate these reports is hindered by the paucity of our sources. Nonetheless the Stoics may not have been quite as unbending as Cicero suggests. We know that they made at least some place for conventional rhetoric's concern with delivery, order, style and the parts of an oration (Diog. Laert. 7.42; [Plut.] *Moralia* 1047a–b). And it can be doubted whether they insisted that orators formulate their arguments in the maximally explicit style prescribed by dialectic. In any event, their stress on rigor in argument will not have prevented them from acknowledging that issues tackled by rhetoric often resist resolution by conclusive arguments. They own that even the wise must make decisions under uncertainty and on the basis of imperfect evidence by forming expectations that are reasonable (*eulogon*) and selecting the courses of action that are reasonable in the light of those expectations (Cic *Academica Priora* 100). Although we have very little information about how Stoics handled arguments for reasonable conclusions based on imperfect evidence, they will very likely have played a prominent part in Stoic rhetoric as similar arguments did in Aristotle's.

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Notes

- 1 That is 'Dialectical' was the proper name of the school or group, not just the designation of a specialization or expertise, in which sense the term was applied to members of other schools, especially the Stoa, who were expert in dialectic; cf. D. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy', *PCPS* 23 (1977), pp. 74–120 at pp. 74–78, and G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* 4 (Naples: 1990), pp. 43–50.
- 2 For a recent statement of the view that the passages in question were later insertions, see M.F. Burnyeat, 'Enthymeme: Aristotle on the Logic of Persuasion', in D.J. Furley and A. Nehamas (eds.), *Aristotle's Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays* (Princeton: 1994), pp. 3–55 at p. 31. The view is opposed by J. Barnes, 'Proof and the Syllogism', in E. Berti (ed.), *Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics* (Padua: 1981), pp. 17–59 at p. 52 and C. Rapp, *Aristoteles: Rhetorik* 2 (Berlin: 2002), pp. 202–204.
- 3 On Tisias and Corax, see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3.
- 4 On debates about the technicity of rhetoric, see T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24.

- 5 On this point, see J. Brunschwig, 'Aristotle's Rhetoric as a "Counterpart" to Dialectic', in A.O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1996), pp. 34–55.
- 6 See W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9.
- 7 On 'relaxed' arguments see Burnyeat, 'Enthymeme', pp. 15–19, whose term this is. For the view that Aristotle does not accept invalid arguments as legitimate enthymemes, see J. Sprüte, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen: 1982), pp. 88–90.
- 8 On this idea, see Burnyeat, 'Enthymeme', pp. 38–39.
- 9 It is not clear that these considerations are enough to resolve the tension between Aristotle's different pronouncements about signs, and a more complicated solution may be necessary: see J. Allen, *Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence* (Oxford: 2001), pp. 40–72.
- 10 Cf. G. Striker, 'Aristoteles über Syllogismen "aufgrund einer Hypothese"', *Hermes* 107 (1979), pp. 33–50.
- 11 Cf. C. Brittain, *Philo of Larissa: The Last of the Academic Sceptics* (Oxford: 2001), pp. 312–342.
- 12 Cf. M. Frede, 'Stoic vs. Aristotelian Syllogistic', in his *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: 1987), pp. 99–124.
- 13 Note that the truth conditions of the Chrysippean conditional are different from those of so-called material or Philonian implication. According to the latter, a conditional is true for every assignment of truth values to the antecedent (P) and consequent (Q) except that which assigns the antecedent the value true and the consequent the value false. According to Chrysippus, all and only conditionals in which the contradictory of the consequent is in conflict with the antecedent are true.
- 14 Cf. C. Atherton, 'Hand over Fist: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric', *CQ*² 38 (1988), pp. 392–427.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

Rhetoric and Knowledge

Tobias Reinhardt

Knowledge is central to the way in which rhetoric as a discipline, whether formal in some sense or not, is conceived of. In what way do any views one might hold as to how human beings generally develop a grasp of the world around them inform rhetorical practice as well as the theory underpinning it? In what way does being skilled at speaking and at influencing an audience amount to knowledge? What it is that one has to know in order to perform these tasks and how exactly does knowing whatever one needs to know translate into performing the complex task of an orator? Further, if rhetoric is seen not just as a neutral skill but as a moral enterprise in some sense, for instance, in such a way that its effects are meant to conform with certain ethical standards (or promote their implementation), the question arises in what way the knowledge which is rhetorical skill can at all have such a moral connotation: does the orator have to know particular things? Is he thought to have a certain moral make-up which he has independently of his rhetorical performance, but which serves as a prerequisite for it? These are some of the questions I hope to address in the present chapter.

Reflection on the nature of rhetoric was conducted in certain terms, and these terms have a history prior to being used in connection with public discourse aimed at persuasion. An important point of debate from Plato onwards was the question whether rhetoric was an 'art', 'expertise' or 'craft' (*technē*) in some technical sense to be clarified below, and the way in which Plato uses the term suggests a complex earlier history of it. The word *technē* occurs a number of times in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, as do word formations derived from it. From the same Indo-European root the Greek word for 'carpenter', *tektōn*, is derived. In Homer *technē* is more generally the skill of the craftsman, in that it can be used to denote the skill of the carpenter as well as that of the blacksmith (for instance *Odyssey* 3.433). In carpentry one might already see an occupation with rational features rather than a mere practical knack in the way in which an intended outcome and steps to achieve it must be preconceived. However, in Homer *technē* is not used with reference to a range of skills with which it

is later associated like medicine or prophecy, presumably because these are not *practical* skills. It is also important that *technē* is seen as skill manifesting itself in certain actions of the craftsman and hence almost as a disposition of his; in *Iliad* 3.61 Paris likens the heart of Hector to the axe of a carpenter who cuts a beam to be used in a ship out of a tree ‘with *technē*’. And while a *technē* is something beneficial in Homer, some of the derivations have a less unequivocally positive force; thus the net which Hephaestus has created to catch his wife Aphrodite while she is committing adultery with Ares is called ‘cunning’, *technēeis* (*Odyssey* 8.297), and later the famous first stasimon of Sophocles’ *Antigone* (367) would observe that man can use his *technē* to good and bad purposes.

After Homer, the meaning of *technē* develops further: the connection with practical occupations is weakened, and the word acquires a connotation of inventiveness: *technē* is seen as a quintessentially human province and a measure of human ability to survive without divine support in a hostile environment. A term with which *technē* competes is *tychē*, ‘chance’ (Euripides, *Alcestis* 785–786), seen as a factor influencing human life both on the level of the community and of the individual; *technē* is methodical and rational (a pervasive theme, for instance, in the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes*), and it is instrumental to self-assertion. *Technē* in this sense is amenable to being conveyed through teaching in that its procedures can be objectified to the point where they can be communicated. Moreover, since *technē* is instrumental to the self-assertion of human beings as organised in functioning communities, there is a rapprochement between *technē* and virtue (*aretē*); behaviour in accordance with *technē* becomes moral in virtue of its being directed at and beneficial to the community. Virtue thus conceived begins to compete with virtue in a slightly different sense, viz., as the best possible constitution of a thing by nature, which in the case of human beings amounts to personal excellence, which is only secondarily a moral quality.

Another important background is the tradition of philosophical didactic poetry that is represented by Empedocles and Parmenides but goes back to Hesiod. Didactic poetry can be seen as inherently ‘rhetorical’ in that it means to communicate a certain body of knowledge to an audience, a process which is akin to persuasion in obvious ways, as was already acknowledged in antiquity (Aristotle called Empedocles the first writer who was working towards a rhetorical *technē*: 31A19 D-K).¹ Parmenides wrote a hexametric poem *On Nature*, which marks an important step in the debate about the nature of rhetoric in that it introduces a set of notions that informed the way in which people thought about argumentation. Thus he establishes an antithesis between truth and reality (both concepts are merged into one in the word *alētheia*) on the one hand and the ‘opinion (*doxa*) of mortals’ on the other (28B8 D-K, lines 50–52); Parmenides claimed that he would promote the way of truth and reject *doxa*. The way of truth, we are told, is accessible to reason only, while the opinion of mortals derives from the senses (28B7 D-K). Moreover, Parmenides claims that the way of truth offers or leads to conviction, *pistis* (28B1 D-K), a word that in later technical terminology was to acquire the sense of ‘proof’, and he holds that the way of truth inherently carries more conviction than the way of *doxa*. Given that the way of truth is meant to assert being and reject non-being, which means *inter alia* that all correct thoughts and valid statements have to relate to something ‘that is’, for ‘that something is thought is the same thing as that it is’ (28B3 D-K), we thus arrive at the notion that the way of truth carries conviction in virtue of its reference to being and

that the way of truth is therefore *intrinsically* more plausible than the opinions of mortals. The content of Parmenides' didactic poem was important for the debate about rhetoric in two ways: influential sophists of the second half of the fifth century can plausibly be seen as responding to and disagreeing with Parmenides, while important aspects of Plato's thinking about rhetoric can be traced back to Parmenides.

We proceed to Protagoras and Gorgias, two celebrated sophists of the middle and the second half of the fifth century, men of an elevated social standing, on occasion entrusted with diplomatic missions on behalf of their cities. They offered instruction against money; the 'subjects' that they taught were 'virtue' in the case of Protagoras (a position discussed at length in Plato's *Protagoras*), and 'prowess in speaking' in the case of Gorgias (Pl. *Meno* 95c). The later tradition and certainly parts of modern scholarship describe them either as rhetoricians or as philosophers, but this needs to be qualified, in that what we might call their philosophical teaching is dialectical in nature rather, and their teaching of effective public speaking lacks some crucial features of rhetorical instruction as it was later conceived of (see below). Protagoras' relevance for our purposes largely derives from his most famous tenet, the so-called *homo-mensura*-thesis. The evidence for this thesis comes almost exclusively from Plato's *Theaetetus* and is problematic since in that dialogue Plato pursues concerns of his own and is thus less interested in giving us a historically accurate account of Protagoras' views. The main quotation, if that is what it is, comes in the context of a discussion of the question whether perception is knowledge, itself a very Platonic question, since Plato was the first to distinguish between perception and belief;² it runs 'man is the measure of all things: of the things which are, that they are, and of the things which are not, that they are not' (152a). Plato initially takes this as a claim about perception, but it is more likely that Protagoras would have wanted to make man the measure of beliefs and appearances (cf. Arist. *Metaphysics* 3.5 1009a6–8), and indeed when Socrates goes on to refute Protagoras, he takes him to make statements about beliefs, reformulating the thesis to 'a thing is for each man what it seems to him to be' (162c8–d1), shifting from a verb meaning 'to perceive' (*aisthanesthai*) to one which is normally used of holding beliefs (*dokein*). It has plausibly been argued that in the *homo-mensura*-thesis Protagoras meant to critically engage with Parmenides, trying to assert that truth is in fact relative to the believer, and that it coincides with mortal beliefs, not with the Parmenidean way of truth. It would thus appear that Protagoras was able to meet one of the main challenges to mortal beliefs which Parmenides had constructed, the idea that mortal beliefs contradict each other: if truth is relative to the believer, this would not be a problem. (However, Protagoras, for all we know, did not so much argue as cite examples to support his position.³) At least two problems arise from Protagoras' relativism. First, Isocrates among others would later on uphold *doxa* as the epistemological foundation of rhetorical argument, and this view of his has been connected with Protagoras. For this to work, it is not good enough to claim that truth is relative to the believer, because rhetoric does not trade in individual beliefs but rather in beliefs that are collectively held, i.e., beliefs of an entire community like a city state or a social class within a city state. In the *Theaetetus*, no clear distinction is drawn between beliefs peculiar to the individual and beliefs peculiar to a particular community, and the impression is given that Protagoras would not have made such a distinction. Second, in the *Theaetetus* the

question is raised whether it would be possible for Protagoras to retain the notion of an expertise, in order to describe or account for his own teaching, given his relativism; for an expertise involves a set of beliefs, and teaching the passing on of beliefs.⁴

Gorgias wrote two different kinds of work, what we might call display speeches (*Helen*, *Palamedes*) as well as a short treatise called *On not being* or *On Nature* and available to us in two different paraphrases. The connections between the two types of work are less than clear; some scholars assign *On not being* and the speeches to different and unconnected phases of Gorgias' work and thought, others – while accepting the same chronology – see an integral relationship. I will side here with the latter, and will cite evidence from the speeches to illuminate the treatise and vice versa. The treatise argues that (i) nothing exists, and if (ii) there was something, it would be unknowable to us, and (iii) if anything is and can be known, it cannot be communicated to others (see the end of this paragraph for elucidation). Like Protagoras' *homo-mensura*-thesis, the *On not being* is plausibly read as a response to Parmenides, whose claims about being, its accessibility by reason, and its being the only possible subject for communication are apparently contradicted by Gorgias. As to Gorgias' conception of persuasive public speaking, if we put off considering the evidence on Gorgias which comes from Plato and his *Gorgias* in particular, the relevant direct evidence consists in metatextual remarks in the *Helen* and the *Palamedes* as well as terms which are recurrent and descriptive of speech, its features and effects in such a way that they almost amount to a set of technical terms. A key concept for Gorgias is *logos*, 'speech': to begin with, Gorgias does not hold that we hear speech which is meaningful in the way in which we would hear a noise, and retrieve or decode its meaning by mental processes. Instead, *logos* corresponds to a separate sense, and there is some indication that Gorgias viewed *logos* as something material (a plausible connection has been made between what Gorgias says about *logos* and the so-called theory of pores by Empedocles, which assumes that perception occurs when particles enter the human body through particular pores). Accordingly, Gorgias uses expressions that suggest that the generation of the *logos* performed by a speaker involves the physical shaping of it. And in this context he can use the term *technē* and related terminology, which suggests that his conception of the speaker as a *technitēs* is rather closer to that of a craftsman than, say, to that of a doctor who implements rational procedures. And even when medicine becomes a metaphor for Gorgias' efforts, the conception of medicine that is being referred to is crucially different from that invoked, for instance, by Socrates in Plato's *Gorgias*: rather, Gorgias presents himself as a doctor-*cum*-magician who administers drugs in the shape of *logoi*. The (for us) elementary and ever-present distinction between content and form of persuasive speech is not one that is made by Gorgias. Rather, *logos* is a unity which is shaped by the speaker and whose impact Gorgias likens to physical force. Moreover, there is a sense in which access to the perceptible world, to facts about it, and to states of affairs in it can in most cases only occur via *logos* in Gorgias' view, and *logos* in turn is not in a simply and predictable way representational of the perceptible world. This is relevant to the way in which Gorgias conceives of belief (*doxa*) on the one hand and truth (*alētheia*) on the other. *Doxa*, as the term is used by Gorgias, is both what we might call the epistemic quality of *logos* and part of the mechanism humans are endowed with for the processing of *logoi* (*Helen* 10). The notion of truth is redescribed by Gorgias: he does not accept the distinction between

a world which is ‘there’ and a *logos* which is ‘about’ this world or items or states of affairs in it, and truth is seen as the internal coherence and consistency of the *logos*.⁵ One possible connection between the speeches and *On not being* is that the speeches may be seen as evidencing an obviously working alternative to Eleatism. There may be no being in the Parmenidean sense, which *logos* would be able to convey, and which humans might be able to conceive of, and yet in the realm of *doxa* meaningful speech and more importantly persuasive processes are evidently possible. Second, in the claim I marked as (iii) above, i.e., ‘if anything is and can be known, it cannot be communicated to others’, Gorgias may actually be relying on his physical conception of *logos*, since he seems to have supported that claim by pointing out that (*On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias* 980a19–b3) ‘if things were knowable, how could one make them clear to another. For how could one utter in *speech* what has been *seen*?’, where the assumption seems to be that different senses have objects peculiar to them and that there is no way of converting data pertaining to one sense into data pertaining to a different sense.

Before we proceed to Isocrates, we must briefly consider developments in the field of medicine, because extant treatises from the second half of the fifth century include a fair amount of methodological discussion which is relevant to rhetoric in that from Gorgias onwards the method or effects of argumentation are frequently compared to or described in terms of the method or effects of medicine (see previous paragraph). The relevant texts all belong with the corpus of writings transmitted under the name of Hippocrates; the most important of them are called *On Ancient Medicine* and *On the Art*.⁶ The treatises offer glimpses of a debate about the nature of medicine that is fierce and at times self-absorbed, so that one has to work hard to locate the battle lines and identify the combatants. Two important things emerge from these texts. First, there was, prior to Plato, a fairly rigorous conception of what a *technē* amounts to and how a field of expertise has to be submitted to analysis so as to form a *technē*, which helps us to understand why the question could arise whether there might be a *technē* of public speaking.⁷ According to this conception, a *technē* has to be beneficial not harmful; it has to have an objective peculiar to it (medicine aims to bring about health, agriculture food or nourishment); it amounts to the knowledge of the *technitēs*, which enables him to devise strategies in a given case how the goal of the art is to be achieved in a given case (strategies which should be reproducible in contingent circumstances and amenable to formulation in words, if in a primitive way); and it is teachable in one way or another, partly a function of the previous feature (although Gorgias would claim that his craft was teachable without accepting that previous feature). Second, the terms in which these treatises conceive of the debate about *technē* are in one important respect different from Plato’s (the issue matters since it represents a qualification of the commonly held view that Socrates relies on a medical conception of *technē* as a yardstick when questioning Gorgias in Plato’s *Gorgias*). When Plato uses the conception of *technē* to have Socrates inquire into the nature of persuasive public speaking or of virtue, he tends to contrast *technē* with *empeiria*, an empirical knack of doing things which may look superficially similar to what the craftsman does but is not informed by any abstract knowledge of the subject matter of the *technē* in question and is unable to objectify and explain success or failure of craft-related activity. This contrast is alien to the medical texts referred to above, because

they see the craft of medicine as grounded in both technical knowledge and experience and rather contrast the art of medicine with *tuchē*, being subject to uncontrollable chance.⁸

For the discussion of Isocrates, I will primarily focus on his early programmatic speech *Against the Sophists* (13), although I will cite supplementary evidence from later speeches too. I shall attempt to characterise Isocrates' theoretical position on the relevance knowledge has for rhetoric, bearing in mind that Isocrates himself was much less prone to devising something like a theoretical position on the nature of rhetoric than, for instance, his critics Plato and Aristotle. It will be clear that Isocrates can on the one hand be seen as an heir to the thought of the celebrated sophists of the fifth century, but that on the other he modifies these views slightly in important ways. This will become important when we come to Plato, for he arguably at times takes issue with an Isocratean version of earlier positions on public speaking. One feature of *Against the Sophists* is that in it positions are largely developed in contrast to competitors in the field of education, whom Isocrates tellingly classifies according to the subject matter they are concerned with, not according to the techniques they use, the rigour manifest in these techniques, or the metaphysical assumptions underpinning them; he refers to them as *eristikoi* (i.e. people who debated general questions, dialecticians), teachers of political *logoi*, and writers of manuals on forensic rhetoric respectively.⁹ It has been observed that what views Isocrates holds in the field of epistemology he formulates in response to positions held by the *eristikoi* and others whom we could anachronistically call philosophers, while his views on the concrete methodology of public speaking are formulated in response to the teachers of rhetoric.¹⁰

Isocrates seems to assume that there is in principle such a thing as facts or states of affairs (*erga* in 13.7). However, the concept of a fact or a state of affairs is not articulated in Isocrates and indeed is not a prominent one in his works. Instead, Isocrates holds any argument one might advance in a public speech will *de facto* not be informed by some kind of knowledge (*epistēmē*), but by opinion only, since more than opinion at least in relation to these *erga* is not to be had. Where Isocrates does use the term *epistēmē*, its objects are what he calls 'political ideas' and what one might describe as recurrent motifs of political debate (13.16–17). These are acquired through 'experience' (*empeiria*, 10), i.e., by following political debate and engaging with it, and they are apparently not amenable to being set out, for instance, in the form of a catalogue of recurrent political opinions. Alternatively, while Isocrates may have considered it possible to set them out like that, he held that there was no way that such a body of political opinions could then be drawn upon in order to methodically generate a speech for a given context, simply because the actual practice of generating such a speech could not be subjected to a system of mutually coherent rules (15.184). Rather he held that experience in actually dealing with these political ideas would suffice, together with an intuitive skill that enabled the speaker to generate a speech out of them that was appropriate to the given situation (*kairos* can mean both the right moment in time and due measure).¹¹ And while prowess in speaking could be acquired through practice, Isocrates also assigned an important role to the natural talents of the speaker that constituted a limiting factor on the progress a would-be speaker could make. His overall approach, which he famously called 'philosophy', is pointedly characterised in *Antidosis* 271 (trans. Norlin):

Since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight.

A point on which Isocrates takes issue with the *eristikoi* is their claim that they can teach young men who undergo instruction from them how they should act and how they can become happy (*eudaimōn*) through this knowledge (13.3). This is later elaborated on: it is specifically the claim that the knowledge the *eristikoi* can impart and which is supposed to have this effect is virtue in general or justice in particular (13.4, 6, 20). Isocrates responds by observing that knowing how one should act would presuppose knowledge of the future, which on his view can never be at the disposal of human beings. Rather, he argues, one cannot hope to advance beyond saying what ought to be said (*ta deonta*) with regard to the present circumstances (*peri tōn parontōn*, 13.8). This, however, does not mean that he has no moral aspirations and sees the ability to speak effectively as a neutral faculty. Isocrates does believe eloquence should promote virtue, but he holds that one cannot advance beyond reasonable opinions about what is just, and cannot hope to be guided by a knowledge of justice so that it could provide a long-term rather than a situational strategy.

Isocrates' position can be brought in sharper focus by asking what kind of questions he did not pose and what kind of theoretical underpinning he might have given to his views but did not.¹² As to the former, it is arguable that Isocrates had no clear grasp of the kind of knowledge the *eristikoi* claimed could be achieved through dialectical practice, which is why his arguments why dialectical argument cannot impart or make progress towards knowledge do not contradict or refute the *eristikoi*. As Cooper explains, dialectic is only supposed to convey knowledge of the principles and standards of ethical appropriate behaviour, not knowledge of how to apply these standards in situations requiring moral action, let alone knowledge of what is going to happen if a certain course of action is taken. Further, Aristotle will later on agree with Isocrates that the propositions which feature in arguments are plausible (*endoxa*) rather than true, but he will distinguish different degrees of repute which these propositions can enjoy, so as to arrive at a band ranging from extremely peculiar views held by very few people to deeply unproblematic opinions held by virtually everyone. It is only the latter, one might think, which could have a claim to being an Isocratean 'political idea', especially given that he observes that there is much more disagreement among those who claim to have wisdom than among those who rely on opinion. Isocrates' view is different in that he sees the political ideas to acquire their plausibility in virtue of being connected with examples that are 'most illustrious and most edifying' (15. 277).¹³

Plato engaged extensively with rhetoric as a cultural and intellectual phenomenon. The two dialogues that investigate rhetoric's relationship with knowledge are the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*, but others, especially the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*, provide useful material as well. In the *Gorgias* an alternative, 'Platonic' conception of rhetoric is developed in the context of an exchange between Socrates and Gorgias, and we shall have to retrace briefly the course of the argument in order to pinpoint in

what way the discussion connects with the views of the historical Gorgias as well as with relevant aspects of the history of argumentation in general. Socrates starts off by asking what the *dynamis* of the *technē* is which Gorgias teaches and what he teaches (447c). Already here the discussion is steered in a certain direction; for while Gorgias uses the term *technē* and can say, for instance, that someone ‘speaks with *technē*’, it does not appear likely that he advertised his teaching as such, not because he would have wanted to avoid incurring a range of unwanted methodological commitments, but because his overall conception of *logos* and of the quasi-magical powers of the speaker was incompatible with aspirations to scientific rigour. Then Socrates introduces a range of *technai* and surveys what they are about, including both arts which end up with a physical or material product, and others like medicine, which is ‘about health’. Here Gorgias’ pupil Polus rises (448c) and states that there are many crafts among men, that they are grounded in experience (*empeiria*), and that lack of *empeiria* amounts to leaving the field to chance (*tychē*); this resonates with the conception of an art in *On Ancient Medicine*, but is markedly different from the position held by Socrates later in the dialogue. That is, while on a superficial reading Gorgias may appear as less than successful in following Socrates’ exploration, one has to bear in mind that an indication is provided that he simply may not share assumptions about *technē*, which Socrates introduces as unproblematic.

Gorgias then accepts Socrates’ suggestion that what he teaches is ‘the art of rhetoric’, but it is striking that the term is not introduced by himself, and if it is true that Plato himself in fact coined the word,¹⁴ then by accepting the term Gorgias may again have allowed his position to be presented in a more hard-and-fast way than it actually was. Socrates then secures agreement that Gorgias can teach persuasive speaking, in itself a claim which Gorgias did make but which acquires not necessarily intended implications through other commitments made earlier. Socrates’ next question is ‘knowledge about which of the things that are’ rhetoric is (449d), a reformulation of the earlier question. Gorgias’ reply is ‘about *logoi*’, and he immediately finds himself struggling to separate rhetoric from other arts since practitioners of other arts like arithmetic or geometry use *logoi* as well. He might have replied that rhetoric is about persuasive *logoi* irrespective of content. We have seen before that this answer was unavailable to the historical Gorgias because of his conception of *logos*; so Plato is not misrepresenting Gorgias on this crucial point, and the contemporary readership may not have shared the perception of modern readers that Gorgias foregoes an opportunity to counter Socrates. Further questioning reveals (452d) that rhetoric is in reality, i.e., as opposed to other arts making the same claim, the greatest good and ‘responsible for the freedom of a man himself, and at the same time for the rule over others in his own city’. To the reader conditioned by Plato’s dialogues it will appear the focus of the discussion has been slightly lost, in that we are given attributes of rhetoric or are being told what it is for; and this vagueness is encapsulated in the famous metaphorical phrase that rhetoric is the ‘craftsman of persuasion’, which Socrates offers as a summary of his position to Gorgias (453a), who gladly accepts it, again not implausibly given what we know about the historical Gorgias’ conception of *logos*. Yet the effect is that Gorgias has been probed and that one can only come so far with him, not because he is an interlocutor of limited ability, but because his overall position imposes limitations.

In a new advance, Socrates asks further what persuasion is and about what rhetoric persuades (453e). Gorgias's answer has two parts; rhetoric, he says, is the craft of persuasion in jury-courts and other public gatherings, and it is about the things that are just and unjust. The first part gives us a context for persuasion that is rhetoric, but does not tell us what it essentially is. So Socrates makes a suggestion (454b): there are two forms of persuasion, one producing conviction without knowing, the other producing knowledge. Gorgias agrees that rhetoric is the former (454e), and again the stance of the historical Gorgias is not misrepresented. Socrates produces a modified version of the earlier 'definition' (455a): rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion that produces conviction but does not teach about the just and the unjust. This result is then found to jar with the fact that orators wield so much power in political debate (455a). Gorgias is moved to a speech in which he means to explain the supremacy of rhetoric over other arts, but what he in fact does is make the factual observation that the orator will outperform the expert in public debate on issues in the expert's field, and stipulate that rhetoric is to be used for beneficial purposes only (while allowing for the possibility that it can be used for bad purposes). Socrates finds this self-contradictory (457c, 461a), and since it is not obvious why this should be so, an explanation is provided. For him, being able to talk about just and unjust things competently means knowing what is just and what is not, a most important assumption which Gorgias proclaims to accept (460a) without a clear understanding of what Socrates means; and knowing what is just is for him incompatible with acting in an unjust fashion. The background assumption, as he makes clear through a comparison with medicine, is that craft is in important respects like virtue, and just as knowing the precepts of medicine is incompatible with acting in a way that falls short of the standards of good medical practice, so knowing just things is for him incompatible with acting unjustly. Gorgias' self-contradiction, on this construal, lies in allowing for the possibility that someone who has the art of rhetoric at his disposal, which it had been established was concerned with just and unjust things, might be able to act unjustly.

Socrates is here now clearly relying on assumptions that Gorgias could not share, but the literary character Gorgias is not granted a response, since his pupil Polus is made to interrupt. Socrates is asked to set out how he sees rhetoric, and he obliges. He argues that there is such a thing as justice as well as a counterfeit of it, which corresponds to how conventional rhetoric is taught and practised in his day. The latter is a mere empirical knack, which cannot be objectified and whose procedures cannot be discursively communicated, 'of a guessing brave soul' (463a). (The latter phrase has been plausibly seen as an allusion to Isoc. 13.16, who talks in similar terms about the orator's grasp of rhetorical situations and who embraces the term *empeiria*. It may appear somewhat odd to introduce a pupil of Gorgias defending his teacher and then alluding to Isocrates, but Plato no doubt took the view that Isocrates' and Gorgias' approach to rhetoric ultimately showed the same flaws, and he is likely to have taken the view of modern scholarship that Isocrates was an intellectual descendant of Gorgias.) A true art would be able to offer a rational account of its own procedures, and explain why they are as they are and why they achieve the purpose they are supposed to achieve (see above on the conception of *technē*, which can be extracted from medical treatises of the later fifth century). Socrates thus offers us a glimpse of an art of rhetoric deserving of the name, but will only in the *Phaedrus* describe it in positive terms.

In devising his alternative version of rhetoric, Plato might either have constructed an ideal that, while conceptually consistent, is detached from the inevitably tainting actualities of real-life public speaking, or he might have taken these actualities into account, ending up with the best rhetoric for an imperfect world. The *Phaedrus* leans towards the second of these possibilities, and we will have to bear that in mind (cf. H. Yunis, Chapter 7). The dialogue is concerned with the question which forms of speaking and what type of knowledge is appropriate to love, *erōs*. After three speeches, one (supposedly) by Lysias and two by Socrates (the second on the nature of the soul), have been presented, the discussion turns to rhetoric, and the suggestion is that there is no independent art of rhetoric; rather, rhetoric properly conceived cannot be separated from philosophical modes of thinking and arguing, i.e., dialectic. The second half of the dialogue starts with Phaedrus' suggestion, reminiscent, for instance, of Isocrates' views, that rhetoric has no need for knowledge, since its objective is persuasion, which trades in commonly held opinions (259e–260d). In response Socrates argues that, in order to argue plausibly about just and unjust, and good and bad things, one has to have knowledge of what is good and what is just. For only such a knowledge would enable the orator to construct arguments within the constraints of the situation he found himself in, inasmuch as he is dealt a certain set of facts and has to construct a plausible speech which fits those facts and yet is designed to support the conclusion that he wants to reach; as Socrates says, the orator must have the ability to let the same thing appear as just and unjust, similar and dissimilar (sc. to what is just and unjust; 261e–262c). And in order to, for instance, present a certain action as fair and just, one needs to have knowledge of what is fair and just as well as the methodology of an art which Socrates postulated in the *Gorgias* already (see below), even if one ends up defending an action as just which was in fact not just.

The section where all this is developed does not (unlike *Gorgias* 460–461) make reference to or invite the reader to bring to the text the idea of Socratic virtue knowledge, i.e., that someone who knows what is just cannot but act justly, which might have acted as a limiting factor on the degree of conceit the orator is capable of and the contexts in which such conceit is permitted. Rather, the wider context provides an explanation where the plausibility of plausible statements or arguments ultimately derives from, which, as has been observed by Cooper, might have provided a theoretical underpinning, for instance, for the status which Isocrates accords to *doxa* (see 273d, referring back to 261e–262c). The suggestion is that plausible statements (*eikota*, literally 'likelihoods') derive their plausibility from resembling truths, and that they carry conviction because human beings have an innate knowledge, however dim and distorted, of these truths, which is the reason why statements can at all appear plausible to them. A good orator as Plato conceives of him will be very effective in creating these *eikota* methodically, ought to produce them with greater regularity than someone who is merely a skilled practitioner, and to be able to give an account why the *eikota* carry conviction. But the theory also explains why there can be plausible speakers who are not good orators in Plato's sense, and it is because the theory's explanatory power extends to such cases that one feels discouraged to supply the notion of Socratic virtue-knowledge in the passage in question. As far as methodology is concerned, two suggestions are made. First, a clearer idea is provided how rhetoric might integrate with or indeed amount to dialectic; proper speaking, for instance, about *erōs* would involve an analysis of the concept (*dihairesis*)

as well as the ability to draw a synthesis from such an analysis (264e–266b). Second, the idea familiar from the *Gorgias* that rhetoric is concerned with the soul is picked up and developed in a comparison with medicine, which is obviously concerned with the body. A proper art of rhetoric would be able to distinguish different types of soul, ‘whether they are uniform or manifold’ (271a), what effects the different types of soul exercise and to which influences they are amenable, and what the causes are that a soul is persuaded or that an attempt at persuasion fails. Contemporary rhetoric is then found wanting in all these respects.

Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* famously begins with the sentence ‘rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic’. For him, there is a *de facto* similarity between rhetoric and dialectic as he conceives of it, but it does not consist in the access to objective truths to which rhetoric can aspire if it actually becomes dialectic. Rather, dialectic and rhetoric are formal argumentative faculties that show considerable overlap in their methodology. The methodology of rational argument in the fields dialectic and rhetoric has two parts, the first concerned with theory of argument, for instance, how to construct arguments meeting varying standards of logical rigour, the second concerned with the epistemic status of the propositions on which both dialecticians and orators rely.¹⁵ Aristotle holds that both dialectic and rhetoric trade in *endoxa*, propositions of ‘good repute’ which are held, for instance, by the majority of people or by select experts. Both types of *endoxon* can in suitable circumstances have persuasive force. For Aristotle *endoxa* are ultimately grounded in experience, *empeiria* (for instance, *Parva Naturalia* 462b14–16), which is why he can also refer to them as *phainomena*, ‘things which appear to be the case’ (*Topics* 104a12 and 105a37–b1). Aristotle famously shares none of the metaphysical commitments that, for instance, make Socrates in the *Phaedrus* ground the plausibility of *eikota* in their resemblance to objective realities. Thus Aristotle may appear to be in agreement with Gorgias and Isocrates on a central point; the difference is that Aristotle developed elaborate procedures for scrutinising and evaluating commonly held opinions (*Topics* 8.5).¹⁶ Aristotle, then, took the view that, while there may be inconsistencies in the *endoxa* pertaining to a given field of expertise and while ordinary people or his philosophical predecessors may not be able to account for any opinions they hold, human nature is in principle such that it is likely to produce *endoxa* which are not without value. As far as the status of rhetoric as an art and a body of knowledge is concerned, Aristotle’s position is one of rigour tempered by pragmatism. In a way which seems to reveal knowledge of a stock argument against the technicity of rhetoric, frequently used in later debate (‘rhetoric is not an art since there are plenty of competent speakers who have not undergone a rhetorical education’), Aristotle states that examining arguments, sustaining them, speaking as a defendant or prosecutor, which many do without much practice or in consequence of habituation, may equally be done methodically, and that it would be the task of an art of rhetoric to investigate the causes for the adoption and success of certain procedures (*Rhet.* 1.1 1354a6–11). The art of rhetoric, seen as a body of knowledge, is thus the product of this investigation. Yet Aristotle does not promise that an art of rhetoric thus conceived will invariably produce conviction on the part of the audience; rather, he holds that the job of the art would be to identify plausible arguments relative to the case in hand, thus allowing for the influence of factors beyond the orator’s control (1.1 1355b7–21). Moreover, emotions are of course knowledge-related for Aristotle, in that both experiencing

them and generating them are to be explained with reference to judgments, opinions, and convictions of orator and audience alike; Aristotle holds that generating a certain emotion or set of emotions on the part of the audience will require inducing them to make a series of judgements and evaluations.¹⁷

Stoic views on rhetoric have to be assembled together from a range of fragmentary sources, among which the treatise *On Rhetoric* by the first century Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara stands out. This treatise is, however, very fragmentary, and the standard edition of Stoic fragments is overly optimistic in the way in which it assigns substantial extracts from Philodemus to the second century Stoic Diogenes of Babylon. One way to look at Stoic rhetoric is to see it as a version of 'rhetoric as it should be' which Plato adumbrates in the *Phaedrus*, but without any of the concessions to real-life rhetorical practice made by Plato in the dialogue. Thus rhetoric properly speaking is only to be had by the Stoic sage, a supremely rational, virtuous, and rare human being. The Stoic conception of virtue is a version of the view exhibited in Plato's dialogues, where Socrates frequently likens virtue knowledge to craft knowledge. Virtue, characterised in some Stoic fragments as 'the *technē* of living', is seen as a particularly stable form of complex knowledge. Rhetoric and dialectic are considered virtues, and both are subordinate to practical wisdom, *phronēsis*. Another doctrine developed out of Plato, the notion that having one virtue entails and is entailed by having all the others, ensures that it is necessary for the orator to be a good man, who will only in exceptional circumstances utter falsehoods, namely in the service of a goal which he has identified as good and beneficial.¹⁸

During the Hellenistic period and into the Roman Empire, reflection on what a *technē* is (and whether rhetoric has a claim to being one) continued. The reasons for this are manifold. An ever-growing interest in science prompted continued reflection on the methodology of scientific enterprise; the Stoic conception of virtue alluded to above meant that disputes on what a *technē* is provided the framework in which discussions of moral questions were conducted.¹⁹ But there was also an interest in rhetorical methodology *per se* which correlated with the important role rhetoric played in education and, in the right circumstances, in political contexts. In a tradition which goes back to Aristotle's dialogue *Gryllus*, there was constant critical engagement with rhetoric's claim to being an art, be it by rhetoricians who held that theorizing about rhetoric is irrelevant to the practice of successful public speaking or by philosophers, notably Academic sceptics. Again Philodemus' *Rhetoric* is an important source for this debate, but also the treatise *Against the Rhetoricians* by the second century AD doctor and sceptical philosopher Sextus Empiricus, who devoted a whole series of treatises to attacks on the various arts, in each case drawing on a substantial earlier tradition.²⁰ This tradition of questioning rhetoric's status as an art is for us also tangible in another set of texts, the so-called *Prolegomena*, introductions to the study of rhetoric dating from the Imperial to the Byzantine period.

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Notes

- 1 H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁷ (Berlin: 1954) – hereafter D-K.
- 2 See M. Frede, ‘Observations on Perception in Plato’s Later Dialogues’, in his *Essays in Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: 1987), pp. 3–8.
- 3 These examples are discussed by G. Striker, ‘Methods of Sophistry’, in her *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge: 1996), pp. 3–21, at p. 16.
- 4 M.F. Burnyeat, *The Theaetetus of Plato* (Indianapolis: 1990), pp. 22–31.
- 5 See G. Bona, ‘*Logos e Aletheia* nell’*Encomio di Elena di Gorgia*’, *RFIC* 102 (1974), pp. 5–33, in particular pp. 31–33.
- 6 The standard editions are J. Jouanna, *Hippocrate – De l’ancienne Médecine* (Paris: 1990) and, by the same editor, *Hippocrate – Des Vents, De l’Art* (Paris: 1988).
- 7 See D.L. Blank, *Sextus Empiricus – Against the Grammarians* (Oxford: 1998), pp. xviii–xxi.
- 8 See M.J. Schiefsky, *Hippocrates On Ancient Medicine* (Leiden: 2005), Appendix 1.
- 9 See further, T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6.
- 10 See C. Eucken, *Isokrates* (Berlin and New York: 1983), p. 29.
- 11 See J. Wilson, ‘*Kairos* as Due Measure’, *Glotta* 58 (1980), pp. 177–204.
- 12 See J.M. Cooper, ‘Plato, Isocrates, and Cicero on the Independence of Oratory from Philosophy’, in his *Knowledge, Nature, and the Good* (Princeton: 2004), pp. 65–80.
- 13 Cf. Cooper, ‘Plato, Isocrates’, p. 77.
- 14 See E. Schiappa, ‘Did Plato Coin *Rhētorikē*?’, *AJP* 111 (1990), pp. 457–470.
- 15 Cf. W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9, p. 109: ‘For typically the premises of dialectical and rhetorical deduction are not known truths but acceptable opinions’.
- 16 See the commentary by R. Smith, *Aristotle, Topics, Books I and VIII* (Oxford: 1997).
- 17 Cf. D. Konstan, Chapter 27, p. 419: ‘Aristotle’s conception of the emotions is through and through cognitive, in the sense that the emotions are rational evaluations of situations. They thus depend essentially on judgments’.
- 18 On Stoic rhetoric, see C. Atherton, ‘Hand over Fist: The Failure of Stoic Rhetoric’, *CQ*² 38 (1988), pp. 392–427.
- 19 See G. Striker, ‘Antipater, or the Art of Living’, in her *Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics* (Cambridge: 1996), pp. 298–315.
- 20 For a survey and an analysis of the arguments levelled against rhetoric, see J. Barnes, ‘Is Rhetoric an Art?’, *DARG Newsletter* 2 (1986), pp. 2–22.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

Rhetoric and Ethics from the Sophists to Aristotle

Jane M. Day

1 Rhetoric, Ethics, and Two Relationships Between Them

Rhetoric: the theory and practice of eloquence, whether spoken or written, the whole art of using language so as to persuade others: the art of literary expression, especially in prose: false, showy or declamatory expression.

Thus *Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary*.¹

The connotations of the English word ‘rhetoric’ as defined in Chambers are still remarkably continuous with those of the ancient Greek word which it transliterates, and thus Chambers captures well the notion of rhetoric at issue in this chapter. Like the English word, the Greek word covered both theory and practice, and included the facets of persuasiveness, expressiveness, and at least sometimes artificiality and showiness.

The Chambers dictionary also relevantly defines ethics.

Ethics: the science of morals, that branch of philosophy which is concerned with human character and conduct: a system of morals, rules of behaviour: a treatise on morals.

These definitions all introduce the term ‘morals’, and indeed the cognate trio ‘moral’, ‘morals’ and ‘morality’ cover much of the same ground as the word ‘ethics’ does. From Chambers again:

Moral: of or relating to character or conduct considered as good or evil: ethical: conformed to or directed towards right, virtuous ...

Morality: quality of being moral: that which renders an action right or wrong: ... virtue: the doctrine of actions as right or wrong: ethics: ...

Morals: writings on ethics: the doctrine or practice of the duties of life: moral philosophy or ethics ...

The sum of these definitions conveniently demarcates the range of the word ‘ethics’ in the title of this chapter. Like ‘rhetoric’, the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ also cover both theory and practice within their range, and we too shall be concerned with both theory and practice as we trace the interrelations between rhetoric and ethics.

The English term ‘ethics’, like the term ‘rhetoric’, also derives from a Greek root. The same does not apply to the term ‘moral’ and its cognates, which derive from the Latin word invented by Cicero to translate the Greek one. To some extent the two terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morals’ have gone their separate ways in English, in the process collecting differing connotations. Ancient Greek naturally has no comparable term analogous to ‘morals’ and separate from ‘ethics’. It is sometimes suggested that ethics as conceived in ancient Greece is not concerned with what English speakers would call morality: thus for example C. Rowe, writing on Greek ethics, claims that it concerns ‘not morality, but the nature of the good life for man’.² However, I would suggest that this statement exaggerates the distance between ethics and morality. Rowe is absolutely right to emphasise that Greek writers on ethics, and especially Plato and Aristotle, conceive their subject as centred on the nature of a good life for human beings. But this hardly means that they are not concerned with morality, considering the closeness of connection between the terms ‘morality’ and ‘ethics’. I shall therefore move freely between the terms cognate with ‘moral’ and those cognate with ‘ethics’ as convenient.

Among various important and interesting strands of relationship between Greek rhetoric and ethics there are two on which I shall particularly focus in this chapter. First, there is the evidential strand. The rhetoric produced in a society provides some of the best evidence one can have about the ethical views generally accepted in that society. Second, there is the critical strand. The rhetoric produced in a society can itself become the subject of critical ethical appraisal by members of that society. In Greece there were many, from moral traditionalists to philosophers, who were deeply suspicious and critical of rhetorical methods of persuasion. My main focus will be on this second strand – on the critical appraisals of rhetoric from an ethical point of view. But I would like to say a bit about rhetoric as evidence for the ethics of the surrounding society first. The two strands are not unrelated, as will emerge.

2 Rhetoric as Evidence about a Society’s Ethical Views³

‘Each audience enjoys speeches delivered in its character, and dislikes those in an alien character’, says Socrates in Plato’s *Gorgias* (513c). It is possible to learn a great deal about the predominant ethics of a society from studying the rhetoric used in that society. The aim of rhetoric in actual practice is persuasion, and persuasiveness is relative to the audience; the audience will be swayed in proportion as its members perceive the speaker’s conclusions as following from principles that they themselves accept. This is the point of Socrates’ very true statement. So the speaker, knowing this, will act on it, and present his case in a way that emphasises continuity with his audience’s beliefs, and thus the text of his speech constitutes fine evidence about those beliefs to the historian. This applies to all forms of rhetoric. The aim of prosecutor or defendant in a law-court is to show that he has right on his side and

his opponent is in the wrong; the aim of a speaker in a debate about public policy is to persuade his hearers that the course he proposes is both expedient and by their lights ethically justifiable in the current circumstances; an orator pronouncing a eulogy must speak of his subject in ways which his audience will hear as praise; and so on.

3 Ethical Appraisal of Rhetoric

We turn now to the second strand of relationship between Greek rhetoric and ethics: moral questions posed by the theory and practice of rhetoric itself; how these arose in Greek thought and how they were developed.

The earliest extant occurrence of the Greek word *rhētorikē*, from which the English term ‘rhetoric’ is derived, is thought to be in Plato’s *Gorgias* (448d9, and repeatedly thereafter). The earliest extant occurrence of *ta ēthika*, from which similarly the English term ‘ethics’ is derived, is found later still, in Aristotle’s ethical works. But before Plato (let alone Aristotle) was writing, a notorious controversy was in existence about the nature and proper role of persuasion, going back at least to the sophists and especially Gorgias, who played an important part in various aspects of the history of rhetoric and was particularly influential in crystallising some of the ethical issues raised by the power of persuasive speech.

4 Gorgias on the Power of Words

Gorgias (c. 485–c. 380) visited Athens as part of an embassy from Leontini in Sicily, in 427 (Socrates will have been about 42 years old at the time, Isocrates about 9, and Plato about 2!). His power of speaking made an immediate and forceful impression. In general, and in broad terms, the sophists were itinerant professors of higher education, though what they professed to teach varied. We learn from Plato’s *Meno* that many, including Protagoras, claimed to teach ‘virtue’ (*aretē*, *Meno* 91b), but that Gorgias laughed at such claims, and himself claimed only to make people clever speakers (*Meno* 95c). The *Meno* records also his bold offer to speak on any topic he was asked about (70b), and how his pupils learned to follow suit.

Some of Gorgias’ own words will set the stage for discussion of the ethical problems posed by rhetoric. The following comes from his showpiece, the *Encomium on Helen*, a *tour de force* of glowing whitewash. Given any of the possible explanations of Helen’s elopement to Troy, he boldly claims that it was not her fault. She was not responsible if fate was the cause, nor if she was taken by brute force, nor if she fell uncontrollably in love with Paris, and the excerpt I now quote aims to persuade the hearer that she was equally not responsible if someone had used the powers of persuasion to talk her into it. To get something of the flavour of Gorgias’ extraordinary prose style I quote the translation by L. van Hook, who tried to reproduce some of its effect in English. Apparently, to his contemporaries, Gorgias’ prose style added to his rhetorical effectiveness, thus providing extra support to the claims that he is making for the irresistible power of persuasive eloquence:⁴

If [her travel to Troy] was through persuasion's reception and the soul's deception, it is not difficult to defend the situation and forgo the accusation, thus. Persuasion is a powerful potentate . . . it can put an end to fear and make vexation vanish; it can inspire exultation and increase compassion . . . All poetry I ordain and proclaim to be composition in metre, the listeners of which are affected by passionate trepidation and compassionate perturbation and likewise tearful lamentation, since through discourse the soul suffers, as if its own, the felicity and infelicity of property and person of others.

Gorgias goes on to call the power of rhetoric 'witchery and sorcery'. How many men have persuaded how many others about how many things, and still persuade them, he exclaims, by forging false speech! Speech gains this power to deceive through the near-universal lack of firm knowledge in human affairs, leaving only opinion, with its unsteadiness and unreliability, to look to for advice. And he quotes three fields where knowledge is particularly lacking: meteorology, legal cases, and philosophical debate. All of these, he claims, illustrate particularly well how easily persuasion is able to form and sway opinion without reference to truth, and he concludes this section by likening the power of speech on the soul, both for good and for ill, to that of drugs on the body. So Helen was not responsible if she went to Troy as the result of persuasion.

Furthermore, Gorgias himself implicitly claims similar power over the audiences who hear his own speeches (including this one); that is the corollary of what he says. The implication is shocking, since his picture of persuasion leaves no place for a distinction between valid and invalid means towards it. To quote one more sentence in full: 'A single speech charms and convinces a vast crowd when skilfully composed, rather than when truthfully spoken' (*Helen* 13). One should add that it is difficult to be sure how seriously he himself takes the view he puts forward – he ends the *Encomium* by referring to the piece as 'praise for Helen and a pastime for me' (21) which does not suggest complete seriousness – but this would not greatly reassure anyone troubled by the power of rhetoric untrammelled by constraints of truth.⁵

5 Protagoras, Relativism, and the 'Opposed Arguments'

Protagoras, Gorgias' slightly older contemporary (c. 490–c. 420), also put forward views that were found shocking. Like Gorgias, Protagoras divorced the power of words from truth. But his rationale for doing so was quite different. Protagoras was famous for his relativist view that what is true actually depends on people's opinions, as is encapsulated in his much-quoted aphorism, 'of all things the measure is man, of what is, that it is, and of what is not, that it is not'.⁶ Details of how to interpret this have been much debated, but the broadly correct interpretation is clear: the truth is just what people believe, so no beliefs can be false.

It is much less clear whether he was claiming that the truth is relative to each individual's set of beliefs, or that it is relative to the beliefs shared by whole societies, and we cannot even be sure whether Protagoras considered this issue. But Plato, Aristotle and Sextus all interpret him as intending his thesis to apply at the individual level,⁷ and it may be said that his thesis would have a better chance of consistency if he

did so, for individuals can diverge in their opinions, and in the absence of some external objective standard there is no rational way of deciding that one of them is right and the other wrong.

Protagoras' thesis is not primarily about rhetoric, but it certainly raises questions for it. What becomes of persuasion on the view that all opinions are true for the person who holds them? In particular, what becomes of Protagoras' own profession as a wise man qualified to put others right? This second question is raised in Plato's dialogue the *Theaetetus* by Socrates who then presents on Protagoras' behalf the answer that, whilst all opinions are equally *true* for the person who has them, not all are equally *good* for him, and the wise man is 'one who can change any one of us, when bad things appear and are to him, and make good things both appear and be to him' (*Theaetetus* 166d). Presumably, to judge from the way in which Plato uses Socrates to present this answer, we may conclude that the historical Protagoras did not formulate it. But some such pragmatic criterion is necessary to justify Protagoras' claim to be an expert despite no-one's beliefs being false. Socrates goes on, continuing on Protagoras' behalf, to liken the wise teacher to a doctor, who makes his patient feel physically better, or a husbandman, who does the same for sickly plants. It is most probable that the historical Protagoras really did draw these comparisons, since they were fairly commonplace at the time, and the emphasis within medicine on different needs of different patients fitted well with his relativism.

In line with his claim that everyone's beliefs are all true, Protagoras also claimed that 'there are two opposite arguments on every subject' (80B6A D-K). This principle is Protagoras' most direct and most influential contribution to the theory of rhetoric. And he made it an integral part of his teaching. He taught his pupils to practise arguing for and against the same proposition. He also himself wrote two books of 'Opposed Arguments' (*Antilogiai*, 80B5 D-K). These books have not survived even in fragments. But there still exists a brief handbook by an unknown author, dated from 400 or just after (i.e., about twenty years after Protagoras' death), which provides evidence for a continuing tradition of training in arguing both sides of a question. This is the so-called *Dissoi Logoi*, 'double arguments', a compendium of arguments for and against various theses, from 'the same thing can/cannot be good and bad' to 'wisdom and virtue can/cannot be taught'.⁸

In formulating and acting on the principle that there are two sides to every argument, Protagoras can be seen as setting up an enormously valuable liberal principle to follow – in fact, that is how he is likely to be seen by those committed to democracy today. But by many of his contemporaries he was seen as subverting all moral values. Even Aristotle seems to show some sympathy with their disapproval: 'and this is to make the weaker argument the stronger. So people were right to censure Protagoras' assertion' (*Rhet.* 2.24.11).

6 New Learning and Clever Speeches in Aristophanes' *Clouds*

The idea of arguing both sides of the question is finely caricatured in Aristophanes' comedy, the *Clouds*. This play was first produced in 423, but the extant edition is a revised one dating from a few years later. It features a father Strepsiades, his son

Pheidippides, and an establishment of higher learning, the ‘Thinkery’, presided over by Socrates, where the Clouds are worshipped as deities, and with the Stronger and the Weaker Arguments, the latter being that which wins unjust causes, both on hand (94–118). Strepsiades is old and dim-witted, Pheidippides is young, idle and extravagant and has brought his father into debt. Strepsiades plans that his son shall learn from the Thinkery how to argue a way out of the debts, but the outcome after many comic vicissitudes is that Pheidippides applies the new learning to justify beating his father, thus (1420–1424):

- Strepsiades: But nowhere is it the law that a father be treated this way.
 Pheidippides: Well, wasn’t it a man like you and me who originally proposed this law and persuaded the ancients to adopt it? If so, am I any less free to establish in my turn a new law for the sons of tomorrow, that they should beat their fathers back?

After beating his father, Pheidippides is ready to justify beating his mother too, and goes on to jeer at Zeus, the traditional chief Deity (1469–1470):

- Pheidippides: Listen to him, ‘Zeus of the Fathers’! How antiquated! Do you think there’s a Zeus?
 Strepsiades: I do.
 Pheidippides: There isn’t a Zeus, because Whirl (*Dinos*) is king, having kicked out Zeus.

And the play ends with Strepsiades, repenting of his flirtation with new ideas, setting fire to the Thinkery and putting Socrates and his pupils to flight.

This play is full of interest for our subject. It illustrates particularly vividly how sophistic ideas impinged on ordinary Athenians who would consider themselves right-thinking. We must remember, of course, that Aristophanes was writing satire, and that his picture is naturally exaggerated, but to be a successful caricature it must also be immediately recognisable to his audience. This audience would be huge (up to at least 17,000) and a mixture of all classes, men, women and children, Athenians, visitors and slaves. The viewpoint Aristophanes represents is a principled, broadly conservative one, which heartily disapproves of the amorality and irreligion, as he presents it, of the new learning. The same viewpoint is consistently maintained throughout his plays, and we must assume that his audience were broadly happy to have it put forward, even though there were doubtless some dissenters.

We should note with E. Schiappa that the *Clouds* does not target rhetoric specifically. Its target, as Schiappa points out, is rather ‘the newfangled “higher education” more broadly, with its clever skills with argument in general’.⁹ Indeed the ‘Sophists’ in the Thinkery engage in a whole range of academic activities, parodying the range of pre-Socratic philosophers’ interests from grammar to cosmology and theology, as well as knowing how to win a case with unjust arguments. However, the crunch point, at which the sophists’ learning is presented as pernicious rather than merely absurd, is precisely where it is applied to creating unjust arguments which achieve victory by falsehood and fallacies. Schiappa himself grants that ‘with hindsight we can interpret specific portions of *Clouds* as an attack on Rhetoric’, and without denying that Aristophanes’ target as a whole is broader, I suggest it is fair to emphasise also the

continuity between Aristophanes' criticism of the sophists and later criticisms of rhetoric, particularly those brought by Plato. In both cases the same fault was found, namely a reckless and unprincipled disregard of truth, or real validity, in pursuit of winning the argument.¹⁰

A further obvious point of great interest in the *Clouds* is that Socrates is introduced as the arch-sophist. This may well astound modern readers of Plato, but we have to accept that the picture must have been recognisable to Aristophanes' audience. It is very possibly true, as Plato makes Socrates say in the *Apology of Socrates*, that Aristophanes had set the stage for Socrates' later trial and conviction as 'corrupter of the youth'. But anyway Plato, if not Socrates himself, took it as an important challenge to demonstrate that Socrates was *not* in the same class as others called sophists, and furthermore to show that the relativism espoused by Protagoras is demonstrably false.

7 Philosophy and Oratory in Isocrates

The next two figures on our stage, Isocrates and Plato, both showed themselves highly sensitive to the ethical issues raised by the power of rhetoric, and both took pains to establish their own practices on morally high ground, differentiating themselves from others more open to censure for the unscrupulous use of oratory to achieve victory at whatever cost to truth or justice. They were roughly contemporaneous – Isocrates' long life (probably 436–338) spanned that of Plato (c. 429–347) – and both founded educational establishments in Athens; Isocrates opened his Academy in about 390, and Plato followed with his rival Academy probably soon after 387. Both called themselves philosophers, rejecting the title of sophist, which they saw as negative. Indeed, Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* (13), published when his Academy was opened, and Plato's much later *Sophist*, both share the common aim of showing that their own activity of 'philosophy' is distinct from and superior to the practices of the 'sophists'. Also, even more interestingly, Isocrates, no less than Plato, even though he ran an educational establishment centred on oratory and where his own written speeches were studied as examples, distances himself from the sophists' claims to make his pupils clever speakers. Isocrates asserts that pupils who follow his teaching will be 'helped more speedily towards honesty of character than towards facility in oratory'. Not, he quickly adds, that mere teaching alone can make anybody just; but he maintains that his curriculum will be particularly helpful in bringing good character in his pupils to fruition (13.21).

Nevertheless, as will emerge, Isocrates' conception of philosophy is very different in content from Plato's. Isocrates is at pains in *Against the Sophists* to distinguish his way of education from those of two rival types of practitioner: those focusing on disputations ('eristics') about ethics (13.3), and those professing to teach political oratory, especially those who produced 'so-called-arts' (his phrase) of speaking (13.3, 20). His major complaint about the first group is that they claim that following their teaching will guarantee happiness and prosperity, a transparently absurd claim, he says, since we do not know the future. Against those professing to teach oratory, he objects to the way they do it by formulating rules, on the grounds that no set of rules could determine the possibilities offered by a given

occasion. Much later, in 354/3, Isocrates revisited the themes of *Against the Sophists* in the much fuller defence of his whole career, the *Antidosis* (15), in which he describes his competitors in mainly similar terms, but expands his account of the professors of disputation to include the whole range of presocratic natural philosophy (15.268). (He graciously allows that such disputations can form quite useful mental gymnastics for those still in training, but denies them the title 'philosophy' on the grounds that they have no direct use, and suggests that they should be discontinued in adult life.) His sharpest disapproval in both *Against the Sophists* and *Antidosis* is reserved for unscrupulous claimants to teach the art of rhetoric, whose field is uncomfortably close to his own (13.19, 15.197, 215), so that it is from these that he must particularly dissociate himself.

So how does Isocrates mark himself off? What was his positive 'philosophy'? And what does he say about the ethics of his profession?¹¹ Early in the *Antidosis*, he claims not only that he has never harmed anyone by his 'cleverness' or his writings (15.33) but also that in fact his works have been more beneficial to his fellow-citizens than those of any other author (15.51). He has devoted his life to a particular branch of oratory, namely the writing of public discourses 'which deal with the world of Hellas, with affairs of state, and appropriate to be delivered at the Pan-Hellenic Assemblies . . . more akin to works composed in rhythm and set to music than to speeches which are made in court . . . in a style more imaginative and more ornate: . . . [employing] thoughts which are more lofty and more original . . .'. And, he adds, there are many who desire to take lessons in this skill. This, he says, is 'my philosophy, my profession, or whatever you care to call it' (15.47–50).

Isocrates illustrates with quotations of passages from his past speeches how all his writings tend towards virtue and justice (15.60–95), and also cites some of his pupils and associates whose careers he claims redound to his credit (15.95–101). Most crucially for his theoretic position, he also argues for an actual causal link between the practice of oratory and the orator's personal morality (15.276–278):

For, in the first place, when anyone elects to speak or write discourses which are worthy of praise and honour, it is not conceivable that he will support causes which are unjust or petty or devoted to private quarrels, and not rather those which are great and honourable, devoted to the welfare of man and our common good; for if he fails to find causes of this character, he will accomplish nothing to the purpose. In the second place, he will select from all the actions of men which bear upon his subject those examples which are the most illustrious and the most edifying; and, habituating himself to contemplate and appraise such examples, he will feel their influence not only in the preparation of a given discourse, but in all the actions of his life.

S. Usher comments that 'this is probably the best that can be made of a difficult thesis. The contemplation of lofty ideas can shape character. But he has already had to admit that a really depraved character cannot be so altered (274)'.¹² (And we may add 13.21, already quoted.)

In fact there seem to be two problems with Isocrates' claim. As a matter of psychology, the link between hearing a speech and endorsing its ideals is far from necessary, but there is another point too, which is that if hearing a speech (or repeated speeches) *does actually cause* hearers to endorse its ideals, the link hardly seems rational, and we are back to Gorgias' description of oratory as having its powers to

persuade regardless of the truth. Then arises the problem, how can Isocrates be sure that the ideals he promotes are right?

8 Plato in the *Gorgias*

While at Athens, I read the *Gorgias*, and in that work I above all marvelled at Plato because in the very act of mocking the orators he showed himself the supreme orator (L. Crassus in Cicero's *The Orator*, 1.47).

This apt comment on Plato's writing poses sharply the question of what really was his attitude to rhetoric. As H. Yunis says at the opening of Chapter 7, Plato is often seen as the 'inveterate opponent' of rhetoric, but as Yunis also says, this straightforward opposition between philosophy and rhetoric cannot represent the whole of Plato's view. Let us start with the *Gorgias*, the dialogue in which Plato's position about rhetoric seems the most negative of all.

The *Gorgias*' date of composition is likely to have been between 387 and 385, thus when Gorgias himself was in extreme old age. Of equal importance as background, Isocrates' Academy was newly founded, and Plato was setting up or (more likely) about to set up his own. The actual question from which discussion starts in the dialogue is the nature of 'what is called the art of rhetoric' (448d9) that Gorgias professes. It is agreed at 453a4–5 that rhetoric's function is 'to produce persuasion in the soul of hearers', and this raises the issue, crucial to the ethical evaluation of rhetoric, as to how, if at all, a *rhētōr*'s success involves *knowledge*, either on his part or on that of his hearers. Plato's *Gorgias*, like the real one, is clear both that a *rhētōr* (in contrast to a teacher) will produce conviction without knowledge in his hearers, and that he does not even need knowledge of the subject himself (see *Gorgias* 445c–456d, 459b–c, and *Gorgias*' *Helen*, 11.13, already discussed above). Gorgias sees the ability to operate without knowledge as a positive, adding to the *rhētōr*'s power, though he generously suggests it should not be used to do other craftsmen down (456c–457d).

Another issue concerning ethics is raised by Gorgias' claim in the dialogue that rhetoric is the most beneficial of all arts to those who have it, giving them freedom for themselves and power over others in the city (452d). Against this view, Plato develops through Socrates an argument that this power claimed for rhetoric is illusory, since it has no necessary link with any benefit to the possessor. Being just is a more valuable good than being able to persuade people with clever speeches, he claims. He argues in a notorious passage that in fact rhetoric often positively harms the person it is popularly supposed to benefit, because whilst being unjust is a great evil, worse than suffering injustice, the worst evil of all is to be unjust and remain unpunished (since punishment is curative). So clever pleading will actually harm, not benefit, anyone who escapes just punishment through it (474e–481).

So far Socrates' interlocutors have been first Gorgias, rather vain and complacent, but civilised and generally well-meaning, and then Gorgias' brash young companion, Polus. Now at 481b, the role of the interlocutor passes to a much more forceful figure than Gorgias and weightier than Polus, Callicles, an ambitious young Athenian politician, 'quite friendly' towards Socrates (485e2), but totally rejecting Socrates' views. The *rhētōr*, Callicles insists, does unquestionably possess power to attain great

good for himself, for what his art empowers him to attain is his own pleasure, and pleasure is a real good, whereas what Socrates is speaking about – justice, temperance and so on as conventionally understood – are not truly goods at all. Might is the true right; in nature ‘it is just for the better man to have more than the worse’ (484d), and the best way of life consists in maximising one’s desires and then satisfying them all – thus maximising one’s pleasure! To this, Socrates argues back that good and pleasure are not the same. To choose what is really good requires knowledge with understanding (*epistēmē*: both English words are within the meaning of the Greek term). Simply pursuing pleasure, he claims, does not.

A final crucial claim that Socrates makes concerning rhetorical persuasion is that no-one can achieve success at it without becoming enslaved to the values of the crowd whose approval he is courting. Far from free, the successful orator must become the very reverse. To win the crowd’s friendship it is not enough, Socrates claims, just to imitate them, you must become really like them (513b, and cf. the above point about rhetoric reflecting society’s values).

Clearly, the Socrates of this dialogue is profoundly opposed to rhetoric as employed in Athenian civic life. Clearly also he has no time for Gorgianesque display oratory (see, e.g., 448e–449c). But the question remains whether Socrates is totally opposed to rhetoric *as such*, or whether he allows the possibility of rhetoric that is good. There are hints of this ideal in the *Gorgias*, particularly at 503d–505b, in the description of the ‘good man who speaks with a view to the best’, and promotes what the city needs rather than what it wants, who is designated a *rhētōr* at 504d. But the hints remain undeveloped and problematic. Does this ideal *rhētōr* have knowledge? He presumably must have to be ideal. But if so, how does his ‘rhetoric’ differ from teaching? What I think we may safely say is that Socrates himself does not quite measure up. His suggestion that he himself is a practitioner of the true political art (521d) must immediately be qualified by adding first that he disclaims knowledge, and second that he is no example of a *successful* persuader (522a)! The most notable outcome of the *Gorgias*, for all the eloquence remarked by Cicero, is that Socrates makes no headway with persuading his audience.

9 Plato in the *Phaedrus*

Plato wrote one other dialogue, the *Phaedrus*, which treats rhetoric extensively. The *Phaedrus* is generally thought by scholars to be considerably later than the *Gorgias*, in consideration of both stylistic features and content. Certainly its mood is very different – calmer, detached from political struggles, playful rather than bitter in its irony, almost serene, as befits its idyllic setting by a shady stream. The attitude to rhetoric too is much less dismissive. Whereas in the *Gorgias* there was at most a hint of a possible worthwhile kind of rhetoric, in the *Phaedrus* rhetoric is explicitly divided into good and bad and the differences are explored.

The dialogue has two parts, which as G.A. Kennedy notes correspond to the two methods of instruction current at the time in Greece.¹³ The first half contains three ‘display’ speeches such as sophists or Isocrates would use as models, while the second half, starting at 257b, contains a theoretical discussion of such issues as a rhetorical handbook might cover: the definition and different forms of rhetoric, and especially the question of what makes a speech good or bad.

The speeches in the first half are entertainingly introduced. Socrates' young friend Phaedrus has just been listening to a display speech by Lysias, and persuades Socrates to join his walk and hear what he remembers of it, but Socrates sees the actual text hidden beneath Phaedrus' cloak and demands to hear the speech *verbatim* (228d–e). This first speech thus purports to be by the well-known orator Lysias, but there is no reason to suppose it is other than a clever construction by Plato, analogous to the speeches in the *Symposium*. This speech too is 'in a sort of way about love' (227c4–5), but the thesis it presents is that a boy will do better to prefer the suit of an older man who does not actually love him than of one who does. Bearing in mind that homosexual relationships between older men and boys were taken for granted in Plato's Athens, even so this thesis would have been as unacceptable in Plato's Athens as today, and the whole idea was to 'show off' by defending the indefensible (as we have seen with the *Helen* of Gorgias or other works of the same genre, or the Unjust Argument caricatured in *Clouds*, etc., discussed earlier in this chapter).

The second speech is by Socrates, and defends the same position as that of Lysias, merely improving style and structure. Plato is showing he can out-Herod Herod. But then, half-way through, Socrates suffers a revulsion from what he is doing – as being both absurd and verging on blasphemous, in denying the goodness of love (242d). And this leads into his 'recantation', a long, rich and eloquent panegyric, in the form of a myth, of love and its inspirational and purifying power on the souls of lovers. This is the emotional high point of the dialogue, Plato at his most poetic and most moving.

This speech and the other two stand in the background of the rest of the dialogue. The style after this changes abruptly as the conversation turns from examples to analysis. Socrates recognises that speaking – or equally writing, its alternative vehicle of expression – can be done well or badly, and raises the question of what makes a speech good (257c–258e, 259e). They agree that one necessary condition is that the speaker or writer should himself know the truth of what the speech is about (259e); indeed, this is desirable even if his aim is to mislead his audience successfully (262a–c)! But Socrates does not suggest that this knowledge adds up to mastery of an art of persuasion. Is there such an art, or is rhetoric just an artless knack (260e; cf. Pl. *Gorgias* 462c)? In discussing this, Socrates very interestingly starts from a definition of rhetoric which extends it far beyond the public domain assumed in general in Greek usage, including Plato's in the *Gorgias* and elsewhere, and also including later Aristotle's, to include any linguistic communication whatever (216a):

an art of winning over souls by means of words, not only in lawcourts and other public meetings, but also in private ones, applying equally to small or great matters, and in which no less merit attaches to correctness in minor matters than in major ones.

Good powers of analysis are an essential prerequisite, especially where controversial topics such as 'justice', 'virtue' or indeed 'love' are concerned. Also structure is crucial, and is beautifully described (264c):

Every speech should cohere, like a living creature, lacking neither head nor foot, but having both middle and beginning and end so written as to fit one another and the whole.

It soon emerges that this structure coincides with the method of collection and division, called 'dialectic' at 266a–d and identified with philosophical activity here and in *Sophist*, *Statesman* and other late dialogues. But despite some sarcastic comments on current textbooks of rhetoric, it becomes clear that Plato grants there is more to rhetoric than sound philosophy alone, though sound philosophy is essential. The crucial extra factor is psychological insight into the human souls to be won over (271), and the *Phaedrus* position is summed up at 277b–c: a good speaker must know the truth of his subject, must be able to analyse it logically, and must have an equally good understanding of psychology and ability to tailor his words to his hearer or hearers. All this, says Socrates, is essential to any 'art' of speaking, whether to teach or persuade.

Is the *Phaedrus*' view of rhetoric essentially different from that of the *Gorgias*? It has been claimed (notably by W.K.C. Guthrie)¹⁴ that there is no real difference but of tone. But this does not seem entirely right. The *Gorgias* offers only two models of persuasion, on the one hand chicanery and pandering, and on the other pure logical argument, of which one is ethically unacceptable and the other, as the *Gorgias* is designed to illustrate, ineffectual in circumstances of real conflict. The *Phaedrus* offers a way in between by recognising that awareness of your hearer's character does not automatically imply surrender to his values, but is the way to open his mind (and heart) to yours.¹⁵ But the demands set upon rhetoric in the *Phaedrus* are still impracticably high: if it is to qualify as an art it must rest on knowledge of everything relevant (reasonable belief will apparently not do), and this knowledge involves full dialectical analysis. Can it really be the case that persuasion based on less than this is disreputable? But if the limits are set at less than full knowledge, how do we justify this?

10 Ethics in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*

Aristotle wrote several works on rhetoric, of which only the treatise *Rhetoric* survives. One of the others, *Gryllus*, was a dialogue after the Platonic model, and written well before the *Rhetoric*. Quintilian 2.17.4 commented that it included, for the sake of discussion, some 'subtle' arguments against rhetoric's claim to be an art, which suggests a link with Plato's concerns in the *Gorgias*. But obviously this is speculative. However that may be, the *Rhetoric* itself is very firmly and confidently based on the proposition that rhetoric *is* an art, a valid subject of study.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a difficult text, and one of its most difficult problems is to establish what view it takes as to the place ethics should have in the practice of rhetoric. T. Engberg-Pedersen usefully presents two extreme interpretations.¹⁶ He quotes first the scholar W.J. Oates who describes the *Rhetoric* as 'a practical handbook for the instruction of public speakers in all the techniques and tricks of the trade', thus entering a 'realm of amorality, if not immorality'.¹⁷ At the other extreme he quotes another scholar, M.H. Wörner, who claims that for Aristotle an accomplished orator must be also a man of virtue and one with genuine knowledge of moral and political matters, and rhetoric in principled hands is not a mere technique of persuasive speaking but 'an appropriate tool for finding the good, the noble and the just'.¹⁸

As we have seen, Plato in both *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* had posed a great moral challenge to rhetoric. The *Gorgias* at least seems to denounce rhetoric as cognitively

bankrupt and morally corrupt, while the *Phaedrus*, though rehabilitating rhetoric in principle, seems to allow merit only to rhetoric that confirms to an ideal that is impracticable. Aristotle knew Plato well, having been a member of his Academy for twenty years, and there can be no doubt that he knew Plato's work. How could he fail to make his response to Plato's challenge clear? We may be sure also that he was not uninterested in ethical issues, for we know from his writings on ethics and politics that he was as deeply committed to ethical values as Plato.

There are some connections which Aristotle does draw suggesting an ethical dimension to rhetoric. He sees the political art – by which he means statesmanship rather than what we moderns would call politics – as having the same aims as ethics, albeit on a grander scale (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2.1094b7–11). And in both the *Rhetoric* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* he links rhetoric to the political art. At *Rhetoric* 1.2.1356a25–27 he describes rhetoric as 'an off shoot, as it were, of dialectic and of ethical studies, which may justly be described as the political art', and at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2.1094b2–3, similarly he states that 'we see even the most honoured abilities subordinate to the art of politics, such as generalship, household management, rhetoric'. This immediately creates an ethical context for rhetoric. Then also in the first chapter of *Rhetoric* Book 1, at 1355a31, he has almost casually mentioned, in parenthesis, that one should not use persuasion to incite people to bad actions.

But he says little more as the *Rhetoric* continues about ethically legitimate or illegitimate uses of rhetorical technique. He opens the second chapter of Book 1 (1.2.1355b25–26) with a definition of rhetoric as 'the ability to see, in each case, the possible means of persuasion', without specifying any ethical limitations on what is 'possible', and he then goes on to identify three types of possible means within rhetoric's scope: the character of the speaker should inspire trust, the audience's emotions should be appropriately stirred and, last but by no means least for Aristotle, the actual argument of the speech should be such as to 'establish or seem to establish' the conclusion the speaker wishes to draw (1.2.1356a1–20). These are discussed through Books 1 and 2, and the further factors of style and diction are introduced in Book 3. It is striking how little he speaks of the right use of any of these things. Even in Chapter 6 of Book 1, for instance, when Aristotle is outlining background understanding of good and bad, honour and dishonour, etc. which an orator needs, his concern seems to be merely that a speaker should be acquainted with common opinions to help make his case persuasive rather than with true values. While saying this, it should be admitted that the contrast between popular and true values is not stark for Aristotle as it is for Plato, and indeed Aristotle believes that the way to truth is by refining, rather than turning away from things popularly believed, but that does not seem to be what the would-be orator is advised to do here. The problem of Aristotle's attitude to ethics within rhetoric remains.

One solution with some appeal is to conclude that rhetoric, in itself, is morally neutral. This is Kennedy's view: 'Aristotle was the first person', he suggests in the preface to his translation of the *Rhetoric*,¹⁹ 'to recognise clearly that rhetoric as an art of communication was morally neutral, that it could be used either for good or ill'. This view can be held without going to Oates' extreme, since although the *Rhetoric* describes 'tricks of the trade' it does not advocate using them, but rather says one should know them in order to combat them (1.1.1355a29–61).

A related but subtly different interpretation which is perhaps slightly closer to the text is that rhetoric is not seen by Aristotle as simply morally neutral so much as something which is in itself good, but can be abused. This is something which Aristotle says applies ‘to all good things except for virtue, and most of all to the most useful things, like strength, health, wealth, and generalship; for one may do the greatest good by using these justly, the greatest harm by using them unjustly’ (*Rhet.* 1.1.1355b1–7). Among good things are arts, in that every art facilitates some good, but all arts can also be abused and used for bad ends, and so too with rhetoric. Plato was right that an art must always have some good as its general product, but this does not rule out bad use, whether by accident or design. There is much more to be said on this topic – but that is another story.²⁰

Bibliographical Essay

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Notes

- 1 E.M. Kirkpatrick (ed.), *Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary* (Edinburgh: 1983).
- 2 C. Rowe, ‘Ancient Greek Ethics’, in P. Singer (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Ethics* (Oxford: 1991), pp. 121–131; the quotation is on p. 124.

- 3 For extended development and illustration of the principle that its rhetoric provides some of the best evidence of a society's values, see K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: 1974; repr. Indianapolis: 1994).
- 4 L. van Hook, *Isocrates 2*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: 1945), pp. 55–57. A good new translation of the full work is now available in J. Dillon and T. Gergel, *The Greek Sophists*, Penguin Classics (London: 2003), pp. 76–84 (no. 31). The Greek text of Gorgias' *Helen* is in H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶ 2 (Berlin: 1951–52) 82 (= Gorgias), Fragment 11 (*Helen*) – hereafter D-K.
- 5 For more about Gorgias and indeed Protagoras, see J.A.E. Bons, Chapter 4 and T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24.
- 6 80 D-K (= Protagoras), fr. 1, trans. Dillon and Gergel, *Greek Sophists*, pp. 10 (no. 7) and 13 (no. 9a).
- 7 Plato: *Theaetetus* 152a, Aristotle: *Metaphysics* 4.4.1007b22 and 9.6.1062b11–19, trans. Dillon and Gergel, *Greek Sophists*, pp. 20 (no. 15) and 21 (no. 16). Sextus quoted in 80A.14 D-K, trans. Dillon and Gergel, *Greek Sophists*, p.13 (no. 9a).
- 8 90 D-K (= *Dissoi Logoi* or Double Arguments), trans. Dillon and Gergel, *Greek Sophists*, pp. 320–333 (no. 8).
- 9 E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Ancient Greece* (New Haven: 1999), p. 72.
- 10 For more about Aristophanes and how far he is targeting rhetoric, including discussion of other plays, see T.K. Hubbard, Chapter 32.
- 11 For matter relevant to these questions, see also T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6 and T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24.
- 12 S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), p. 317.
- 13 G.A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), p. 39.
- 14 W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 4 (Cambridge: 1975), pp. 412–417.
- 15 For much more about rhetoric in Plato, both in *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* and in other dialogues, see H. Yunis, Chapter. 7. The recognition that persuasion must start from understanding your audience's opinions, but by no means must end there, is interestingly illustrated within Greek tragic drama; cf. M. McDonald, Chapter 31.
- 16 T. Engberg-Pedersen, 'Is there an Ethical Dimension to Aristotelian Rhetoric?', in A.O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1996), pp. 116–117.
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- 18 M.H. Wörner, *Das Ethische in der Rhetorik des Aristoteles* (Freiburg: 1990), pp. 282–283.
- 19 G.A. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric* (New York: 1991), p. ix.
- 20 For fuller discussion of the *Rhetoric* as a whole, and for discussion of Aristotle's views about the emotions, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9 and D. Konstan, Chapter 27, respectively.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX

Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest

Joseph Roisman

In his monumental study of Greek culture, Jakob Burckhardt characterizes the archaic age of Greece (roughly 776–500) as a culture dominated by aristocrats, who were guided by competitive spirit and values. Modern historians of Classical Greece and Athens have maintained that the elite preserved the Greek competitive ethos well, and that the *dēmos* also subscribed to it.¹ Among scholars, Alvin Gouldner's thesis has exerted much influence with its argument that the Greeks looked at their social environment through the prism of the contest, and often of the zero-sum game kind, in which one's victory is perceived (rightly or wrongly) as another's defeat, because the resource at stake, whether real or symbolic, is limited. Scholars have found Gouldner's explanatory model of contest systems useful in analyzing subjects ranging from war, athletics, trials, and politics to issues of honor, sexuality and gender.²

Because these and other competitive activities and concepts were often applied, or restricted, to male participants and took place in front of a mostly male audience, contest and competitiveness served as a means of judging individual and communal worth and manliness. They established or strengthened the victor's manhood and dictated that the loser's claim to it and to valor be ranked as inferior or put in doubt. Lysias provides a mythical and somewhat blunt example of this view in a speech eulogizing the Athenian war dead of possibly the Corinthian war (394–387).³ Wars or battles were types of contest, and Lysias describes the war between the valiant men of Athens and the Amazons, who prior to their invasion of Attica had been regarded more like men than women on account of their courage and spirit. The Athenian victory exposed these women's aberrant masculinity, reversed them back to womanhood, and finally obliterated them (Lys. 2.4–6).⁴

The following discussion examines the rhetoric of *agōn* (contest) and its relevance to masculinity. Focusing on the Attic orators, it aims to show how speakers both articulated and manipulated competitive values and perceptions in order to claim victories, to validate individual and collective valor and manliness, but also to mitigate any adverse effects that losing a contest might have on the way men were judged.⁵

1 The Rhetoric of Winning a Contest

The commonest meaning of the Greek word *andreia* is ‘manly courage’ that is best demonstrated in the contest of the battlefield. During the Classical age, the Spartans were deemed the best and most courageous warriors, but their reputation was not above dispute or challenge. In a funeral oration for the dead of the first year of the Peloponnesian war, as reconstructed by Thucydides, Pericles distinguishes between the more valuable Athenian courage, based on knowledge and understanding of the danger involved in combat, and the more ignorant, obedience-induced, and less rational courage, which presumably characterized the Spartans (Thuc. 2.39.1–2, 40.2–3). About a century later, the orator Lysurgus chose not to downgrade Spartan courage but to appropriate it. He tells how the gods advised these bravest men (*andreiotatoi*) to take Athenian leaders in order to win over their Messenian enemies. The Spartans followed this advice and invited the Athenian Tyrtaeus to be their general. He defeated the Messenians, established the Spartan education system, and wrote verses that taught their young manly courage (Lyc. 1.105–106).⁶ Regardless of the reliability of this patriotic story, the gods’ recommendation and its implementation showed that the Athenians were first in *aretē* (valor) from very early times. Their leaders, after all, were better than the Spartan kings, who were believed to have been the descendants of Heracles, the mythical male par excellence. Lysurgus’ statements are full of allusions to manhood tested in competition, and his praise of his city incorporates all the elements of a legitimate *agōn*: a worthy field (warfare), a prize (*aretē*), mutually acceptable umpires (the gods), and an audience (the Athenians and the whole of Greece) that, all together, gave courage, victory, and defeat their cultural meanings.⁷

As Lysurgus suggests, the evaluative assessments of a state or a man as good at something (*agathos*), or as possessing *aretē* – a word of many meanings, including ‘excellence’, ‘prowess’, ‘valor’, ‘noble origin’, ‘moral virtue’ and much more – were usually accorded a man with a demonstrated superiority over others. Being a good man, then, meant being better than other men. This is why the oratorical language of approval and condemnation was often comparative, and giving higher ranking to oneself by denigrating others’ performance or courage is common throughout the corpus.⁸ There was a powerful incentive, therefore, to succeed, or claim success, in a contest, because it could prove a man’s worth, increase his honor and prestige, and, no less importantly, put his defeated rivals to shame. These rewards, as well as the risks of competing, encouraged men to try to change the odds in their favor (see below). Conversely, speakers used the competitive ethos to grant themselves or other men prizes in contests which they framed and whose outcome they controlled.

The last kind of manipulating the rhetoric of competition occurred on both the individual and the communal level. For example, Demosthenes justified his political conduct, and in particular his hosting a Macedonian embassy, by making himself a contestant in a competition over his, and by implication the city’s, prestige. The issue was his seemingly contradictory politics. On the one hand, he praised the envoys, including himself and Aeschines, who had gone with the first Athenian embassy in 346 to Philip II to negotiate peace with the king, and then entertained lavishly Philip’s envoys at Athens. On the other hand, he later strongly opposed the peace

and called Aeschines a traitor for supporting it. In 343 he prosecuted Aeschines for his misconduct as an envoy, but was concerned that Aeschines would use his praising the Athenian envoys and his hosting the Macedonians to show that Demosthenes' political conduct was inconsistent and hypocritical. Indeed, in his defense speech, Aeschines pounded on these points and highlighted Demosthenes' unseemly and servile flattering of the Macedonians' representatives (2.45–46, 111, 121; cf. 3.76). In order to forestall this attack, Demosthenes turned his hosting of Philip's envoys into a contest in honor. He stated that he observed how, in Macedonia, people prided themselves on showing their prosperity and splendor through, *inter alia*, entertaining envoys, and he thought that he should to be the first in this field and show himself as having a greater spirit, or generosity (19.234–235). Appealing to Athenian agonistic drive and the masculine wish to outperform others, Demosthenes converted his elitist display of friendly munificence in expectation for a Macedonian return into a competition on Athenian versus Macedonian prestige, which he presumably won and which made him and the Macedonians rivals instead of friends.⁹

In his defense speech, Aeschines, too, construes a diplomatic competition of a different sort and makes himself a winner, only this time against Demosthenes. He reports that when the ten members of the first Athenian embassy to Philip reached Macedonia, each was supposed to deliver a speech to the king and his attendants in a descending order of age. Aeschines does not waste time on what the other envoys said, but dwells on his own and Demosthenes' performances. His own address to Philip focused on the king's personal debt of gratitude to Athens and her claim to the city of Amphipolis, which the king had seized. In short, it included all that an Athenian jurymen would have liked to tell Philip had he been given the opportunity, only better argued. Then came Demosthenes' turn. He was the youngest of the envoys and, according to Aeschines, had bragged throughout the trip about his rhetorical prowess. Clearly relishing the moment, Aeschines tells how Demosthenes lost his bearings after a miserable preamble, and could not even continue speaking, in spite of Philip's sympathetic advice to take heart and deliver his piece (2.20–39).¹⁰

The jury could not have got a clearer picture of the difference between Aeschines and his rival. At stake were Athens' image and interests, which required unity of purpose, coordination among the envoys, and their best oratorical skills. Demosthenes, however, consistently breached the solidarity of the Athenian team (Aes. 2.22, 55; cf. 2.108–109). He proved to be an empty braggart who failed the test at a crucial point. His unmanly timidity brought disgrace on himself and the city. Years later, both Aeschines and Dinarchus would pursue this theme and charge Demosthenes, probably slanderously, that he fled the battlefield of Chaeronea.¹¹ In the present speech, however, Demosthenes' cowardice served to contrast him with Aeschines. The antithesis between his embarrassing speechlessness and Aeschines' brilliant delivery was a product of the rhetoric of competition. It turned the jurors into spectators of a contest in public speaking and service to the state, and demanded they proclaim Aeschines the winner and manlier than his weak-kneed adversary.

The genre of the funeral orations shows too an inclination to construe contests, win them, and when necessary, circumvent defeats, on both the individual and the communal levels. The funeral oration (*epitaphios*) was a speech delivered on the occasion of a state funeral given by the democratic city to the fallen of its wars. The speakers would generally commend the Athenian community, as opposed to

individuals, on showing unsurpassed courage, justice, leadership and similar masculine or desirable attributes. They would praise the dead for their excellence and call upon the living to emulate them.¹²

Agonistic values and concepts affected both audience and speaker.¹³ The latter, whose choice by the city to deliver the speech had already distinguished him from other public speakers, still felt the need to highlight his skills by putting them in a competitive context (cf. Thuc. 2.34.6). The speaker of the Lysian funeral oration commenced his speech by offering guidelines on how to assess his performance.¹⁴ He begins by asking his audience for their indulgence. The city has given the speaker only a short notice to prepare the speech, because no words could match the deeds of the dead or their *aretē* in any case: 'Yet even though my speech is about them, the contest (*agōn*) is not with their deeds but with others who spoke about them previously'. He adds that the *aretē* of the dead warriors had left much to be said about and acted upon, and that previous speakers said many fine things but also left out others (Lys. 2.1–2). The speaker thus frames the contest and identifies his rivals. The Athenians should be fair in evaluating his speech because the contestant is handicapped by the short preparation time, presumably, through no fault of his own.¹⁵ It was almost a truism that words ranked below deeds in the measurement of man, and that in deeds the fallen could only stand at the top. By removing the dead from the contest, the speaker both pays them homage and narrows down the field to rhetorical skill. His rivals are past eulogists, and the speaker grants that they have contributed to the fame of the dead, but also claims that they have omitted much. The last claim justifies his attempt to be original, but it also makes one wonder how many of those attending the ceremony could recall past eulogies in order to test this assertion, or were motivated to judge his speech in comparison with others and find it lacking. The result of this rhetorical contest was largely fixed.¹⁶

Demosthenes, who eulogized the Athenian war dead in the Battle of Chaeronea (Dem. 60), found a different way to distinguish the oratorical contest from other competitions and to disqualify potential rivals to his claim to excellence.¹⁷ He argues that his choice by the people to speak of the dead cannot be compared to other competitions. Wealth, power, zeal, athletic skills, and luck are sufficient to win a man a contest in sport or in leiturgical services (the spending of private money on public functions voluntarily or by compulsion). But for him to win reputation and favor through speech, he needs the listeners' cooperation and good will (60.13–14). In this way Demosthenes simultaneously pays tribute to the democratic notion of public persuasion that empowers the audience rather than the speaker and ingratiates himself to his hearers. But he also argues that his *agōn* is tougher and more participatory than other competitions. By distinguishing his performance as more challenging, and by co-opting the audience into his competitive effort, Demosthenes ensures his victory.¹⁸

Surely, the Athenian audience could see through both Lysias' and Demosthenes' avowed concern about the magnitude of their task or other conventional means of *captatio benevolentiae*. They willingly played the role of understanding judges because they were complying with the rules of this fictitious contest. Ostensibly, speaker and *polis* would share the prize. In practice, the speaker did not have to proclaim himself a winner because the occasion dictated that the audience could watch only a solo performance.¹⁹

The rhetorical contest complemented the theme of the speeches, which was the superiority of the imagined or ideal Athens. The orators promoted the manly distinction of the city and the fame of its fallen warriors, usually by placing them above others in merit. Lysias ranks Athens first among the Greeks in the active and courageous pursuit of justice and military prowess. Similarly to other orators, he uses the stock myth of Heracles' children, who were given shelter at Athens from their persecutors, to illustrate the Athenians' selflessness when, as opposed to other Greeks, they risked their lives in defense of the weak and the oppressed (Lys. 2.11–16). In fact, they did even better than Heracles, who had failed to defeat an enemy that the Athenians vanquished.²⁰ The speaker notes how Athens met danger regardless of the strength of her enemies, and pursued the manly ideals of independence and honor by refusing to be in their allies' debt (Lys. 2.20–26). In the Persian wars, the Athenians set standards for true courage and showed their worth in combat, where men are defined and tested. Even those who were too young or too old to go on a campaign had displayed bravery and discipline on the battlefield as happened in one campaign against Corinth. Then and in other enterprises, they earned their reputation for *aretē* and fame the manly way: 'by means of many toils (*ponoi*), most evident contests, and glorious courage they made Greece free and showed the greatness of their fatherland' (Lys. 2.55). While envy of others' possessions characterized Athens' enemies in the Corinthian war, the absence of self-interest and a readiness to put themselves in danger were the marks of the Athenian *agathoi andres* and of the community that bred such men (Lys. 2.11, 16, 20–23, 49–50, 67).²¹

In a speech eulogizing the dead of Chaeronea, Demosthenes notes that the courage of the young Athenians who died in this battle was not the sheer boldness that is typical of youth, but the valor that makes a man choose to risk his own life in full awareness of the consequences (60.17).²² Using the agonistic means of ranking and contrast he seeks to link Athenian democracy to the masculine courage of its citizens, and argues that democratic principles and mechanisms make democracy manlier than oligarchy or monarchy (60.25–26).

Demonstrating worth by outranking others characterized also Hyperides' funeral oration for the Athenian dead in the war against Macedonia in 322 (Hyp. 6). The speaker valorized the fallen Athenian general, Leosthenes, by placing him above rivals to fame. He praised the general for surpassing the heroes of the Trojan and Persian wars, because he had fought a stronger army. Unlike his predecessors, he had greater courage, gave better advice, and conferred greater benefits on the city (6.35–40).²³

The outcome of all these claims to supremacy was to strengthen the patriotic identity and masculine self-esteem of the listeners. As descendants of valorous ancestors, or as contemporaries and comrades of brave fallen soldiers, the Athenians partook in their manliness and reaffirmed it. In the funeral orations, the results of the competition over courage and valor were known in advance if only because the audience was simultaneously a contestant, a witness, and a judge.

The rhetoric of agonistic masculinity allowed speakers to praise the fallen even after they had been defeated in battle, a result which normally meant a loss of honor and lower ranking than the victor in worth.²⁴

Lysias lays the blame for the Spartan defeat of Athens in the Battle of Aegospotamoi on the Athenian generals, or, similar to Homer and the archaic poets, ascribes it to the gods (2.58). In this way, the defeat tells nothing of the *aretē* of the Athenian

dēmos. He goes on to state that the exiles of oligarchy, who fought to restore democracy in Athens in 404/3, and who emulated their ancestors' valor, showed that the city's past misfortunes were not due to its enemies' *aretē*. Even the shame of this military disaster was not really a disgrace but served as an incentive to fight for free and united Athens. Lastly, the fact the exiles were able to return home in spite of the opposition of fellow citizens, the Spartans, and other opponents, showed that united, the city would have been able to contend with the enemy at war (2.62–65). It was not uncommon for the vanquished to retain their pride by scoring a hypothetical victory.

Demosthenes' treatment of the Athenian defeat in the Battle of Chaeronea against Philip shows a similar reluctance to equate military loss with inferiority and shame. The speaker asserts that the combatants of both sides, who fulfilled the hoplitic commandment of dying at their posts, shared in the victory. The last remark is less a complement to the Macedonians as forcing on them partners in success. He attributes the enemy's victory to divine power and fate, and so is able to claim that the spirit of the Athenian fallen remained unconquered. If one insists on finding a human cause for the loss, it is the poor leadership of the Theban allies of Athens, but not the performance of the Athenian or even the Theban troops. The speaker also opines confidently that even the enemy will not attribute their victory to their valor or their leaders' daring (*tolma*, but significantly not *andreia*, courage). Indeed, the fact that Philip did not invade Attica following the battle and sued for peace showed his lack of judgment as well as reluctance to contend with the brothers-in-arms of the valorous fallen (60.19–22).

Both Lysias and Demosthenes view battle as a test of honor, courage, and manliness, but also strive to devalue the significance of test's results. When fates or the generals' incompetence decides who wins or loses, what matters is the contestants' performance rather than their success.²⁵ Hence the placing of the fallen of the victorious Macedonian and of vanquished Athenian on par, or detecting in Philip's decision not to punish Athens, not magnanimity, or political and tactical considerations, but a fear of her brave warriors. With self-conviction both speakers and their audiences distinguish between real and moral victory, because the occasion of a state funeral and the Athenian legacy of primacy required the production of a perfect winning record and conceding to no one an advantage in manhood and valor.²⁶

In a prosecution speech, which borrows motifs and style from the funeral orations, Lycurgus goes even further than Demosthenes. While the latter acknowledges that in war there are victors and vanquished (*hettasthai*) and praises them equally (Dem. 60.19; cf. 18.208), Lycurgus forcefully argues that those who died standing their ground in the cause of freedom were not defeated (*oukh hettēthentes*). Acknowledging the paradox of a victorious loser, the speaker gives nevertheless the fallen on the defeated side the prize of freedom and *aretē* which *andres agathoi* are awarded in war. Men who did not give in to fear when the enemy charged and died nobly cannot be said to have been defeated, he says (1.47–49). Clearly, the ranking of motives and military courage above the final results worked in favor of those who lost the battle.²⁷

These orators' treatment of defeat should be contrasted with their handling of successful campaigns. Lysias, Demosthenes, and Lycurgus, all discuss the glorious record of Athens' military victories that shows the citizens' valor, patriotism, sense of justice, altruism, and a host of other manly attributes.²⁸ The city's victories are never

attributed to fate, divine will, or the enemy's poor generalship. Both community and speakers willingly cooperated in applying a double standard to the rules of contests and to its rhetoric.

Forensic speakers made their own contribution to the *polis*' eagerness to distant itself from taking responsibility for military defeat and its cultural meaning. In contrast to the funeral orations that deny defeat its disgrace, they stress the shame and the sufferings it brought, but use them to incriminate legal adversaries for inflicting these evils on the community or for not sharing in them. Thus Lycurgus charges the general Lysicles, who was one of the Athenian commanders in the fateful Battle of Chaeronea, of being responsible for the death and capture of many citizens, for the raising of a trophy over the city, and for the enslavement of Greece. He calls the defendant 'a reminder of the fatherland's shame and disgrace', and wonders how he has the nerve to live or walk about in the Agora. The jurors must have shared these sentiments because they condemned Lysicles to death (Diod. 16.88.1–2). In another speech, Lycurgus charged the Athenian Leocrates with desertion or treasonable activity, and described defeated Athens in the wake of Chaeronea as a city in fear, pitiable, and compelled to take desperate, even ignoble, measures of self-preservation (1.37–43). Yet the *polis*' distress and humiliation are never linked to the performance of its defeated army. Rather, they serve to augment the villainy of Leocrates, who had left the city in the lurch. The Athenian jurors are thus given an opportunity to vent their wrath on a man, who, unlike his compatriots, 'did not have the courage to share our grief for the fatherland's sufferings' (1.43).

Aeschines, too, tried to make Demosthenes the scapegoat for the city's defeat at Chaeronea. At various places in his prosecution speech against a proposal to honor Demosthenes for his public service, he contrasts Athens of old, the Greeks' leader and protector, with the humiliating present when she is forced to fight for her own protection. He blames Demosthenes, who advocated fighting Philip, with responsibility for the orphaning of Athenian children, and asserts that honoring him is like setting a trophy for Athens' defeat in one of the most visible places in the city (3.134, 155–156; cf. Din. 1.12). But he makes a point of distinguishing between corrupt and cowardly Demosthenes and the brave Athenians whom he had sent to battle, and deplores the orator's brazenness in praising their valor and in claiming honor for himself (3.152; cf. 3.245, 253). Like Lycurgus, he tries to evoke thus the jurors' patriotic and manly duty to punish and shame the man who is an anomaly in the city of the brave, and who is responsible for the disgraceful consequences of their losing the battle.

In his response to Aeschines' speech, Demosthenes seizes upon the latter's highlighting the outcomes of the battle to attack him for violating the national consensus that battles are decided by divine will and that their results have no bearing on the Athenians' character. In his view, Athens should have gone to war with Philip even with the clear foreknowledge of defeat because of her commitment to past and future generations to maintain the city's reputation (*doxa*). Giving up on Athenian leadership position over the Greeks would have been a betrayal and tantamount to a spit in the face (18.199–205). Demosthenes thus replaces the dishonor subsequent on defeat with the honorable shame of abandoning worthy causes such as freedom, honor, fame, primacy, and other manly ideals. By accusing Aeschines of directing attention to the military loss, the speaker puts his audience in an epitaphiotic state of

mind, which allows them to put the contestants' motives and conduct ahead of their record.²⁹

2 Contesting the Contest and the Prize

Demosthenes' and Aeschines' speeches demonstrate the susceptibility of the Athenian competitive ethos to rhetorical manipulation. But while neither they nor other speakers questioned the validity of the contest of war as a measure of manhood and worth, the evaluative merit of other competitions was less secured. This gave speakers considerable latitude in claiming superiority over others or denigrating their accomplishments.

One means of gaining distinction while devaluing others was to place contests or prizes in a hierarchical order. In an erotic essay attributed to Demosthenes (61), which was written by a lover to a prospective beloved named Epicrates, the author commends the youth on his choice of competition. Epicrates competed in the *apobatēs*, a chariot race, which included dismounting the chariot and running in armor. The speaker says that unlike other sport events, which are open to slaves and aliens, this contest is restricted to free citizens and to the best men (*bellistoi*). Discounting practicing for the foot race as contributing nothing to one's manliness and courage, and training in boxing as destructive to body and mind, the speaker praises the youth for choosing the most solemn (*semnotaton*) and beautiful (or noblest: *kalliston*) of all contests, the one that resembles war the most, and which is deserving of the greatest of prizes.³⁰ The speaker's praises are saturated with elitist attitudes, and his ranking of competitions and the preparations for them in prestige and degrees of manliness should not be viewed as universal. Yet, his assertions also demonstrate the tactic of denigrating rivals to fame and distinction, winners included, based on slandering their competitions or the preparations for them. We have seen Demosthenes employing a similar technique when he describes the challenges he faces in delivering a funeral oration as greater than those in any other contests.

Aeschines sought not to devalue the contest but its prize. In a prosecution speech against a proposal to crown Demosthenes for his public service, delivered in 330, he treats this honor as an award, and warns the Athenians that granting too many of them, and especially to men who plot to win them (i.e., Demosthenes), cheapens the prizes and depletes the pool of candidates competing for political *aretē* (3.178–180; cf. Dem. 23.203). Based on the perception of public honors as an inducement for men to compete in helping or serving the city, Aeschines argues that awards cease to fulfill their function of separating the better man from the rest, and so benefit the city, if they are too easy to win or to manipulate. Employing the logic of exclusivity similar to that of Epicrates' suitor, Aeschines both depreciates Demosthenes' claim to distinction and tries to deny it to him.

About sixteen years earlier, Demosthenes defended not his winning a prize of honor but losing it. In a speech charging Meidias of treating him hubristically (Dem. 21), he recounted how the latter had labored to underhandedly prevent him and the chorus he produced for his tribe from winning the men's choral competition in the Dionysia of 348. The list of Meidias' nefarious means included attempts, largely unsuccessful, to oppose the lawful release of Demosthenes' choristers from

military service, to destroy Demosthenes' choregal attire and the chorus' golden crowns, to corrupt the chorus' director and the archon in charge, to incite the other chorus-producers to join forces against Demosthenes, to influence the votes of the judges, and to block and nail up the side-scenes. 'So, corrupting the judges for the men's contests in advance . . . he treated my person with insolence, and he was the man most to blame that the tribe which was best in the contest did not win' (21.13–18; trans. MacDowell).³¹ Demosthenes' chief purpose was to illustrate Meidias' insolence and make it an offense against his person, the sacred festival, and the state. But by faulting his legal adversary, Demosthenes could also dispute and excuse his defeat in a contest even though the people had already decided that he had lost it. It should be noted, however, that, except for the unproven allegation of corrupting the judges, all of Meidias' efforts to destroy the chorus' performance had been checked or failed.³²

A different kind of questioning contests and their results was used in courts by applying the norms of the Athenian competitive ethos to legal suits. Generally, the principle of fair contest ordained that the competitors should stand on the same starting line, with advantages and handicaps more or less evenly distributed. Hence, when the evidently strong overcame the weak in a struggle or a feud, he was likely to be perceived as hubristic rather than as the rightful winner, as manlier, or as a better man (e.g., Aes. 1.64). These notions applied to various forms of conflicts, including legal contests or trials (of which the singular is *aggōn*).³³ It was useful, then, to depict a legal opponent as more powerful than oneself and, thus, invalidate his victory in a past legal contest or make it difficult for him to win an ongoing one.

Litigants, accordingly, who claimed to be suffering from the competitive disadvantage of lack of experience in public speaking and litigation, tried to conceal or excuse their legal know-how, and alerted the jurors of their rivals' court maneuvers and judicial or rhetorical expertise. A client of Demosthenes, for example, associates sophists, or teachers of rhetoric, with criminals and dishonest people, and argues that those who employ their services think that they are better and cleverer than others. They wish to use their advantage to dispossess rightful owners of their property by deception and to mislead the jury (Dem. 35.40–41). Besides evoking sympathy to himself, the speaker prejudices the court against his adversary based on the resentment of professional contenders in a world that equates fairness with amateurism.³⁴

Litigants found it equally beneficial to protest that they had been forced, rather than volunteered, to join a legal contest or dispute. Some pleaders, for example, identified themselves as men who led lives of quietude and leisure (*hesukhia* and *skhole*), as unmeddlesome (*apragmōn*), or as non-litigious persons, that is to say, as victims of unwarranted aggression, who sought to avoid a feud.³⁵ In the eyes of some Athenians, such attributes suggested an unmanly reluctance to face the risk involved in the competitive pursuits of honor, revenge, politics, and litigation (Pl. *Republic* 8 549b–50b). But the notion of autonomy and free choice, including of not joining such pursuits, was no less manly or socially approved. Aeschines, for example, defended his infrequent public activity by claiming to have lived a life of *hesukhia* and moderation marked by self-control and resistance to corrupting bribes, both civic and masculine virtues (3.216–220; cf. Dem. 18.308). As in the case of the self-proclaimed ordinary, inexperienced litigant, the purpose of this role-playing was to turn an

alleged weakness into a virtue, because, in Athenian courts, democratic justice and agonistic ethos joined to give a competitive advantage to the self-professed disadvantaged and to the one who, allegedly, was compelled to compete.

The irony in the protests against expert speakers and frequent users of the courts should not escape notice. They come from men who were themselves expert speakers or had hired a speechwriter to write up these complaints. Moreover, the truly unskilled litigant could enlist the help of more proficient supportive speakers, though it was prudent to excuse such resort by pleading deficiency in public speaking.³⁶ Finally, the jurors were surely aware that complaints about unequal standing were intended to court their favor and improve the odds of winning the case. Nevertheless, the concerns litigants raised about their deficiencies were relevant to the jurors' sensitivity about their role and power as judges in a contest, in which one of the contestants violated the ethos of a fair fight or tried to trick and shame not only his adversary but also the judges.

3 Competition in a Democratic State

Speakers' complaints about the nature of the contest and their handicaps were informed by the expectation that, in Athens, democracy, justice, and competition complemented each other. Yet contest and its ethos could also problematize democratic ideology when it rewarded men and ranked them in a descending order of worth. Such hierarchy and distinction did not accord well with a belief in the basic equality of Athenian citizens, including their claims to manliness, merit, and especially honor.³⁷ Thus, a speaker in a speech attributed to Demosthenes reproaches the Athenians for exclusively crediting military victories to their generals and conceding to them honors that belong to all ([Dem.] 13.21–22). Aeschines draws his audience's attention to the absence of generals' names in inscriptions, which, he says, commemorated a victory over the Persians in Thrace in 476/5. He claims that the omission was intentional, and designed to show that the honorary inscriptions belonged to the people and not to the generals (3.183–85; cf. Andoc. 2.17–18). In his funeral speech on the dead of the Lamian war between Athens and Macedonia in 322, Hyperides lavishes praises on the fallen general Leosthenes (6.10–14). He then cautiously adds that praising the general takes nothing away from the praise of the other citizens, that victory in battle belongs to those ready to risk their lives, and that he wishes to pay a tribute both to the general's leadership and to the *aretē* of others (6.15). In reality, the Athenians singled out the generals for their patriotic service and gave them special honors (Lyc. 1.51). But the agonistic view of honor and success as a zero-sum asset, and the democratic ideology of sharing them, especially in relation to the collective effort of war, created a tension and uneasiness about the generals' distinct honors. This tension informed Hyperides' sensitive allocation of praise to both general and army. It allowed the aforementioned Demosthenic speaker to antagonize the *dēmos* and its public officials and to complain that the people gave the latter undue distinction and even allowed them to exploit them. Finally, Aeschines uses this tension in his efforts to prevent the honoring of Demosthenes for his public service. He depicts the honor as excessive, as violating past practices, as detracting from the people's honor, and the honorand as undeserving of it (3.181–187).³⁸

The problematical nexus of contest, democracy, and honor, as well as its rhetorical manipulation, recur in relation to other honors for public service or contribution. Athenian civic ideology expected men, especially from among the elite, to compete with each other on leadership positions or on benefiting the city, moved by the pursuit of honor (*philotimia*) and civic spirit. In return, the city rewarded them with public honor and recognition. These contests, competitiveness, and their rewards were regarded as useful to the city and its democracy. Demosthenes claims that, in Athens, the rivalry, or contest (*hamilla*), among fine men (*andres agathoi*) for prizes awarded by the people guarantees the freedom of the *dēmos* (Dem. 20.108; cf. 102–103). Aeschines concurs. He establishes a direct correlation between the city's international fame and prosperity and intense competitions among publicly spirited citizens over a limited number of prizes of honor. Comparing the contest over 'political *aretē*' to an Olympic sport event, he says, 'I think it is because of its rarity, the fierce competition, the honor, and the immortal renown that come from victory that people choose to risk their bodies, endure more extreme hardship, and face the danger through the end' (3.177–180; trans. Carey).³⁹

Both speakers make these assertions in the interest of their respective cases: Demosthenes, in 355, to discredit a measure intended to abolish past public rewards, and Aeschines, in 330, to discredit a motion to honor Demosthenes. Yet their different purposes and rhetorical tactics are based on the same belief in the benefit of competitive civic contributions.

This belief, however, ran into a host of practical and ideological problems. In reality, there were qualified and wealthy men who sought to spare their resources rather than join the contest in providing public services. In addition, the functional competition over honor and its pursuit (*philotimia*) could easily deteriorate into a dysfunctional ambition to win (*philonikia*) that produced discord instead of public gain. Ideologically, according to norms of reciprocal exchange of favors (*kharis*), the people were expected to express their gratitude to their benefactors and to men who did a great service to the city by honoring them in public.⁴⁰ Such distinctions, however, could stir up the democratic anxiety about granting individuals excessive honor and at the people's expense. It also publicly proclaimed the people's debt to their benefactors. For Athenian men, sensitive of their status and autonomy, this was an awkward situation. The solution was to reverse the status of the parties in the relationship, and so regard the act of honoring as placing the benefactor in debt of gratitude to the people.

Both Aeschines and Demosthenes used this perception in their legal feud over the crowning of Demosthenes. The issue was Aeschines' claim that the motion to announce the crowning of Demosthenes in the Theater of Dionysus during the Dionysia festival was illegal, because according to the law, such proclamations were restricted to meetings of the Assembly.⁴¹ Well aware that Demosthenes would produce another law showing the legality of proclamations in the theater in some cases, he conceded that it was allowed when foreign communities crowned citizens, but only after the Assembly had permitted it. He explained the procedure as intended to place the crowned man in a greater debt of gratitude to the Athenian people than to the foreign *polis* that had initially bestowed the honor on him. Aeschines' interpretation, tendentious as it might have been, reflected the democratic wish to change the honorand's position from creditor to debtor, but also the people's concern to rank

their honors higher than similar rewards in a field inundated by prizes of honor (3.34–47).

Demosthenes' response to Aeschines' legal objection evinced similar sensitivity to the people's status. In addition to producing a law legitimizing the crowning proclamations in the theater, and describing them as highly common and hardly extraordinary, he offered his own explanation of the custom. The proclamation benefited those who bestowed the honor, because it induced the hearers to serve the state, and the praise went more to those who showed gratitude than to the crowned man (18.120; cf. [Plut.] *Moralia* 817b). The speaker's statements reflected the functional perception of the service–honor exchange and the notion that the *dēmos* was a reliable partner in the *kharis* transaction. Yet his interpretation of the honoring act was no less biased than that of his archrival. By focusing on the givers of honor rather than on its recipient, the orator diminished the latter's role and distinction. In other words, Demosthenes told the people that they would lose nothing by honoring him, but would gain many benefactors like him as well as the recognition of their good virtue.

Both Demosthenes and Aeschines agreed on the role of the *dēmos* as judge and distributor of prizes of honor. But in a city where the *dēmos* had the power to give awards, it could also take them away. Demosthenes makes this violation of the ethos of both contest and *kharis* a focal point of his speech *Against Leptines* (20). One of the Athenians' ways of honoring a man for his distinguished public service or contribution was to exempt him and his descendants from certain leiturgical services. In 355, the city's economic distress, or other, hard to decipher reasons, moved the Athenian Leptines to propose a law that abolished such past exemptions and prohibited granting new ones.⁴² Demosthenes, who opposed the measure, argued that the motion was both impractical and immoral. It would not increase the number of leiturgists, but deter future benefactors who expected to be rewarded for helping the city. It would do away with the people's authority to honor through exemptions whomever they wanted; indeed, taking back the reward was not a democratic, but a tyrannical or oligarchic, act. Revoking the rewards would also hurt Athens' reputation because the city would show distrust, deceptiveness, and ingratitude. The *polis* should be truthful and *chrēstos* (honest) and aspire not to money but to noble deeds.⁴³

Demosthenes discussed another potential spoiler of the functional relationship between the *dēmos* and honor-pursuing men, namely, envy (*phthonos*).⁴⁴ In general, envy made one's worthiness a cause of unjustified resentment and even attacks, and so promoted feuds instead of constructive competitions. There were men who rather than appreciate others' success and rightful superiority looked at them with envy or with predisposed hostility.⁴⁵ This was a counter-productive and reproachable attitude, and Demosthenes advised his audience to avoid the fault of envying people who did good to the *polis* more than any other because it was a sign of wickedness by nature (*phuseōs kakias*). He argued that there was nothing further removed from the Athenian *polis* than the shame of envious reputation (20.140; cf. 10, 56, 151). As proof of the city's fair conduct he produced the honors she had given without envy to the war dead, to public benefactors, and to winners of athletic competitions, even though the last were few and attained individual glory. This is how Athens sustained its honor and reputation for justice, excellence, and greatness of spirit (*dikaiosunē, aretē, megalopsukhia*, Dem. 20.141–142). Leptines' law, in contrast, was dishonorable, and evinced envy and discord (20.157).

In this way, Demosthenes endowed the democratic people with the values and qualities of an *anēr agathos*, a moral, civic, and masculine role model.⁴⁶ He also made democracy the guardian of trust, honor, and expediency (cf. Dem. 21.66–67). While discussing the harms that the law would cause past and future contributors to the city's welfare and success, he focused on foreign benefactors and victorious generals or famed politicians. But he also had in mind leiturgists and other men ambitious for honor from the Athenian elite, who presumably would stop competing on being useful to the city if she failed to honor them in return. Thus, based on moral and utilitarian grounds, Demosthenes aimed to persuade the people to vote against a seemingly democratic measure that sought to eliminate the privileged status of some Athenians, and especially of those who, Leptines argued, did not deserve the exemptions (e.g., 20.1). While Leptines probably tried to exploit the tension between competition, honor, justice, and democracy, Demosthenes advised the people to stick to the rules of contest and *kharis* in order to keep them in concert with democracy.

In spite of Demosthenes' or Isocrates' warnings against, complaints about, or apprehensions of, popular envy of accomplished citizens who deserved public appreciation (especially Isoc. 15.4, 31, 141–144), envy of the latter appeared to have been a sentiment more typical of the elite than of the people. Members of this group often complained that their peers received more than their due share of honor, and took initiatives to deprive a rival of his victory and to devalue his award (e.g., Dem. 18, 51, Aes. 3; cf. Dem. 19.227–228). The appeal to the *dēmos* not to be envious often meant a request not to side with an adversary.

Both elite and masses acknowledged, however, the moral pitfalls of envy because they shared an agonistic ethos that deplored it. This ethos was primarily male oriented. It envisioned men and nations competing over who was best or on top in honor, prestige, moral conduct and values, and manliness. It is true that not every Athenian man was affected similarly by this ethos, but the ideology and rhetoric of contest aimed to make almost everybody vulnerable to their power to judge, praise, or harm a man. This power persevered throughout ancient Greek history and for reasons that are too many or complex to be discussed here. I will offer only two possible explanations. The first has to do with tradition. The contest as a way of life and as a worldview was promulgated in literature, rituals, education, and other institutions that helped preserved memories and values. The other reason had to do with contest as an organizing principle. Contest created order out of uncertain situations and helped man understand and arrange his environment.⁴⁷ It defined and regulated conflicts, contained rival arguments, and decided their fate. Contests, thus, helped in removing anxieties and uncertainty and in introducing clarity by defining and ranking participants and claims. It is true that competition could destabilize order by inviting challenges, but as long as the contestants accepted the contest's basic rules, the Greeks could argue, as we have seen, that this institution and its culture benefited them.⁴⁸

Bibliographical Essay

J. Roisman, *The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators* (Berkeley: 2005), investigates Athenian masculine values and perceptions and how the orators used them in their persuasive efforts. Three anthologies discuss different facets of

Greek and Roman masculinity: L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (eds.), *Masculinity and Self-Representation in the Classical Tradition* (London: 1998) and their *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity* (London: 1998) and R. Rosen and I. Sluiter (eds.), *Andreia: Studies in Manliness and Courage in Classical Antiquity* (Leiden, 2003). A.W. Gouldner, *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Thought* (New York: 1965), discusses Greek competitiveness, though his thesis is at times too rigid or inclusive. M. Golden, *Sport and Society in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: 1998) and T.F. Scanlon, *Eros and Greek Athletic* (Oxford: 2002), deal with the cultural and social significance of Greek competitions and sport. D.B. Hawhee, *Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece* (Austin: 2005), regards Greek rhetoric as modeled after athletic practices and values. K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: 1974; repr. Indianapolis: 1994) is still the best account of Athenian social values and concepts, some of which are discussed above. J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: 1989) is a highly influential book on the nature of Athenian political and civic ideology and how it negotiated a relationship between citizens and their leaders. E.M. Harris, *Aeschines and Athenian Politics* (New York: 1995), R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time: A Study in Defeat* (Berkeley: 1993), and Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), deal with the careers and speeches of the two orators mentioned most frequently in this chapter. In spite of recent criticism, the best discussion of the Athenian funeral orations and their imagery is still N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA: 1986).

Notes

- 1 Aristocratic competitiveness: J. Burckhardt, *Greeks and Greek Civilization* (London: 1998), pp. 160–214, O. Murray, *Early Greece*² (Cambridge, MA: 1993), pp. 201–219. For aristocratic competitive values, see, for example, W. Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century* (Lawrence, KS: 1980), pp. 113–177; for its perseverance and adoption, see A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values* (Chicago: 1960), pp. 225–226, and in democratic Athens, see N. Fisher, ‘Gymnasia and Social Mobility in Athens’, in P.A. Cartledge, P. Millett and S. von Reden (eds.), *Kosmos: Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: 1998), pp. 84–104.
- 2 A.W. Gouldner, *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Thought* (New York: 1965), especially pp. 41–132. For the many facets of Greek competitions, see also W.R. Connor, ‘Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression’, *P&P* 119 (1988), pp. 3–29, J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: 1989), pp. 250–251, D.M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality* (New York: 1990), pp. 36–37, M.R. Christ, *The Litigious Athenian* (Baltimore: 1998), pp. 34–39, 160–192, M. Golden, *Sport and Society in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge: 1998) and L. Rubinstein, *Litigation and Cooperation: Supporting Speakers in the Courts of Classical Athens* (Stuttgart: 2000), pp. 19–21, 172–198. Given this study’s limited scope, I shall not deal here with athletic metaphors and the relations between sport and rhetoric, for which see, for example, M. Golden, ‘Demosthenes and the Social Historian’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 168–175.

- 3 I subscribe to the view that Lysias wrote this speech, although he did not deliver it. For the controversy, see V. Frangeskou, 'Tradition and Originality in Some Attic Funeral Orations', *CW* 92 (1999), p. 317 with notes 10–11.
- 4 War and battle termed as *agōn*: Dem. 18.290, 60.20, 25, Lys. 2.34, 55, Hyp. 6.17–20, 23–24, 38–39. See also N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge, MA: 1986), pp. 95–96, T.F. Scanlon, 'Combat and Contest: Athletic Metaphors for Warfare in Greek Literature', in S.J. Bandy (ed.), *Croebus Triumphs: The Alliance of Sport and Arts* (San Diego: 1988), pp. 230–244, D.B. Hawhee, *Bodily Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece* (Austin: 2005), *passim*. For the anthropologist David Gilmore, competition and testing are, in essence, what separates man's and woman's rights to their respective gender: *Manhood in the Making: Cultural Concepts of Masculinity* (New Haven: 1990), pp. 11–12.
- 5 The present study relies on, but also revises, and significantly expands on, my earlier discussions of the subject: 'The Funeral Oration and the Rhetoric of Winning a Contest', in R.P. Bozón, P.A. Cavallero, A. Romano and M.E. Steinberg (eds.), *Los Estudios Clásicos ante el Cambio de Milenio: Vida Muerte Cultura 2* (Buenos Aires: 2002), pp. 375–383 and my *The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators* (Berkeley: 2005), *passim*.
- 6 At 1.109, however, Lyncurgus concedes that at Thermopylae the Spartans surpassed all others in courage. For a discussion of these speakers' different perceptions of courage, see R. Balot, 'Pericles' Anatomy of Democratic Courage', *AJP* 122 (2001), pp. 505–525 and 'Courage in the Democratic *Polis*', *CQ*² 54 (2004), pp. 406–423.
- 7 Heracles as a 'super male': N. Loraux, *The Experiences of Tiresias: The Feminine and the Greek Man* (Princeton: 1995), pp. 116–139. Athenian leaders better than Heracles' descendants: Lyc. 1.105.
- 8 The literature on these evaluative terms is vast. Helpful here are Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, Index, s.v. 'Agathos', 'Agathos politēs' and K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Berkeley: 1974), especially pp. 63–65, 235–242. Comparative language: cf. Lys. 16.13, Is. 7.38, Dem. 51.7, 60.4, 8, 61.1, 21–22, and Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, pp. 190–192.
- 9 For the affair, see D.M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes: On the False Embassy (Oration 19)* (Oxford: 2000), pp. 299–301; cf. T. Paulsen, *Die Parapresbeia-Reden des Demosthenes und des Aeschines* (Trier: 1999), pp. 439–440, for the text of Demosthenes 19.235.
- 10 A different version of these events is reported in Plut. *Demosthenes* 16.1. For the episode and the authenticity of Aeschines' report, see A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*² 2 (Leipzig: 1885–87), pp. 202–204, R. Sealey, *Demosthenes and his Time: A Study in Defeat* (Berkeley: 1993), pp. 151, 304 n. 70, E.M. Harris, *Aeschines and Athenian Politics* (New York: 1995), pp. 57–60 and Paulsen, *Die Parapresbeia-Reden*, pp. 313–325, 450–451.
- 11 See Aes. 3.148, 152, 159, 175–176, 187, 244, 253, Din. 1.12, 71, 79, 81; Ian Worthington, *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus* (Ann Arbor: 1992), pp. 147–148, rejects the charge.
- 12 For the genre of the funeral oration and the aspects discussed here, see C. Carey, Chapter 16, along with Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, especially pp. 59–61, 95–97, 105–107, 184–188. See also J.E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches in the Classical City* (New York: 1981), pp. 157–158, K. Prinz, *Epitaphios Logos: Struktur, Funktion und Bedeutung der Bestattungsreden im Athen des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main: 1997), Frangeskou, 'Tradition and Originality', pp. 315–336, J. Herrman, *The Athenian Funeral Orations* (Newburyport, MA: 2004), pp. 1–8.
- 13 Indeed, it appears that games formed part of the ceremonies: Lys. 2.80, Pl. *Menexenus* 249d.
- 14 See n. 3 on the authorship of Lysias 2. For the following, see also C. Carey, Chapter 16: it has been encouraging to find out that our analyses often complement each other.

- 15 The complaint on the short preparation time may have been a commonplace or indicates an authentic difficulty, depending on the observer: Pl. *Menexenus* 235c–d, Isoc. 4.13, Dem. 60.1, 13–14, and see Ziolkowski, *Thucydides*, pp. 24, 132, P. Tsitsiridis, *Platons Menexenos: Einleitung, Text, und Kommentar* (Stuttgart: 1998), pp. 159–160 and C. Carey, Chapter 16 n. 14.
- 16 See Plato's wry remark at *Menexenus* 235d about the speaker's easy challenge, which was approved by Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14.11 1415b30–32. Frangeskou, 'Tradition and Originality', p. 318, argues that Lysias is singular in putting his accomplishment in an agonistic context, but cf. Demosthenes below, and Pl. *Menexenus* 239b–c.
- 17 The authenticity of Demosthenes' speech has been questioned, but I am in agreement with those who find enough indications to support it or not enough to exclude it: Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, pp. 8–10, 346, notes 62–63, Frangeskou, 'Tradition and Originality', especially pp. 317 n. 10 and 329–336, Herrman, *Athenian Funeral Orations*, p. 63 and Ian Worthington, 'The Authorship of the Demosthenic *Epitaphios*', *Museum Helveticum* 60 (2003) pp. 152–157.
- 18 In contrast, Pericles portrays his audience more as an adversary (Thuc. 2.35.1–3). Demosthenes appeals here to the cooperation of non-Athenian hearers, but he presupposes that the Athenian in the audience are familiar with the injunction to accord him good will. For persuasion and power in democracy, see Dem. 18.277, 19.340, and Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, pp. 139–141.
- 19 Contrast these speakers' modesty with Isocrates' more revealing aim to silence the competition in his *Panegyricus*: 4.4; cf. 8.
- 20 Myth of the Heraclidae: Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, pp. 67–68, Frangeskou, 'Tradition and Originality', pp. 320–323. For Athens' piety and altruism, cf. Pl. *Menexenus* 244e–245a, Tsitsiridis, *Platons Menexenos*, pp. 341–343. For the theme of justice in symbouleutic speeches, see S. Usher, Chapter 15.
- 21 Cf. Isoc. 4 *passim*, 7.74, Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, pp. 166–167.
- 22 Cf. Hyp. 6.28–29, Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, pp. 100–101, 116, and Ober, *Mass and Elite*, p. 262.
- 23 Even those who died fighting the Macedonians in 322 improved the previously glorious record of their compatriots: Hyp. 6.3, 19, 23. Hyperides' focus on Leosthenes in his funeral oration deviated from the tradition of the genre that espoused collective, rather than individual, accomplishments: Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, pp. 110–112, S. Usher, *Greek Oratory: Tradition and Originality* (Oxford: 1999), pp. 335–337. On generals, including Leosthenes, as masculine models, see Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, pp. 120–121.
- 24 For the following, cf. E. Lévy, *Athènes devant la Défaite de 404: Histoire d'une Crise Idéologique* (Paris: 1976), pp. 40–43, Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, pp. 134, 138–141, A. Wolpert, *Remembering Defeat: Civil War and Civic Memory in Ancient Athens* (Baltimore: 2002), pp. 120–122.
- 25 For ascribing defeat to nonhuman agencies and devaluating success, see also Dem. 18.193–194, 200, 208, 289–290, 303; cf. Hyp. 6.13, Thuc. 2.87.2.
- 26 Frangeskou, 'Tradition and Originality', p. 333, notes that Demosthenes does not refer to Philip and the Macedonians by name. The enemy is thus deprived of both victory and reputation. For more devaluations of enemies' victory, see, in addition to the previous note, Dem. 18.146; cf. S. Usher, *Greek Orators V: Demosthenes On the Crown* (Warminster: 1993), p. 254.
- 27 Gouldner, *Enter Plato*, pp. 50, 82, deals with the wish to deny defeat, but his position that the Greeks were result-oriented and that they disregarded the participants' intentions and circumstances ignores the funeral orations.

- 28 Lys. 2.4–53, Dem. 60.6–11, Lyc. 1.70–73, 104, 108–110; cf. Hyp. 6.35; Pl. *Menexenus* 240a–246a.
- 29 Cf. C. Carey, ‘Propaganda and Competition in Oratory’, in K.A.E. Enenkel and I.L. Pfeijffer (eds.), *The Manipulative Mode: Political Propaganda in Antiquity. A Collection of Case Studies* (Leiden: 2005), pp. 88–91.
- 30 Dem. 61.22–25; cf. Isoc. 16.33. For the Athenian *apobates*, its elitist character, and the hierarchical culture of contest, see E.N. Gardiner, *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals* (London: 1910), pp. 237–239; N.B. Crowther, ‘The *Apobates* Reconsidered (Demosthenes lxi 23–29)’, *JHS* 111 (1991), pp. 174–176, and Golden, *Sport and Society*, p. 3.
- 31 Trans. D.M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes Against Meidias (Oration 21)* (Oxford: 1990), p. 101; cf. Dem. 21.62–69, 147.
- 32 For the affair, see MacDowell, *Demosthenes Against Meidias*, pp. 236–243, 282–287, P. Wilson, *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City and the Stage* (Cambridge: 2000), pp. 156–166.
- 33 For the expectation of fairness and equal opportunities in competitions and trials, see, for example, Isoc. 18.12, Xenophon, *Cyropaedia* 2.3.8, 2.3.11–15; cf. Astydamas [II] in B. Snell (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (Göttingen: 1986), 1.60 T2a with D.L. Page, *Further Greek Epigrams* (Cambridge: 1981), pp. 33–34 and M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford: 1991), pp. 83–84. See R. Garner, *Law and Society in Classical Athens* (New York: 1987), pp. 75–83, for the influence of the notion of symmetry and balanced antitheses on court procedure and rhetoric, and Golden, *Sport and Society*, especially pp. 139–140 and 160–161, for using the principle of approximation among contestants in order to exclude competitors from a contest.
- 34 Resentment of legal experts: S. Todd, ‘Lysias against Nikomachus: The Fate of the Expert in Athenian Law’, in L. Foxhall and D.E. Lewis (eds.), *Greek Law in Its Political Setting: Justification Not Justice* (Oxford: 1996), pp. 115–116, 131. Claiming judicial disadvantage: Lys. 12.3, 19.2, Is. 9.35, 10.1, Dem. 23.4–5, 27.2, 36.53, 48.36, Aes. 1.175, Hyp. 1.20; cf. Lys. 17.1, Dem. 19.339, 32.31, 58.65, Aes. 1.141, Isoc. 15.258.
- 35 In addition to the previous note, see, for example, Ant. 3.2.1, Lys. 7.1, 12.3, Dem. 40.32, 42.12, 54.24; cf. Lys. 17.1, Dem. 24.6, 37.43, with L.B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford: 1986), especially pp. 106–110, P. Demont, *La Cité Grecque Archaïque et Classique et l’Idéal de tranquillité* (Paris: 1990), MacDowell, *Demosthenes against Meidias*, p. 304, and Christ, *Litigious Athenian*, pp. 193–224.
- 36 For example, [Dem.] 59.14, Hyp. 1.20, and see generally Rubinstein, *Litigation and Cooperation*, *passim*.
- 37 Cf. Wilson, *Athenian Institution of the Khoregia*, p. 165, Gouldner, *Enter Plato*, p. 48; in traditional Mediterranean societies: J. Pitt-Rivers, ‘Postscript: The Place of Grace in Anthropology’, in G.J. Peristiani and J. Pitt-Rivers (eds.), *Honor and Grace in Anthropology* (Chicago: 1992), p. 242. For equality in democratic Athens, cf. K.A. Raafaub, ‘Athens: Equalities and Inequalities in Athenian Democracy’, in J. Ober and C. Hedrick (eds.), *Demokratia: A Conversation of Democracies, Ancient and Modern* (Princeton: 1996), pp. 139–174. The ideology of political equality was accompanied by the recognition, as P. Cartledge, ‘Comparatively Equal’, in Ober and Hedrick, *Demokratia* (cited this note), p. 178, puts it, that ‘in hard political praxis the operative criterion governing equality’s implementation is not sameness or identity but rather similitude or likeness’. J.T. Roberts, ‘Athenian Equality: A Constant Surrounded by Flux’, in Ober and Hedrick, *Demokratia* (cited this note), p. 189, notes that ‘economic inequality inevitably undermines high-sounding professions of equality in the political realm’.
- 38 Demosthenes raises similar objections in 352 against honoring Charidemus of Oreus: 23.196–198.
- 39 Trans. C. Carey, *Aeschines* (Austin: 2000), p. 226.

- 40 For example, Dem. 23.197, Aes. 3.182. For *philotimia* and *philonikia*, see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality*, pp. 229–236, D. Whitehead, ‘Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: *Philotimia* in Democratic Athens’, *Cl. & Med.* 34 (1983), pp. 55–74 and especially Wilson, *Athenian Institution of the Khoregeia*, pp. 144–197. For *kharis* and its political meaning, see conveniently, Roisman, *Rhetoric of Manhood*, pp. 153–156.
- 41 On rhetoric and arguments based on laws in this and other cases, see J.P. Sickinger, Chapter 19.
- 42 Sealey, *Demosthenes*, pp. 113, 117, 126–127, E. Badian, ‘The Road to Prominence’, in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Demosthenes: Statesman and Orator* (London: 2000), pp. 27–28. For the following see Wilson, *Athenian Institution of the Khoregeia*, pp. 59, 178–179.
- 43 Dem. 20.2, 4, 6–7, 10, 13, 15–17, 103, 120, 164; cf. 20.65–66, 134–135, 148, 154–155, Aes. 3.46.
- 44 On aspects of envy relevant to the present case, see P. Walcot, *Envy and the Greeks: A Study of Human Behaviour* (Warminster: 1978), and especially N. Fisher, ‘“Let Envy be Absent”: Envy, Liturgies and Reciprocity in Athens’, in D. Konstan and N.K. Rutter (eds.), *Envy, Spite and Jealousy: The Rivalrous Emotions in Ancient Greece* (Edinburgh: 2003), pp. 181–216, D.L. Cairns, ‘The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece’, in Konstan and Rutter, *Envy, Spite and Jealousy* (cited this note), pp. 235–252, S. Saïd, ‘Envy and Emulation in Isocrates’, in Konstan and Rutter, *Envy, Spite and Jealousy* (cited this note), pp. 217–234.
- 45 Lys. 24.1–3, Isoc. 12.16, Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.98, Cairns ‘Politics of Envy’, pp. 239–240, Saïd, ‘Envy and Emulation’, pp. 221–222.
- 46 See Fisher, ‘“Let Envy be Absent”’, especially pp. 191–212, who argues against an elitist reading of Demosthenes’ statements and sees here an appeal to values shared by mass and elite; cf. Ober, *Mass and Elite*, pp. 289–292. For Aristotle’s discussion of popular envy, see Fisher, ‘“Let Envy be Absent”’, pp. 183–185, Cairns, ‘Politics of Envy’, pp. 240–242; cf. D. Konstan, Chapter 27.
- 47 Cf. Golden, *Sport and Society*, pp. x, 4, 176, who emphasizes the hierarchical function of competitions.
- 48 I wish to thank Ian Worthington for his useful comments.

CHAPTER TWENTY-SEVEN

Rhetoric and Emotion

David Konstan

If you wish to consult an ancient Greek or Roman discussion of the emotions, the place to look is not – as one might have expected – in a treatise on psychology, or in classical terms, ‘On the Soul’ (for example, Aristotle’s *De anima*), but rather an essay on rhetoric. First and foremost, on the Greek side, there is Aristotle’s own *Rhetoric*, with its detailed treatment, in Book 2, of a dozen or more different passions. In Latin literature, Cicero examines the emotions in his youthful *De inventione*, as well as in other essays on oratory, although he also treats them at some length in his philosophical dialogue, *The Tusculan Disputations* (especially Books 3 and 4). As late as the third century AD, a certain Apsines – if that is his true name¹ – surveyed the emotions in elaborate detail as part of an extensive handbook on rhetoric (only a portion survives, chiefly the part dealing with pity).

It is not difficult to see why the emotions were of interest to writers on rhetoric. If an orator was to be convincing, he had to know how to arouse or allay the passions of his audience, whether in the courtroom, the Assembly, or some other public forum, and the composers of manuals duly undertook to catalogue the best ways of doing so. This, in turn, required at least an elementary understanding of what emotions are and how they function. The emotions may also affect human behavior in general, which is why they are discussed at least to some extent in treatises on ethics, for example Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. But the close connection between rhetoric and the emotions in ancient Greece was not merely an accident of scientific compartmentalization. Classical Greece was an intensely verbal culture, and from the very beginning of Greek literature it is words that are the stimuli to emotion: Achilles’ great wrath in the *Iliad* is a consequence of what he considers an intolerable insult on the part of Agamemnon, and the events that lead to Achilles’ fateful withdrawal from the battle at Troy take the form of speeches. The intimate connection between emotion and discourse, in turn, contributed decisively to the way the Greeks conceived of and defined both emotion in general and the several specific passions. Richard Lazarus, one of the founders of the modern ‘appraisal theory’ of the emotions, which takes

evaluation of a situation to be a fundamental constituent of emotional behavior, observes that ‘those who favor a cognitive-mediational approach must also recognize that Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* more than two thousand years ago applied this kind of approach to a number of emotions in terms that seem remarkably modern’.² If cognition, as opposed to instinctive reaction, indeed plays so central a role in Aristotle’s analysis of emotion, the reason in no small part is precisely the tendency to treat emotion in the context of dialogue and persuasion.

This is not the place for a survey of the ways in which emotions are elicited and assuaged in classical Greek literature as a whole, though the results of such an investigation would be illuminating for the present discussion. In what follows, I propose rather to concentrate on two kinds of evidence: first, technical treatises, above all Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, that provide explicit definitions of the emotions and instructions on how to manipulate them in an audience, and second, forensic and deliberative speeches of the sort written by the major Attic orators. I begin with a brief consideration of how emotions were analyzed by thinkers prior to Aristotle. I then turn to Aristotle himself, who has, in the *Rhetoric*, bequeathed to us the single most important and influential essay on the emotions produced in classical antiquity. After examining Aristotle’s conception of the emotions, both as a whole and severally, I consider the ways in which the orators in fact appealed to them, in part with a view to illustrating Aristotle’s treatment, in part also to test and correct Aristotle’s view against the evidence of ancient speeches themselves. Finally, I examine the views developed by the Stoics, who, in the aftermath of Aristotle, constitute the other great school of thought concerning the emotions.

1 Before Aristotle

At the very beginning of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle makes it clear both that there were earlier works on rhetoric, now lost to us, and that they too dealt with the emotions; indeed, he faults them precisely for devoting excessive attention to this topic. Thus, he opens his discussion by remarking (1.1, 1354a11–24) that:

the framers of the current treatises on rhetoric have constructed but a small portion of that art. The modes of persuasion are the only true constituents of the art: everything else is accessory. These writers, however, say nothing about enthymemes [that is, proofs based on hypothetical premises], which are the substance of rhetorical persuasion, but deal mainly with non-essentials. The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case . . . It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity – one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it.³

Unfortunately, there do not survive any of the treatises that worried Aristotle for their undue focus upon the emotions. The *Rhetoric to Alexander*, which has been transmitted to us as part of the Aristotelian corpus but is now generally ascribed to Anaximenes and was probably written a decade or two before Aristotle’s own treatise, has little to say about the emotions.⁴ There are references in Plato and Aristotle to a work called *Eleoi*, or ‘Pities’, attributed to the sophist Thrasymachus, which may have taken the form of a rhetorical handbook but perhaps was more like a collection of

model topics or examples. The orators themselves, of course, give evidence of the appeal to emotion, and to pity in particular, as a means of persuasion from the late fifth century on down; the practice was common enough to be satirized by Aristophanes in his comedy *Wasps*, produced in 422 (cf. 572, 975–978).

Perhaps the most explicit statement concerning the role of emotion in persuasion that survives today is to be found in the famous display speech, *Praise of Helen*, by the eminent orator Gorgias (second half of the fifth century). Gorgias testifies to the extraordinary power of words to move an audience. As he puts it, ‘Speech is a great prince. With tiny body and strength unseen, he performs marvellous works. He can make fear cease, take away pain, instill joy, increase pity . . . For just as various drugs expel various humours from the body . . . so some speeches give pain, some pleasure, some fear, some confidence’ (8, 14).⁵ It is just this magical influence of speech to which Gorgias appeals in order to exonerate Helen from blame; since persuasion is irresistible, the fault for Helen’s seduction must be laid entirely to the persuader, that is, Paris. Rhetoric works on the mind and the emotions like a drug, bewitching the hearer rather than persuading through dispassionate argument (see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9 p. 117 and A. López Eire, Chapter 22 p. 340).

As is well known, Plato harbored a deep distrust of rhetoric, which he compared disparagingly to cooking: it was not, he argued in the *Gorgias*, properly speaking a craft at all, with specific standards and goals and a regard for truth, but rather a form of flattery, catering to the taste of the masses without regard for what was right or beneficial. It may be in part for this reason that Plato never developed an analysis of the emotions, or even distinguished ‘emotion’ as a clear and independent psychological category. When he does mention such passions as pity, he is deeply suspicious of their effect on human behavior. A well-known example is the passage in the *Republic* (606a), in which Socrates warns that, when we watch characters lament in tragedies:

the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain, and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves. For after feeding fat the emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings (trans. Shorey).

It is just when reason has relaxed its hold that the emotions are aroused, and the passionate part of the soul feels authorized to indulge in the pleasure proper to it. Pity and similar emotions grow simply by being allowed to find expression; were reason in control, it would prohibit them as inappropriate responses to the vicissitudes of life.

2 Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*

When Aristotle remarks, in the opening statement of his *Rhetoric*, that ‘it is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity – one might as well warp a carpenter’s rule before using it’, he would appear to share the queasiness of Plato in

respect to the role of emotion in persuasion. And yet, in the chapter immediately following this (1.2, 1358a13–18), Aristotle explicitly includes among the basic strategies of persuasion the effect that is produced in the audience ‘when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgements when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject will be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions’ (trans. Roberts). And so it is, and at some length, comprising virtually half of the second of the three books of Aristotle’s treatise.

It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Aristotle has flatly contradicted himself in his preamble to the *Rhetoric*. Jonathan Barnes supposes that the two chapters were alternatives, one of them intended to replace the other.⁶ George Kennedy, in turn, prefers to ‘acknowledge frankly that chapter 1 is inconsistent with what follows’ (he suggests that the two passages were addressed to different audiences).⁷ William Fortenbaugh (Chapter 9 pp. 117–118) offers two possible explanations of the tension between the two chapters. First, he proposes that ‘1.1 introduces an ideal rhetoric that limits itself to arguing the issue. That ideal is put aside in 1.2, where Aristotle turns to real political oratory, which includes emotional appeal’. But he rejects this interpretation in favor of the idea that ‘1.2 and 2.1–11 reflect a development in Aristotle’s thought’; indeed, Fortenbaugh suggests that Aristotle first developed his analysis of the emotion in a distinct treatise, now lost, and then ‘transferred it to his course of lectures on rhetoric’.

The question is perhaps impossible to resolve, but it is clear that when Aristotle came to treat the several emotions in some detail in the *Rhetoric* (2.1–11), he no longer believed – if indeed he ever did – that the emotions might be elicited or appeased independently of the kind of dialectical arguments with which the *Rhetoric* is chiefly concerned. His critique of earlier writers on rhetoric was principally, as we have seen, that they ‘say nothing about enthymemes’, but deal ‘mainly with non-essentials’, to wit the arousing of ‘pity, anger, and similar emotions’ independently of any reference to ‘the essential facts’. Aristotle’s own analysis of the emotions, however, is grounded precisely in their responsiveness to such arguments: this is, indeed, at the heart of his ‘cognitive’ approach to the passions.

We may begin by examining Aristotle’s definition of an emotion, or *pathos*, which he provides in a crisp and condensed form in the first chapter of Book 2 – the closest he comes to such a definition anywhere in his writings (Aspasius, the second-century AD commentator on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in fact denies that Aristotle ever offered a definition of emotion): ‘Let the emotions be all those things on account of which people change and differ in regard to their judgments, and upon which attend pain and pleasure, for example anger, pity, fear, and all other such things and their opposites’ (2.1, 1378a20–23).⁸ The second component of the definition apparently looks to what modern accounts call the ‘hedonic or valence dimension’ of an emotion, that is, its positive or negative affect.⁹ On this view, the emotions may be subsumed under two headings, depending on whether they are characterized chiefly by a painful or a pleasurable feeling. It is worth noting, however, that Aristotle does not say ‘pleasure OR pain’ but rather ‘pleasure AND pain’: the two sensations are not alternatives.¹⁰ Aristotle is not dividing the emotions into two categories in accord with their positive or negative valence. Accordingly, when two emotions are described

as opposites it does not necessarily follow that one of them is accompanied by pain, the other by pleasure: both pity and its opposite, indignation, for example, are said to be a kind of pain. In some emotions, pleasure and pain are combined; others perhaps involve just one of the two sensations.¹¹

More to the point in the present context, however, is the first part of Aristotle's definition of emotions, which looks to their effect on judgments. This condition is particularly apposite to Aristotle's immediate concern in the *Rhetoric*, the object of which is to influence the decisions of jurors and legislators.¹² Some scholars have supposed, accordingly, that the definition is tailored to the context, and does not represent Aristotle's view on the nature of emotion as such. Thus William Fortenbaugh comments that 'the definition of emotions given in *Rhetoric* 2 is . . . not intended as a general definition covering all the emotions felt by human beings'.¹³ But I should like to suggest that, for Aristotle, the manipulation of emotions in forensic and deliberative contexts represented in a concentrated form the way emotions were exploited in social life generally. If Aristotle chose to discuss emotions under the heading of rhetoric, it was in part, I expect, because the medium by which the emotions were understood to be influenced in daily life was principally verbal as well. In both judicial situations and in private life, Athenians worked on the emotions of others in order to sway their beliefs.

Let us turn, then, to the descriptions that Aristotle provides of the several emotions, to see just how they may relate to the rhetorical purpose of the treatise. Aristotle defines anger (*orgē*) as follows: 'let anger be a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one's own'. A slight, in turn, is 'the active belief that something seems worthless'. We immediately note that anger is understood as a response to a social transaction, and not merely to a painful stimulus. It may be excruciating when one's toe collides with the leg of a chair, but there is no sense in which the chair can be said to have belittled one, or made one seem worthless (unless of course one personifies it, and treats it as a hostile antagonist that has willfully placed itself in the way of one's feet). Anger results from an insult or put-down – from snubbing, we might say, rather than from stubbing. This is not to say that the only means of eliciting anger in another is verbal. If someone slaps me in public, and I fail to respond – as happened to Demosthenes at the hand of the arrogant Meidias (see Dem. 21) – my personal esteem or worth will surely be, or seem to be, diminished, and I will become angry, unless I acknowledge the other person's superior status and treat him as one of those who are 'fit' to slight me: for example, if I happen to be a slave, and have been struck for my impertinence by a free Athenian citizen. Gestures, in any case, may be as effective as words in provoking anger. But even here, the slap will be the cause of anger, rather than simply of pain, only if it is interpreted as an intentional and willful act – that is, if we ascribe a certain purpose and meaning to it. A purely physical description of the blow, without reference to the agency behind it, would reduce it to a mere event and not an action; and thus deprived of its symbolic or semantic significance, the smack would no more be a stimulus to anger, on Aristotle's definition, than would the stubbing of one's toe against a chair.

Anger is, fundamentally, a desire for revenge, according to Aristotle; but the Greek word *timōria* means punishment as well as revenge, and here again the judicial relevance of Aristotle's account of anger is clear. The stimulus to anger is an offense,

and the response is, suitably, a penalty or other form of retribution that restores the original equilibrium between the two parties. The punishment must, moreover, be 'perceived' – that is, seen by others and by the offender himself. A slight or insult is a matter of public esteem, and redressing it requires that the author of the affront both feel in return a comparable sense of humiliation (Aristotle's word is *antipathein*) and that his diminishment be a social, not merely a private, fact.

The prominence of social roles in Aristotle's account of anger, the centrality of esteem or repute (*doxa*), the importance of redressing a challenge to one's status – all these elements are particularly germane to the arena of the courts and other public fora, where Athenians might negotiate threats to their social standing or seek to gain an advantage over their rivals. Nevertheless, Aristotle does not limit his analysis of the emotions to forensic or political contexts; rather, he provides, to all appearances, a general description of the passions as such, or at least as many of them as he chooses to discuss in detail in the *Rhetoric* (it is conceivable that his selection of which emotions to examine was in part conditioned by the purpose of the treatise). For Aristotle, anger as such involves a test of social status and the desire for retribution; these are its essential components. Far from being an interior feeling, or a mere bodily response wholly describable in physiological terms (e.g., warm blood around the heart, which Aristotle indeed mentions as the somatic basis for anger in *On the Soul*), anger is necessarily a symbolic and hence cognitive transaction. An infant or a brute animal is not capable of recognizing an affront, or of responding with the intention to inflict an analogous degradation on the offender; hence, neither infants nor animals can experience anger, in Aristotle's terms – and the classical philosophical and rhetorical traditions are pretty much unanimous in denying emotions to both. If Aristotle's conception of the emotions is cognitive and evaluative in nature – and a precursor, in this respect, of modern appraisal theories of the emotions – it is in no small part because he understands the emotions fundamentally as products of social exchanges, in which the stimulus takes the form of an intentional act and the response, in turn, is an evaluation of that act together with a corresponding action or disposition. To put it differently, emotions are, for Aristotle – and for the Greeks of his time in general, I believe – the kinds of things that can be roused or assuaged by arguments, or by appeals to the intellect. Was the insult deliberate? Was the other person fit, or not, to address you in this way? Was your reputation in fact damaged, and what is required to restore it? From Aristotle onward, and very probably even earlier as well, the ancient Greek understanding of the emotions was basically rhetorical rather than psychological, and this left an indelible mark on how the emotions were understood in general.

Let us consider now Aristotle's definition of love, or rather, loving (he employs the infinitive expression 'to love' in his analysis of this emotion in the *Rhetoric*): 'Let loving be wishing for someone the things that he deems good, for the sake of that person and not oneself, and the accomplishment of these things to the best of one's ability' (2.4, 1380b36–1381a1). Love, then, is an altruistic sentiment in regard to another that includes the desire or intention to provide the other with what she or he values. Note how objective this definition seems, in contrast to modern conceptions of love. The second edition of *Webster's New International Dictionary* (1959), for example, defines 'love' as 'a feeling of strong personal attachment' and 'ardent affection'. So too, in a recent handbook on emotion, Elaine Hatfield and Richard Rapson offer the following

description of non-erotic love: 'It combines feelings of deep attachment, commitment, and intimacy'.¹⁴ Aristotle says nothing about feelings or intimacy; his concern is with the provision of good things to another. Nor do we love others on the basis of some mysterious attraction, or 'chemistry', in the modern formula. Love is elicited by the positive qualities of another person: in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle specifies that we are disposed to love those people who are helpful, liberal, courageous, just, independent, and temperate; in a word, those people who are good and virtuous and well-regarded (*eudokimoi*) in the community at large (Aristotle allows that we are inclined to like people who are pleasing or entertaining as well). It is obvious that loving, as Aristotle conceives it, depends essentially on an appraisal of the character of another. It is not simply an instinctive response, as, say, in the case of a mother's affection for her infant child, which Aristotle characterizes in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as the most natural (*phusikē*) kind of love. The love that interests Aristotle, both in his ethical and in his rhetorical writings, is one based on evaluation or judgment. It is, accordingly, able to be influenced by reasoning and hence by discourse: one disposes a jury or an Assembly to regard a person favorably by describing her or his noble traits. Once again, there is a coincidence between the rhetorical orientation of Aristotle's analysis of love and the cognitive nature of his account. But this correlation, I would argue, is no mere coincidence: the tendency to view the emotions as specifically pertinent to rhetoric was a function of the way the emotions were understood in daily life, and the handbooks of rhetoric, in turn, confirmed and no doubt extended and deepened popular attitudes toward the emotions.

Of all the emotions, the one that might seem to be least cognitive in nature, and hence least susceptible to modification by means of discourse, is fear. And yet, even a brief glance at Aristotle's treatment of fear in the *Rhetoric* shows that he understands fear too as a cognitive response rather than as a merely instinctive reaction to a threat. Recognizing this dimension to Aristotle's discussion of fear makes it clear why he can say that 'fear makes people deliberative' (2.5, 1383a7). His definition of fear (*phobos*) runs as follows (2.5, 1382a21–26):

let fear be a kind of pain or disturbance deriving from an impression of a future evil that is destructive or painful; for not all evils are feared, for example whether one will be unjust or slow, but as many as are productive of great pain or destruction, and these if they are not distant but rather seem near so as to impend. For things that are remote are not greatly feared.

It is worth noting that, according to Aristotle, it is not pain itself that induces fear, but rather things that threaten pain. This is an important distinction. Fear is not just an instinctive avoidance but depends on the knowledge or understanding that a person or thing is dangerous, that is, that it can cause pain or harm. One must be able to recognize the relationship between an object we fear and the harm it can produce.

In his discussion of fear, Aristotle concentrates exclusively on threats posed by people as opposed to animals or inanimate objects. Thus, he describes as frightening those who are unjust or arrogant, who fear us or are our competitors, whom we have wronged or who have wronged us, and who are in a position to do us harm. But, Aristotle notes, we will only fear them if we believe that they are stronger than we are. On the contrary, we will be confident – that is, we will experience the emotion that

Aristotle treats as the opposite of fear – if we believe that our rivals are either weaker than we are or friendly to us, or that we have more or stronger allies on our side. Thus fear involves the calculation of relative power and intentions. As William Fortenbaugh has written: ‘Humans have the capacity to think and therefore can believe that an insult has occurred and that some danger threatens. Animals lack this cognitive capacity and therefore cannot experience emotions as analyzed by Aristotle’.¹⁵ Even fear, then, is fundamentally cognitive and social in character.

Aristotle goes on to treat the emotions of shame, which he defines as ‘a pain or disturbance concerning those ills, either present, past, or future, that are perceived to lead to disgrace’, and which is caused principally by the awareness of a vice in oneself; gratitude; pity; envy; indignation; and, finally, emulousness or competition (*zēlos*), a kind of positive rivalry corresponding to the negative resentment or contentiousness characteristic of envy. Let me pause to consider just three of these: pity, which plays a highly prominent role in classical oratory, indignation, which Aristotle identifies as the opposite of pity, and, in passing, envy, which he is at pains to distinguish from indignation.

Aristotle defines pity as ‘a kind of pain in the case of an apparent destructive or painful harm in one not deserving to encounter it’, and which, he adds, ‘one might expect oneself, or one of one’s own, to suffer, and this when it seems near’. Pity, then, depends on one’s own vulnerability to the harm suffered by another: it is not an emotion of identification, like the modern empathy, but depends rather on an inference about one’s own liability to suffer a comparable misfortune to that experienced by the one who is pitied. This is why Aristotle can conclude that neither those who have never suffered a reversal – that is, those who have been privileged or fortunate throughout their lives – nor those who are at the nadir of their fortunes are prone to feeling pity. The reason is that neither expects to suffer something worse: those least well off believe they have already endured the worst. In addition, one does not feel pity, Aristotle says, for those nearest to us, for example, a child or parent: in this case, rather, we feel the harm as though it had befallen ourselves. True, Aristotle mentions, in his definition of pity, one’s own near and dear ones, but these are not identified as people who elicit pity for their suffering, but are rather treated as being among the conditions of our own vulnerability.

It is clear that pity, on Aristotle’s definition, is both a highly cognitive response – it depends on recognizing one’s own exposure to the kind of evil that another is suffering – and a moral one: we pity not simply the misfortune of another, but undeserved misfortune. The punishment of a person guilty of murder, for example, does not evoke pity. In insisting that pity responds to unmerited affliction, Aristotle is in conformity with popular usage, although there were some, as Aristotle himself informs us, who understood pity to be elicited by any spectacle of suffering, whether deserved or not. The point is made clear in Aristotle’s discussion of envy versus indignation. Indignation, or what Aristotle labels with the verbal formula ‘being indignant’ (*to nemesan*), is defined as ‘feeling pain at someone who appears to be succeeding undeservedly’. On this account, Aristotle says, it is the proper opposite of pity, which is, as we have seen, pain felt at another’s undeserved misfortune. But Aristotle goes on to record the view held by some others that envy, rather than indignation, is the opposite of pity, envy being ‘a disturbing pain arising from the well-being’ of another. However, Aristotle rejects this view precisely on the grounds

that envy, which he defines as ‘a kind of pain, in respect to one’s equals, for their apparent success in things called good, not so as to have the thing oneself but [solely] on their account’, does not take account of merit or desert; this is why it is not an emotion characteristic of a morally decent person.

Now, the verb *nemesan*, and the corresponding noun *nemesis*, rarely occur in the Attic orators or in prose of the classical period generally, and were clearly either archaic or poetic in Aristotle’s time. It seems likely that Aristotle included it among the basic emotions to be influenced by the orator because he wanted a moral opposite to pity. We shall see shortly that, in making space for indignation in his account of the emotions, he may have encroached on the territory of some other passions, and most particularly on the domain of anger, which, in the definition that he provides, is perhaps more restricted in respect to its cause – a slight, and nothing but a slight – than was customary in contemporary Greek usage. For it was understood that injustice as such might elicit anger or outrage; indeed, Aristotle himself, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, affirms that ‘anger resides in a perceived injustice [*adikia*]’ (5.8, 1135b25–29).

In the rhetorical world that forms the context for Aristotle’s discussion of the passions, emotions are not raw feelings or instinctive responses, such as disgust, shock (for example, being startled), the elementary identification with another characteristic of empathy, ‘chemical’ attraction, or the automatic trembling and recoil caused by the approach of a hot poker. While some of these reactions can perhaps be controlled by deliberate habituation, none of them is normally elicited or eased by argument and persuasion. Aristotle’s conception of the emotions is through and through cognitive in the sense that the emotions are rational evaluations of situations. They thus depend essentially on judgments. In turn, emotions condition the kinds of judgments we form, as Aristotle makes clear in the brief definition of emotion that he offers in the opening paragraph of Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*. While it is no doubt true that, by rationalizing the emotions, Aristotle sought to provide a justifiable place for them in rhetoric, thereby rescuing them from what he considered the one-sided approach of his predecessors in this area, Aristotle was also offering an account that corresponded far better to the actual way in which appeals to emotion worked in discourse than other writers had done. If the Spartans tended to be laconic, the Athenians were a talkative people, and conversation was their medium. Be that as it may, however, Aristotle’s treatment of the emotions in his *Rhetoric* set the terms for almost all subsequent analyses – and the place where the emotions were discussed continued, in large measure, to be in treatises on rhetoric.

3 The Attic Orators

The Greek orators employed the full range of appeals to the emotions in order to elicit sympathy or affection for their clients or odium for their opponents, to remind the public of acts that deserved their gratitude or, contrariwise, to moderate their undue resentment or envy, to induce shame at vicious behavior – their own, it may be (especially in political contexts) or that of others – or a spirit of emulation in respect to the achievements and virtues of good people, and to produce a rational fear concerning enemies and, correspondingly, a justifiable confidence – which Aristotle

defines as the emotion opposite to fear – when there is good reason to believe that one's enemies are weaker than oneself. Such forms of argument were not limited to the court room or the Assembly; they are fully in evidence in the set orations or *agōnes* that are a regular part of both Greek tragedy and comedy, are essential to the direct speeches that form the larger part of epic narrative, and are an indispensable part of ancient historiography. But the two emotions most relevant to forensic discourse, at least, were the pair pity and anger: pity, the emotion a pleader sought to arouse in behalf of the accused (or, it may be, his victim), and anger, the legitimate outrage experienced at behavior that violated the norms of the community and its sense of justice.

Consider the following extract from a speech by Lysias, in which the plaintiff admonishes the jurors (15.9):

And if any one of you, gentlemen of the jury, thinks that the penalty is great and the law too harsh, you must recall that you have not come here as lawmakers on these matters, but rather to vote according to the established laws, nor to pity those who do wrong, but rather to be angry with them and to come to the aid of the entire city.

Elsewhere, Lysias has a defendant declare (1.28): 'I believe you know that those who do not act justly do not acknowledge that their enemies are telling the truth, but rather, by lying and scheming in this way, they instil in the wrongdoers anger against those who do act justly' (cf. 21.21, 32.19). Anger is the appropriate response to true malefactors. Another speaker in Lysias (6.17) declares: 'It is right, Athenians, to be more angry at citizens who do wrong than at foreigners'. Demosthenes denounces a law, the result of which will be that jurors will appear to 'take their oath, impose penalties, pronounce their verdicts, grow angry, and do all that they do in vain' (24.90). Demosthenes comments specifically on the usefulness of civic anger against the unjust, since people are then likely to be more careful about unlawful behavior (24.143). Thucydides asserts categorically (1.77.4) that 'it seems that men are more angry when they are wronged than when they suffer violence' (cf. 5.46.5). Indeed, the term *orgē* may be used in a way that is virtually equivalent to a negative verdict or condemnation, as when Demosthenes says that the laws authorize the jury to utilize anger that is proportionate to the offense (24.118; cf. 24.218, 25.6).¹⁶ As Danielle Allen observes: 'The Athenians had no doubts about why they punished: it was simply because someone was *angry* at a wrong and wanted to have that anger dealt with'.¹⁷ The premise of anger was a judgment concerning the moral behavior of another, and was for this reason susceptible to the techniques of persuasion developed by the Athenian pleaders and codified by Aristotle and other writers of technical treatises on rhetoric.

Like anger, pity was not something separate and apart from judgments concerning justice and desert, but rather presupposed the innocence (as anger did the guilt) of the accused. For this reason, appeals to pity on the part of defendants were never accompanied by expressions of remorse or requests for pardon or forgiveness; rather, such pleas were intended to remind the jury of the consequences of condemning an innocent person – a person who, therefore, did not deserve the punishment that a guilty verdict would entail. This is why the Greeks – and Romans – did not typically attempt to arouse pity by dwelling on their unfortunate childhood, for example; they

were not explaining how they acquired criminal tendencies – quite the contrary, they were affirming their innocence, for only in this way could they induce the emotion of pity in their audience. When it comes to arguing the facts of the case, the Greek orators exploited logical arguments or enthymemes with a precision and versatility worthy of Aristotle himself. For pity to be invoked, the facts – or a plausible interpretation of them – had already to have demonstrated the innocence of the speaker. This is why appeals to pity come regularly in the peroration of speeches, after the narrative has made the case for a positive verdict. Thus, the arousal of emotion, and of pity in particular, worked differently in the Athenian courts from the way it functions in the modern judicial process, where it is assumed to constitute an appeal to the heart rather than the mind (and hence is deemed illegitimate in the verdict phase of trials). In antiquity, it was taken for granted that one should be pitiless toward those who deliberately committed an unjust act.

In forensic speeches, then, efforts to induce pity or anger in the jurors were predicated on a cognitive and moral interpretation of these emotions. It is just for this reason that they could be influenced by arguments. It is true that the emotions, once aroused, in turn may lead a person to judge matters in a more positive or unfavorable way than would have been the case on a purely dispassionate appreciation of the evidence; that is just the function of emotional rhetoric. There exists, accordingly, the danger that a judge who is in the grip of an emotion may deviate from the right ruling. But the emotions themselves are a function of cognitive appraisals; they are anything but raw, irrational feelings. They do not produce their effects by magic, as Gorgias seems to have supposed, but by argument. And Aristotle's understanding of the emotions is confirmed by the way in which they were exploited in practice by the orators who were his contemporaries.

4 After Aristotle

The doubts that Aristotle raised in the first chapter of his *Rhetoric* concerning whether appeals to the emotions were a legitimate technique of persuasion proved to be enduring, and subsequent philosophers and orators took opposite sides on the issue. Cicero (*On the Orator* 2.52.211–16) puts into the mouth of Antonius a defense of the orator's practice of inciting his hearers to passion. Quintilian (6.1.7) reports that the Athenians tried to forbid emotional appeals in the courts, but insists himself that the orator must know how to manipulate the emotions of his audience; so too, Diodorus Siculus (1.75.6–1.76.2) relates that the Egyptians sought to have all legal cases filed in writing rather than presented orally in order to avoid playing on the emotions of the jurors.

But it was the Stoics in particular who took a hard line against appeals to the emotions; indeed, they believed that a sage, and hence an ideal, judge was wholly free of the ordinary emotions or *pathē*, including anger and pity as well as envy, indignation, and fear, and that it was wrong for a speaker to arouse such passions in a jury. True, the Stoic definitions of the passions often hewed close to those provided by Aristotle; for example, Chrysippus, considered the second founder of the Stoic school (third century), defined *orgē* as 'the desire to take vengeance against one who is believed to have committed a wrong contrary to one's deserts'.¹⁸ At the same time,

however, Chrysippus wrote that ‘anger is blind; it often prevents our seeing things that are obvious and it often gets in the way of things which are being comprehended ... For the passions, once they have started, drive out reasoning and contrary evidence, and push forward violently towards actions contrary to reason’.¹⁹ The Roman Stoic Seneca, in turn, replying to Aristotle’s successor Theophrastus, explains (*On Anger* 1.12.2–5):

‘Good men are angry for injuries done to their dear ones.’ When you say this, Theophrastus, you look to cast scorn on more powerful principles and turn away from the judge in order to play to the crowd. Since everyone gets angry when a misfortune of this kind befalls their own, you imagine that people will judge that what they do should be done, since all people pretty much judge that an emotion they recognize is justified. But they act the same if hot water is not adequately supplied, if a glass is broken, if their shoe is splashed with mud. It is not filial piety but weakness that inspires such anger, just like children who weep equally whether they lose their parents or their toys. To be angry in behalf of dear ones is the mark not of a dutiful soul but a weak one.

It is true that the Stoics allowed the wise certain good sentiments or *eupatheiai*, but it is not clear that they envisaged upright orators playing to, or attempting to induce, such feelings in their audience.²⁰

The Stoics, then, would seem to have taken an opposite position to that of Aristotle, at least in his most mature reflections on the emotions. And yet, this is not the simple contrast that it might seem. For the Stoics went even further than Aristotle in defending a strictly cognitivist or intellectualist view of the emotions, eliminating Aristotle’s reference to pleasure and pain as constituent elements and describing emotions simply as assents to certain presentations or impressions. In their view, then, the emotions were all the more susceptible to amelioration (or the reverse) by means of rational argument.

Since the subject of this chapter is the emotions in relation to rhetoric, and not the ancient Greek conception of the emotions as such, I shall not enter further into the complex Stoic theory of the passions, save to mention one point that has a bearing, I believe, on subsequent accounts of the emotions in rhetorical treatises. The Stoics identified four broad classes of emotions, which they subsumed under the master headings of appetite or desire, fear or avoidance, pleasure, and pain or distress. The last two items correspond to Aristotle’s mention of pleasure and pain, save that the Stoics clearly consider separate these sensations and make them characteristic of distinct emotions, whereas for Aristotle they might well be mixed in a single passion. Appetite and fear, in turn, are understood as the anticipation of pleasure and pain, respectively. Now, Cicero, in his essay *On the Orator* (2.206), observes that the most important emotions that an orator must aspire to arouse are ‘love, hate, anger, envy, pity, hope, joy, fear, and distress’ (*amor, odium, iracundia, invidia, misericordia, spes, laetitia, timor, molestia*). This list closely resembles that of Aristotle in the *Rhetoric*, with the addition of hope, joy, and grief – indeed, the four final members of the series include fear, and taken together would seem to represent the four general Stoic categories of desire and pleasure, fear and pain. In the *Brutus* (188), moreover, Cicero says that a crowd listening to a good speaker ‘feels pleasure and pain, laughs and cries, hates, scorns, envies, is moved to pity, shame, and disgust, grows angry,

calms down, hopes, and fears' (*gaudet, dolet, ridet, plorat, favet, odit, contemnit, invidet, ad misericordiam inducitur, ad pudendum, ad pigendum; irascitur, mitigatur, sperat, timet*). Again, Cicero would seem to have added to Aristotle's typical emotions the four-fold Stoic generic passions of pleasure and pain (first in the list) and desire or anticipation and fear (the last two items).²¹ Despite their opposition to the arousal of passions by the orator, as recorded by Cicero in his *On the Orator* and elsewhere, it would appear that rhetorical treatises had no trouble in accommodating additional passions, drawn from the Stoic classification, to those derived principally from the Peripatetic tradition.

Today, the cognitive interpretation of emotions is a well-established approach among psychologists and philosophers, and the idea that the emotions are simply irrational has been outmoded in most disciplines for several decades. Aristotle's understanding of the emotions, and that of the Stoics as well, have, as we have seen, become newly relevant, and are seen as forerunners of modern theories.²² But the classical conception of the emotions did not emerge in a vacuum; on the contrary, it responded, at least in part, to the intensely dialogic environment of the classical city-state, and above all Athens, where a person's public esteem was continually being negotiated and challenged, and the emotions played an essential role in this intense verbal sparring, whether in the courts or the Assembly, on the stage or in the Agora. When thinkers came to investigate and define the emotions systematically, it was natural for them to orient their studies to the role of emotion in debate and persuasion. It is thus perfectly understandable that the intellectual domain in which the study of the emotions chiefly took place was rhetoric, and this in turn helped to determine how the object of study itself was perceived over the better part of classical antiquity.

Bibliographical Essay

There is a detailed study of the emotions discussed by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* in D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature* (Toronto: 2006), with extensive bibliography. Still indispensable is W.W. Fortenbaugh's *Aristotle on Emotion*, first published in 1975 and reissued, with a new afterword, in 2002 (London: 2002). The fine translation of the *Rhetoric* by G.A. Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York: 1991) has useful headnotes summarizing the argument. D. Allen's *The World of Prometheus* (Princeton: 2000) discusses anger in its social and judiciary context in classical Greece. For modern studies of emotion in connection with rhetoric, see A. Brinton, 'Pathos and the "Appeal to Emotion": An Aristotelian Analysis', *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5 (1988), pp. 207–219 and D. Walton, *Appeal to Pity: Argumentum ad Misericordiam* (Albany: 1997). A full discussion of the relationship between ancient ideas of emotion and rhetoric, both as it was theorized and as it was practiced in antiquity, is still a desideratum.

Notes

- 1 See M. Heath, 'Apsines and Pseudo-Apsines', *AJP* 119 (1998), pp. 89–111.
- 2 R.S. Lazarus, 'Relational Meaning and Discrete Emotions', in K.R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), *Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research* (Oxford: 2001), pp. 37–67; citation on p. 40. Cf. also A.L. Hinton, 'Introduction: Developing a Biocultural Approach to the Emotions', in A.L. Hinton (ed.), *Biocultural Approaches to the Emotions* (Cambridge: 1999), pp. 1–37 at p. 6.
- 3 Translated by W. Rhys Roberts, 'Rhetoric', in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle 2* (Princeton: 1984), pp. 2152–2269.
- 4 The most recent editions are M. Fuhrmann, *Anaximenes, Ars Rhetorica quae vulgo fertur Aristotelis ad Alexandrum*² (Munich: 2000) and P. Chiron, *Ps.-Aristote, Rhétorique à Alexandre*, Budé edition (Paris: 2002). See further, P. Chiron, Chapter 8.
- 5 Trans. D.A. Russell and M. Winterbottom, *Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in New Translations* (Oxford: 1972), pp. 7–8.
- 6 J. Barnes, 'Rhetoric and Poetics', in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* (Cambridge: 1955), pp. 259–285, especially p. 262.
- 7 G.A. Kennedy, *Aristotle On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York: 1991), p. 28.
- 8 P. 44.20–21 in the *Commentaria Graeca in Aristotelem* 19, ed. G. Heylbut (Berlin: 1889) – hereafter Heylbut. For other lists of emotions or *pathē*, cf. *Rhet.* 3.19 1419b24–26, where, in speaking of the epilogue to a speech as the place to rouse emotion, Aristotle mentions pity, shock [*deinōsis*], anger, hatred, envy, competitiveness or emulation, and strife; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1105b21ff., *On the Soul* 403a16–17.
- 9 Cf. A. Kappas, 'A Metaphor is a Metaphor is a Metaphor: Exorcising the Homunculus from Appraisal Theory', in K.R. Scherer, A. Schorr and T. Johnstone (eds.), *Appraisal Processes in Emotion: Theory, Methods, Research* (Oxford: 2001), pp. 157–172, especially p. 160.
- 10 It is true that in the *Eudemian Ethics* (1220b14–15) Aristotle speaks of pleasure OR pain, and says that these MOSTLY accompany the emotions; but in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1104b13–16), he twice writes pleasure AND pain.
- 11 On the mixture of pleasure and pain in emotion, cf. D. Frede, 'Mixed Feelings in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*', in A.O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1996) pp. 258–285, especially p. 278 and G. Striker, 'Emotions in Context: Aristotle's Treatment of the Passions in the *Rhetoric* and His Moral Psychology', in A.O. Rorty (ed.), *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1996), pp. 286–302, especially p. 291. Aspasius, in his digression on the emotions in his commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* (pp. 42.27–47.2 Heylbut), affirms – incorrectly, in my view – that the emotions are grouped generically according to pleasure (*hēdonē*) and pain (*lupē*); R. Sorabji, 'Aspasius on Emotion', in A. Alberti and R.W. Sharples (eds.), *Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berlin: 1999), pp. 96–106, argues that desire or appetite is also essential to the Aristotelian classification.
- 12 Cf. *Rhet.* 1.1, 1354b8–13 on how the pain and pleasure associated with the emotions obfuscate [*episkotein*] judgment; also 1.2, 1356a15–16: 'for we do not render judgments in the same way when we are suffering and rejoicing, or loving and hating'.
- 13 W.W. Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion*² (London: 2002), p. 114.
- 14 E. Hatfield and R.L. Rapson, 'Love and Attachment Process', in M. Lewis and J.M. Haviland-Jones (eds.), *Handbook of Emotions*² (New York: 2000), pp. 654–655.
- 15 *Aristotle on Emotion*, p. 94.
- 16 Cf. Andoc. 1.8, 1.24, 30, Lys. 10.26, 10.29, 11.10, 12.20, 12.58, 12.96, 14.8, 14.13, 16.17, 20.1, 25.16, 27.15, 28.2, 29.9, 29.12, 30.23, 31.11 and Dem. 16.19, 18.18,

- 18.20, 19.7, 19.302, 20.8, 21.34, 24.215, 40.5. It is going too far, however, to affirm that *orgē* and *orgizesthai* ‘came to mean, for a time, not only “anger” and “to be angry” but also sometimes “punishment” and “to punish”’: W.V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, MA: 2001), p. 62.
- 17 D. Allen, ‘Democratic Dis-Ease: Of Anger and the Troubling Nature of Punishment’, in S.A. Bandes (ed.), *The Passions of Law* (New York: 1999), pp. 191–214, especially p. 194. For the role of anger in judicial verdicts, see also D. Allen, *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: 2000), pp. 18–24; on anger as the counterpart to pity, see D. Konstan, *Pity Transformed* (London: 2001), pp. 41–43.
- 18 J. von Arnim (ed.), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* (Leipzig: 1921–24) 3.395 = Stobaeus 2.91.10; cf. Diog. Laert. 7.113; also Posidonius, fr. 155 in L. Edelstein and I. Kidd, *Posidonius* (Cambridge: 1972–99) = Lactantius *On the Anger of God* 17.13.
- 19 [Plut.], *On Moral Virtue* 10, 450c = *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 3.390; quoted in Harris, *Restraining Rage*, p. 370.
- 20 We know from Cicero and other sources that there were self-professed Stoic pleaders, and it is an interesting question how they might have performed in the courtroom.
- 21 See also Dion. Hal. *Demosthenes* 22 in S. Usher, *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Critical Essays* 1 (Cambridge, MA: 1974), p. 322.
- 22 For a neo-Stoic approach, see M.C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: 2001).

PART V

Rhetoric and Literature

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT

Right Rhetoric in Homer

Hanna M. Roisman

Commentators on the *Iliad* have frequently noted the importance of speech in this epic, almost half of whose lines consists of direct address.¹ As Griffin points out, it is largely through their speech that Homer reveals his characters' individuality and advances much of the action of the poem.² In addition, the *Iliad* makes speech, especially persuasive speech, a theme in and of itself. As Matthew Clarke observes, 'persuasion – its function, its meaning, its successes and failures – is an important element of the story. In a way, the *Iliad* is a meditation on persuasion.'³

The term 'persuasive speech' as used in this chapter refers to any speech that aims to bring its hearers to adopt a particular course of action. Its salience in the *Iliad* is established in numerous ways. Although the *Iliad* is a war poem, its heroes spend more time talking than fighting. Formal discussions in which characters try to persuade one another to act in accord with their own recommendations abound in Assemblies (*agorai*) and Councils (*boulai*), in both the Greek and Trojan camps and on Mount Olympus itself. The discussions and disputes in these forums form the action of the epic as much as the battle scenes and generate more interest and tension.⁴

Moreover, the nature and quality of the heroes' speech is noted at some length. This is true not only of Nestor (1.247–253), whose speaking ability is important to his role as the Achaeans' counselor, but also of Odysseus, Menelaus (3.209–224), and Diomedes (9.53–59), who are pre-eminently fighters. Skill in speech or counsel is repeatedly paired with fighting ability as an essential feature of the hero.⁵ Achilles' father Peleus is said to have had him tutored to be both 'a speaker of words and a doer of deeds' (9.443), Nestor praises Agamemnon and Achilles as excelling the Danaans both in counsel and in fighting (1.258), and the common soldiers praise Odysseus both for 'bringing forward good councils and ordering armed encounters' (2.272–273).

In making persuasive speech a theme, the *Iliad* anticipates the development of formal rhetorical theory in the fifth century and onward. Given the centrality of Homer in education in ancient Greece, his role as a source of wisdom in all matters,⁶ and the polish and power of his verse, it is not surprising that some classical rhetoricians

viewed Homer's characters as rhetoricians and Homer as the fount of their art, or that they searched his writings for the rhetorical figures that were formally categorized only centuries after he lived.⁷ Modern scholars too have assiduously ferreted out these rhetorical features in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, even as they have acknowledged the great distance between Homer's rhetoric and what came later.⁸ The figures identified by later teachers of rhetoric have all been found in Homer.

This chapter examines one of Homer's 'meditations on persuasion': the paired speeches by Thersites and Odysseus, in which Thersites urges the troops to leave the battle for home (2.225–242) and Odysseus urges them to stay on and fight until Troy is defeated (2.284–332).⁹ Thersites is depicted as a debased speaker whose manner and message are to be rejected out of hand, while Odysseus is depicted as a speaker whose advice is to be followed and his verbal skill respected. The relationship between the speeches is highlighted by structural parallels. Both are framed by an introduction and after-statements provided by the narrator to clue the audience as to how to assess what is said. Both begin with a rhetorical address to Agamemnon whose purpose is to prime the troops to accept the speaker's proposal, and both then shift to a direct address to the troops, which presents and justifies the proposal.¹⁰

Comparing the addresses enables us to deduce what may be termed Homer's theory of right rhetoric. My focus will be on the judgments in the frames and on the means that the speakers use to persuade their hearers to follow their recommendations. I use the term 'means' here in a non-technical sense. While 'rhetorical devices', such as the play on words and sounds, enjambment, onomatopoeia, ring composition, and repetition, will be noted where relevant, the heart of the analysis will be on the differences in the characters of the speakers, the relationships they establish with their audience, and the nature of their arguments.¹¹ These are the differences Homer highlights as distinguishing the rhetoric of the two speakers.

To shed light on Homer's views, I will conclude by looking at them in the context of Aristotle's model of persuasion. No attempt is made to reopen the archaic debate about whether or not Homer was a 'rhetorician' or to treat Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in any depth.¹²

In content, the paired speeches are two of several speeches in the *Iliad* that deal with the question of whether and when to press forward or retreat. This is a central question in any military campaign and is debated repeatedly in the poem. It is important not only to get the answer right but also to convince one's hearers that one's answer is right, since war is fought as much on conviction and morale as on orders. The question thus serves as a powerful base for Homer to demonstrate the qualities of successful oratory, while contemplating the dangers of skilled speech even as he shows its great capacity for good.

The speeches follow from Agamemnon's earlier address testing the mettle of his troops (2.110–141). Based on the promise of speedy victory made to him in a lying dream, Agamemnon has determined to renew the onslaught against Troy after nine years of stalemate outside the city walls. The warrior leaders have concurred. Instead of announcing his intentions to the troops, however, he tests them in a speech urging them to give up the struggle and sail for home. He tells them that the battle is already lost, reminds them of their long sojourn away from their wives and children, and argues that the futility of further fighting makes it necessary to accept the shame of going home without attaining the ends for which they had come. Although it is an

argument of despair based on the false premise that victory is unattainable, it ‘stirred up the passion in the breast of all’ (2.142–143) and issued in a rush for the ships. The address is a well-argued, emotionally moving piece of successful persuasion that illustrates the power of speech to move men to wrong action.

The point is repeated as Thersites and Odysseus manage to sway the same audience in diametrically opposed directions. The powerful effect of Odysseus’ speech is demonstrated by the resounding applause of the soldiers when he finishes (2.333–335), as well as by their staying on to fight. The effectiveness of Thersites’ speech remains unactualized, but its potential potency is implied by the forceful response that Homer saw fit to give to Odysseus (2.246–264), who has an authoritative role in this episode. In a nineteen-line response, Homer has Odysseus rebuke, strike, threaten, and humiliate Thersites before the troops. The implication is that without such forceful measures, Thersites’ speech could have attained its end. Indeed, the narrator observes that the soldiers were ‘sorry’ (2.270) even as they laughed at Thersites’ pain and humiliation. The text does not tell us what they were sorry about; but we can surmise that it was because they would have liked to go home, as Thersites had urged.¹³

The inner audience’s responses to these three speeches demonstrate Homer’s view of the human susceptibility to skilled speech. This susceptibility is not shared by his warrior heroes. Neither Agamemnon nor Achilles is moved by Nestor’s skillfully articulated, sensible counsel for resolving their dispute over Briseis (1.284–303), and in Book Nine Achilles firmly rejects the pleas and arguments of all three emissaries who try to persuade him to rejoin the battle. But the ordinary soldier is vulnerable, and it is this that apparently makes it so important for Homer to distinguish merely skilled rhetoric from right rhetoric.

This effort informs both the frames to the paired speeches and the speeches themselves. The introduction to Thersites’ speech draws the distinction as one between verbal fluency and order, defined both as a quality of speech and a quality of character and mind. The narrator introduces Thersites as a man *ametroepēs* (‘of measureless speech’, 2.212), who utters ‘many but disorderly words’ (2.213), which are *ou kata kosmon* (‘improper or inappropriate’, 2.214). *Ametroepēs* can be understood to mean measureless in the sense both of excessive (Thersites talks too much) and of immoderate (describing the unrestrained ranting that the audience will hear). What makes his words *ou kata kosmon* are to be the ends to which they are put: to scold or to rail (2.212), to quarrel (2.214, 221), to raise a laugh from his audience (2.215), and to insult or reproach (2.222) – misuses of speech that are noted again, by the narrator (2.243) and Odysseus (2.250, 254–255), after Thersites completes his speech. The description of the disorder of Thersites’ speech is followed by a description of Thersites’ person as repugnant and deformed: ugly, bow-legged, lame, round-shouldered, stooped, and his head grossly misshapen. The description of his distorted body, which have been viewed as reflecting the distortions of his mind, is aimed at repelling the outer audience lest they be misled by his speech.

The introduction cues the outer audience to view Thersites’ address as an example of verbal dexterity put to wrong purposes. The speech itself demonstrates Thersites’ verbal skills and provides further insight into what makes his speech disorderly.

The speech opens with a rhetorical address to Agamemnon (2.225–234), which begins with an abrupt, one-line question, ‘Son of Atreus, with what are you now

again discontent?', that paints Agamemnon as a chronic complainer. It then goes on to develop this insinuation in two statements. The first (2.226–228) describes Agamemnon's tents as filled with bronze and 'the choicest women'. The second (2.229–233) sarcastically asks whether he wants yet more gold or some 'young woman with whom you will lie in love', while faulting him for taking her all to himself and not sharing her.

The lines show both psychological acumen and linguistic skill. On a psychological level, Thersites uses his understanding of the troops' deprivations and frustrations to incline them toward following his advice to go home. By harping on Agamemnon's women and wealth, Thersites depicts Agamemnon as greedy and lascivious, while tapping into the envy and resentment that people who have little, as the troops probably do, often feel toward those who have a great deal. In addition, Thersites intimates that Agamemnon owes his booty to the troops. The women in Agamemnon's tents, he tells, are those whom 'we, the Achaeans,/give you as the first of all, whenever we seize a citadel' (2.227–228). The gold is that 'which some man of the horse-taming/Trojans will bring out of Ilios as a ransom for his son' (2.229–230). These statements encourage the troops to see themselves as brave and loyal fighters who sacrifice themselves for their unworthy ruler, provoking yet further resentment. His last statement of this section challenges Agamemnon's right to rule and insinuates that Agamemnon is to blame for the soldiers' undoubtedly hard lot (2.233–234).

As evidence of Thersites' verbal ability, the passage shows a command of long, complex sentences marked by multiple subordinations; an excellent ear for rhythm, in the alternation of longer and shorter statements to maximum effect; an able use of enjambment; and a skillful use of alliteration and consonance to reinforce the points that are made and the emotions that are appealed to. The sharp one-line question (2.225) that opens the address to Agamemnon is developed with two long, well-structured statements, of three and four and a half lines respectively. Lines 226–228, which describe Agamemnon's wealth and the role of the troops in procuring it, form, in the words of Kirk, 'a smooth and carefully subordinate three-verse sentence'. The liquid l's in Line 226 (*pleiai*/full, *chalkou*/bronze, *klisiai*/tents, *pollai*/many) reinforce the sumptuousness of Agamemnon's possessions. The repeated o's in Line 228 (*prōtistōi*/very first, *didomen*/we give, *ptoliethron*/citadel, *belōmen*/we took) draw attention to the troops' labors on behalf of Agamemnon. Lines 229–233 form an even longer sentence, with even more elaborate syntax and subordination. The section is brought to an end with the abrupt one-and-a-half line challenge to Agamemnon's rule. Its brevity and syntactic simplicity, contrasting with the length and complexity of the preceding ones, add force and conviction to the challenge, while the enjambment in Line 233 ('it does not beseem/one who is a leader') reinforces Thersites' finger-pointing by highlighting the flawed leader. In content and tone, the lines are overly familiar and marked by ugly insinuation. Nonetheless, their well-controlled syntactic rhythm conveys the impression of a clearly stated idea which is well developed and brought to a close with an emphatic and proper conclusion, while the play of sound works on a subliminal level to intimate that Agamemnon obtained his wealth unjustly through the sacrifice of the troops and was waging the war in Troy for his own personal benefit and at their expense.

The address to Agamemnon is followed by a direct address to the troops (2.235–240). It begins with a derisive, one-line rebuke: 'O fellows! Base things of

shame, you women of Achaea, men no more' (2.235), which insults the men's character in general and their masculinity in particular. The term *pepones*, translated here as 'O fellows',¹⁴ is a polite form of address in the singular but it has a pejorative flavor in the plural.¹⁵ Although the criticism of the men's manhood is formulaic (cf. 7.96), the rebuke constitutes an assumption of authority and command, whose purpose seems to be to bully the men into accepting his proposal.

The proposal consists of two parts: to go back home and to leave Agamemnon in Troy to mull over his prizes and how much he needs his army. Although both actions would have fateful implications, nowhere in the speech does Thersites give clear reasons for them. Both are arguments by proximity. The proposal to go back home follows immediately upon the maxim at the end of the address to Agamemnon that it is unfitting for a leader to bring suffering to his men (2.233–234). This maxim is a truism that both the inner and outer audiences would have accepted as self-evident and, hence, as logical. By placing his proposal almost immediately after it, Thersites implicitly links the men's going home to Agamemnon's misconduct. The generalization about the duties of a king bears only on the king, however, and Thersites never draws an explicit connection between that and the conduct he is recommending to the soldiers. The second part of the proposal, to leave Agamemnon in Troy, is offered in precisely the place where one would expect to hear the reason they should go home. The two parts are linked by parallel structure ('let us go back home', 'let us leave this man'), which creates the impression that the soldiers should go home to punish Agamemnon for his greed and womanizing at their expense. But Thersites never says this. Nor do the closing two lines of this section, which describe Agamemnon as having dishonored Achilles by taking his prize (2.239–240), provide logical support. They imply an analogy between the common soldiers and the great hero, which elevates them to Achilles' level and frames their desertion as an act aimed at restoring their offended honor. But this is never said, and what comes through is flattery and self-aggrandizement.

Like his opening lines to Agamemnon, Thersites' lines to the soldiers also demonstrate his mastery of words and psychological acumen. Here we see, in particular, his ability to whip up his audience's emotions in the absence of rational *argument*. Thersites unleashes a breathless rush of words that streams out of the rebuke in Line 235 almost without pause and does not come to a full syntactic stop until the end of Line 240. The long breath, the two quasi-alliterative, parallel, paratactic adhortative verbs *neōmetha*, *eōmen* ('let us go back home, let us leave this man') in Line 236, and the harping on Agamemnon (this man; that he may learn; he who, better than he) give the sentence a rousing, forward-moving thrust, full of indignation, which is brought to a triumphal climax in Line 240 with no fewer than four verbals (dishonored, having taken away, keeps, took by his own act) describing Agamemnon's transgression against Achilles. The multiple enjambments following rapidly one after the other yet further reinforce the indignation that Thersites is trying to work up and endow his propositions with a sense of urgency. The particular jaggedness of the enjambment on 'Achilles ... /dishonored' in Lines 239–240, where the subject and verb are separated by a relative clause, yet further emphasizes the wrong Agamemnon did the great hero. The enjambments are particularly powerful in view of the relative scarcity of enjambments in the *Iliad*.¹⁶ Finally, Thersites ends his speech with a second address to Agamemnon (2.241–242). The seemingly

reassuring statement that Achilles bears no resentment is actually a threat telling Agamemnon that if Achilles had been less forgiving, 'this would be your last outrage'. The threat is the height of arrogance and folly, since Thersites has neither the right nor the power to threaten the king, nor to speak for Achilles. His presumption is even more outrageous in view of the narrator's earlier information that Achilles hated Thersites (2.220). Yet empty and ridiculous as the threat is, the multiplication of Agamemnon's transgressions and the special emphasis placed on Agamemnon dishonoring Achilles lends it a spurious emotional justification.

In addition to demonstrating Thersites' ability to marshal words so as to relay his message and to appeal to his hearers' emotions, these lines illustrate the quarrelsomeness, scolding, and offensiveness that, according to the narrator, make his speech disorderly and inappropriate. The excessive, run-away quality of his words is discernable in the racing six lines of his direct address to the soldiers, their lack of moderation in his repetitive pounding on Agamemnon's flaws, and their utter impropriety in the absurd, half-veiled threat to the king. We can also see that instead of offering a rational argument for going home, Thersites abuses Agamemnon, manipulates his hearers' basest emotions (envy and resentment), plays on their natural desire for recognition and appreciation, and flatters them by implying that they are as good and worthy as Achilles and motivated by the same desire for honor.

In contrast to the introduction to Thersites' speech, the introduction to Odysseus' focuses more on his character than his words (2.278–283). The shift in focus suggests that the main difference between the two rhetoricians lies not in their verbal skill but in their characters and dispositions. The narrator begins by describing Odysseus as 'a sacker of cities' and telling that he rises to speak holding his staff (2.281). This information, brief as it is, anchors Odysseus' speech in his experience and personal knowledge of warfare, the subject under discussion, in his courage (as implied by his successful military experience), and in the decorum he shows in addressing his hearers in the proper and accepted manner. Thersites, tellingly, had not been credited with any of these attributes.

It is only after drawing attention to the relevant qualities of Odysseus' character and conduct that the narrator refers, obliquely, to the quality of his speech. Describing Athena's efforts to quiet the assembled multitudes so that they will be able to listen to Odysseus' words and learn his counsel (2.281–282), he implies that Odysseus will deliver a rational, substantive address that will require his hearers' attention and thought. He then leads into Odysseus' speech with the statement: 'He with good intentions (*eu phroneōn*) addressed them and spoke among them' (2.283). The term *eu phroneōn* denotes both 'with good intentions' and 'with good sense'. It reinforces the expectation that Odysseus will speak rationally and to the issue and adds the idea that his speech will be well-meaning.

The introductions, along with other aspects of the frames, place the two speakers in relation to Nestor, the *Iliad's* chief counselor. In the seven-line introduction to Nestor in Book One (247–253), the narrator had described him as a good speaker, an elderly ruler, and a man who is *eu phroneōn*. The message was that the ideal counselor, that is the man whose speech is to be valued and respected, possesses verbal skill, experience of successful leadership and command, and the right attributes of mind and disposition.¹⁷ The narrator's brief and formulaic allusion to Odysseus' military accomplishments and his description of him as *eu phroneōn* place Odysseus

within the Nestorian line. Thersites, in contrast, is placed outside this line. Odysseus' first words to Thersites are that although he is a *ligys agorētēs*, he is *akritomythos* (2.246–247). The term *ligys agorētēs*, which denotes both clear sounding and flowing speech, is one of several terms that the narrator had used to describe the quality of Nestor's voice and words (1.248). *Akritomythos* can be translated as 'ill-considered', 'not well thought out', or 'lacking in discernment'. Odysseus' statement tells us that even though Thersites shares with Nestor the verbal fluency of the good speaker, he lacks the more important quality of good judgment.

In keeping with the expectations established in the narrator's introduction, Odysseus' rhetorical address to Agamemnon is respectful, moderate, and logical. The respect is evident from the opening line, where Odysseus addresses Agamemnon as *anax* – lord or king – in addition to the patronymic 'Son of Atreus', with which Thersites addressed him. While address by patrimony is certainly acceptable, *anax* is the proper form given Agamemnon's status as the supreme king, and it is also adopted by Nestor, Diomedes, and Achilles. The appellation serves Odysseus as a means of restoring Agamemnon's standing in the eyes of the troops after Thersites had undermined it, and serves Homer as a way of drawing the attention of the outer audience to Thersites' omission of this basic courtesy, as of every other.

Odysseus also takes care not to criticize Agamemnon directly or to demean him publicly. From his very first line, he deftly shifts the troops' attention from Agamemnon's flaws to the lapses in their own conduct. Thus he states that the Achaeans want to make Agamemnon an object of shame or reproach and that they refuse to keep their promise to fight on till Troy is sacked. From here, he proceeds to criticize the troops for wailing to go home and then, in a gnomic statement, to deliver the uncompromising moral message that 'it is utterly/shameful to remain long and return home empty handed' (2.297–298).

The avoidance of direct criticism of the king does not mean that Odysseus agrees with him. In fact, Odysseus specifically counters the key arguments that Agamemnon had made for going home. Agamemnon had urged the troops to accept the shame of going home empty-handed (2.134–141); Odysseus rejects this. Agamemnon had urged the homesick troops to return to their families (2.136–138); Odysseus tells them that they must stay on despite their homesickness. Agamemnon had claimed that further fighting would be pointless because Zeus had turned against them (2.110–115); Odysseus will refute this claim at length. The refutation is necessary in order to provide the troops with an alternative point of view and grounds for staying on. It is not disrespectful, however. Odysseus avoids embarrassing Agamemnon by not pointing out the differences between the king's claims and his own. In fact, Odysseus' point-by-point refutation may be seen as a sign of respect: that he regards the king's claims as weighty and relevant enough to counter. It is noteworthy that he does not trouble to counter any of Thersites' charges.

Similar respect marks Odysseus' attitude to the troops, even as he criticizes them. Like Thersites, he impugns the troops' manhood, describing them as behaving like 'little children or widowed women' (2.289). However, the criticism is issued indirectly, as a statement to Agamemnon, not flung in the men's faces as Thersites' was, and it is couched in non-abusive language.¹⁸ There is no attack on the men's dignity, nor is there any of the derision or bullying that could be heard in Thersites' words.

Moreover, Odysseus soon tempers the severity of his criticism by acknowledging that being away from home for so long is indeed difficult and by his moving and sensitive description of the grief it brings (2.291–294). The picture Odysseus paints of ships kept from sailing by blustery winter-winds and rising seas and of men pining for their wives after a month's delay conveys his empathy with the troops' plight. His inclusion of himself in the analogy he draws between the vexation felt under these familiar circumstances and the much greater vexation felt by the troops who are still waiting to go home nine years into the war tells the men that he knows what they feel because he shares their experience (2.295–296). The sting of the rebuke is almost lost in the pathos of the picture, as well as in Odysseus' conciliatory statement that he does 'not blame the Achaeans/for their impatience' (2.296–297). The moral message with which he ends his address places honor above personal interests and desires. Given the close association between honor and masculinity in the warrior society of the *Iliad*, as in later Greek culture,¹⁹ the statement turns Odysseus' earlier denigration of the troops' manhood into an appeal to their values and identities as men. It intimates his own respect for them and bolsters their respect for themselves.

Like Thersites' address to Agamemnon, Odysseus' address also shows considerable verbal dexterity. Odysseus' sentences are less grammatically complex than those of Thersites and his rhythms are steadier, with less alternation between long, flowing sentences and short, curt ones and proportionally fewer and less dramatic enjambments.²⁰ The fifteen lines (2.284–298) of his address to Agamemnon consist of nine paratactic statements as opposed to five in the ten lines (2.225–234) of Thersites' address to the king. On average, his sentences are shorter than Thersites' and do not contain the kind of subordination in which Thersites excels.

Odysseus uses his verbal dexterity differently from Thersites. One key use is in the creation of a logically coherent argument.²¹ Substantively, the logic of his approach is evident in his methodical refutation of Agamemnon's arguments for leaving. This refutation makes his speech part of an ongoing discourse that is meaningful to the leaders, who make the decisions, and relevant to the troops, since it deals with the legitimate concerns of soldiers fighting a long war away from home: the pangs of homesickness, the tension between the claims of honor and the claims of survival, and, above all, the chances of victory and the disposition of the gods in whose hands victory ultimately lies. Consideration of these vital issues is strikingly absent from Thersites' speech.

More technically, Odysseus fashions his short, relatively simple statements into a complex thought sequence that moves methodically through three different phases: criticism of the men's behavior, empathy with their desire to go home, and the moral message. In contrast to Thersites' two accusations, about Agamemnon's women and wealth (2.226–228, 229–233), which are highly repetitive in content and couched in the same sarcastic voice, each of Odysseus' statements makes a distinct point and has its own emotional tone. The empathy in the second statement softens the criticism in the first, while the moral message in the third elevates the soldiers' duty above the longing for home that had been legitimized in the second. The statements form a successive, progressive argument held together semantically by the term 'go home,' repeated in each phase (2.288, 290, 291, 298), and syntactically by the use of connectives to link paratactic statements.

The connectives are of note. In Thersites' address to Agamemnon the only connective is the word *ēē*, in Line 232. It connects the two alternative motives for complaint that Thersites attributes to Agamemnon, and there is no way of stating the alternative without it.²² Most of the connectives in Odysseus' address seem to be optional, utilized to link ideas that can stand separately (*gar*, 'for', 2.289), for emphasis (*ē mēn*, 'indeed', 2.291), and for contrast (*d'*, 2.295). Of particular interest are the connectors 'therefore' (2.296) and 'yet even so' (2.297). 'Therefore' (*tō*) creates a causal link between his statement that he does not blame the men for wanting to leave or for their deep homesickness. 'Yet even so' (*alla kai empēs*) is necessary to the sense of his argument (his meaning could not be inferred without it); like 'therefore', however, it delineates the logical relationship between two points. The progressive movement of the address from one point to the next, the successive qualifications, and the coherence created by the connectives give the whole a logical, nuanced, and balanced quality.

The second part of his speech demonstrates Odysseus' respectful attitude and logical approach at least as fully as the first. It opens with a direct address to the troops closely conjoined with his proposal, and then goes on to the account of the portent of the snake and Calchas' prophecy as a means of persuading the troops to follow his advice. His direct address and proposal – 'Persevere, my friends (*philoi*), and remain for a time, so that we may learn/whether Calchas prophesized truthfully or not' (2.299–300) – conveys a view of the troops as partners in a joint endeavor. The appellation 'friends' has consistently positive connotations in the *Iliad* and is free of the denigrating quality of Thersites' *pepones*. He frames his proposal not simply as a directive to the troops to stay, but as an invitation to 'persevere' with him so that he and they may together learn the truth of Calchas' prophecy. He recounts the portent and prophecy as an event that the soldiers and he witnessed together, and repeatedly uses the first person plural to indicate their common experience (2.301, 305–306, 320, 324, 328).

Thersites had also included himself in his address to the troops. He counted himself among 'we Achaeans' who gave Agamemnon the women and gold whenever 'we captured' a citadel (2.227–228) and related that it was 'I ... or some other of the Achaeans' (2.231) who captured the young Trojan soldiers who were exchanged for the ransom payments with which Agamemnon enriched himself. But these are statements vaunting accomplishments. Odysseus includes himself in shared experiences, hardships, and aspirations. There is no boasting or self-aggrandizement. On the contrary, he presents himself rather modestly as one who will 'learn' the truth of Calchas' prophecy along with the common soldiers and who has no more insight into the future than they do. His depiction of himself as one who has yet to 'learn' contrasts pointedly with Thersites' urging the soldiers to let Agamemnon 'learn' whether he needs them or not. The contrast is heightened by Odysseus' enjambment on 'learn/whether' (2.299–300), which replicates that in Thersites' speech (2.237–238). The replication is all the more notable in view of the limited use of dramatic enjambment in Odysseus' speech.

Odysseus supports his proposal by means of maxim and proof aimed at his audience's rational faculties. His maxim, 'it is utterly/shameful to remain long and return home empty handed' (2.297–298), like Thersites' gnomic statement that a leader should not bring suffering upon his men (2.233–234), would probably have been

accepted as self-evident by the troops, as well as by Homer's outer audience. Unlike Thersites' maxim, however, which had applied primarily to the leadership, Odysseus' applies directly to the troops and thus serves as a sound basis for his advice. It provides the moral imperative to fight on until victory and the rationale for the soldiers to keep their promise to do so. Homer bolsters the maxim by giving Hera a similar sentiment in 2.160–163. Aristotle will use both statements as examples of the argument that a thing is good which has cost much labor and expense (*Rhet.* 1363a22).²³

Odysseus' 'proof' consists of the portent and prophecy he relates. These are his evidence that the Greeks will conquer Troy, as Zeus had promised. The details of the portent – the snake coming from under the altar, the devouring of the sparrow and her fledglings, the disappearance of the snake, turned to stone – are the 'facts' of the case. So are the contents of Calchas' prophecy, declaring that the portent came from Zeus, that the eight fledglings and their mother represent the nine years that the Achaeans will wage war without success, and that Troy will be conquered in the tenth year. Aristotle would later refer to this type of narration as *diagēsis*: a narrative 'leading through' the facts (*Rhet.* 1416b16). He will also count the maxim or gnome as a tool of logical argument (*Rhet.* 1394a1–b15), with the special advantage of endowing a speech with moral character (*Rhet.* 1395b15–16), and list oracles among the various types of witnesses that can be brought to support or refute a claim in court. Oracles, he will write, are witnesses of future events (*Rhet.* 1375b13–1376a17).

Odysseus sets out his evidence in a methodical, orderly way. He introduces his narration in line 301 with the conjunction 'for' (*gar*), which signals that he will explain why the men should persevere. Before recounting the details, he establishes the factuality of the incident by reminding his hearers that 'you all were/witnesses' (2.301–302) and by carefully situating it in specific circumstances (under a fair plane tree, near a spring with bright waters, when the men were gathered and making hecatombs on the holy altars (2.305–307). He then relates the portent point by point, in three tri-stichic sentences, each introduced by the chronological marker 'then' (2.308, 311, 314), which tell in succession of the snake's emergence, of the terrified sparrow-fledglings and their mother in the plane tree, and of the snake's devouring them all. Then, signaling a shift of focus by the use of the conjunction 'but' (*autar*, 2.317), he ends his account of the portent with a four-line statement reminding his hearers how Zeus had turned the snake to a stone and made it invisible, and how they stood there and marveled at what had happened. Finally, he completes his narrative by quoting Calchas' prophecy, taking pains to link it closely with the portent. The particle 'so' (*hōs*) at the beginning of Line 321 highlights the idea that the 'dread portent' is the reason for Calchas' speaking up. The first two lines of the prophecy (2.326, 327) repeat almost verbatim Lines 317 and 327 recounting the portent. The repetition creates a smooth transition from portent to prophecy and reinforces the analogy between the actions of the snake and the actions of the Trojans, which will lead to an Achaean victory.

His reliance on reason does not mean that Odysseus neglects his hearers' emotions or that he is any less inclined to manipulate them than Thersites. This could already be discerned in the first part of his speech, where his harsh criticism of the troops aimed at making them ashamed of their desire to go home, while his moving picture of their homesickness was designed to soften them up and make them receptive to the

need to stay on. Here, Odysseus' narrative of the portent and prophecy is full of emotion. In principle, the only information about the portent that is required for the prophecy is that the snake emerged from the altar, ate the nine birds, and was turned to stone, a point which reinforces the supernatural quality of the event.²⁴ Instead of simply relating these bare details, however, Odysseus uses his verbal skills to create a vivid, suspenseful, and terrifying narrative. The image of the blood-red on the snake's back and the onomatopoeia of the adjective *smerdaleos* ('terror-striking', 2.309) describing the snake create an aura of dread, which is then heightened by the emphasis on the youth and innocence of the terrified fledglings (2.311).²⁵ The portent is related so that the troops can see the snake slithering out from under the altar and darting quickly to the plane tree, the fledglings cowering beneath the leaves in the topmost branch and their mother fluttering about them, the serpent devouring them and catching the mother on the wing, and so that they can hear the birds twittering piteously and the mother wailing and screaming. With each line, Odysseus adds a new piece of information that compounds the dread and awe evoked by the previous details, building up to a cumulative effect of horror. The repetition of the idea of devouring in two consecutive statements (2.314, 317) further accentuates the horror of the event. The contrast between Zeus bringing the snake to light and making him unseen (2.318, *ephēne, aizēlon*²⁶) compounds the sense of wonder and amazement that Odysseus reminds the troops they had felt when they first 'stood there and marveled at what had happened' (2.320).

Odysseus' speech arouses and channels his hearers' emotions even more skillfully than that of Thersites. There is nothing in Thersites' speech that matches Odysseus' storytelling and his ability to bring ideas and events alive. Odysseus' use of emotion differs from Thersites', however, in two important ways. One is the type of emotions to which he appeals. Thersites appeals mainly to his hearers' baser emotions, their envy and resentment. Odysseus appeals to their sense of honor and shame. His address to Agamemnon leads up to the pointed declaration that it would be disgraceful to go home empty-handed after such a long wait. His account of the portent and prophecy taps into and bolsters their desire for military action and glory.

The other notable difference is in the relation between emotion and reason. Thersites' manipulation of the soldiers' emotions comes in place of rational support for his proposal. His argument is based on association and insinuation, with little if any logical connection between his statements. Odysseus employs reason together with emotion in his speech. The orderly succession of occurrences linked by 'then', 'but', and 'so' is the same scaffolding that supports the emotive elements of the narrative. The reminder that the troops were 'witnesses' to the dramatic events he relates both underscores their 'factuality' and involves the hearers in them emotionally. The strong emotional experience – pity and dread, terror and amazement – that the narrative creates would heighten the hearers' intellectual desire to hear Calchas' interpretation of the unnatural and mysterious portent. Odysseus' direct quotation of Calchas' lines simultaneously heightens their dramatic quality and supports the authenticity of the prophecy.

For all their intensity, the emotions that are aroused in Odysseus' speech are bounded by the logical framework. This can be seen with particular clarity in the endings of the two speeches. Thersites' second address to Agamemnon, with its bombastic threat, brings the speech back to the abuse of Agamemnon with which it

had begun. There is less a feeling of closure than of starting all over again, with the same overwrought and abusive railing at the end as was heard at the beginning. Odysseus brings his speech to a close by marking the end of his quotation of Calchas and stating that the prophecy is already coming to pass (2.330) and by repeating his urging that the troops 'stay . . . until we take the great city of Priam' (2.331–332). With these statements, he progressively lowers the emotional pitch that he had built up and reinforces his central message that the troops should stay on and fight till the end. There is a sense of purpose, progression, and closure that are all absent from Thersites' speech.

What is the incipient theory of rhetoric that can be deduced from the comparison between Thersites' and Odysseus' speeches? And what, if any, relation does it bear to Aristotle's theory of rhetoric four centuries later?

The basis of Homer's theory seems to be that, in view of the power of speech to move men, especially ordinary men, merely skilled rhetoric must be distinguished from right rhetoric. This distinction is implicit in Aristotle's comment that speakers who appeal to jurors' emotions seek to warp their judgment (*Rhet.* 1354a3–6), as well as in the primacy he gives to the logical aspects of speech (see below). Nonetheless, Aristotle's main concern is with effective rhetoric, not right rhetoric. He acknowledges that speech can do great harm if it is misused, but quickly points out that most good and useful things, like health, strength, wealth, and so forth, can do great harm if used unjustly (*Rhet.* 1355b13).

Skilled rhetoric, for Homer, is marked by a command of language, as manifested in its easy flow, and by the ability to understand, manipulate, and appeal to the emotions of one's hearers. Both speeches show both qualities, though Odysseus' is clearly superior on both counts. The orderly, logical flow of Odysseus' words, in which the statements are linked to one another substantively and grammatically and built up to form a coherent whole, show his capacity to construct a logical argument. Its riveting story and lively, palpable images demonstrate his ability to use words poetically. Thersites' speech shows neither of these skills. The superior psychological power of Odysseus' speech inheres in its appeal beyond the men's baser desires, which Thersites' manipulates, to their nobler qualities.

The clear superiority of Odysseus' speech in both verbal fluency and psychological power testifies to the value that Homer placed on the speaker's ability to marshal his words to his purposes and to understand and engage his audience. It is also one of the many indications in the *Iliad* of how much Homer valued skilled speech even while he regarded it as potentially dangerous.

Aristotle will share Homer's apparent admiration of logical speech, but will not give the same pride of place to poetic expression or to the speaker's ability to manipulate his audience's emotions. As is well known, Aristotle's model of persuasive speech (*Rhet.* 1356a3–5) encompasses three means of artistic persuasion: logical argument (*logos*), the character of the speaker (*ēthos*), and the emotions of the audience (*pathos*).²⁷ Verbal dexterity is not defined as an essential feature. Aristotle seems to admire the poetic quality of Homer's writing. He showers praise on its *energeia*, obtained by the use of personification and visual imagery, which bring events before the audience's eyes (*Rhet.* 1411b–1412a). He also lauds metaphoric speech (*Rhet.* 1412b–1413a) and the use of hyperbole to obtain vehemence (*Rhet.* 1413a15–16, citing *Iliad* 9.385). What he admires, however, in these 'poetic'

features of language is their ability to increase the clarity of the speech. Although he declares that *lexis*, or style, along with delivery, is important to the clarity of speech and must be taught, he maintains that it is not an intrinsic part of the argument but 'a form of outward show intended to please the audience' (*Rhet.* 1404a6). His ideal is a clear prose style that possesses the liveliness of poetic language, but stops short of its intricacy and artificiality, which he fears will alienate the speaker's audience (*Rhet.* 1404b1–2).

With regard to emotional appeal, Aristotle maintained that speakers must address the audience's emotions in order to put them in the right frame of mind to decide a matter in accord with his urging (*Rhet.* 1356a). Nonetheless, of the three means of artistic persuasion, he seems to have regarded *pathos* as the least worthy. As noted above, he writes that speakers who appeal to jurors' emotions seek to warp their judgment (*Rhet.* 1354a3–6). Kennedy suggests that his treatment of emotions is a concession to the fact that people do not decide matters solely on the basis of reason.²⁸ A certain wariness of emotion-based rhetoric is also evident in Homer's distinctions between speech that appeals to nobler emotions and that which appeals to baser ones, and between speech whose appeal is almost solely emotional and that whose appeal is also logical. Nonetheless, Homer seems more accepting of the role of emotions in decision-making, and hence in speech.

Right rhetoric may be characterized by the absence of the qualities that Thersites' speech is said or shown to display and the presence of the qualities that Odysseus' speech is said or shown to possess. Thus, right rhetoric is orderly, moderate in content and quantity, and appropriate to the subject, occasion, and audience. It is tactful and respectful, and free of derision and sarcasm, but does not pander to or flatter the audience or shy away from what needs to be said. It is marked by the conventional courtesies and formalities and informed by knowledge, experience, and judgment, which make the speech worth attending to. It is also informed by good intentions, manifested in such things as the speaker's positive disposition toward his audience, his appeal to their nobler emotions, and his speaking for their good. (Odysseus' urging his hearers to stay and fight in the name of honor would have been viewed in their best interests; Thersites' urging them to flee would not have been).

Right rhetoric is also logical. The importance of logic to right rhetoric cannot be overstated. Logic permeates Odysseus' speech from beginning to end. It is present both in its stylistic features (e.g., its progressive structure and consistent use of connectives to create and articulate the logical links between statements) and in the more substantive features, namely the use of a maxim that applies to the recommended course of action and the laying out of what the audience would have regarded as factual evidence supporting the claim that the Achaeans will conquer Troy.

The logic of the speech is testimony both to the order of the speaker's mind and to his respect for his audience. In arguing by insinuation and association, Thersites had displayed both the muddle of his own mind and his contempt for, or unawareness of, his audience's critical facilities. It is as though he had assumed that his hearers lacked the ability to discern the absence of logic in his speech as they were swept up by his appeal to their envy and resentment. Odysseus' address to his audience's rational faculties, even as he arouses and engages their emotions, implies an assumption that his hearers, the common soldiers no less than the leaders and kings, have the intelligence to know that they are hearing a reasoned, logical argument and to be able to follow it.

In making logic an essential component of right rhetoric, Homer anticipates the great value that Aristotle will place on logical argument. Of the three means of persuasion, Aristotle seems to view *logos* as the most important and most effective. He introduces rhetoric as a counterpart of dialectic (*Rhet.* 1354a1), that is, philosophical disputation, in which logical argument was virtually the only significant element. He faults earlier handbooks of rhetoric for neglecting *logos*, the means of proving a claim, and for paying too much attention to the less important matters of arrangement, expression, and emotional manipulation (*Rhet.* 1354b9). The primacy of logical argument in persuasive speech seems to be anchored for Aristotle in the conviction that people have the intellectual capacity to see what is true and in their best interest, so that they will be persuaded by a speaker who speaks to those capacities (*Rhet.* 1354a–b). Homer seems to have a similar faith in people's capacity for judging persuasive speech logically.

Finally, Homer anchors right rhetoric in the speaker's character: in the quality of his mind and disposition. Aristotle will observe that the speaker's projection of a moral character is a means of persuasion that is separate from his *logoi* or arguments. The orator, he advises, should speak in such a way as to make the audience view him as credible and worthy of belief. Projection of credibility is a controlling factor, he states, in winning over an audience, especially in matters where there is room for doubt (*Rhet.* 1356a3–4). He names as the qualities that the speaker should try to project, practical wisdom (*phronēsis*), excellence (*aretē*), and good will (*eunoia*), since these, in his view, are what make the speaker seem trustworthy to his audience (*Rhet.* 1378a 5–7).

Homer has Odysseus display or the narrator attribute to him all of these qualities. He specifically notes Odysseus' good will and good sense (*eu phronēōn*), alludes to his *aretē* through the mention of his military experience, and makes practical wisdom, or resourcefulness, a centerpiece of his personality. Homer differs from Aristotle, however, in that he does not seem to think that the speaker should try actively to project his persona. He treats Thersites' claims about himself (e.g., his taking credit for helping to procure Agamemnon's women and wealth) as self-aggrandizement; and gives Odysseus only the very modest self-claim that he witnessed the portent and prophecy along with the troops.

This difference may be rooted in the circumstances of public speech in the *Iliad* and in Aristotle's time. Aristotle directed his recommendations to the many Athenians who would have occasion to file suit or defend themselves in the popular courts and to aspiring politicians who might want to bring proposals before the popular Assembly. These speakers would probably not know or be known by most of their audiences, so would have had to take active measures to establish their credibility. Homer's speakers may or may not have known all those they addressed, but they were known by them. Odysseus' reputation preceded him, as did Thersites'. Homer's warrior speakers thus had no need to prove themselves. Where further information is required for the outer audience, the narrator supplies it.²⁹ For Homer's theory of rhetoric, this would mean that rhetoric practiced rightly is modest and free of efforts to prove oneself to the audience.

Before closing this discussion, I would like to consider briefly two questions that arise from the paired speeches. The first is whether right rhetoric is contingent on the speaker's taking the correct position. It seems to be, in that the text presents fighting till victory as the right thing to do and leaving in mid-course as wrong. Moreover,

later on, when Agamemnon again urges going to the ships, Odysseus seems to link the nature of his proposal to the quality of his mind: A man 'who has understanding . . . to utter things that are right', he declares, should not let such a suggestion pass his lips (14.91–92). On the other hand, we cannot be sure that Odysseus is an authoritative voice here. His remarks are not supported by the narrator, as those to and about Thersites had been. Indeed, when Agamemnon proposed leaving in order to test the soldiers, nothing was said about his being an undiscerning speaker. Moreover, the issue of staying or leaving is tackled on various occasions in the *Iliad*, notably in Book Nine, after the Achaeans' fortifications have been breached, and in Book Fourteen, after Agamemnon, Odysseus, and Diomedes are wounded and unable to fight. The repeated discussions of the issue suggest that the right thing to do is not always clear and that there must be room for debate.

The second question, which stems from Quintilian's claim that Thersites' criticisms of Agamemnon would have been commendable had they been voiced by a major warrior of noble standing,³⁰ is the extent to which right rhetoric is contingent on social class. There is no denying that class is important in the *Iliad*: just before presenting the paired speeches, the narrator describes Odysseus as behaving very differently towards the kings and men of influence and the ordinary men (2.188–206) who were running to their ships. To the first he spoke gently; but he struck the second, and told them to listen to their betters (2.203–204), which would seem to bear out Quintilian's claim and even imply that those of the lower social order should not speak on political matters at all.

So would the fact that no aspersion is cast on high-born warriors who criticize the king. Achilles had accused Agamemnon of being interested only in his own profit (1.149), complained that Agamemnon was the first to receive the booty from any conquest and received the largest portion of it (1.163–167), and refused to 'stay here dishonored and heap up your wealth and riches' (1.171) before Thersites made very similar statements of his own. Later in the epic, when Agamemnon urges sailing home in earnest, Diomedes attacks him as lacking the courage to continue fighting (9.39) and Odysseus expresses scorn for his mental faculties (14.95). No aspersion is cast on these warriors.

Yet the notion that what makes Thersites' speaking up against Agamemnon unacceptable is his inferior social status is a simplification. His speech is *ou kata kosmon*, unfitting, not because he is a commoner, but because it is abusive, ill intentioned, and inflammatory. Achilles' criticisms stem directly from the personal wrong Agamemnon had done him in appropriating Briseis. They are stated in blunt, clear terms, with none of the ugly insinuation or sarcasm of Thersites' speech, and they serve to explain Achilles' reasons for leaving the field himself, not as spurious arguments to foment rebellion. Diomedes, along with criticizing Agamemnon, acknowledges his leadership and status (9.38). Odysseus (14.83–102) excoriates Agamemnon's suggestion that they head for the boats as 'ruinous'; yet his harsh words are not meant to insult, but to move Agamemnon to retract his recommendation, which he does. Thersites' criticism of Agamemnon lacks the restraints that are inherent in Diomedes' and Odysseus' rebukes. His overly familiar and offensive words would be equally unfitting whoever uttered them. The issue is character and decorum, not class.³¹

Based on the above analysis, we can say that right rhetoric possesses inter-related social and intellectual dimensions. The disorder of Thersites' mind encompasses both

the illogic of his speech and his ranting and abusiveness. Being *eu phroneōn* in the way that marks right rhetoric denotes both good sense (an intellectual property) and good intentions (a social property). The judgment or discernment, which Thersites lacks despite his clear voice (2.246), covers knowing what to say for the occasion and how to marshal one's points, as well as addressing one's hearers with courtesy, respect, and a sense of the proprieties.³²

Bibliographical Essay

A good start on the controversy for the dispute between the classical philosophers and rhetoricians on the question whether rhetoric already existed in Homer is G.A. Kennedy, 'The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer', *AJP* 78 (1957), pp. 23–35 and his *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963) with A.J. Karp, 'Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric', *Arethusa* 10 (1977), pp. 237–258. For rhetorical devices and style in Homer, a helpful summary can be found in M.W. Edwards, *The Iliad: Commentary V: Books 17–20* (Cambridge: 1991), pp. 42–60. D. Lohmann, 'The "Inner Composition" of the Speeches in the *Iliad*', in G.M. Wright and P.V. Jones (eds.), *Homer: German Scholarship in Translation* (Oxford: 1997), pp. 71–102, focuses on ring composition and parallel structure as compositional principles in the speeches in the *Iliad*. P.G. Toohey, 'Epic and Rhetoric', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 153–175, is a helpful discussion of four speeches of Nestor's speeches in the *Iliad*.

Notes

- 1 According to J. Griffin, 'The Speeches', in R. Fowler (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Homer* (Cambridge: 2004), p. 156 n. 1 (based on W. Schmid and O. Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* 1 [Munich: 1992], p. 92), 7,019 out of 15,690 lines in the *Iliad* are in direct speech. In the *Odyssey*, 8,225 lines are in direct speech out of 12,103.
- 2 Griffin, 'Speeches' and 'Homeric Words and Speakers', *JHS* 106 (1986), pp. 36–57, G.S. Kirk, *The Iliad: Commentary* 1 (Cambridge: 1990), pp. 35–35, P. Friedrich and J. Redfield, 'Speech as a Personality Symbol: The Case of Achilles', *Language* 54 (1978), pp. 263–288, H.M. Roisman, 'Helen in the *Iliad*: Causa Belli and Victim of War – From Silent Weaver to Public Speaker', *AJP* 127 (2006), pp. 1–36.
- 3 Clarke, *Out of Line: Homeric Composition Beyond the Hexameter* (Lanham, MD: 1997), pp. 99–100.
- 4 See M. Schofield, 'Euboulia in the *Iliad*', *CQ*² 36 (1986), pp. 6–31.
- 5 On skilled speech, see for example F. Solmsen, 'The "Gift" of Speech in Homer and Hesiod', *TAPA* 85 (1954), pp. 1–4.
- 6 F.A.G. Beck, *Greek Education, 450–350 B.C.* (London: 1964), pp. 55–66.
- 7 For the dispute between the classical philosophers and rhetoricians on the question whether rhetoric already existed in Homer, see G.A. Kennedy, 'The Ancient Dispute over Rhetoric in Homer', *AJP* 78 (1957), pp. 23–35 and *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), p. 27. Kennedy observes that 'speeches in the Homeric poems already illustrate some of the structural patterns sought by later rhetoricians': *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*

- (New York: 1991), p. 257; cf. F. Létoublon, 'Le Bon Orateur et le Génie selon Antéenor dans l'*Iliade*: Ménélas et Ulysse', in *La Rhétorique Grecque* (Paris: 1994), pp. 29–40 and A.J. Karp, 'Homeric Origins of Ancient Rhetoric', *Arethusa* 10 (1977), pp. 237–258. In ancient times, Homer's rhetorical devices were assembled, for example, in a work known as *de Vita et Poesi Homeri*, which came down to us with [Plutarch]'s *Moralia*: J.J. Keaney and R. Lamberton, [Plutarch] *Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer* (Atlanta: 1966).
- 8 Among modern scholars, P.G. Toohey, 'Epic and Rhetoric', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 153–175, analyses four of Nestor's deliberative speeches in terms of the structural categories of the classical rhetoricians. M.W. Edwards, *The Iliad: Commentary V: Books 17–20* (Cambridge: 1991), pp. 55–60, treats Homer's rhetorical figures based on sound-effects, world play, etymology, and repetition. M. Delaunoy, 'Comment parlent les Héros d'Homère', *Les Études Classiques* 20 (1952), pp. 80–92, creates a four-part typology of the speeches in the *Iliad*: the disorganized psychological speech, the slightly organized and psychological speech, speeches of simple logic, and logical and studied speeches. Létoublon, 'Bon Orateur', suggests that Antenor's contrast between Odysseus' and Menelaus' speeches contain an implicit rhetorical theory, which opposes what would later be called the terse or plain style with the grand or elevated style; cf. Schofield, 'Euboulia', p. 13.
 - 9 For rhetorical examination of Chryses' prayer in *Iliad* 1.435–474, see K. Dowden, Chapter 21, pp. 321–322.
 - 10 They are also both ring composition (225 and 242 in Thersites' speech, 299 and 331–332 in Odysseus' speech) but then so are many other speeches in the *Iliad*: D. Lohmann, *Die Komposition der Reden in der Ilias* (Berlin: 1970), pp. 51–55, 174–178 and 'The "Inner Composition" of the Speeches in the *Iliad*', in G.M. Wright and P.V. Jones (eds.), *Homer: German Scholarship in Translation* (Oxford: 1997), pp. 71–102.
 - 11 Other common rhetorical devices to be found in Homer are: hyperbaton, anaphora, emphasis by word position, ring composition, metaphor.
 - 12 On the *Rhetoric*, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9.
 - 13 N. Postlethwaite, *Homer's Iliad* (Exeter: 2000) on 2.270.
 - 14 Lattimore's translation is 'fools', but 'fellows' seems more precise and less prejudicial.
 - 15 Kirk, *Iliad* 1 on 2.235; see also *Iliad* 13.120.
 - 16 The break between verses was usually maintained in Homer: see further, C. Higbie, *Measure and Music: Enjambement and Sentence Structure in the Iliad* (Oxford: 1990), pp. 9, 28, 109–110, Clarke, *Out of Line*, pp. 47–48, for anticipatory enjambment, see especially his Chapter 4; cf. Edwards, *Iliad*, p. 60.
 - 17 For fuller discussion of these qualities as they are exhibited in Nestor's oratory, see H.M. Roisman, 'Nestor the Good Counsellor', *CQ* 55 (2005), pp. 23–35.
 - 18 In Line 201, Odysseus is quoted as addressing an individual soldier as 'unwarlike and a weakling'. The insulting quality of this address points to the difference between the more casual and candid norms of one-to-one speech and the proprieties of public speech. It is also of note that Odysseus' manner toward the troops becomes progressively kinder as he proceeds.
 - 19 J. Roisman, *The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators* (Berkeley: 2005), pp. 65–83.
 - 20 There are five enjambments in Odysseus' speech: 2.284–285, 293–294, 297–298, 299–300, 301–302. Clarke, *Out of Line*, pp. 37–38, also sees enjambments in 2.311–313, and 326–327.
 - 21 Lohmann, *Komposition*, p. 52, points out the logical, analytical quality of this speech in contrast to the emotionality of Achilles' utterances.
 - 22 Kirk, *Iliad* 1, p. 32, maintains that particle-complexes and conjunctions are more common in the speeches than in the narrative.

- 23 See also Odysseus' statement at *Iliad* 14.88–89.
- 24 According to the Scholia, the turning into a stone signifies a cessation of movement, which indicates the cessation of war.
- 25 Cf. Kirk, *Iliad* 1 on Lines 307–318.
- 26 The mss reading is *arizēlon*, 'very bright', 'conspicuous'. For this well-known crux, see Kirk, *Iliad* 1, *ad loc.*
- 27 On *logos*, see W.M.A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric* 1 (New York: 1980), *ad loc* and *Aristotle, Rhetoric* 2 (New York: 1988), *ad loc.*
- 28 Kennedy, *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*, p. 39 n. 45.
- 29 Nestor, who sounds his own horn in lengthy stories of his youthful feats, is a notable exception. His stories are meant to serve as exemplars, however; they refer to his younger self, whom his hearers did not know, and allowance is made for the long-windedness that comes with his venerable age.
- 30 Quint. 11.1.37: 'Give these words to Diomedes or some other of his equals, they will seem to demonstrate a great spirit'.
- 31 Much the same point is made in the depiction of Euryalus, who is of higher social class than Thersites: *Odyssey* 8.165–185.
- 32 I wish to thank Jenny Clay and Ian Worthington for their constructive comments.

CHAPTER TWENTY-NINE

Hesiod's Rhetorical Art

Jenny Strauss Clay

The handbooks tell us that rhetoric was discovered in Greece during the fifth or even fourth century and required both developed democratic and legal institutions and a literate culture to flourish,¹ social conditions Hesiod, a near contemporary of Homer, from a small village in Boeotia could not have known. Moreover, we usually consider rhetoric to refer to speech making in prose, not Hesiod's traditional hexameter verse. Nevertheless, the Hesiodic poems share an important characteristic of oratory in its usual meaning: both are conceived as spoken performances in front of an audience. All early Greek poetry was performed orally before an audience rather than read, and the occasion of performance determined its character and genre. If we define rhetoric generally as the 'means by which a writer makes known his vision to the reader and persuades him of its validity',² then the term would indeed apply to the Hesiodic poems, but it would also promiscuously embrace just about any form of literary expression. If, on the other hand, we define rhetoric as the formal study or codification of the means and rules of persuasive speech, then to speak of Hesiod's rhetoric might leave us open to the charge of gross anachronism. Yet if rhetoric means reflecting self-consciously and systematically about the power and efficacy of speech,³ Hesiod, I will argue, not only practiced that art, but also thought about and formulated his views, not, to be sure, in a treatise, but nevertheless in a coherent manner. In fact, I would maintain – with only a little tongue in cheek – that Hesiod might well be considered the father of rhetoric. I will also show that applying certain terms and categories from the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition to Hesiod, while apparently anachronistic, can not only be a useful heuristic tool, but even illuminating.

The *Theogony* recounts in about one thousand hexameter verses the genesis and evolution of the gods and the other eternal forces that regulate the cosmos and culminates in Zeus' final and permanent ordering of that cosmos; in the slightly shorter *Works and Days* Hesiod purports to advise his ne'er-do-well brother Perses how best to live in the world constituted by Zeus, a world that requires human beings to practice justice and to toil for their daily bread. These two poems are

complementary, the one dealing with the divine and everlasting components of the cosmos while the second focuses on the character of human life. Here we will concentrate on one particular facet of the interrelation between the two compositions: their presentation of the function of eloquence and persuasive speech. To oversimplify a bit, we might say that the proem to the *Theogony* sets out a theory of rhetoric and the *Works and Days* puts it into practice.

While the Homeric heroes assign a high value to the ability to speak persuasively (see H.M. Roisman, Chapter 28), Hesiod is the first to extend the Muses' domain from poetry to rhetoric and thereby to put the power of persuasion under divine patronage. In the proem to the *Theogony*, Hesiod describes the twofold gift of the Muses to mankind. To the poets they, along with Apollo, grant their gift of song whereby 'the bards celebrate the glorious deeds of men of old and hymn the blessed gods' (99–101). This gift of the goddesses has the power to distract (*paretrape*) us poor mortals, diverting us from the griefs and cares that beset us (98–104). The Muses' second gift is granted to kings (81–90):⁴

Whomever of Zeus-nurtured kings the daughters of great Zeus honor,
And look upon favorably at his birth,
On his tongue they pour sweet dew,
And honeyed are the words that flow from his mouth; and the people
All look to him as he discerns what is established as right and proper
With straight judgments. And he, speaking with assurance,
Straightway makes an end to even a great quarrel;
This is what makes kings prudent, because for those
Who have been aggrieved they accomplish deeds of requital
With ease, persuading with soft words.

While their royal prerogatives, particularly the dispensation of justice, stem from Zeus, the eloquence of the kings derives from the Muses, more particularly, from Calliope, 'she of the lovely voice'. Hesiod then would seem to agree with Aristotle that rhetoric is related to the political art (*Rhet.* 1356a). But Hesiod singles out three special characteristics of royal speech: first, its role in resolving quarrels, 'even great ones', second, its soothing quality, which is particularly effective with parties that have been wronged, and, finally, the ability of such speech to distract or divert through persuasion so as to bring about reconciliation. The expression for such diversionary tactics, *paraiphamenoi* (90), seems to parallel the power of poetry to deflect us (*paretrape*, 103) from care. For Hesiod, then, both poetry and rhetoric constitute a kind of verbal sleight-of-hand that, on the one hand, gives pleasure by distracting us from human misery and, on the other, allows us to reconcile ourselves to an imperfect world. What may surprise us here is the ambivalent character of eloquence: while its sweetness heals, it also masks an underlying bitterness inherent in the human condition; rhetoric would then perhaps be unnecessary in a perfect world.

At the beginning of the *Theogony*, Hesiod narrates his encounter with the Muses on the slopes of Helicon. On that occasion, the goddesses gave him two gifts: they breathed into him a divine voice and gave him a scepter of laurel, an emblem that unites Apollo with the royal authority of speech. In Homeric epic, the scepter is thrust into the hands of the speaker and signifies his authority to address the Assembly. The gifts given to Hesiod thus correspond to the twofold sphere of

the Muses we have traced above: poetry that celebrates the glorious deeds of men and hymns the gods, and the political eloquence of kings that arbitrates and persuades. Hesiod appears to lay claim to both, and we shall observe him practicing both facets of his art.

As Aristotle argues, the ambiguity of eloquence and persuasion arises from the fact that, unlike the other arts, rhetoric deals with means rather than ends; it does not *per se* deal with, say, justice or virtue (*Rhet.* 1355b). For Hesiod too, the verbal art of poetry shares such ambiguity; the Muses' songs may delight not only with truth, but also by means of lies that cannot be distinguished from truth. Hesiod uses a metaphor to express this difference: both truth (*alētheia*)⁵ and just judgments (*dikai*)⁶ are straight. To bend the truth means to lie; to twist justice renders it crooked. Persuasive speech, however, is precisely the art of bending, of mollifying, of persuasion or seduction. The last act of the Succession Myth whereby Zeus brings stability to Olympus and renders his regime eternal requires just such seduction when Zeus swallows his first wife Metis ('Cunning') by tricking her with 'wheedling words' (*Theogony* 890). Decked out by the Graces and Lady Persuasion (*potnia Peithō*, *Works and Days* 73), Pandora, the first woman whose jar unleashes baneful miseries upon mankind, likewise possesses 'lies, wheedling words, and the morals of a thief' (*epiklopon ēthos*, *Works and Days* 78) with which she seduces Epimetheus. Aphrodite's prerogatives include 'the babble of maidens, smiles, and deceptions' (*Theogony* 205), while the offspring of Strife include 'Quarrels, Lies, Arguments and Counter-arguments' (*Theogony* 229). Hesiod may well be the first to acknowledge the ambiguity of rhetoric, its ability to harm and to heal, to persuade and seduce, and its power to further the truth as well as to dress up lies.

The *Theogony's* subject matter is assigned to Hesiod on the occasion of his meeting with the Muses. They grant him divine song and the laurel scepter and command him to sing of the 'race of the blessed ones who are forever' (33). This song is very similar to the one the goddesses themselves sing ('they celebrate in song the revered race of gods', 44) in order to 'delight the great mind of their father Zeus on Olympus', 37). While listening to Hesiod's song, we can, even if only momentarily, share in that divine delight. As a song praising the cosmos as it has come into being and celebrating Zeus's eternal dominion, the *Theogony* can appropriately be assigned to the category of epideictic speech, which, according to Aristotle, deals with praise and blame. The *Works and Days*, on the other hand, can fruitfully be analyzed as a combination of forensic and deliberative oratory insofar as it presents Hesiod's indictment of his brother Perses for his past misdeeds, which he accomplished with the connivance of the kings, and advises both Perses and the kings henceforth to mend their wicked ways.

1 *Theogony*

Of the three categories of rhetoric, epideictic oratory, according to Aristotle, is the closest to poetry.⁷ Later rhetoricians went so far as to include all of literature and history under this rubric. The audience of an epideictic speech – in Aristotle's terminology, *theoroi* or spectators – while not required to render a verdict or vote on a decree, nevertheless pass judgment on the merits of the speech itself (*Rhet.* 1358b, 1391b). The epideictic speaker implicitly competes with his predecessors, and

the spectators inevitably evaluate him in relation to others.⁸ Much early Greek poetry closely resembles Aristotle's definition of epideictic oratory in respect to the occasion of its performance, often a civic or religious festival, its audience, frequently Panhellenic, its concern with praise and blame, as well as its agonistic character.⁹ The *Theogony*, like so much of Greek literature, presents itself both explicitly and implicitly as a poem that competes with other theogonies. After all, 'bard envies bard' (*Works and Days* 26). Indeed, Hesiod himself tells us in the *Works and Days* how he won a prize at the funeral games for a certain Amphidamas, presumably with his *Theogony*, and that he dedicated his prize tripod to the Muses of Helicon who first initiated him in the art of song (*Works and Days* 654–659). The competitive character of the *Theogony* is also indicated by its frequent allusions to other, possibly local, theogonies and Hesiod's insistence on the Panhellenic completeness and authoritativeness of his own composition. Hesiod's poem embraces not only the birth of the gods, but also cosmic forces and components; in the invocation proper (105–115), Hesiod calls on the Muses to:

Celebrate the holy race of the immortals who are forever,
Those who were born from Earth and starry Sky,
And from gloomy Night, and those whom the salty Sea nurtured.
Tell how from the first the gods and the earth came into being
And the rivers and the boundless sea with billowing swell,
The shining stars and the broad heaven above;
And those who were born from them, gods, givers of good things,
How they divided their wealth and chose their honors,
And also how first they came to inhabit Olympus.
These things, Muses who inhabit Olympian homes, tell
From the beginning, and say who of them was born first.

Within this table of contents of the poem, Hesiod's repeated insistence on the proper ordering draws attention to the arrangement of his composition – what Aristotle would have called *taxis*. Another Greek word for the orderly arrangement of parts into a coherent whole is *cosmos*. Hesiod's *taxis* follows the arrangement of the cosmos from its first beginnings to its final state. Given his genealogical model, the expected arrangement of the material would seem inevitable and transparent, beginning from the first born of the gods and continuing to the last. Yet the ordering of the genealogies itself forms a *tour de force*, grouping the phenomena into families displaying similarities, differences, and interrelationships. Indeed, even the basic genealogical scheme is interrupted or displaced by various narratives, particularly the different stages of the Succession Myth, and digressions, which reveal the artfulness of Hesiod's disposition of his material. Thus the catalogue of the dreadful children of Night follows upon the castration of Uranus, the first act of the Succession Myth, that inaugurates the cycle of divine violence and revenge and unleashes those dark forces on the cosmos. Likewise the description of the nether world is delayed until the Titans are defeated by Zeus and imprisoned there. Most important are the various prolepses that allude to Zeus's triumph and the end of divine succession and generation. The story of Prometheus and his theft of fire, for example, comes out of sequence, not as we might expect after the Titanomachy that ensures Zeus's victory over the previous generation of the gods, but before. This shift renders Zeus's

triumph over trickery, which now becomes the central episode of the *Theogony*, prior to his martial victory. Such foreshadowings constitute rhetorical devices that give a teleological character to the whole work by continually pointing to the final arrangement of the cosmos that is imminent in its beginnings. In fact one could argue that Hesiod's dominant means of persuasion, of convincing his audience of the validity of his vision, lies precisely in its *taxis*. Hesiod's description of the cosmos from its primordial beginnings to its present and eternal shape itself constitutes a self-conscious and artful arrangement – a verbal cosmos.

Ēthos, which refers to the authority and trustworthiness of the speaker that in turn promotes persuasion, constitutes an important aspect of what Aristotle regarded as one of the primary components of rhetorical *heuresis* or invention. The *Theogony* presents an intriguing problem in this regard. In singing of the divine origins of the cosmos, the successive generations of the gods, their battles, and the final triumph of Zeus, Hesiod has set himself a task that is beyond human ken. His first item of business, then, is to establish his credentials to pronounce with authority on such matters. This he accomplishes with great rhetorical ingenuity in the opening lines of the proem where he describes his meeting with the Muses (22–28):

Who once taught Hesiod lovely song
While he shepherded his sheep under holy Helicon.
And then it was that the goddesses first addressed me –
the one right here standing in front of you –
The Olympian Muses, the daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus:
'Shepherds, wretched disgraces, mere bellies,
We know how to compose many lies indistinguishable from things as they
are
And we know, whenever we wish, to declaim things that are true'.

The deictic *tonde* ('this one here right in front of you') assures Hesiod's audience that the speaker before them is indeed the very same one to whom the Muses appeared. His authority derives from eyewitness, not from hearsay. Even their insulting address lends credence to their epiphany – and stresses the gulf separating gods and men, who are here decidedly lower than the angels – thus guaranteeing the speaker's trustworthiness. Yet the goddesses' riddling speech, slyly boasting of their power over both truth and falsehood – and the human inability to distinguish the two – displaces the responsibility for the truthfulness of the subsequent song from Hesiod onto the Muses. Then commanding him to celebrate the eternal gods, which is what they themselves do on Olympus, and to hymn the goddesses themselves first and last, they make him their mouthpiece. Hesiod's song, the *Theogony*, thus not only fulfills the divine command but also, while avoiding an overt claim to truth, traces its authority directly to the divine Muses.

To summarize: Hesiod is the first to extend the Muses' dominion over the realm of political and juridical rhetoric, and he is cognizant of the ambiguous character of speech that has the capacity both to persuade and to deceive. His ability to speak about matters that transcend human knowledge and to order them in a persuasive manner derives from the highest authority, the Muses themselves. Nevertheless, the opaqueness of the Muses' rhetoric does not permit him to assert the truthfulness of his poem. Hesiod then already shows an awareness of the notorious gap between

rhetoric and truth and foreshadows the philosophic critique of rhetoric traced in previous chapters of this volume.

2 *Works and Days*

The *Theogony* dealt with matters divine, remote from the ken of ordinary mortals. But in the *Works and Days* Hesiod's theme focuses on the human sphere: how human beings should live and behave toward each other and the gods, and how they can prosper within the limits established by the laws of Zeus. In the *Theogony*, Hesiod traced his authority to speak from the Muses, but finessed the issue of their truthfulness. In the *Works and Days*, however, on his home turf, so to speak, he immediately asserts not only his personal authority to hold forth on matters of concern to mankind, but also he affirms the validity of his assertions: 'I would declare to Perses the way things are' (10).

The Muses, so essential to the project of the *Theogony*, are invoked only briefly at the outset of the *Works and Days* where they are asked to celebrate their father Zeus, not, however, his supremacy over the gods, but his authority over human beings. Hesiod's elegant chiasmus would make Gorgias proud (3–8):

[Zeus] through whom mortal men are both disreputable and reputable,
Famous and infamous by the will of great Zeus.
For easily he gives strength, and easily trips up the strong;
Easily he diminishes the great and makes great the obscure;
Easily he straightens the crooked and shrivels the proud,
High-thundering Zeus, who inhabits the most exalted halls.

The power Zeus wields over mortals is not only absolute but also has an ethical and punitive dimension. Furthermore, he here seems to usurp the Muses' traditional prerogative to bestow fame upon mortals, with the implication that good repute depends on Zeus's favor, which in turn derives from moral considerations. The main themes of the poem are thus adumbrated in its proem.

The *Works and Days* as a whole purport to present a speech addressed primarily to Perses, who may be real or a fictional persona, and, secondarily, to the kings and occasionally to an anonymous 'you'. While not denying the differences between the political and legal institutions of fourth century Athens and Hesiod's Ascra, we may nevertheless identify elements of both forensic and deliberative rhetoric in Hesiod's harangue. Critics have indeed likened the *Works and Days* to a court case presenting Hesiod's indictment of his brother for his past misdeeds as well as the kings, who have abetted his nefarious schemes. But the poem also fits Aristotle's definition of a deliberative speech although, to be sure, Hesiod does not offer advice concerning a specific motion before an Assembly; rather, he presents a protreptic that argues for the beneficial character of justice and work and the harmful consequences of injustice and sloth.

The *mise en scène* for the *Works and Days*, while obscure in some details, is sufficient for an understanding of the general situation. Hesiod and his brother had divided their inheritance, but Perses wanted more. In the meantime he has been engaging in various shady dealings, picking quarrels, bringing trumped-up charges, committing

perjury, and suborning the judges; the kings for their part have collaborated by accepting bribes and pronouncing dishonest 'crooked' judgments. The misdeeds of Perses and the kings all involve the misuse of speech. The proper corrective to such abuse of language will be Hesiod's response, the *Works and Days* itself. Apparently, Perses' get rich quick schemes have not, however, been successful, and he has run out of options. Hesiod now declares (35–36):

Let us decide our quarrel here and now
With straight judgments, which from Zeus are the best.

Hesiod's language echoes his earlier description of the king favored by the Muses in *Theogony* 84–87:

The people
All look to him as he discerns what is established as right and proper
With straight judgments. And he, speaking with assurance,
Straightway makes an end to even a great quarrel.

Both justice and injustice have turned out to be speech acts. The full significance of Hesiod's extension of the Muses' domain in the *Theogony* only emerges here; for in the *Works and Days* he will adopt the role of the Muse-inspired king whose emblem was the laurel scepter that united royal authority with eloquence. For while the kings are quite willing to arbitrate the dispute between the two brothers (*Works and Days* 39), they have become 'gift-eaters', corrupted by bribery and their own crooked decrees. Bypassing the kings and arrogating to himself their power and rhetoric, Hesiod will wield the scepter, resolving his differences with Perses on the spot (*authi*) with straight judgments. The *Works and Days*, then, itself enacts that just resolution and gives a demonstration of the royal rhetoric announced in the *Theogony*.

If Hesiod plays both complainant and judge, the parties he must bring into harmony are not merely himself and his brother; his brief also implicates the kings since Perses' crimes have only succeeded with their collaboration. But in addition to an indictment of past wrongdoing, Hesiod makes the case that justice, which seems to go against one's self-interest, is profitable and makes work, which is inherently unpleasant, palatable and rewarded.

The complex form and arrangement of Hesiod's oration is necessitated by the multiplicity of his arguments for work and justice and the multiple parties involved. The *Works and Days* display an astonishing variety of rhetorical strategies and tropes as Hesiod tailors his advice to his addressees. Almost all can be paralleled in speeches of Homeric characters, especially paraenetic ones like Phoenix's plea to Achilles; both employ mythological exemplars, personification, allegory, parables, and gnomic statements. What matters here is not so much the skillfulness of the oration Hesiod constructs, but rather the self-conscious and, yes, rhetorical, exploitation of such verbal devices and persuasive ploys that demonstrate his awareness that one must speak differently to different people. In addition, the poem incorporates a dynamic progression as Hesiod's arguments are assumed to be persuasive and his lessons absorbed step by step in the course of his oration. Thus, a full appreciation of

Hesiod's rhetoric requires us to follow the dramatic development of his multi-pronged maneuvers and to evaluate their effectiveness.

A brief outline of the first three hundred lines of the poem will give a taste of the range and variety of Hesiod's rhetorical tactics. It begins with a self-conscious correction, not unworthy of the sophists, of his earlier negative depiction of Eris, 'Strife', in the *Theogony*; there, as we have seen, she was personified as the mother of 'Quarrels, Lies, Arguments and Counter-arguments'. In the *Works and Days*, however, she turns out to have a beneficial sister of the same name who inspires human beings to healthy competition with their fellow men. The link between the two compositions is further underlined, as we have seen, by the similarity between Hesiod's stated intention to resolve his differences with Perses and his definition of the righteous king in the *Theogony*. These general reflections are then applied to Perses' situation: he has become a devotee of the evil Eris rather than her good sister. Two proverbs directed at both stupid Perses and the foolish kings with whom he has allied himself form a transition to two mythical accounts that outline the twin themes of Hesiod's protreptic: the origins of the need for work (Prometheus Myth) and the need for justice (the Myth of the Five Races). At the beginning of the *Works and Days* the recasting of the Prometheus myth that appeared at the center of the *Theogony* again reveals Hesiod's awareness of how the same story can be reworked for very different ends. For if in the earlier poem the story demonstrated Zeus' invincible cunning that guaranteed the permanence of his rule, in the *Works and Days* it reveals the divinely-decreed need for human toil. The Myth of the Five Races constitutes a second argument (*eteros logos*) that Perses is to take to heart; it culminates in Hesiod's passionate outburst decrying the viciousness of his own times and culminating in an apocalyptic warning of far worse to come, thus lending an urgency to his message. These two *logoi*, we may note, present incompatible versions of the early history of mankind. Hesiod is quite conscious that they are indeed myths: the two accounts cannot both simply be true. Myths, he is aware, are not fixed, but can be manipulated to persuade their addressees.

Turning now to a different genre whose addressee must take an active part in deciphering its message, Hesiod recounts the fable of the hawk and the nightingale, specifically inviting the kings to ponder its meaning. Caught in the claws of the hawk, the nightingale (*aēdōn*) laments her fate, but the hawk responds brutally: even though she may be a fine singer (*oidos*), he will do whatever he wants with her, even eat her up. The fable's apparent message is that in a bird-eat-bird world, speech, even the just speech of Hesiod, like the poor nightingale, is powerless against brute force. Now, abruptly, Perses is addressed and told to hearken to justice and reject *hybris*. The lesson is illustrated with two allegories that resemble Phoenix's parable in *Iliad* 9 of the Prayers; in a race with Hybris, Dikē (Justice) will win out in the end. Second, the corrupt practices of the kings are depicted as a violent rape of Justice, which arouses popular indignation. In two tableaux, Hesiod contrasts the fates of the Just and the Unjust City whose welfare depends on the justice dispensed by the kings: the former flourishes, but the latter is visited by all sorts of disasters sent by Zeus.

Throughout this section, Hesiod addresses Perses, but speaks about the kings and their reprehensible behavior that threatens the well-being of the whole community – including Perses himself. As if he has convinced Perses where his true self-interest lies, Hesiod now addresses the kings directly with thunderous threats of divine punishment. Hesiod launches a threefold frontal attack, warning that the kings' injustice cannot

escape detection: Zeus' 30,000 guardians observe their crooked decrees, Justice herself denounces them to her father Zeus, and, finally, nothing escapes the eye of Zeus himself, 'seeing and noticing all' (*Works and Days* 267). The kings are left to weigh these threats as Hesiod returns to Perses, repeating his earlier injunction to 'hearken to Justice' and now explicating the fable from which his discourse on justice began. The fable's premise turns out to be false: Zeus's decree forbids humans to eat each other; might does not make right. Brute force and violence can indeed be overcome by persuasive speech. At this point, the heavy artillery of Hesiod's rhetoric is assumed to have successfully convinced both the kings and Perses of the benefits and rewards of justice.

The kings now disappear from Hesiod's discourse, but Perses will require further instruction. Hesiod's protreptic toward justice culminates in the famous allegory of the two ways; a steep and arduous path leads to virtue, while an easily accessible and broad highway leads to vice. Now set upon the right path, Perses must turn his attention to honest labor, i.e., agricultural work, since it alone leads to just prosperity. In the rest of the *Works and Days*, Hesiod will instruct his brother on the proper way to live and farm. Hesiod caps his demonstration by declaring his own excellence (293–297):

Altogether best is he who thinks for himself
And understands how things will turn out in the end;
Excellent too is he who is persuaded by the one who speaks well;
But the one who can neither think for himself nor when listening to another
Takes his advice to heart: that man is totally useless.

The Perses of the poem's beginning is indeed useless; if he has listened to Hesiod's advice and obeyed his instructions, he can become an *esthlos* – or at least a decent human being. On a completely different level, however, is the one who is 'altogether best', the one who constructs the persuasive argument of the *Works and Days*.

My analysis has concentrated on the *Works and Days* in large part because discussions of Hesiod's rhetoric have focused primarily on the *Theogony* proem. I have emphasized not only the virtuosity of Hesiod's eloquence but also its self-consciousness that takes into account both his explicit addressees and his audience. From the very beginning of the *Works and Days*, Hesiod lays claim to yet another witness to the proceedings by invoking Zeus to observe his undertaking (9–10):

Hearken, watching and listening, and straighten the established ordinances with justice,
For your part, but I would tell Perses the way things are.

As the poem progresses, first the kings, now converted to the cause of justice and henceforth presumably occupied with dispensing just verdicts, vanish from the poem. Moreover, Perses, likewise persuaded that being just is expedient and instructed how to manage his farm, is now presumed to be urgently attending to his agricultural chores. Throughout Hesiod's dramatic monologue we have been silent observers, but toward the end of the poem, Hesiod increasingly directs his teaching to a nameless 'you' who is invited to evaluate, and absorb Hesiod's teaching concerning 'things as they are'.

Having offered a definition of the nature and function of rhetoric that unites the authority of Zeus with the honeyed discourse of the Muses in the *Theogony*, Hesiod presents a paradigmatic demonstration, which the Greeks would have called an *epideixis* of just such rhetoric in the *Works and Days*. Indeed, the Greek word for justice, *dikē*, and the term epideictic, share the same verbal root, *deiknumi*, to show or demonstrate.¹⁰ By showing forth justice as praiseworthy for both king and peasant, by countering the unjust speech of both Perses and the kings with his just speech, and resolving the great quarrel with his brother, Hesiod in fact practices justice, and we his audience can award him the prize to which he himself lays claim: ‘best is he who can think for himself’.

Bibliographical Essay

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Notes

- 1 For example, G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Ancient Greece* (Princeton: 1963), T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991) and E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999).
- 2 David Lodge’s blurb for the paperback edition of W. Booth’s *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: 1983).

- 3 Cole, *Origins of Rhetoric*, p. ix, insists on the 'self-consciously manipulative character of the process [that] distinguishes rhetoric from eloquence'.
- 4 All translations are my own. I translate *basileis* throughout as 'kings', although the role they play in the Hesiodic poems more closely resembles arbiters or judges.
- 5 In both Homer and Hesiod, *alētheia* is not a quality that inheres in things, but in speech; it occurs only as the object of verbs of speaking; to speak *alētheia* means to give a complete and veracious account, 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth'.
- 6 *Dikē* and the plural *dikai* in Hesiod can have several meanings: justice, legal case, (legal) judgments, and even punishment.
- 7 On epideictic oratory, see C. Carey, Chapter 16.
- 8 Cf. G.A. Kennedy, *Aristotle. On Rhetoric* (New York: 1991), p. 48 n. 77.
- 9 Cf. J. Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* (Oxford: 2000), pp. 3–16.
- 10 E. Benveniste, *Le Vocabulaire des Institutions Indo-européennes* (Paris: 1969), pp. 107–110.

CHAPTER THIRTY

Acts of Persuasion in Hellenistic Epic: Honey-Sweet Words in Apollonius

Anatole Mori

I

In the *Argonautica*, a third-century Greek epic written by Apollonius of Rhodes, speeches, songs, and magic spells are crucial to the Argonauts' quest for the Golden Fleece. The narrative emphasis on these particular skills is also connected with another departure from traditional epic, for in contrast to Iliadic verbal contests, which generally take place in public assemblies or on the battlefield, a number of dramatically significant conversations in the *Argonautica* are staged behind the scenes, as it were, in the private quarters of Aphrodite, Medea, and the Phaeacian rulers Alcinous and Arete. It is true, of course, that excellence in speaking is essential to Homeric warriors, as H.M. Roisman observes (Chapter 28, p. 429), and it is also true that important events like the embassy in Book 9 and Priam's visit in Book 24 of the *Iliad* take place in Achilles' tent. But what particularly distinguishes the *Argonautica* is its emphasis on rhetorical exchanges in private settings and, in addition, a marked preference for negotiation and alternatives to open aggression. While the Argonauts do fight in several skirmishes that explicitly evoke epic battle narratives,¹ these incidental episodes (*parenga*) are comparatively brief and do little to diminish the shadow that falls, in this poem, on the glory (*kleos*) of wartime slaughter.

Force is typically employed by the Argonauts only as a last resort, and much of the dramatic focus has shifted, oddly in a heroic epic, from martial to verbal exploits, and from the inevitability of death to the possibility of negotiation. This concern with a verbal *aretē* that may be wielded strategically by both genders is arguably an inheritance from the speeches of long-suffering heroines in Attic tragedies and yet, while the nuances of Medea's ethical dilemma are beautifully articulated in Book 3, the poem on the whole is concerned with the rhetorical agility of Jason, its central male character.² Indeed, Medea's intimate confessions and dark incantations can be seen

as the rhetorical allies of Jason's 'honey-sweet' words:³ his capacity to charm, soothe, and manipulate his listeners in private and public settings alike. Throughout the poem we see words employed not only to create, resolve, and at times forestall political and emotional conflicts but also to oppose and overcome preternatural aggression, as when Medea calls down spirits of death against the bronze giant Talus (4.1665–1669).

Given the premium placed on the tactical effectiveness of the spoken word in this poem, it should come as no surprise that the greatest crisis of the Argonauts' voyage is brought about by a tyrant's refusal to yield to reasonable persuasion during a council. In contrast to the *Iliad*, which dramatizes Agamemnon's inability to sway Achilles,⁴ the *Argonautica* maps out an intricate network of rhetorical acts that are meant to subvert and circumnavigate the will of Medea's father Aietes, the ruler of Colchis. Hera begins plotting a romance between Jason and Medea before the Argonauts even meet the king, partly because she knows that the king is not susceptible to 'honey-sweet words' (*epeessi . . . meilichiois*, 3.14–15), and partly because she intends to punish the sacrilegious disrespect of Pelias, king of Iolcus, by bringing Medea back with the Argonauts to Greece. To ensure that Medea returns with Jason, Hera and her ally Athena seek an audience with Aphrodite at the beginning of Book 3. During this meeting Hera persuades Aphrodite to use her influence with her son Eros and, inasmuch as Eros' arrows are also said to 'persuade' (*pithētai*, 3.26)⁵ Medea to fall in love with Jason, the narrative focus on acts of persuasion, whether literal or metaphorical, is apparent.

The Argonauts are likewise forewarned about Aietes' stubbornness when they rescue the shipwrecked sons of Phrixus. A fugitive from Iolcus, Phrixus originally flew on the back of a magical golden ram to Colchis, where he married Aietes' daughter, Chalciope. Their sons have attempted to sail back to Thessaly, but they lose their ship in a storm not far from Colchis. Like Hera, the sons of Phrixus very much doubt that Aietes will respond favorably to a stranger's request for the Golden Fleece that has been taken from Phrixus' ram, but Argus, the eldest, offers to help by introducing Jason to his imperious grandfather. Thus, as a result of the Argonauts' meeting with the Sons of Phrixus, a second sequence of persuasive acts is set in motion, for not only will Argus seek to persuade Jason to accept help from two women, Chalciope and Medea, but also Jason in turn must persuade the Argonauts to do the same. When Chalciope asks Medea to help Jason perform the labors demanded by Aietes, these two sequences, the mortal and the immortal, begin to dovetail, for by this time Medea has already been 'persuaded' by Eros to help Jason. The crucial determinants of the Argonauts' success are thus entirely bound up with the power of rhetoric, for Medea's compliance is as over-determined by acts of persuasion as her father is resistant to them.

2

If we step back for a moment from the *Argonautica* in order to consider its historical context, we find that this emphasis on the efficacy of rhetoric reflects contemporary Hellenistic interest not only in tragic expressivity but also more practical forms of verbal coercion. The study of persuasive speech historically included not only analyses

of the structure and strategy of political rhetoric but also an exploration of the entire discursive domain, from the requirements of political debate to the philosophical implications and poetic antecedents of the discipline. Pragmatic rhetorical skill, narrowly defined by Aristotle as a facility with prose expression, whether oral or textual, that is essentially empty of content and is therefore transferable to all fields of study, was accordingly contrasted with a more broadly conceived theory of a discursive art, the Isocratean *logōn technē* that was seen as the cornerstone of moral and cultural knowledge. A decline of practical rhetoric in third-century Athens has often been presented as the corollary of the decline in Athenian autonomy in the wake of the conquests of Alexander the Great. Yet despite the evident deterioration of Athenian hegemony abroad, citizen participation in democratic forms of government continued to be strong at home.⁶

What is more, with the expansion of Hellenic culture overseas at the end of the fourth century came an attendant expansion of opportunities for the practical application of Greek rhetoric – deliberative, forensic, and epideictic alike – in northern Africa and western Asia.⁷ Rhetorical training therefore continued to be fundamental in political professions and civic contexts, from private consultation to the Assembly, the courtroom, and the diplomatic embassy, in addition to the epideictic or ornamental speeches delivered in a lecture hall or the royal court. International conflict resolution and arbitration by third-party mediators also became much more widespread in the Hellenistic period. Interstate arbitration on mainland Greece, the islands, and in western Asia Minor generally addressed debt, property disputes, or loan and contract settlements, with teams of dicasts or individual judges invited from one city to another, often to handle an overload of cases. The ancient Greeks had long relied on arbitration in the resolution of conflict, but the increase in intervention by third-party mediators at this time was probably the result of increasing refinements in diplomatic protocol.⁸ Rhetorical handbooks are replete with illustrative examples that attest the centrality of such schooling for members of the élite classes whose careers in public life necessarily entailed displays of erudition and oratorical skill.⁹

By contrast, theoretical advancements evidently lagged behind, or at least were largely limited to practical elaborations of Aristotle's canonical *Art of Rhetoric*.¹⁰ Such was the case of *On Style*, a treatise by an otherwise unknown Demetrius, and the numerous works (most no longer extant) of the prolific Peripatetic scholar Theophrastus. The work of the most important rhetorical teacher of the period, Hermagoras (second century), does not survive; our knowledge of his work must be reconstructed from Latin works such as Cicero's *De Inventione rhetorica*, the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*.¹¹ The loss of Theophrastus' and Aristotle's works, which were not available to the philosophical community in Athens until the first century, undoubtedly contributed to the methodological rift between rhetoricians and philosophers inasmuch as each side mistrusted the pedagogical practices of the other. This division probably hindered advances in rhetorical theory, but despite these losses and for all practical purposes, 'rhetoric continued to enjoy a certain number of differentiated settings and institutional occasions of performance, which persisted, practically unchanged and uninterrupted, until the end of antiquity', as has recently been observed.¹²

Although the traditional 'performance contexts' of Greek rhetoric weathered the passage to new Hellenic communities in the east and south, the same cannot be

said for those of Greek poetry. Certainly the famous Library of Alexandria rivaled and in many ways outshone Athens as Callimachus, Apollonius of Rhodes, and the other scholar-poets who worked under the Ptolemaic aegis collected, studied, and codified the Greek poetic corpus in accordance with its metrical conventions and modes of expression. And yet, as Fantuzzi comments, ‘an increased understanding of the nature and contexts of archaic and classical poetry led also to the realisation that such contexts were things of the past’.¹³ In other words, the Greek diaspora forced the abandonment of the very regions and traditions in which particular genres were rooted and with which they were closely identified. At the same time, however, the centralization of poetic enterprises under Ptolemaic patronage in Alexandria generated new theories about the structure and function of poetry, which led in turn to the creation of innovative, hybrid genres. The *Argonautica* itself exemplifies this conscious intermingling of genres through the subversion of (or experimentation with) conventional expectations.¹⁴ In relating the adventures of Jason and the Argonauts, whose voyage is set in the generation that precedes the Trojan War, Apollonius regularly draws on and alludes to Homeric characters and episodes, echoing traditional epic diction, modes of expression, and narrative structures while at the same time confounding the audience’s expectations by importing extra-generic aesthetics and a sensibility that was finely attuned to the religious, political, and rhetorical practices of the first quarter of the third century.

3

The contemporary sensibility of the *Argonautica* is particularly conspicuous in what is generally regarded as the highlight of the poem: the representation of Medea’s pivotal love for Jason in Book 3. Scene after scene lingers on the tender agonies of the love-struck girl, from the stealthy attack of the god Eros at the moment Medea first glimpses the hero to her anguish late at night in her bedroom and her shy adoration at their initial meeting. Such lengthy attention to the erotic desire of a young woman represents a clear departure from the communal themes and masculine heroics of Homeric epic, and the narrative method that brings it to life is equally innovative. Apollonius regularly turns to monologue in order to dramatize Medea’s dilemma in the manner of tragic heroines. Sometimes the narrator reports her thoughts indirectly (e.g., 3.451–462) and at other times she talks to herself about her freshly kindled desire to save Jason, whom Aietes has challenged to perform a series of labors in exchange for the Golden Fleece. She is very much aware of Aietes’ slight regard for those whom he considers inferior, and she also realizes that her disloyal support for the foreign-born hero would soon be found out, since a mortal could not survive the ordeal without the aid of enchantment, and her skill with *pharmaka* is widely known (3.635–644, 770–801). Medea’s monologues in Book 3 are thus the ancient prototype of the ‘interior monologue’ that will be employed in later literature, where it is similarly associated with the representation of emotional turmoil and confusion, particularly that of women.¹⁵

A reliance on dramatic monologue in epic is not in itself innovative, of course. In the *Iliad*, monologues are similarly associated with decisions involving two alternatives (e.g., 11.404–410) as well as more complex patterns with respect to decisions of greater gravity (e.g., 18.6–14, 22.297–305).¹⁶ Still, Apollonius’ repeated use of

extended, deliberative monologue for a single character – and a woman at that – represents both a significant departure from traditional epic discourse and an interest in new modes of characterization. In fact, Apollonius' revision of the terms of epic discourse extends far beyond Medea's monologues. While it is true that there are many more direct speeches in the *Iliad*, nearly half of which take the form of character speeches,¹⁷ the *Argonautica* is far more concerned to offer the tactical superiority of heroic cooperation in preference to individual heroic conflict, though it regularly relies on Homeric episodes as a point of departure.

The communicative rift between Achilles and Agamemnon, for example, is revised as a dispute between Telamon and Jason that occurs when the Argonauts leave Heracles behind at the end of Book 1. Telamon accuses Jason of intentionally plotting to get rid of the hero (1.1290–1295), who has already overshadowed him on two pivotal occasions.¹⁸ Telamon then attempts to take control of the Argo, but the sons of Boreas restrain him with harsh words (*chalepoisin* ... *epessi*, 1.1301), at which point the sea-god Glaucus appears, explaining that the loss of the hero accords with the will of Zeus (1.1310–1325). Jason wisely (*epiphradeōs*, 1.1336) accepts Telamon's apology and comments that although he was initially offended, he understands that Telamon was defending a companion and would also defend him under similar circumstances (1.1337–1344).

There are numerous points of comparison between this scene and its Homeric model,¹⁹ but for our purposes it is sufficient to observe that the Argonauts are quickly reconciled, thanks in no small part to the device of the *deus ex machina* – the timely but wholly unanticipated emergence of Glaucus from the depths of the ocean. The Argonauts' ensuing solidarity will allow them to reach Colchis despite the disappearance of Heracles, an analogue of Achilles, whose own withdrawal in the *Iliad* imperils the entire Achaean force.²⁰ Divine necessity – not to mention narrative urgency – is driving Jason and Telamon to be more rational and cooperative than their Homeric counterparts: the one for tendering an apology, the other for readily accepting it. While such a swift reconciliation cannot match the catastrophic profundity of *Iliad* 1, the Hellenistic narrative continues to be haunted by the spectral menace of the Homeric strife that might have been. More importantly, it illustrates how acts of persuasion, by gods as well as mortals, reinforce *homonoia* ('together-mindedness') among the Argonauts and are accordingly more critical to the success of a cooperative venture than the public renown (*kleos*) of any individual hero.

The conflict with Telamon is by no means the first demonstration of Jason's rhetorical skill, however. The poem opens with a catalogue of the Argonauts who are recruited by Jason for a sea voyage that Pelias, the ruler of Iolcus, secretly hopes will founder, for he has learned through an oracle that Jason will destroy him. The first Argonaut mentioned by the narrator, and perhaps the first to be approached by Jason, is Orpheus. Jason persuades (*pithēsas*, 1.33) Orpheus to come (1.33), the same Orpheus whose music is capable of moving rocks, rivers, and wild beasts by the charms (*thelksai*) of his song (1.26–31). The reference to Orpheus' power over the natural world is echoed in the description of Medea, who will later be recruited by Jason for her ability to charm (*meilisseto*, 3.531) fire, stay the course of rivers, and bind the stars and the tracks of the moon (3.529–533). Jason's alliance with Orpheus and Medea is further reinforced by the representation of Amphion and Zethus that is included among the seven scenes portrayed on Jason's elaborate cloak (1.735–741):

The two sons of Asopus' daughter Antiope,
 Amphion and Zethus, were next. Close by was Thebes,
 Without walls, which they had lately come to fortify;
 Zethus struggled to hoist on his shoulder
 The summit of a high mountain, but after him
 Came Amphion, sounding a golden lyre, and
 A boulder twice that size, following his tracks.

Many have noted the programmatic character of this ecphrasis, which privileges over physical strength the power of the lyre, the instrument of Apollo, a god dearer to the Argonauts than any other.²¹ For that matter, just as Amphion's musical skill evokes the incantatory powers of Orpheus and Medea, so Zethus' physical strength recalls that of Heracles. Indeed, the 'might of stout-hearted Heracles', as he is periphrastically introduced in the catalogue (*biēn kraterophronos Heraclēos*, 1.122), is in many ways antithetical to qualities prized by other characters in the poem. The narrator observes that Heracles does not scorn Jason's entreaty (*oude ... atheriksai*, 1.122–123), although the comment seems to raise the possibility that he certainly might have done. Heracles here gives the impression of haste and unpredictability: he literally drops the Erymanthian boar, still alive, at the gates of Mycenae, and abandons his labors against Eurystheus' will (1.130) for an unscheduled expedition that promises much greater glory (1.124–131). Heracles' stubborn independence becomes still more apparent in two subsequent episodes. During the election on the shores of Pagasae, he declines the Argonauts' nomination and then unilaterally refuses (*ou ... peisomai*, 1.345–346) to allow anyone other than Jason to lead them on the grounds that it was he who first brought them together (1.347). Later he will rebuke Jason for prolonging their stay on Lemnos, revealing that his primary allegiance is not to Jason, but to *kleos*: 'We will not win fame (*ou ... eukleieis ... essometha*) by wasting our time with foreign women' (1.869–870).

These scenes reveal that Heracles can be a formidable ally when it suits him, but it also shows that he is intractable and intolerant of debate. In other words, he cannot be persuaded, and so must somehow be distracted and diverted from his present course. As it happens, a distraction soon presents itself, for Heracles will be accidentally left behind in Mysia, as he seeks a replacement for the oar he has broken (1.1168–1171):

He splintered his oar in the middle.
 He himself fell off balance
 Holding one part with both hands, the other the sea washed away
 And bore off in the backwater. He sat up in silence,
 Glancing around, for his hands were unaccustomed to repose.

This image of Heracles – inactive, embarrassed, speechless – typifies the impatient hero for whom direct action consistently outweighs the finer points of compromise.

In contrast to Heracles, Jason recalls a heroic paradigm best represented, among the Homeric heroes, by Odysseus. And yet where Odysseus' strength lies in his defensive and nearly compulsive habit of telling of elaborate lies, Jason's rhetorical skill lies in the area of consolation and persuasive appeal, as for example when he bids farewell to his mother, Alcimede. She is distracted with grief at his departure, and he

consoles her with *meilichiois epeessi*, 'honey-sweet words' (1.294) by asking her to put aside her grief lest she cast a pall over the venture. More importantly, it is Jason's charming manner of speaking that will captivate Medea in Colchis. When she first sees him during the embassy with her father she muses on his appearance and movements, but she is especially taken with his speech (3.457–459): 'His voice and the heart-soothing (*meliphrones*) words with which he addressed them resounded in her ears'. The following day, encouraged by the seer Mopsus to press his advantage with Medea by seducing her with well-guarded words (*pukinoisi paratropeōn epeessin*, 3.946), Jason at once marks her distracted state, recognizing that she suffers from the influence of a malign power (3.973–974). He gently flatters her (*huposainōn*, 3.974) and encourages her with sweet conversation (*meilichioisi ... oarōisi*, 3.1102), comforting her while at the same time urging her to help him. As their meeting draws to a close, the narrator observes that she has been overcome by his beauty and seductive words (*baimulioisi logoisin*, 3.1141). Later, after they have fled Colchis, he will again beguile her with *meilichiois epeessin* (4.394), soothing her rage at the possibility that he might use her, like the Golden Fleece, as a bargaining chip in order to escape the Colchian fleet.

Thus the narrator regularly draws our attention to the warmth and sweetness of Jason's voice, to his awareness of the *pathē* or emotional disposition of his audience, and to his ability to console and persuade at the same time. Indeed, as Vian observes in his commentary on the poem, the adjective *meilichios* is specifically employed to characterize these two modes of address.²² Like Orpheus, whose song about the rise of Zeus ends a violent quarrel between Idas and Idmon at the outset of the voyage (1.494–518), Jason is adept at calming disruptive emotions, and as Aristotle points out, an effective orator must know how to manage anger and pity in order to sway his audience. Medea's emotions have already been more than a little swayed by the intervention of Eros, and for the most part the therapeutic virtues of sweet speech are pitted throughout the *Argonautica* against the corrosive effects of emotional strife.

In effect, Medea's expressive monologues are primarily designed to play on the emotions of the audience, while Jason uses controlled and gentle speech to navigate the emotional torrents of the women with whom he is intimately involved, much as he quite literally guides Hera across the raging waters of the swollen Anaurus river (1.9–10, 3.69–73). But we find that he is equally capable of managing the emotional outbursts of his male companions as well. When the hot-tempered Idas tries to shame the other Argonauts for their decision to rely on the arts of love rather than the arts of war by sending Argus to recruit Chalciope and Medea (3.558–563), a murmur passes through the group, yet since no one steps forward either to support or to contradict him, Jason, in a masterful stroke of *praeteritio*, simply ignores the outburst and urges the others to proceed: 'Let Argus leave the ship, then, since this proposal is pleasing to everyone' (3.568–569).

As one might expect, the gods also use honey-sweet speech, both among themselves and in addressing mortals. The guardian nymphs of Libya, called the Herossae, address Jason with gentle words (*meilichiois epeessin*, 4.1317), and Aigle, one of Hesperides, likewise recounts with *meilichiois epeessin* (4.1431) the damage wrought to their garden by Heracles. Furthermore, such courtesy and rhetorical refinement is characteristic of oracular speeches in the poem. The prophet Phineus, who offers

direction to the Argonauts as an analogue of the Odyssean Circe, is said to welcome them gently (*meilichios*, 2.467). In a later episode with no apparent Homeric antecedent, Triton, the son of Poseidon, greets the Argonauts with a guest gift, a clod of Libyan earth (4.1552–1553). This clod of earth is Triton's daughter, Calliste: her image visits Euphemus in a dream, directing him with *melichioisi epessi* (4.1740) to hurl the clod into the sea in order that it may become an island. Euphemus' latter-day descendants will inhabit Calliste (renamed Thera), and are destined to take part in the Greek colonization of Libya. Honey-sweet speech is therefore instrumental in this episode, an etiological foundation (*ktisis*) story that looks ahead to the Greek presence in northern Africa.

4

Divine figures like Calliste and the Nymphs are said to speak graciously throughout the *Argonautica*, but the narrator is generally less concerned to convey their technical knowledge of oratory than a general impression of rhetorical loveliness. Strictly speaking, divine figures make pronouncements: their speeches are designed to inform rather than to persuade their hearers to adopt a particular course of action. For that matter, Apollonius does not typically depict characters being won over by grief or social pressure, as we find in Homeric epic, although they are sensitive to promises of fair exchange during formal negotiations. There are textbook examples of oratorical skill, however, such as Polyxo's *dēmēgoric* speech during the Assembly of the women of Lemnos. Previously, in a collective fit of jealousy they have killed all the men on their island, and the arrival of the Argonauts now throws them into confusion. The Lemnian queen, Hypsipyle, urges (*epotrunousa*, 1.656) the Assembly to send gifts to the visitors, but cautions that it would be best to keep them outside the walls lest they discover the murder and spread the report abroad (1.657–666). She then opens the floor to alternate proposals. Polyxo, Hypsipyle's aged nurse, does not waste time rebutting her suggestion but offers a different solution. The Lemnian women have no plan for defense against foreign invaders, she observes, and there is no younger generation to bring in the harvest once they grow old (1.675–696). Instead of keeping the Argonauts out, it would be better to shower them with gifts, as Hypsipyle advises, and to welcome them into the city. Her argument is wise, concise, and utterly persuasive, presenting only the facts of their situation.²³ Though her manner of speaking is labored (1.673–674), and her words are not said to be honey-sweet, her audience is won over by her foresight.

More often than not, however, characters in the *Argonautica* are beguiled by soft and gentle voices in much the same way as they are seduced by visual beauty or by that which is precious and richly made. Such extreme beauty is likely to be dangerous, as when Jason and Medea lure her half-brother Apsyrtus into ambush with the intoxicating gift of Dionysus' robe, but in contrast to the *Odyssey*, where seductive charm is predominantly associated with the alien and monstrously exotic, like the Sirens and the Lotus-Eaters, it has now been added to the new heroic panoply. The strategic alliance between honey-sweet words and erotic schemes and deception is certainly a natural one, but love is shown to be unpredictable in the *Argonautica* and its cunning devices can be as unreliable as the physical force of Heracles. Jason accordingly tries to

control Medea by fawning on her (*hupossainōn*, 3.974; cf. 4.410) and by misleading her and taking advantage of her ignorance. Many readers have been particularly troubled by Jason's manipulative comment that Medea, if she helps him, will be admired like her celebrated cousin Ariadne, who helped Theseus defeat the Minotaur. Ariadne may be beloved by the gods and she may even have a constellation named for her, as he says (3.997–1007), but what he fails to mention is that after she helped Theseus she was promptly abandoned on an island. Since anyone familiar with Euripides' famous play knows that Jason will eventually leave Medea in Corinth, it is difficult to avoid the assumption that the hero planned from the start to use her just as Theseus used Ariadne.

The issues raised by Jason's ambiguous intentions in the Ariadne speech cannot be addressed in full here, but we should take note of the fact that false speeches in the *Argonautica* are usually made quite obvious to the reader, inasmuch as the narrator customarily points out deception during dialogue. So, for example, when Jason seeks to test the Argonauts' resolve, in a scene modeled on Agamemnon's testing of the Achaeans in *Iliad* 2, he addresses the helmsman Tiphys with *meilichioisi epeessi*, but the narrator qualifies this address by noting that Jason speaks 'sideways' (*parablēdēn*, 2.621), disguising his true intentions, in contrast to his straightforward conversations with Medea and Alcimedē. The narrator also makes it clear that Hypsipyle, the queen of the Lemnian women, is lying to Jason about the absence of men on their island. She welcomes him with 'wheedling words' (*muthoisi* ... *haimulioisi*, 1.792) that discreetly revise the Lemnians' violent history, managing to cover up mass murder (*amaldunousa phonou telos*, 1.834), but here too Jason responds to her by speaking 'sideways' (*parablēdēn*, 1.835), as though he suspects her game and is playing along with it.²⁴

The paradigmatic example of such deceptive and 'wheedling words' (*haimulioi logoi*) in epic is found also in Hesiod's *Theogony* (see J. Strauss Clay, Chapter 29). In this episode Zeus uses *haimulioisi logoisi* to seduce and ambush Metis, the incarnation of cunning and resourcefulness, in order to swallow her and prevent the birth of a son (*Theogony* 860). But as Clay explains in these pages, while wheedling words bend the truth in a persuasive fashion, they do not twist it in an unjust manner (p. 449). Thus the deception implied in such speech is of a lesser order than flagrant injustice. It turns out that there are degrees of falsehood, in the *Argonautica* as in the *Theogony*, and Apollonius seems to be principally concerned with the advantage to be gained by minor alterations of the truth, or even the humor that such alterations may produce. When Hera and Athena at last arrive in Aphrodite's bedchamber, she greets them with 'wheedling words' (*haimulioisin*, 3.51), gently teasing these preeminent goddesses who so rarely come to call.

Throughout the *Argonautica* acts of persuasion are accordingly staged both in private, intimate settings, and in more public, political contexts. Fawning or wheedling speeches need not necessarily be understood as malicious; rather, like honey-sweet words, they represent a vital component of persuasive speech. Nevertheless, for all his charm and elegance Jason will be unable to talk Aietes into relinquishing the Golden Fleece. Indeed, Aietes' obstinacy creates the very type of political crisis that Hellenistic handbooks of rhetoric sought to forestall, namely, the failure of rhetoric during a formal council with a powerful autocrat. In *On Style*, for example, Demetrius offers advice to his readers on addressing and censuring tyrants or other overbearing

(*biaion*, 289) leaders by means of equivocating (*epamphoterizousin*, 291) or allusive indirection (*eschēmatismenos*, 293). In truth, the fault lies less with Jason than with Aietes himself since, as Hera observes, he is an arrogant (*hyperphialos*, 3.15) tyrant, one who cannot be influenced by *epeessi meilichiois* (3.14–15). Indeed, the suspicious Aietes represents the very opposite of the ideal ruler who is described in the salutation that begins the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, a rhetorical treatise by Anaximenes that is framed as a letter purportedly sent by Aristotle to Alexander the Great.²⁵ The treatise begins by explaining that Alexander must study rhetoric because monarchs rule not by *nomos*, a systematic code of customary precedents, but by *logos* or their own ability to persuade others (1420a5). If Jason fails to sway Aietes, it is also certain that Aietes makes no attempt to persuade Jason either: he simply forces him to accept an impossible challenge.²⁶

In the course of their journeys the Argonauts encounter a number of rulers, most good, but others less so: Aietes, for one, and the Bebrycian king Amycus for another. These two are portrayed as inflexible, suspicious, xenophobic, and aggressive – particularly Amycus, who compels all visitors to his country to fight with him (Book 2). By contrast, good rulers like Lycus, king of the Mariandynians, and Alcinous, king of the Phaeacians, extend hospitality to the Argonauts and quickly offer aid and support to their guests. Lycus, delighted at the Argonauts' defeat of Amycus, his bitter enemy, greets them with a pact of friendship (*arthmon ethento*, 2.755) and sends his son Dascylus along with them as a diplomatic envoy to ensure the hospitality of the lands as far as the River Thermodon (2.803–805). Alcinous similarly welcomes the Argonauts as though they were his own kin (3.994–997), and his diplomatic intervention proves invaluable in the reconciliation of the Argonauts' conflict with the Colchians. In effect, both Lycus and Alcinous represent the positive formulation of kingship as it is described in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*.

It is not difficult to see that Aietes fails to live up to the standards of diplomacy and rhetorical skill that are established by these other kings. But in order to understand exactly how the poet constructs the failure of the Argonauts' embassy, we will need to consider it more closely. Jason enters the palace of Aietes together with the Sons of Phrixus and two Argonauts, Telamon and Augeas. Chalciope is overjoyed and welcomes her returning sons as Medea, struck by Eros' arrow, catches sight of Jason for the first time. Aietes then enters the hall and interrogates Argus about the accident that has apparently forced them to return. He claims that he had warned them about the dangers of the voyage, but abruptly breaks off ('But what's the good of talking?', 3.314)²⁷ to ask them what has happened, who these men are, and where their boat is. Already fearful (*hupoddeisas*, 3.318) on Jason's behalf, Argus gently (*meilichios*, 3.319) explains that their ship was lost in a storm, but they were rescued by the Argonauts, who were forced to sail to Colchis in order to recover the Golden Fleece and to appease the wrath of Zeus for the attempted murder of Phrixus. This explanation for the voyage differs from those we have heard before, but Argus evidently hopes it will justify the Argonauts' presence to Aietes, who generally respects Zeus, albeit somewhat grudgingly.²⁸ Argus then points out that in exchange for the Fleece, the Argonauts will subjugate Aietes' enemies, the Sarmatians, and ends his proposal by introducing Jason, Telamon, and Augeas and indeed all the Argonauts as the sons and grandsons of gods (3.365–366).²⁹

Argus is off to a good start here, but Aietes flies into a towering rage. He accuses Argus of lying, dishonoring the gods, and plotting to seize the throne, and declares that only his respect for the laws of hospitality prevents him from cutting off their hands and their tongues (3.377–381). Aietes' brutal scorn infuriates Telamon, who burns to threaten him with violence (*oloon phasthai epos*, 3.384), but Jason restrains him, keeps his head, and gently replies (*ameipsato meilixioisin*, 3.385) that they have no such plans as Aietes suspects, and indeed have come under divine compulsion and at the command of a presumptuous king. He then reiterates what Argus has already said about their desire to bring Aietes' enemies under his control, and adds that if he helps them, his suppliants, he will personally spread his divine renown throughout all of Greece (3.386–395). Jason thus offers Aietes an opening, the opportunity to play the role of the good king in contrast to the presumptuous one (Pelias) who has placed such a cruel demand on them. The narrator notes also that Jason speaks 'with a smile and a kindly voice' (*hupossainōn aganēi opi*, 3.396).

A heroic performance indeed, and one that might have won even Heracles over, but all it encourages Aietes to do is debate inwardly whether to kill Jason on the spot or to make trial of his strength.³⁰ The latter seems to him the better course, so he challenges Jason, speaking, as the narrator points out, in an underhanded, deceptive way (*hupoblēdēn*, 3.400). He will give the Argonauts the Fleece and accept them as the sons of gods, he says, if one of them proves equal to a labor that he himself performs: yoking a team of fire-breathing bulls to plough the field of Ares and sow the teeth of Cadmus' dragon, and then harvesting a ready crop of earthborn warriors – all within the span of a single day. For, he concludes, it would be unseemly (*aeikes*, 3.420) for a better man to yield to his inferior (3.401–421).

Now it is Jason's turn to sit in silence (*sigā*), his eyes fixed on his feet, speechless (*aphthongos*, 3.423) and unwilling to accept this trial. A hero like Telamon would probably have volunteered instantly, out of pride, but Jason, as we have seen, is given to deliberation, and to framing his responses in advance. At length he makes a shrewd (*kerdaleoisin*, 3.426) reply, agreeing that the king is within his rights to make the request, and agreeing also that he will hazard the labor, though it is extreme, and though he is likely to die. He then concludes with a general observation about the harshness of the cruel necessity that drove him here at a king's command (3.427–331). Jason's response is shrewd both because it does not pointlessly antagonize the king further, and because it buys him time to secure the means of accomplishing the labor.

For his part, Aietes fully expects that the bulls will tear to pieces the Greek champion, whoever he turns out to be (3.579–380), after which he intends to ambush the rest of the crew and burn them alive in their ship (3.581–383). He thus dismisses Jason, thoughtlessly (*apēlegeōs*, 3.439) and with a terrible threat (*smerdaleois epeessi*, 3.434–438):

Go now, and rejoin your company, since you long, at least, for battle.
 But if you are afraid to yoke the bulls
 Or if you shrink from the bitter harvest
 Then it would be my concern to ensure, in every detail,
 That any other man would shrink from pursuing a greater hero than he.

That is, he will punish Jason's arrogance in asking for a prize that he has not won in heroic combat. But the truth is simply that Aietes is unjust and given to brutality. The use of the adjective *smerdaleos* ('terrible') to describe this speech is arresting for several reasons. The term is also used to describe Aietes' terrible war cry, the equal of Ares' own (2.1205–1206), as well as Peleus' cry of horror when he sees Thetis dipping the infant Achilles in fire (4.875). Both of these instances evoke the meaning that Apollonius typically reserves for *smerdaleos*: it connotes the supernatural, such as Jason's strength (*alkē*) after he applies Medea's magic salve to his body (3.1257), and especially the monstrous, such as the serpents of Hecate (3.1215), the dragon that guards the Golden Fleece (4.154), the Furies (4.714), or the jaws of Scylla (4.830).³¹ It is not surprising to find that none of Aietes' speeches is described as *meilichios*, as so many speeches are throughout the poem, but we might not have expected such an extreme contrast between the king's monstrous discourse and Jason's characteristically gentle and restrained counsel.

In the end, it seems that Jason's rhetoric has not really failed him. Although he has not been able to charm Aietes into exchanging the Golden Fleece for a political alliance, he has succeeded on two counts. First, he has kept the combusive tempers of Aietes and Telamon from exploding into violence, and second, he has actually persuaded the enraged Aietes to come to terms, even if these are not the terms he himself would have chosen. It was Argus who unfortunately and unintentionally enraged Aietes by introducing the Argonauts as demigods. Argus meant only to present them in the best possible light, as men of good character,³² but he inadvertently wounded the pride of the king, himself the son of a god (Helios) and exceedingly hostile to the thought that these pirates, as he regards the Argonauts, could rival him in any way. He is, as the Phaeacian king Alcinous later remarks, 'the kingliest of kings' (*basileuteros*, 4.1102), and resents any comparison with those he considers to be lesser men. Such volatility is a common failing of those who rule, according to Aristotle, who cautions that kings are easily vexed because of their high standing (*Rhet.* 1379a), and cites several Homeric passages, noting that the depth of royal resentment can be extreme (*kotos*, *Iliad* 1.82), for 'great is the wrath (*thumos*) of those kings who are cherished by Zeus' (*Iliad* 2.196).

The voyage of the Argo maps the territory dominated by such kings in an ancient mythical age onto lands newly conquered and contested in the war-torn age of the Hellenistic dynasts. The *Argonautica's* association of justice with peace-loving, *philoxenic* piety does not simply counter the combative heroism of traditional epic; rather, it infuses it with a distillation of Ptolemaic ideology. The poem therefore celebrates the martial heroism of leaders like Alcinous and Jason to a lesser extent than it does their diplomacy and pious respect for the gods. Inscribed in Jason's honeyed words we find the virtues celebrated in this era as well as its fascination with the power of speech as it is portrayed in the final scene on his cloak (1.763–767):

There too was Phrixus the Minyan, who seemed
To be listening to the ram, and it in turn appeared to be speaking.
Looking at them you would be silent and beguile your own heart
Hoping to hear from them some well-formed
Word, and long in this hope you would gaze.

Bibliographical Essay

The standard Greek text of Apollonius' *Argonautica* is the three-volume Budé edition, with commentary by Francis Vian and French translation by Émile Delage (Paris: 1974–81); a second edition (2002) of all three volumes is now available. R.L. Hunter's *Apollonius of Rhodes. Argonautica. Book III* (Cambridge: 1989), provides a concise and current overview of the poem and its background (pp. 1–43). For English commentary on the entire Greek text, see G.W. Mooney (ed.), *The Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius* (London: 1912). For English translation with commentary, see R.L. Hunter, *Jason and the Golden Fleece: The Argonautica* (Oxford: 1993). Extensive notes are also available in the cloth edition of P. Green's translation, *The Argonautika. Apollonios Rhodios* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1997). T.D. Papanghelis and A. Rengakos (eds.), *A Companion to Apollonius Rhodius* (Leiden: 2001), deal with many aspects of the poem and its background. For a survey of recent scholarship on the poem, see R.F. Gleis, 'Outlines of Apollonian Scholarship 1955–1999', in T.D. Papanghelis and A. Rengakos (eds.), *A Companion to Apollonius Rhodius* (cited above), pp. 1–26. For an incisive analysis of Hellenistic poetry, see M. Fantuzzi and R.L. Hunter, *Tradition and Innovation in Hellenistic Poetry* (Cambridge: 2004). The best monograph in English on the *Argonautica* is that of R.L. Hunter, *The Argonautica of Apollonius. Literary Studies* (Cambridge: 1993). On the use of rhetoric in the poem, see R.J. Clare, *The Path of the Argo: Language, Imagery, and Narrative in the Argonautica of Apollonius Rhodius* (Cambridge: 2002), pp. 261–285. On allusions to Homeric epics, see V. Knight, *The Renewal of Epic. Responses to Homer in the Argonautica of Apollonius* (Leiden: 1995) and R.V. Albis, *Poet and Audience in the Argonautica of Apollonius* (Boulder, CO: 1996). On the diminished importance of messenger speeches in written epic, see J. Nishimura-Jensen, 'The Poetics of Aethalides: Silence and *Poikilia* in Apollonius' *Argonautica*', *CQ* 48 (1998), pp. 456–469.

Notes

- 1 Both of the encounters on the island of Cyzicus recall conflicts in archaic epic: the Hesiodic defeat of six-armed giants (1.989–1011) and the tragic, Homeric conflict with the Doliones (1.1021–1052).
- 2 See M. McDonald, Chapter 31, pp. 479–481, on Euripides' very different representation of the respective rhetorical strengths of Jason and Medea. On Jason as a new kind of hero, see J.J. Clauss, *The Best of the Argonauts: The Redefinition of the Epic Hero in Book One of Apollonius' Argonautica* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1993).
- 3 At 1.294, 2.621, 3.385, 1102, 4.394.
- 4 See further R.P. Martin, *The Language of Heroes. Speech and Performance in the Iliad* (Ithaca: 1989), who shows the dominance of Achilles' rhetoric during the embassy in Book 9 and throughout the epic.
- 5 She claims later that she left Colchis because she was also persuaded by fear (*tarbos epeise*, 4.1022).
- 6 See C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, trans. D.L. Schneider (Cambridge, MA: 1997), and see now G. Oliver, 'Oligarchy at Athens after the Lamian War: Epigraphic-Evidence

- for the *Boule* and the *Ekklesia*', in O. Palagia and S.V. Tracy (eds.), *The Macedonians in Athens, 322–229 B.C.* (Oxford: 2003), pp. 40–51.
- 7 On the likelihood of the representative political activity (*boulē* and *ekklēsia*) in third-century Alexandria, for example, see P.M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* 1 (Cambridge: 1972), p. 194 and R.W. Smith, *The Art of Rhetoric in Alexandria. Its Theory and Practice in the Ancient World* (The Hague: 1974), pp. 42–50.
- 8 S. Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337–90 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1996), p. xiii. On dispute settlements in earlier Greek literature, see M. Gagarin, *Early Greek Law* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1986), pp. 19–50.
- 9 For more on public oratory in this period, see A. Erskine, Chapter 18.
- 10 On this work, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9. For developments in rhetoric in the Hellenistic period, see J. Walker, *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* (Oxford: 2000), pp. 45–70 and G.A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), pp. 81–101; see also J. Vanderspoel, Chapter 10.
- 11 Hermagoras' work focused on the strategically important identification of the cruxes of rhetorical controversies: G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), pp. 303–321.
- 12 M. Fantuzzi and R.L. Hunter, *Tradition and Innovation in Hellenistic Poetry* (Cambridge: 2004), p. 24.
- 13 *Tradition and Innovation*, p. 25. On allusions in Hellenistic poetry to the literary past, see P. Bing, *The Well-Read Muse: Present and Past in Callimachus and the Hellenistic Poets* (Göttingen: 1988) and S. Goldhill, *The Poet's Voice. Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature* (Cambridge: 1991), pp. 284–333.
- 14 See further R.L. Hunter, *Apollonius' Argonautica: Literary Studies* (Cambridge: 1993).
- 15 M. Fusillo, 'Apollonius Rhodius as "Inventor" of the Interior Monologue', in T.D. Papanghelis and A. Rengakos (eds.), *A Companion to Apollonius Rhodius* (Leiden: 2001), pp. 127–146.
- 16 For discussion, see Fusillo, 'Inventor', p. 120.
- 17 I.J.F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalisers: The Presentation of Story in the Iliad*² (London: 2004), p. 149. Direct speeches comprise 45% of the *Iliad* and 67% of the *Odyssey*, in contrast to only 29% of the *Argonautica*: Hunter, *Literary Studies*, pp. 138–139.
- 18 The Argonauts automatically look to Heracles to lead them during the election on the shore of Pagasae (1.341–343), and it is Heracles who rebukes the Argonauts, especially Jason, for delaying the voyage on Lemnos (1.864–874).
- 19 See A. Mori, 'Jason's Reconciliation with Telamon: A Moral Exemplar in Apollonius' *Argonautica* (1.1286–1344)', *AJP* 126 (2005), pp. 209–236.
- 20 There are other points of comparison between the two heroes. Heracles' wrath exceeds even the wrath of Achilles, for he will later kill the Boreads (1.1302–1309). Heracles will also save the Argonauts (although he does not rejoin as Achilles rejoins the Achaeans) by creating a spring in the garden of the Hesperides (4.1441–1460).
- 21 Eight sacrifices are dedicated specifically to him: 1.406–436, 966–967, 1186, 2.490–495, 698–704, 927–928, 4.1547–1550, 1719–1720.
- 22 F. Vian, *Apollonios de Rhodes. Argonautiques*³ 1 (Paris: 2002), p. 206 n. 2.
- 23 Her speech confirms the stylistic recommendations offered in Chapter 30 of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1438a1–1438b1).
- 24 In any case she is not actually plotting to kill him. Compare the scene in Book 4 when Medea speaks with Circe attempting, unsuccessfully, to disguise the desperate character of her flight from Colchis (*katelekse ... meilichiōs*, 4.730–732). In both instances the deception is in self-defense and takes the form of an omission rather than an Odyssean elaboration, and neither is intended to do real harm to the addressee.
- 25 See further, P. Chiron, Chapter 8.

- 26 The scene suggests that Aietes considers rhetoric beneath him, in the manner suggested by Strabo 9.2.40 (cited by A. Erskine, Chapter 18, p. 279).
- 27 On Aietes' use of this phrase, see the note on l. 314 in M. Campbell (ed.), *A Commentary on Apollonius Rhodius Argonautica III 1–471* (Leiden: 1994), pp. 285–286.
- 28 Aietes took in the suppliant Phrixus only because Zeus forced him to do so (3.587–588).
- 29 Jason is descended from Aeolus; Helios is the father of Augeas (which would make him Aietes' half-brother), and Telamon is the grandson of Zeus (3.356–364).
- 30 Cf. Achilles' dilemma (*Iliad* 1.188–192). M.F. Williams, 'The Character of Aeëtes in the *Argonautica* of Apollonius Rhodius', *Hermes* 124 (1996), pp. 463–479, takes Aietes' part, and argues that in contrast to the thieving Argonauts the king behaves like an outraged Homeric warrior demanding justice.
- 31 The other two occurrences include the roar of the sea (2.567) and preternatural lightning sent by Hera (4.510).
- 32 See W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9, especially pp. 114–117.

CHAPTER THIRTY-ONE

Rhetoric and Tragedy: Weapons of Mass Persuasion

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The origins of Greek tragedy are shrouded in mystery.¹ The genre that we trace to the sixth century and its development in the fifth eventually formed the basis for Western drama. It became part of festivals dedicated to Dionysus with the aim of entertaining the audience and influencing both citizens and allies. Aristotle's *Poetics* is still a good source for the beginnings, although it was written about two centuries later than the material described. He traces the origin to the dithyramb (a hymn in honour of Dionysus) and a type of satyr drama. Herodotus (1.23) tells us that Arion of Methymna (c. 600) first composed dithyrambos in Corinth. The *Suda* claimed that Arion invented the *tragikōs tropos* ('speaking in the tragic manner'). The performance/recitation of Homer was another precedent for Greek tragedy. Herodotus (5.67) also says that there were tragic choral celebrations of the hero Adrastus, which the tyrant Cleisthenes at Sicyon incorporated into the cult of Dionysus. The Doric elements in the tragic chorus also argue in favor of a theory that traces the origin to the northern Peloponnese. In any case, the earliest form of tragedy was a masked drama that was danced, sung, and recited.

There are only three fifth-century Greek playwrights whose works survive in more or less complete form: Aeschylus (c. 525–456, seven tragedies), Sophocles (c. 496–406, seven tragedies), and Euripides (c. 480–406, eighteen tragedies and one satyr play – the comic play that shared elements with tragedy and followed the presentations of the tragedies at the festivals). These constitute roughly one-tenth of the plays these tragedians wrote.²

Aeschylus in many ways is the most poetic of the three major tragedians that have survived.³ His language shows many of the features that one associates with rhetoric, particularly in its verbal fireworks: word play, alliteration, similes, anaphora, and hyperbole, to name a few. He catches an audience's attention with metaphors like 'the Aegean sea was blossoming with corpses' (*anthoun nekrois*, *Agamemnon* 659), or children as corks (*phelloi*) that hold up a net (i.e., a family, *Choephoroi* 505–506). In this earlier drama, which helped shape future rhetoricians, the two main features were

verbal display, as Aeschylus showed in his choruses, and persuasive arguments meant to convince crowds and the court. Sophocles⁴ shows even more rhetorical proficiency than Aeschylus, and the sophisticated use of rhetoric will increase even more with Euripides.⁵ Drama reflects the growing influence of rhetoric on the society in general, a curve that continues in the fourth century.⁶

Of all the fifth-century playwrights whose work has survived, Euripides uses the most rhetorical devices, particularly those derived from the sophists, but at the same time he recognizes the ethical problems associated with their use. In Euripides' plays there is a more ambiguous interpretation of the gods; if the gods intervene, it is generally to the detriment of man. Euripides' plays regularly feature debates, speeches to persuade, and lamentations. However, Euripides was not popular with the Greeks and won only four victories during his life by comparison with Sophocles who was said to have won twenty-four and Aeschylus thirteen.

Greek tragedy used rhetoric to further dramatic action and define speakers, and we find in it Aristotle's three main types of oratory as set out in his *Rhetoric*: deliberative or symbouleutic (addressing a political gathering); judicial or dicastic; and oratory that praises or blames to suit an occasion (epideictic, 1358a–b).⁷ Speeches were usually addressed to individuals rather than groups, but given the constant presence of the chorus (and in Aeschylus the majority of the lines), there is always a crowd to convince, or an audience on stage, besides the audience before whom the drama is performed.⁸

Rhetoric developed into a systematic art for practical use mainly during the second half of the fifth century with the sophistic movement (on which, see J.A.E. Bons, Chapter 4). It reached its acme in the fourth century in the works of the orators. Sophists, or professional rhetoricians, were thought to prize the persuasive content over truth, factors to the dismay of Plato (see the *Gorgias*, where rhetoric is dismissed as a technical skill comparable to cookery or a type of flattery; cf. H. Yunis, Chapter 7). Aristophanes parodied sophistic skills in the *Clouds* (cf 423), showing how rhetoric can be used to justify the bad argument as well as the good one, and persuasion counts more than truth (see T.K. Hubbard, Chapter 32). Also, in *Rhetoric* 1356a3–7, Aristotle saw persuasion winning the day by good argumentation presented by a person of good character, and by arousing the appropriate emotions in the audience (see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9).

The practice of rhetoric appears in the speeches in the first surviving complete Greek drama we have, Aeschylus' *Persians* of 472. But there is no clear articulation of theory such as that attributed to Tisias or Corax, the legendary fifth-century 'founders' of rhetoric.⁹ Drama contributed to the art of rhetoric, and rhetorical practices contributed to drama.¹⁰ The rhetoric of drama is used to please, enhanced by rich vocabulary, meter, and poetic devices. It can sometimes have a magical effect on the listener (see the binding song used by the Furies in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* 306–396). Arguments persuade by appeals to reason, the senses, and the emotions.

1 Early Fragments

There is only fragmentary evidence of playwrights other than the main three, so it is difficult to measure their rhetorical skills. We are told that Phrynichus (first victory 511) made the audience weep by his representation of the *Capture of Miletus* (after

494). It is obvious that he had the rhetorical skill to move an audience, so much so that they fined him for reminding them of their troubles.

The *Suda* tells us that Neophron (whose dates are hotly contested) was the source for Euripides' *Medea*.¹¹ Some of the fragments from his *Medea* demonstrate his rhetorical prowess, as, for instance, a passage in which Medea addresses her passion (*thumē*) and tries to dissuade it from impelling her to kill her children. She concludes with a striking image that could be a maxim and uses rhetorical phraseology: 'I shall destroy my long labour in a brief moment'.¹²

Ion of Chios, born around 490, was an earlier contemporary of the major playwrights. His play (unnamed in the *didaskalia*) was defeated in 428 by Euripides' *Hippolytus*. He is described in Longinus' *On the Sublime* (33, written perhaps in the first century AD) as an accomplished writer in the 'smooth' style, but lacking in Sophocles' and Pindar's force. Only sixty-eight fragments of his works survive, and all are brief.¹³ Fragment 55 includes the pithy 'do not set great store on the maxim "Know thyself", because Zeus alone has such knowledge'. These maxims had popularity in later speeches.

Around 330 the Athenian statesman Lycurgus had copies of some of the most popular texts deposited in official archives and future performances had to conform to them. By the second to third century AD the number of plays that were in circulation was reduced, and at this time the canonical seven for Aeschylus, seven for Sophocles and ten for Euripides (of the nineteen surviving plays) were all that were commonly used as texts.

2 Aeschylus

Some of Aeschylus' most prominent rhetorical arguments can be found in the *Suppliants* (cf 467) and the *Oresteia* (cf 458). Pelasgus, the king of Argos, is persuaded by Danaus and his daughters who are fleeing from Egypt into a marriage with their cousins that is repugnant to them. Pelasgus says he will instruct Danaus in what he has to say to persuade the people (*to koinon*) to be favorable (*eumenēs*) to his request (*Suppliants* 518–519), and concludes this speech with a prayer to persuasion (*peithō*) and good fortune (*tuchē*).¹⁴ The herald proposes that might makes right and that he will use force, but Pelasgus stops him, claiming the superiority of the Greek gods, Greek wine (which comes from grapes and not from grain), and the Greek men themselves (*Suppliants* 911–953). The Greek approach in this play is to use persuasion first, whereas a barbarian favours force first, arguments later.

In Greek tragedy, many speeches justify murder. The *Oresteia* is a mine of persuasive rhetoric. For instance, at the end of Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* (the first play in the Oresteian trilogy) Clytemnestra justifies her murder of Agamemnon with three reasons: first, he killed their daughter for the sake of winds so he could sail to Troy (1415–1418), second, he brought home as his war prize and concubine, Cassandra (daughter of the defeated Trojan King Priam, 1438–1443), and third, Clytemnestra claims that she is the embodiment of *atē*, or the family curse following the misdeeds of Atreus, Agamemnon's father (1497–1504). Ultimately it is the force she holds as ruler with Aegisthus, supplemented with guards, that prevails until Orestes appears as an avenger.

Orestes kills his mother in the *Choephoroi* (the second play of the trilogy), and then in the *Eumenides* (the third play of the trilogy) he justifies his action in a court of law over which Athena presides. Both the judge and the jury must be persuaded to acquit him. In this play we have an example of examination and cross-examination in a formal legal proceeding.¹⁵ The argument by Apollo that a mother is not really a mother but simply a receptacle for the male seed seems rather offensive to modern audiences, but it probably was not so to the ancient audience given what they knew about biology. Perhaps even stranger to a modern audience was Athena's voting in favor of her brother Apollo (who pleaded Orestes' case) simply because of natural inclination: being predominantly male (only born from the father) herself, she sides with the male. The jury is tied, and it is finally her vote that allowed Orestes to be acquitted (734–741).

Athena then uses all her powers of persuasion, both logical and supernatural, to convince the Furies to accept the decision, combining promises with threats (*Eumenides* 824–836):¹⁶

You are not dishonored; do not with excessive wrath
blight the land of morals, goddesses that you are!
I, for my part, have trust in Zeus, and – why need I speak of it? –
I alone among the gods know the keys of the house
wherein is sealed the lightning.
But there is no need of it; let me persuade you . . .
since you shall be honored and revered and dwell with me!
As first fruits of this great land,
you shall have forever sacrifice in thanks for children
and the accomplishment of marriage, and you shall approve
my words.

She first flatters them as co-goddesses, adding a threat, but note the *praeteritio* ('why need I speak of it?') to save their egos. She invokes persuasion as a goddess, Peithō, who soothes and charms (885), but the memory of the lightning bolts is certainly not forgotten.

She offers them a new title (*Eumenides*), but what prevails is a bribe (a shrine, cult, and offerings), and the fact that there is very little the Furies can do when these younger divine bullies (Athena and Apollo) decide on something.¹⁷ However, an attempt was made at verbal pacification and order is reestablished at the end. Convincing rhetoric is a useful tool for those in power, even if it is rarely effective unless there is force to back it up, or a suitable bribe. This was as true for the Athenian democracy as it is in modern times.

3 Sophocles

If we accept the *Ajax* as the earliest play by Sophocles and date it to c. 442, one can already see the influence of the sophists. There are staged examples of speeches to win an audience over (for instance, Ajax's speech meant to persuade and deceive his soldiers, 646–692) and also speeches where two people debate an issue (for example, Menelaus and Teucer, 1047–1160, and then Agamemnon and Teucer, 1226–1315).

Thus from Ajax's speech, where he argues that just as nature changes, so can he (646–649):¹⁸

Time's innumerable days bring to light
all things invisible,
and all that is visible, time eventually buries.
Nothing is hopeless:
the most dreaded oath can be broken,
the most hardened heart, melted.

He presents this change as arguably probable (*to eikos*). But how probable is it? Earlier he told Tecmessa, 'you are a fool if you don't know yet that Ajax is Ajax' (594) and as T. Rosenmeyer says, 'tragic heroes are not changed; they are undone'.¹⁹ Ajax succeeds in persuading his audience to give him just enough time alone to kill himself, another example of 'mass persuasion', the ultimate end of which is murder or suicide.

The first debate has Menelaus confronting Teucer for breaking the law by attempting to bury Ajax, an enemy because he attacked the army, for a man should obey the law otherwise one will have chaos. If men do not fear the law there will be serious consequences. Teucer counters by claiming the law is unjust because now that the man is dead he is no longer an enemy, and furthermore he was a great man who benefited them all, so his good deeds outweigh the bad. Besides, burial is also due the gods of the underworld. Ajax came as a free agent, not subject to any leader, so he should be buried as a free subject. Each gives arguments that have some validity, so they illustrate the *dissoi logoi* ('double arguments') principle, namely that there are valid arguments for everything, a rhetorical skill popularized by fifth-century sophists. It is the function of a good playwright to depict both sides of any question if that helps with the characterization and plot as it does here. We see good reasons for burying Ajax – and good reasons for not burying him.

Both give paradigms intended to discredit the other speaker. Menelaus describes a man who appeared to have courage, urging sailors to sail in a storm, but when the storm hit the ship, he cowardly hid away. Teucer is less metaphoric (typical of his plainer speech throughout) and describes a stupid man who attacked people when they were weak. But then someone like Teucer sees him and tells him he should not harm the dead because, if he did, he would pay for it. Lest the relevance escape Menelaus (who would have had to be deaf and idiotic not to understand), he says plainly that that man is no one other than Menelaus. Then he asks if he has spoken in riddles (playing some rhetorical game), which he obviously has not (*Ajax* 1142–1158).

The second debate does not seem to contain the same truth factors as the first. It instead illustrates the Gorgianic concept that words have no relation to truth, but rather are used in a social context with definitions based on agreed meanings (something that particularly irritated Plato who put great stress on knowledge of truth as fundamental for human happiness). Agamemnon argues that a slave like Teucer should have nothing to say because he was born out of wedlock, totally ignoring the fact that his own mother was a queen (Hesione) and both he and Ajax shared the same father (Telamon). According to Aristotle, an important factor in persuasion was

the *ēthos* or ‘character’ of the speaker (*Rhet.* 1354a13, 1356a13), so by Agamemnon’s impugning Teucer’s character (as evidenced by his birth), and accusing him of a slave mentality, he discredits his judgment and thereby the validity of his argument. Teucer counters by telling Agamemnon that his grandfather Pelops was a barbarian from Phrygia, and that his father Atreus committed horrendous crimes (serving to his brother, Thyestes, his own children cooked in a stew). The score seems to be one-all, with a slight bias towards Teucer.

Odysseus saves the day by convincing Agamemnon that he should change his mind about refusing burial with arguments that appeal to his self-interest: first, he should give in to a friend to whom favors are owed (Odysseus, 1351, 1370–1373) and second, he will thereby appear just in the eyes of the army (1363), an argument that interests him less.

Antigone is not so fortunate in burying her brother Polyneices after Creon, the ruler of Thebes, has forbidden it because Polyneices attacked the city, and so, Creon claims, does not deserve burial. Antigone uses some of the same arguments that Teucer did and Creon uses those of Menelaus from the contemporary *Ajax* (*Antigone* 450–470, 517–523):

- Creon: ... you dared to break the law?
 Antigone: Yes. Because this order did not come from the gods above nor those below, and I didn’t think that any edict issued by you had the power to override the unwritten and unfailing law of the gods. That law lives not only for today or yesterday, but forever. I did not fear the judgment of a mere man so much as that of the immortal gods ...
 Creon: One brother attacked his country; the other defended it.
 Antigone: The gods require that the same laws of burial be observed for both.
 Creon: Traitors and heroes do not have the same rights.
 Antigone: Who knows who is traitor or hero in the land of the dead?
 Creon: An enemy will never be one of us, even if he is dead.
 Antigone: I was born to love, not to hate.

Most orators would be proud of Antigone’s rhetorical flourishes ending with the forceful *outoi sunechthein, alla sumphilein ephun* (‘was born to love, not to hate’) at Line 523, with internal rhyme for two opposites (*sunechthein, sumphilein*). Antigone reconciles opposites rhetorically, but Creon remains unreconciled and unconvinced. He is judge and jury and condemns Antigone to death, Theban style, in order to avoid pollution. At the time of this play (c. 442), the state had complete control over the burial of the war dead.

Sophocles’ *Oedipus Tyrannus* (cf. 427) contains an *agōn* or an argument between Creon and King Oedipus. Oedipus accuses Creon of wanting the throne for himself, saying that he bribed Tiresias in order to implicate him in the murder of Laius, which had occurred just before Oedipus arrived in Thebes. Creon delivers a plausible defense based on the probable (*to eikos*) that concludes with a *gnōmē* or maxim (583–615):

- Listen to me, and think about it.
 Why would anyone want to be king and live in constant fear,
 rather than have the same power and sleep peacefully?
 I don’t want to be king, as long as I enjoy the same privileges.

Any sensible man would agree with me.
 I get all I want now and am free from fear,
 but if I were the ruler,
 I'd have to do a lot of things I would not want to do.
 Why do you think I'd prefer to be king,
 when I have the same power and influence
 without any of the worries? I'm not stupid.
 I only want things that can benefit me
 I'd never do what you accuse me of,
 nor would I be an ally of anyone who did.
 Go to Delphi, and find out whether what I reported was true.
 If you discover I have plotted with the seer,
 don't kill me by one vote, but two: yours and mine,
 but don't accuse me without any proof.
 It is as wrong to call a bad man good as to call a good man bad.

Creon speaks to Oedipus as if he is defending himself in a court of law. Both Jocasta and the chorus are also listening, and the former seems to function as Creon's advocate with the latter as jury, and Oedipus as judge.

Philoctetes (of 409) shows another of Sophocles' brave heroes. Neoptolemus and Odysseus in that play represent two forms of argumentation. Neoptolemus defends the values of Achilles in the *Iliad* (telling the truth and being true to self), while Odysseus' claim that the end justifies the means (namely, lie to get the bow which prophets say will take Troy) represents the point that Aristophanes was making in the *Clouds* about winning a lawsuit through rhetorical skill with no regard for what is just.²⁰ Finally, it is the appearance of the deified Heracles that prevails over argument, but the end result is to go along with what Odysseus wanted in the first place, namely Philoctetes to go with his bow to Troy. Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, as well as Teucer in the *Ajax*, tell the truth plainly and they are seen to be morally superior characters to Odysseus, who, in addition to his sophistic lying speech, shows himself to be a coward as he runs away when Philoctetes picks up his bow.

Sophocles shows us the epideictic rhetoric of heroes who defy man-made authority by defending what they see as right.²¹ Sometimes the gods protect heroes. Oedipus, in fact, goes to a miraculous death the gods have ordained and he himself becomes a demigod in *Oedipus at Colonus*.

4 Euripides

Euripides often has characters refer to their speaking ability, for instance, Hippolytus, who, in the play of the same name, claims he can better speak to a few men of his own age than a crowd, and then disparages public speaking ability by saying words to the effect that 'any fool can show off to a crowd' (985–989).²² Plato has often said that it is better to speak before a few wise people rather than the ignorant masses.

The victim is now the main 'hero' through the way he or she faces disaster. Standard heroes are unmasked, and although they are rhetorically clever, they are shown to be morally base. Medea, in the play of the same name, counters her husband Jason's claim that he is leaving her for her own benefit (591–602):

- Medea: I know your real reason for this.
 You were ashamed of growing old with a barbarian for a wife.
- Jason: Can't you understand? I didn't prefer the princess to you.
 As I said before. I only wanted to make you secure and happy.
 Then have royal children as brothers to those we had,
 and in this way preserve our house for all time.
- Medea: I don't want a 'happy' life that makes me miserable,
 no wealth that shreds my heart.
- Jason: Be sensible. Your attitude is all wrong.
 You reject what is good for you,
 claiming it makes you miserable.
 When you're lucky, you say that you're unlucky.

They play with terms for happiness.²³ Medea uses *eudaimōn bios* and *olbos*, two terms for happiness that connote wealth and prosperity, exactly what Jason claims he promises her. She rejects those terms in favor of a happiness that satisfies the soul, one meaning of *eudaimonia*. Jason immediately counters by using the term *eutuchia*, good luck or good opportunity, something that he has always pursued. Euripides masterfully chooses the right words to illustrate the type of person who uses them. Jason is the sophist who uses rhetorical arguments, following *nomos*, or social convention. Medea follows *phusis*, or nature, particularly her own as she pursues a Homeric course in achieving her vengeance. She accuses Jason of speaking for his own gain (*to sumpheron*) rather than considering her feelings and the consequences of his actions.

Ironically, Medea shows the same rhetorical skills she criticizes: she later seduces Jason into thinking that she has been persuaded by his arguments simply to further her ends (killing the princess, the new object of Jason's desire, and their children, all of whom Jason claimed were tools to better both their lives). Medea is a master of persuasion and symbouleutic skills as she illustrates before the women of Corinth, Creon, and Jason. Medea's speech to persuade Creon to let her stay for one day illustrates the very thing he fears, namely that she is a very clever woman (271–356). She appeals to what she perceives as his one weak point: his sense of fairness and mercy (340–356):

- Medea: Just give me one day so I can figure out where to go,
 and provide for my children, since their father
 has made no provision for them.
 You're a parent too; please have some pity on them.
 I don't care about myself and exile,
 my concern is all for my children and how they will suffer.
- Creon: I'm not a tyrant, and I've paid for that in the past.
 I know I'm making a terrible mistake now,
 but I'll give you what you ask.
 I warn you though, if tomorrow's sun
 still sees you and your children within this land's borders,
 you will die. I mean it. So stay if you must, just this one day.
 That's not long enough for you to commit the crimes
 which I fear you have in mind.

Medea enlists Creon's sympathy as a fellow parent. The irony of Creon's last two lines here is not lost on the audience, who by this time have some indication of the woman with whom they are dealing. The appeal to sympathy was also a device used in courts to impress the jury: parading children who would be adversely affected by a negative verdict (see Aristoph. *Wasps* 561–574).²⁴ Medea has done the same thing rhetorically.

In the *Trojan Women*, we find many examples of the pathetic enlisting choral and audience sympathy. Similes and metaphors contribute. Particularly popular, even in the following century (though it goes back to Solon), is the image of a ship in a storm.²⁵ Hecuba tells Andromache (686–696):

I have never been on board a ship,
but I know about it from pictures, and what people tell me.
If a storm is manageable, the sailors are eager to save themselves;
this one steers, that one mans the sails, and this one bales;
but if a rough stormy sea overwhelms them,
they accept their fate and hand themselves over to the racing waves.
My troubles rise up like these waves, but no voice, no speech rises from my lips.
This wave of misfortune from the gods has silenced me.

Hecuba and Helen debate before Menelaus the question of whether she is guilty or not and whether Menelaus should kill her for her crimes (914–1032). Helen first blames Hecuba for not executing Paris when an oracle predicted the disastrous consequences he would bring. Then she blames Menelaus for leaving when she needed him and then claims she merely obeyed almighty Aphrodite who awarded her to Paris in a beauty contest. Finally, she says she deserves a crown for saving Greece from barbarians; besides this, she often tried to escape. Her speech follows the four-part division as outlined by M. de Brauw (Chapter 13): proem, narrative, proof and epilogue. Helen appeals to Menelaus in her proem, her narrative outlines her case, and for proof she cites her trying to escape. Her epilogue is asking to be rewarded with a crown. She enlists some of the same arguments that Gorgias gave her in his *encomium*, and Gorgias agrees with her that she is blameless: the gods are responsible, along with necessity and luck.²⁶

Helen's speech is more 'rhetorical', whereas Hecuba's is more 'philosophical', because she enlists the truth, dismisses mythological excuses, and uses logic. First Hecuba asks why would goddesses compete in a beauty contest? Does Hera want a new husband? Is Zeus not enough? She says Helen's Aphrodite is instead *aphrosynē* ('folly', namely her own passion). Why did her brothers and servants not protect her if she wanted protection? No. Menelaus' house was too poor for her, and a Trojan prince offered her more. And if Helen tried to escape, who saw her? Hecuba says she pleaded with her to return to her husband Menelaus, but she preferred to stay and lord it over the Trojans. Her epilogue consists of the request that Menelaus 'crown' Greece with Helen's death for the destruction she caused. Hecuba wins according to logic, but in this case once again it is power that prevails, viz., Helen's sexual power over Menelaus. Everyone knows by the end that, in spite of Menelaus' protestations to the contrary, he will spare Helen's life.

Elsewhere in the *Trojan Women* we find an example of epideictic oratory in Hecuba's speech over the dead Astyanax that is the opposite of Pericles' funeral

oration (Thuc. 2.35–46). Rather than praising the Greeks' heroism it condemns their cowardice in executing a young child (1158–1191, abridged):

O you Greeks who have more strength in spear than in brain,
 why did you fear a child so much that you committed this barbaric murder?
 Did you think he would raise again our fallen Troy?
 Did you consider yourselves so weak?
 When Hector was winning, with all his allies at his side,
 we still died in droves. Now that Troy is taken, and Phrygia no more,
 do you fear this little child?
 I hate the fear that comes when reason flies away (1158–1166) ...
 What will some poet inscribe on your tomb?
 'This is the innocent child whom the Greeks feared and murdered!'
 An inscription to bring shame on Greece (1188–1191).

Her speech emphasizes the pathetic. It begins with praise for the child and his hypothetical future, now cut short by 'broken bones grinning between bloody gashes' (1176–1177). She recalls his promises to tend to her grave, but now she must tend his. He will be buried on his brave father's shield. She asks the women to honor him with ornaments, and adds a maxim, a device often used to conclude messenger speeches in Euripides, which was something used in later oratory (1203–1206):

A man is a fool who, when things go well,
 thinks that his happiness will endure;
 fate is like a madman, lurching here and there.
 No one's happiness ever lasts.

After the ornaments are placed on the body, Hecuba addresses the shield, and delivers with the chorus a final lamentation. She bandages his wounds (which she describes as a useless effort), entrusts him to his father's care among the dead, and ends by saying (1246–1250):

Go, bury the corpse in his sorry grave.
 It now has the offerings that are due the dead.
 I think to be buried with pomp and luxury
 means little to the dead;
 it is just vain show for the living.

Hecuba's last comment implies that rhetoric has replaced religion: the gods have proven themselves unreliable, but words now have replaced worship and function as salves for the living.

The audience is left loathing the Greeks, representatives of civilization that act more barbarically than any barbarian. It is in fact the barbarians in Euripides who consistently indict the Greeks. Andromache's speeches in his *Andromache* expose both Hermione and Menelaus, Hermione's father, for the self-serving brutal cowards they are. Hermione wants to kill both Andromache and her child by Neoptolemus her husband (Andromache is his concubine from Troy) because she herself is childless. She and her

father would have succeeded in this ignoble end without the intervention of Peleus, an old man, father to Neoptolemus, who comes in the nick of time. As we have noted, Medea, another barbarian, shows that Jason's rhetoric is in service to his ends rather than her feelings.

Hecuba in Euripides' *Hecuba* defends herself before Agamemnon against Poly-mestor, a Greek ally, and successfully establishes that he murdered her son for his gold. Earlier in the play Odysseus admits he owes Hecuba a debt because she once saved his life, but it is not enough for him to spare her daughter Polyxena who is to be sacrificed on Achilles' tomb. He says (299–331, abridged):

Hecuba, listen to what I have to say.
 Don't be angry with me, when I'm giving you good advice.
 Yes. You saved me. I admit it.
 And I'm ready and willing to save you.
 But I'm not going to change what I said to the army:
 since Achilles asked for this honor
 and we owe our victory here in Troy to him,
 we must sacrifice your daughter.
 This man was our bravest warrior.
 Here's where many cities go wrong:
 they do not give a better prize
 to their bravest and best men
 than the prizes given to their inferiors . . .
 What if there's another war and we have to raise an army?
 What will people say then? 'Shall we fight?
 Or should we try to save ourselves,
 since we see the dead receive no honors?' . . .
 I know that you have suffered much,
 but listen to what I have to say.
 We also deserve your pity:
 Our side has old suffering women,
 besides old men, and brides who have lost their husbands,
 brave men whose bodies the dust of Mount Ida covers.
 Learn to bear your suffering. If we do not honor our brave,
 we will be called foolish and inconsiderate.
 You barbarians,
 if you don't treat a friend and ally as he should be treated,
 and don't honor your dead,
 it's no wonder that you lost and Greece won this war!
 You get what you deserve for the way you act.

Odysseus argues like a sophist with the arguments he musters. He first says all he owes her is *quid pro quo*, her life for his, but her daughter must die because heroes deserve to be honored. The latter is true, but that is not the question that should be addressed. Odysseus' conclusion here makes it sound as if it is.

Hecuba leaps on this weakness in his argument as she says that Greeks oppose human sacrifice (with the implication that this is the shared belief of all civilized human beings, and the Greeks claim to be civilized in contrast to barbarians): 'You have a law that forbids murder and it applies to both slaves and the free' (*Hecuba*

291–292). Odysseus' speech (that argues for this sacrifice) is adorned with rhetorical flourishes, using Aristotle's categories of persuasion in the *Rhetoric*: argument, praise for Achilles, and also an emotional appeal – 'we deserve your pity'. His structure is typical of rhetoric. He begins by trying to win over the audience (Hecuba and the chorus) by getting her to trust his exposition by arguing Achilles' merits and a need for sacrifice, and by giving proof from induction that otherwise others will not make sacrifices if heroes do not have such honor. He ends by stirring the emotions, trying to gain sympathy as he says the Greeks deserve pity, and then criticizing his opponent. Odysseus accuses Hecuba of being a barbarian (discrediting her character), and yet, by sacrificing a human being, he is breaking a law of humanity. Although his arguments are specious, and Hecuba, the barbarian, is acting in a more civilized way, force is on Odysseus' side, and as usual prevails. Murder once more is justified, in this case under the guise of sacrifice, the same way that Agamemnon justified killing Iphigenia. Much of Euripidean tragedy illustrates the claim that the Athenians made in their dialogue with the Melians when they were forcing them to pay tribute (Thuc. 5.89): 'Justice is seen by reasoning men to arise from equal power to compel, and the strong do what they can, and the weak submit to it'.²⁷

Hecuba also gives obeisance to *peithō*, realizing that it is a vital art for persuading the powerful, as she does in the end persuade Agamemnon (*Hecuba* 814–820):

Why do we stupidly struggle to learn all the arts
when the only skill we should pay to master
is persuasion, that art of persuading others
to help us achieve what we want.
Without that art, no one succeeds.

Peithō also won the day in Aeschylus' *Eumenides* (885, 970). Athena, however, in good Athenian fashion flaunts her lightning bolts in case persuasion fails (*Eumenides* 827–828).

Symbouleutic rhetoric is naturally well illustrated in the scene before the Assembly in Euripides' *Orestes* as the messenger recounts how Orestes is condemned for murdering his mother, whom he had claimed he executed in accordance with Apollo's command in order to avenge his father's murder (866–956). One speaker said Orestes set a bad precedent for children. This claim showed that Orestes is a threat to society. Another made an appeal for mercy and condemned execution, but suggested exile instead. Then another suggested the maximum punishment: death by stoning. The messenger commented that if a man with a sweet tongue who lacks common sense sways people, great harm can result for the city (907–908); he voiced the widespread suspicion of rhetoric. One advocate for Orestes recommended awarding him a crown for avenging his father, and went on to argue from probability (*eikota*): if Orestes had not killed his mother in response to Apollo's command to avenge his father, what man would leave home to fight in a war, if he feared a wife like Clytemnestra waiting for his return with malice in her adulterous heart? Orestes chimed in with a similar argument about not being slaves to women, appealing to a widespread view of women as inferior to men, and therefore subject to the superior (Arist. *Politics* 1254b 10–15). The man of sweet tongue prevailed, namely rhetoric

over right, from Orestes' and the messenger's perspective. Electra was also condemned and they were sentenced to committing suicide that same day.

Again and again we see speeches in fifth-century Greek tragedy that either reflect the rhetoric of the contemporary sophists or influence the professional orators to come. These speeches often justify either murders committed (for example, Orestes in the *Eumenides*) or lead to circumstances that result in murder (Medea). Force seems to prevail over justice and Thucydides is filled with examples such as those articulated in the Melian debate (5.89). Greek tragedy, particularly Euripides, illustrates the consequences for the victims of rhetoric.

5 Fourth-Century Tragedians

In the fourth century, prose flourishes more than poetry, and performances now seem to take place in public forensic or dicastic contexts rather than on a stage. There are several rhetoricians who are also playwrights, a combination that inevitably results in a rhetorical style in the dramatic fragments that we have.²⁸ Obviously also, these selections were usually made to exhibit some rhetorical point, which inevitably biases stylistic assessments. Aristotle, *Poetics* 6.1450b4–8, says that whereas characters used to speak like statesmen (*politikōs*), the modern ones (in the fourth century) speak like rhetoricians (*rhetorikōs*). In the same passage, he also comments on *dianoia* taking precedence over *ēthos*, rhetorical argument and reasoning over character. However, one cannot say that these modern playwrights were never tragic in the old sense of the word, just as one cannot say that fifth-century playwrights (particularly Euripides) did not include rhetorical passages that could rival anything in the fourth-century (at least judging by the fragments). Three rhetorically-inclined fourth-century playwrights, Theodectes, Astydamos, and Aphareus, learned more it seemed from Isocrates, with his 'varied, poetic, rhythmic and mellifluous' style in contrast to the more artificial style of Gorgias, which strove more for effect than elegance of expression.

Fourth-century orators often cite mythological precedents in order to back up their arguments (*paradeigmata*). One popular theme was Athens' sheltering the children of Heracles (Lys. 2.11–16, Isoc. 4.56, 12.194), and Euripides' play *Children of Heracles* is about just that.²⁹ It could be argued that Demosthenes also takes Greek tragedy as his source for an insult when he calls Aeschines a *tritagonistēs* ('third actor'), i.e., 'third-rate' (18.129, 209, 262).

The *Suda* tells us that the tragic poet and rhetorician Theodectes was a student of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle. Aristotle praises his *peripeteia* or plot reversals (*Poetics* 11) and, like the fifth-century playwright Achaëus of Eretria, he enjoyed setting riddles. Theodectes was known equally for his speeches and his playwriting, which both received praise. He wrote a historical play, *Mausolus*, honoring the Satrap of Caria. Aristotle, who admired his rhetorical facility and quoted Theodectes frequently, named one of his own works on rhetoric after him, the *Theodecteia*. Theodectes' *Philoctetes* treated the same hero as Sophocles did, but he seemed to be wounded in his hand rather than his foot and one fragment contains the command 'cut off my hand' (*TGF* 5b), an indication that fourth-century playwrights freely altered myths (as Euripides had initiated in the last century by presenting us with an innocent Helen in the play named after her, and a guilty one in *Trojan Women*: *dissoi*

logoi about *dissai gunai*, rhetorical counter-examples). Like so many other tragedians of this century, he enjoyed maxims: 'Hard work leads to fair fame; Idleness may give pleasure for a moment, but eventually leads to sorrow' (TGF 11).

Two fourth-century tragedians, father and son, were both named Astydamas so sometimes it is difficult to identify the authorship of their respective work. Aristotle tells us that Astydamas (probably the son) varied the Alcmaeon theme by having the protagonist kill his mother by mistake instead of on purpose (*Poetics* 14). He says this is an acceptable way of arousing pity and fear, namely, the theme of a character killing a relative by mistake, in contrast to a character killing a relative with full knowledge of what he or she was doing, as Euripides' Medea did. We learn that Astydamas also wrote a *Hector* based on the *Iliad*. One fragment is based on Hector's saying farewell to his wife Andromache and taking off his helmet so as not to frighten his son (TGF 2, 'take my helmet [to servant], and you my child, do not be afraid'). It certainly emphasizes the pathetic. Just as fifth-century tragedians used what would later be codified as rhetoric, so the fourth-century tragedians, in spite of their rhetorical bent, could use the old tools that the earlier playwrights did by arousing pity and fear. Another Homeric hero, Ajax, seemed to be popular in the fourth century since Astydamas, Carcinus, and Theodectes all were said to have written plays about him.

Carcinus (son of Xenocles, also a fourth-century tragedian) was the grandson of Carcinus the tragic poet who was ridiculed by Aristophanes (*Peace* 781ff. and *Wasps* 1497 ff.). We learn from Aristotle that he wrote a play in which Medea defended herself (*Rhet.* 1400b28), and defending the indefensible was a rhetorical/sophistic tradition, as with Gorgias' *Helen* and *Palamedes*. Obviously there was a trial scene, since there are traces of Medea's defense (TGF 70 F 1e). Aristotle cites Carcinus' *Medea* to show mistakes that can be made in arguing a case: Medea is accused of killing her children (but Aristotle tells us she is innocent); she rightly points out that they are only missing and that is not enough to convict her; she simply took them someplace else. She probably took the children away to protect them, so she paints herself as a loving mother, illustrating the good character so necessary to convince a jury of the sincerity of the testifier. She also says she would have killed her husband, not her children. This is an *enthymēmē*, namely a logical argument, once again from probability (*eikota*): Medea does not want to kill her children, but rather her husband. Her children are not her husband. Therefore she did not kill her children.³⁰

Chaeremon was another tragic playwright who wrote during the middle of the fourth century. In his *Rhetoric* (1413b13ff.), Aristotle tells us that his work suited reading more than performance, and he adds that he wrote with the precision of a rhetorician, a statement that later also applies to the plays of Seneca. One fragment gives Chaeremon's name acrostically (TGF 14b), so, like Theodectes with his riddles, he enjoyed word plays, which were very popular in this century's tragedies, and sometimes in rhetorical speeches. Aristotle mentions that his *Centaur* was a drama that used many meters (*Poetics* 1), another device showing rhetorical flourish, but probably intended for recitation rather than a full performance. His subject matter – flowers, maenads lounging about in nude disarray – shows that he liked to appeal to the audience's senses when he was not delivering popular moral maxims (e.g., 'luck conquers and changes everything', TGF 19; 'good people ought not tell lies', TGF 27; 'anger leads to crime', TGF 28–29; 'it is better to bury a woman than to marry her', TGF 32, echoing a common Greek quip). The prevalence of these maxims once

again probably shows a selection bias towards illustrating some point in the work that has transmitted these quotations, and we are not given the opportunity to judge the overall quality in the original context of an entire play. Maxims appealed to both the audiences for Greek tragedies and the ones that rhetoricians addressed. Demosthenes (2.22) used the same maxim that appears in Chaeremon's *Achilles Thersitoktonus*: 'Luck [governs] the affairs of man, not [his] good judgment' (TGF 2). The next fragment of this same play may take place during a trial, or debate, because it says that '[he comes] not as a complainant (*ōs hyparchōn*, the technical term for someone initiating a suit, cf. Lys. 24.18) but as an avenger' (*timoroumenos*, a man seeking vengeance/retribution for a wrong suffered). It is tantalizing not to have the proper context for this. The speaker may well be on the side of the person seeking just vengeance.

Moschion, another tragic poet (c. third century), has fragments that survive that indicate he favored historical plays (*Themistocles* and *Men of Pherae*). Examples from history that offer precedents certainly could provide material for rhetoricians. Another quote seems to take a theme from *Antigone* and *Ajax*, and it indicates a debate, if not a trial: 'What benefit is there in mutilating the dead? Why defile speechless earth any more?' (TGF 7). This would seem to be part of an argument defending burial, which has been forbidden.

The language of fourth-century tragedy is simpler than that of fifth, and it reflects the usage in the law courts, a trend that certainly began in the plays of Euripides. There are frequent debates and what seem to be trial scenes. Maxims abound perhaps because they seem to offer commonplace advice in a universe over which people have little control. Comparable themes also appear in the speeches by rhetoricians. The themes also seem to be more emotional and one might even say melodramatic, rather like Old Comedy's transition into Middle and New Comedy. The appeal to *pathos* by rhetoricians trying to convince juries is reflected in these tragedies. Now there are also more history-based plays that center on exciting figures. Prose writing by philosophers and orators took over the function of the serious issues that were at the core of fifth-century tragedy. Tragedy was influenced by rhetoric and incorporated its tools from the earliest period and was also the model that provided many examples for later rhetoricians. One can see a steady progression from the fifth century and a style that was forged for ethical and political reasons by Aeschylus, to the greater use of rhetorical devices in the fourth century for the sake of display, or to rouse emotions. It is no accident that many of the plays are written by rhetoricians. One can speculate on the reasons for these developments, such as the growing influence of the law courts where persuasion became a fine art. The fifth century witnessed the growth of democracy and imperialism in Athens, not to mention its defeats and the loss of its empire, as did the fourth century. Each century had its own contributions to make, in reaction to the changed conditions, and both tragedians and rhetoricians rose to the challenge.³¹

Bibliographical Essay

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Notes

- 1 For an introductory discussion and bibliography about the origin of Greek tragedy, see R.P. Winnington-Ingram, 'The Origins of Tragedy', 'Greek Drama', in P.E. Easterling, E.J. Kenney, B.M.W. Knox and W.V. Clausen (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical Literature* (Cambridge: 1989; repr. 1993), pp. 1–6.
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- 3 The text I use is that of D.L. Page (ed.), *Aeschyli Septem Quae Supersunt Tragoedias* (Oxford: 1972).
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- 5 The text I use is that of J. Diggle (ed.), *Euripidis Fabulae* 1–3 (Oxford: 1984–94).
- 6 See the account by Ian Worthington, Chapter 17.
- 7 For an exposition and analysis of these categories, see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9 and G.A. Kennedy, *A New History of Classical Rhetoric* (Princeton: 1994), pp. 53–63 and 222.
- 8 See S. Goldhill, 'The Audience of Athenian Tragedy', in P. Easterling (ed.), *Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge: 1997), pp. 54–68 and C. Macleod, 'Religion and Politics in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', *JHS* 102 (1982), pp. 124–144.
- 9 On these, see M. Gagarin, Chapter 3.

- 10 V. Bers, 'Tragedy and Rhetoric', in Ian Worthington (ed.), *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), pp. 189–191, gives examples of how the orators used the poetic devices of tragedy to enhance their speeches (cf. his discussion of Antiphon's prosecution for poisoning).
- 11 D.L. Page (ed.), *Euripides' Medea* (Cambridge: 1938), pp. xxx–xxxvi, shows that the fragments of Neophron must be later.
- 12 Page, *Medea*, p. xxxiii.
- 13 Collected in B. Snell (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* 1, corr. R. Kannicht (Göttingen: 1986), pp. 95–114 – hereafter *TGF*.
- 14 See R.G.A. Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy: A Study of Peitho* (Cambridge: 1982), pp. 30, 41, 75.
- 15 See P. Chiron, Chapter 8, and his discussion of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, including the structure and content of speeches.
- 16 H. Lloyd Jones, *Aeschylus: Oresteia, Eumenides* (London: 1970; repr. 1979), pp. 62–63.
- 17 For the magical content of rhetoric, see J. de Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, MA: 1975).
- 18 All translations of Sophocles and Euripides are mine, unless otherwise indicated, from published and unpublished but performed plays: *Sophocles, Antigone* (London: 2000), *Trojan Women* in M. McDonald and J.M. Walton, *Six Greek Tragedies* (London: 2002), *Hecuba* (London: 2005).
- 19 T. Rosenmeyer, *The Masks of Tragedy* (New York: 1963), p. 184.
- 20 For a deft outline of the 'might makes right' philosophy and speeches openly advocating expediency over justice, see S. Usher, Chapter 15.
- 21 See B.M.W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1966).
- 22 See Ian Worthington, Chapter 17, p. 264, on this passage.
- 23 See M. McDonald, *Terms for Happiness in Euripides* (Göttingen: 1978).
- 24 See C. Cooper, Chapter 14.
- 25 Cf. Dem. 9.69, quoted and translated by S. Usher, Chapter 15, p. 233, in a discussion of this imagery.
- 26 H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* 2 (Dublin/Zürich: 1903; repr. 1970), pp. 288–294.
- 27 Cf. S. Usher, Chapter 15, p. 223. He gives good illustrations that show how power and expediency dictate policy. He also shows how many speeches in the fourth century do not even veil their knowledge of power being the deciding factor.
- 28 A useful resource for this period is G. Xanthakis-Karamanos, *Studies in Fourth-Century Tragedy* (Athens: 1980).
- 29 See the fourth century mythological references discussed by C. Carey, Chapter 16, pp. 243–244. He also covers the epideictic funeral oration (pp. 240–246), on which see also J. Roisman, Chapter 26, pp. 395–398.
- 30 T.B.L. Webster, 'Fourth Century Tragedy and the Poetics', *Hermes* 82 (1954), p. 301, says of these fragments: 'On this evidence we can at least say that Karkinos was an original tragedian who introduced variations into the great fifth century versions of the legends'.
- 31 I am grateful to Christopher Carey, Craig Cooper, Antonio López Eire, Michael Gagarin, David Konstan, Stephen Usher, and Ian Worthington for sending me drafts of their papers and for commenting on mine; to Pierre Chiron, Michael de Brauw, Michael Edwards, William W. Fortenbaugh, Anatole Mori, and William H. Race for sending me their useful drafts; and to Thomas K. Hubbard and Hannah M. Roisman for their comments on mine.

CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO

Attic Comedy and the Development of Theoretical Rhetoric

Thomas K. Hubbard

1 Did Rhetoric Exist in Aristophanes' Time?

Attic Old Comedy is particularly useful in reconstructing the early history of Greek rhetoric, since its formal agonistic structure features many debates that employ rhetorical *topoi* and catchwords, and moreover because more than any other category of evidence from the period, it gives us a vivid picture of contemporary oratory and oratorical education as they appeared to the general public. Some scholars have recently disputed whether anything that can truly be called 'rhetoric' existed in the late fifth-century, but the evidence of Comedy, as it bears on this question, has been either neglected or dismissed.¹ A reexamination is therefore in order.

In the view of the sceptics, both the word and the concept of 'rhetoric' did not come into being until the time of Plato's *Gorgias* in the 480s.² Instead, the fifth century conceived discourse only in terms of *logos*: 'the teaching and training associated with *logos* do not draw a sharp line between the goals of seeking success and seeking truth as is the case once Rhetoric and Philosophy were defined as distinct disciplines'.³ This 'protorhetoric' of the fifth century did not constitute an actual *technē* or analytic theory, but centered around demonstration speeches and model formulae.⁴ True 'rhetoric' is 'a speaker's or writer's self-conscious manipulation of his medium with a view to ensuring his message as favorable a reception as possible on the part of the particular audience being addressed'.⁵ It chooses the kind of argument and premises the audience will find familiar and congenial to its prejudices; it will aim to move the audience on an emotional level rather than merely persuade it with rational, coherent, and accurate arguments.⁶ This technique differs from the unpremeditated eloquence affected by poetry or the verbal virtuosity and logical dexterity of Gorgias, Antiphon, or the speeches in Thucydides.⁷

Strongly influenced by the work of E. Havelock on the paradigm shift involved in the transition from an oral to a literate culture, the sceptics regard the theorization of *logos*, as opposed to its mere practice and refinement, as the product of widespread

literacy, once a substantial body of written examples were available for study and analysis.⁸ They argue that no written treatise on the art of speaking existed in the fifth century, regarding Plato's and Aristotle's information about Tisias and Corax and other early rhetoricians as another artificial doxographical construct like Aristotle's overly simplistic summary of pre-Socratic philosophy.⁹ It is of course possible that the early handbooks have not survived until our time because they were rapidly superseded by more sophisticated handbooks in the fourth century and thus fell out of circulation early.¹⁰ However, it is even more likely that the earliest sophist/rhetoricians did not write *technai* for general distribution precisely because they wanted students to pay for the opportunity to learn their method through dialectical interaction; their exoteric works would only be exemplary orations for different occasions or types of cases, of sufficient virtuosity to impress a literate audience and entice pupils to pay for the real secrets of the trade. Even as Plato's and Aristotle's exoteric works were mainly protreptics to personal study with the master, the most essential truths were unwritten doctrines that could only be approached through years of philosophical commitment and dialectic.¹¹ Theories did not need to be written down to be theories.

It will be the argument of this chapter that even under the sceptics' definitions of 'rhetoric', it is well attested in the earliest comedies of Aristophanes from the 420s, both in the comic poet's own verbal practice and in his satirical depiction of the social and intellectual currents of his time. Fifth-century rhetoric may not have yet developed the widely accepted technical vocabulary and analytic categories of the fourth century, but Comedy clearly shows speakers engaged in self-conscious linguistic and discursive strategies to succeed in persuading a specific target audience. We see and hear of speakers whose speeches appeal most on an emotional and intuitive level, rather than as rational arguments, and whose concerns are not with establishing factual truth, but with success over their opponent at all costs.

2 Persuading the Audience

A contest or *agōn* is at the heart of every Old Comic plot: the Cambridge ritualists saw this contest as the remnant of Comedy's origin in the fertility rites celebrating the defeat of the Old Year by the spirit of the New Year, and other scholars have made a detailed study of the epirrhematic *agōn* as a formal structure in Comedy.¹² It is difficult to be sure about the dynamics of the *agōn* or the criteria for victory in the oldest comic poets, but what we can say is that Aristophanes utilizes the *agōn* specifically as a contest in *peithō* with a particular internal audience in mind: for example, the Sausage-seller and the Paphlagonian in *Knights* engage in a series of verbal duels to convince the old man Demus which of them will benefit him the most. In *Frogs*, Euripides and Aeschylus attempt to persuade Dionysus which of them is the better tragedian and thus more worthy of being rescued from the Underworld. In *Clouds*, the Greater and Lesser Discourse attempt to persuade the young Pheidippi- des which of them will offer the better education.

Moreover, in each of these cases, the speaker's argumentative strategies and stylistic manner are adapted to the tastes of the tragic audience: in pandering to their master Demus, the Sausage-seller and the Paphlagonian both adopt personae that are

obligingly servile and at the same time effectively demagogic, inasmuch as they claim to be men of humble origin who can sympathize with the plight of a poor master like Demus. Their language is appropriately full of obscenity and the vulgar, brawling humor of the marketplace, with its ethos of outbidding all rivals and threatening violence against any it cannot outbid.¹³ In contrast, Euripides and Aeschylus operate on a much higher register of stylistic analysis, critiquing each other's works in ways that even modern critics find appropriate and well-formulated; not surprisingly, their target audience is the preeminent connoisseur of drama, the god Dionysus himself, who, despite his clownish changes of identity earlier in the play, is certainly no fool.¹⁴ The intended audience of the *Clouds* debate is the rather non-intellectual, irresponsible young man Pheidippides. What is interesting about this debate is that the winner, the Lesser Discourse, gauges his audience correctly by appealing to a careless young man's appetite for unlimited sensual self-indulgence, even with others' wives, and offering him a model of elenctic disputation deconstructing any pretension to authority on the part of his elders, like the Greater Discourse. The Greater Discourse is doomed to fail in this contest, despite having the 'greater' or better argument, precisely because he does not tailor his message to the audience, but gives a stiff, formal speech praising the well-disciplined boys of olden times and faulting the lax habits of modern youths like Pheidippides. Even if the Greater Discourse had not preemptively defaulted by crumbling under the *elenchus* of the Lesser Discourse, Pheidippides would have surely preferred the hedonistic anomie opened up by the Lesser Discourse to the ascetic discipline and submission to authority demanded by his opponent.

Even in cases where only one character delivers a speech, we can see that the speech is an effort to persuade a specific audience in terms that audience will find characteristically appealing. In the *Acharnians*, Dicaeopolis' defense of his private peace treaty with Sparta (497–556) succeeds in converting at least some of the destitute old men of Acharnae over to his side by himself donning the persona of a poor beggar, Telephus, and blaming the war on half-foreign elements within Athens (*paraxena*, 518) who stood to profit from the Megarian embargo, as well as on the wild upper-class youths who stole a Megarian prostitute (524–525).¹⁵ Since Dicaeopolis has gone out of his way to emphasize that no foreigners are present either in his dramatic audience or in the broader theatrical audience of the Lenaeon festival (502–507, 513), 'half-foreign' mercantile interests become an easy target to attack. Moreover, since the *Acharnians* are old (209–210, 219–222) and poor charcoal gatherers (212–213, 665–669), appealing to their envy of those more fortunate both in youth and wealth is an effective strategy: hence Dicaeopolis uses the otherwise ridiculous (and no doubt fictive) story that the war began from the kidnapping of prostitutes by idle young men of the leisure class. The speaker deflects the *Acharnians*' resentment away from the Spartans and himself by pandering to class envy against profiteers and playboys, as well as Pericles (530–534) and Aspasia (526–527).

In the *Birds*, a similar targeted appeal to class envy, without any regard for truth, is the basis of Peisthetaerus' (= 'the persuader of his companion') persuasion (cf. *anapeisōn*, 460) of the Birds to follow his lead in revolting against Zeus and the gods (462–626): he flatters the Birds by giving them 'proofs' (*tekmēria*, 482) that the Olympians are an illegitimate ruling class and that the Birds themselves had been the original monarchs of the world, older than all other beings. That he has merely

invented this argument to manipulate the Birds into helping him overthrow the Olympians and obtain Basileia (Sovereignty) for himself becomes clear by the end of the play, when he starts eating birds (1583–1590) and is explicitly called a tyrant (1708). Speakers' oratory fails precisely when they have misjudged the character of their audience and not tailored their presentation to its values, like the Greater Discourse in *Clouds* or Mnesilochus, who delivers to the women a speech (*Thesmophoriazusae* 466–519) reflecting male stereotypes of women instead of playing to women's feelings of self-righteousness or resentment against men.

3 Aristophanes' Early Work and the New Oratory

In addition to practicing what would be, even under Cole's and Schiappa's definition, 'rhetoric', Aristophanes' work treats education in the art of speaking as a social phenomenon within the view of its satirical lens. Even in Aristophanes' very first play, *Banqueters*, dated to 427, rhetoric is the province of the young, but morally obnoxious. We know from *Clouds* 528–529 and other sources¹⁶ that this play concerned a father's problems with his two sons, one of whom was modest (*sōphrōn*) and the other shameless (*katapugōn*). Fr. 205 PCG¹⁷ suggests that the shameless son, utterly disrespectful of his father, has picked up his clever vocabulary from the *rhētores*:

- Son: You're a coffinette, decked out with myrrh and ribbons.
 Father: Look, 'coffinette'. You got that from Lysistratus.
 Son: Maybe you'll run down with time.
 Father: This 'you'll run down' came from the orators.
 Son: These things will depart your lips to some end.
 Father: This 'depart your lips' came from Alcibiades.
 Son: Why do you sub-infer and speak ill of these men
 Who practice the art of nobility?
 Father: Ugh, Thrasymachus!
 Who utters this lawyers' monstrosity?

We hear mention specifically of Lysistratus, Alcibiades, and Thrasymachus. Lysistratus is the least well-known of the three, but is attacked elsewhere in Aristophanes as a poor man who rose to prominence as an orator, skilled in mocking and abusing his opponents, even as the son does his father in this passage.¹⁸ Alcibiades, who at this time would have been about 23, was the very model of a profligate youth with talent and charm. Most interesting is the father's invocation of Thrasymachus, surely to be identified with Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, the notorious sophist/rhetorician who argues in Plato's *Republic* that 'might makes right.'¹⁹ Thrasymachus himself may have been relatively young at this point, so we cannot be certain to what extent his rhetorical theory had been developed. But his foreign origin makes him more likely to have been a well-known teacher or theoretician of public speaking than a public speaker. The passage as a whole parodies strange verbal coinages that Aristophanes must have remembered from speeches of Lysistratus, Alcibiades, and others, but Thrasymachus is never quoted, merely invoked as a relevant witness who is familiar

with such vocabulary. The pompous neologism that immediately precedes Thrasy-machus' naming is *hypotekmairei*, which probably means 'make an inference beneath the surface' and could be a technical term of Thrasymachus' devising to refer to such an allusive style of argument, since *tekmēron* was clearly a technical term for 'inference from evidence'.²⁰

At least two other passages from the same period also refer to young men who have developed a distinctive style of public speaking. At the end of the *Knights* (dated to 424), the Sausage-seller convinces a rejuvenated Demus not to allow himself to be manipulated by orators (1340–1364). When the Sausage-seller asks Demus to specify his desiderata, Demus proposes policies that will favor the lower classes rather than the hoplite class (1365–1372) and then expresses a final wish (1373–1383):

Demus:	Nor will anyone without a beard frequent the marketplace.
Sausage-seller:	Then where will Cleisthenes and Strato hang out?
Demus:	No, not them. I mean these youngsters at the perfume stall Who sit down and wag their mouths like so: ‘Phaeax is smart and cleverly escaped the noose. For he’s coherentic and conclusionistic, Maximistic and clear and aural-ballistic, Cataleptic of the catcallistic in the very best way’.
Sausage-seller:	Aren’t you middigitalistic to the chatteristic?
Demus:	No by Zeus! But I’ll make them all go hunt, Once they’ve stopped proposing decrees.

Again, as in *Banqueters*, an older man criticizes the young for making up new words, but here the criticism goes further by expressing the wish that these elegant, well-perfumed young men should not be involved in legal affairs at all, but should instead busy themselves with the kind of activities usually pursued by upper-class youth, like hunting. The parody of *-ikos* words reveals an awareness of new stylistic trends that might sound unfamiliar to older ears, as in the similar parody of diminutives in *Babylonians*, fr. 92 PCG (dated to 426).²¹ Most interesting for our purposes is that the new style of oratory is specifically associated with lexical innovation, suggesting that it was strongly influenced by sophistic *orthoepia* (the study of verbal correctness).

In the epirrhematic portion of the *Acharnians*' parabasis (dated to 425), the elderly choristers complain about these young orators' word magic, which merely throws worn-out old defendants like them into helpless confusion (685–688):

The young man, hastening to speak against him,
Taking ahold of him with smooth round phrases, strikes him quickly,
And then dragging him up, questions him, setting word-traps,
Tearing apart, mixing up, and stirring around the Old Tithonus.

In his youth, Thucydides son of Melesias had a strong, loud voice (708–711), but now he is no match for the fast-talking (*lalōn*, 705) Cephisodemus. Old men can do little more than mutter (*tonthurozontes*, 683) and mumble (*mastaruzei*, 689). However, it is clear that the young orators' advantage is not merely in superior delivery,

but also in style and content, with ‘well-rounded phrases’ (*stroggulois tois rhēmasin*, 686) and ‘word traps’ of logic (687). The epithet *stroggulos* has a fairly long later history in discussions of rhetorical style, not only in Aristophanes (cf. fr. 488 PCG, of Euripides), but in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Lysias* 6, of Lysias), Plato (*Phaedrus* 234e), Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1394b33), and Demetrius (*Elocution* 20, *stroggoulou stomatos*; cf. Horace, *Ars Poetica* 323, *ore rotundo*).²² Delivery, verbal fluidity, euphonious phraseology, precise vocabulary, and logic are all qualities that could be taught by rhetoricians like Gorgias or Thrasyarchus; indeed, *Birds* 1694–1701 (414 in date) so much as accuses Gorgias of producing such sycophants. As in fr. 205 PCG of *Banqueters*, Alcibiades is the paradigmatic example of such ‘wide-assed and talkative’ youthful pests (*Acharnians* 716).

That three of Aristophanes’ earliest plays make a point of showing old men complain about young orators and their new-fangled styles suggests that something new was afoot in Athenian education, yielding the recently trained a surprising advantage over their elders, despite their relative inexperience. Such a new form of rhetorical education, standing outside the traditional patterns of aristocratic socialization and pederastic mentorship, but open to anyone with the money to pay for it, may have been what allowed the ‘new politicians’ of this era, from wealthy but non-aristocratic backgrounds, to become so effective in influencing the public through their political oratory.²³ Aristophanes’ next two extant plays, *Clouds* (of 423) and *Wasps* (of 422), also feature sons who defeat their fathers through superior education and argumentative skills; the choral ode introducing the *agōn* of the latter (*Wasps* 526–545) frames the conflict in explicitly generational terms, and some have spoken of a historical ‘generation gap’ in this period.²⁴ By attacking young smart alecks and busybodies, Aristophanes could appeal to the prejudices of his mostly older audience, to whom the New Rhetoric might seem an unwelcome invention.

Yet there is also something profoundly ironic in the very young Aristophanes, who was certainly no older than Alcibiades, showing elderly characters (the father of *Banqueters*, the *Acharnians*, Demus) troubled by youngsters who appear sharper and better educated than they are: by adopting an oldster’s persona to lament the aptitude of the young, Aristophanes (whose identity was unknown to the general public in his first three plays)²⁵ may be surreptitiously asserting his own superiority in training and verbal dexterity, particularly relative to his older rivals like Cratinus.²⁶ For all his complaints about young orators and their new vocabulary, we should remember that there is probably no extant author from the classical period responsible for more coinages and *hapax legomena* (words attested nowhere else) than Aristophanes himself.

4 Oratory as Spectator Sport in *Wasps*

Comedy shows evaluation and even ranking of public speakers as a favorite Athenian pastime. Fragments 102 and 103 PCG of Eupolis’ *Demes* (of 412) praise Pericles as the preeminent speaker of his time, and after his death, Demostratus. *Frogs* 679–685 praise the eloquence of Cleophon as that of a Thracian swallow, perhaps implying an ancestry that was not fully Athenian. Aristophanes’ central text documenting oratory and trials as a kind of spectator sport is *Wasps*. Philocleon is an elderly man whose

household is now managed by his adult son, Bdelycleon; without more serious duties or occupation, he spends every available day serving on juries together with his old friends, the chorus of Wasps. His better-educated son attempts to reform him of this addiction, which in the son's opinion leaves him too vulnerable to the manipulation of sycophants and demagogues.

Like *Knights*, the *Wasps* shows elite public speakers who self-consciously manipulate the mass audience by proclamations of solidarity with them.²⁷ In the earlier play, politicians styled themselves as 'lovers of the people' (*Knights* 730–740), echoing what may have been a stock phrase in Cleon's oratory, perhaps with some precedent in Pericles' 'lovers of the city' (Thuc. 2.43.1).²⁸ In *Wasps*, Bdelycleon warns his father precisely against the slick phrases of politicians who say, 'I will never betray the Athenian mob, but will always fight for the majority' (666–668). In a splendid parody of *eikos*-argumentation,²⁹ Bdelycleon demonstrates that these leaders, far from fighting on behalf of the people, must be stealing from the people: he adds up the revenues flowing into the state coffers from tribute, taxes, and fees (= 2,000 talents), subtracts the total pay jurors receive (150 talents), and thus infers that the remaining 1,850 talents must have been consumed by the political class in corruption (656–668). Pointing to all the luxury imports that pour into Athens from tributary allies, he infers that these must be meant as bribes to the upper-class politicians who enjoy such things, since the wretched diet of the poor never includes such delicacies (669–679). Bdelycleon's rhetoric appeals to the lower-class Wasps (= jurors) by demolishing any pretense of the political classes to identification with their interests. Without proclaiming himself a champion of the people, Bdelycleon's rhetoric wins him recognition as the true defender of the public good (725–735), a position Aristophanes also appropriates for himself in the parabasis, where he fights on the public behalf against the most corrupt politician of all, Cleon (1029–1037), as well as against young sycophants who would willingly strangle their own father (1038–1043).

5 Rhetorical Education in *Clouds*

Aristophanes clearly conceived the new oratorical skills displayed by his generation as something taught: *Birds* 1699–1705 attack the morally corrupting influence of 'Gorgias and Philips', implying that the famous rhetorician and his 'son' (cf. *Wasps* 421) replicated themselves into a whole school of clones. *Clouds* provides the clearest evidence, in that the plot of the play revolves around a father who plans to send his son to Socrates' Thinkery to learn how to argue their way out of debt by defeating creditors' prosecutions in court. Lines 467–475 identify the ultimate objective the *Clouds* offer Strepsiades through education not as mere relief from debts, but the opportunity to become a famous legal counselor whom throngs of clients will consult. The 'Socrates' of this play is of course a composite caricature mingling ideas from a variety of intellectual sources. One critic has argued that rhetoric is not among these since Strepsiades learns to address his creditors' demands by thinking up clever excuses (cf. 694–783) rather than through formal speechmaking.³⁰ But this exercise in *inventio* is preceded by lessons in metrics (639–654) and grammar (659–693); as the same scholar elsewhere observes, the discussion of words' gender parodies Protagoras and the general sophistic interest in *orthoepeia*.³¹ What

we would call the discipline of ‘philology’ is thus presented as the first step preliminary to studying rhetorical invention.³² Indeed, when Strepsiades actually confronts his creditors (1214–1302), he does so with a confused hash of Socrates’ philological lessons and the silly ideas he invented in *Clouds* 694–783. This close association of philology and invention does suggest that rhetorical training in this period was more than just a master’s demonstration and practical exercises for students, but had some basis in a more integrated and holistic theory of language and its structure.

We should draw the same conclusion from the repeated parody of newly created vocabulary in Aristophanes’ earlier allusions to the young orators. In creating a more precise new word to describe female fowl, *alektruaina* instead of the traditional gender-indifferent *alektruōn* (850–852), Socrates engages in precisely the kind of word creation that the sophists commonly practiced and that Aristophanes illustrates in the young orators (see also A. López Eire, Chapter 22). The would-be *rhētōr* son who called his father a *sorellē* instead of the usual *soros* (the customary word for ‘coffin’) in fr. 205 PCG had learned a similar lesson in word formation.

Clouds is especially well-known to students of rhetoric for its debate between the Greater Discourse (*Kreittōn Logos*) and Lesser Discourse (*Elattōn Logos*). We should note that one of the scholiastic introductions to the play (*Hypothesis* 1) identifies the *agōn* as one of the parts of the play that may be unique to the second version, probably datable to 417,³³ but the play’s basic plot outline as we have it likely resembles the lost original of 423. The two Discourses are a theme throughout our version of the play, where Socrates is more than once said to be able to ‘make the lesser discourse greater’ and make the unjust cause triumph (99, 112–118, 244–245, 657, 882–885, 1336–1337, 1444–1451).³⁴ It has been generally recognized that Aristophanes is here parodying an expression associated with the sophist Protagoras by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1402a22–28), but we should note that Plato attributes a similar practice to Tisias and Gorgias, who ‘make small things appear great and great things small by the power of speech’ (*ta smikra megala kai ta megala smikra phainesthai*, *Phaedrus* 267a). Sceptics about fifth-century rhetoric must argue that Protagoras actually meant something far less provocative by this expression, to the effect that he was only replacing a dominant *logos* (= received opinion) with a new *logos* (= his own).³⁵ While it is certainly conceivable that Aristophanes could have intentionally twisted the meaning of Protagoras’ phrase by identifying the lesser *logos* with the unjust or untrue, this same interpretation seems also to have been shared by both Plato (*Apology* 18b) and Aristotle (who in quoting the fragment equates it with making the improbable seem probable); the revisionist interpretation requires that all three authors are distorting the phrase’s original meaning. Surely Protagoras must have been aware what his words would suggest to most people and could have found a less ambiguous way of expressing such a banal idea as the revisionists attribute to him. Aristotle’s interpretation is certainly not inconsistent with the *Dissoi Logoi* or Gorgias’ reflections on the power of language, or with what Plato attributes to Tisias and Gorgias. It does suggest that Protagoras at least commented on the potential of rhetorical training to make weaker arguments stronger, even if Protagoras himself did not teach this skill.³⁶ Like Aristophanes, Aristotle clearly embeds this phrase in a discussion of rhetorical persuasiveness. Aristophanes’ *Clouds* proves the idea was widely enough known that he could expect a significant part of his audience during the period 423–417 to have heard of it and understand it the same way he did.

To be sure, the Lesser Discourse never really delivers a ‘discourse’ like the formal speech of the Greater Discourse (961–1023), who praises the traditional pederastic education boys received in the wrestling school and at the music master’s. In contrast the Lesser Discourse clearly embodies modern education, built around a technique of *elenchus*, skilled questioning and clever use of examples; in this case, his *elenchus* is able to lead his opponent into self-contradiction. While we frequently associate this dialectic with the ‘Socratic method’ on display in Plato’s early dialogues, it is also a useful part of rhetorical training. We often forget that there was far more to Athenian legal procedure than delivering polished speeches at the trial: before a case could even be scheduled for presentation to a jury, a pre-trial hearing (*anakrisis*) had to take place at which the magistrate would ask questions and the litigants could pose questions to each other.³⁷ In the fifth- and early fourth-centuries this procedure was entirely oral and thus demanded an ability to succeed in extemporaneous dialectical interchange, as opposed to reciting a memorized speech. Arbitration procedures also involved this type of question-and-answer dialogue. These considerations make it more likely that the kind of dialectical training on offer from Socrates and the sophists was indeed oriented to making their students better orators as well as better thinkers. *Clouds* may very well be correct that such training was part of the reason for their popularity.

6 *Frogs* and Stylistic Theory

Aristophanes’ *Frogs* (of 405) gives evidence of a highly evolved art of evaluating literary style that, like the sophistic *orthoepeia* in *Clouds*, attests the development of philology in the late fifth century. N. O’Sullivan has demonstrated at length that Aristophanes, together with Alcidas and the sophists, reveals the origins of a type of sophistic theory that remained influential into Hellenistic times.³⁸ We know that Protagoras engaged in minute analysis of individual lines of poetry, if Plato (*Protagoras* 339a–347a) is any guide. Polycleitus wrote a treatise on sculpture (40A3, B1–2 D-K); Sophocles supposedly wrote one on the chorus (*Suda* s815). The late fifth century was thus a period of aesthetic theorization and practical criticism even beyond literature.

Frogs shows Aeschylus and Euripides evaluating each other’s work in multiple categories: providing paradigmatic moral examples (Aeschylus) vs. naturalistic display of human perversity (Euripides), high-flown language and dramaturgical obscurity (Aeschylus) vs. appeal to the audience with familiar, even mundane words and situations (Euripides), unnecessary pleonasm in the prologues (Aeschylus) vs. overly formulaic prologues (Euripides). Although many of these criteria are issues of practical criticism rather than rhetorical theory, they do suggest a thriving culture of textual discussion and analysis, which was certainly facilitated by the growing availability of written texts and discussion fora offered by the schools of the sophists and rhetoricians. The ‘weighing of words’ (1365–1410) is of course a ridiculous conceit, but it may call attention to a very serious dichotomy in stylistic practice: Aeschylus’ vocabulary and style are throughout the play characterized in terms of physical magnitude, loudness, and passion, but also as excessive and uncontrolled (cf. *Clouds* 1367). Euripides’ language, on the other hand, is notable for its thinness (*leptos*),

precision (*akribēs*), and clarity (*saphēs*).³⁹ These terms find clear echo in the dichotomies of Aristotle (*pathos* vs. *akribeia*) and most later rhetorical discussions of style (grand vs. low, Asiatic vs. Atticist).

O'Sullivan has argued that Aristophanes and other comic poets make reference to the same patterns of imagery in reference to poetic and oratorical style even as early as *Acharnians* in 425, where Pericles 'thunders' (*Acharnians* 531), or *Knights* in 424, where Cleon blows with the force of a hurricane or typhoon/Typhon (*Knights* 511; cf. *Frogs* 848, of Aeschylus) and the drunken Cratinus roars like an uncontrolled torrent (*Knights* 526–528; cf. *Wasps* 1034 and *Peace* 751, of Cleon's voice).⁴⁰ I would add to O'Sullivan's evidence the observation that Aristophanes presents Crates as a counter-example of verbal restraint and economy in contrast to Cratinus' oral diarrhea (*Knights* 526–528, 537–540).⁴¹

Then he remembered Cratinus, who once overflowing with praise
Streamed through the flat plains; sweeping from their station
Oaks and plane-trees and uprooted enemies, he carried them off.
... What spite and maltreatment Crates has endured from you,
Crates, who sent you off after feasting you at small expense,
Kneading most urbane insights from his most cabbage-dry mouth.
This man only sufficed, sometimes failing, sometimes not.

'Most urbane', 'cabbage-dry', and 'small expense', as well as a subtlety apparently unappreciated by the crowd, all set Crates up as a proto-Callimachean stylistic purist, the very opposite of the grand river bearing refuse in its indiscriminate torrent.⁴² Cratinus, of course, had the last laugh by winning first prize with *The Bottle* in the following year, while Aristophanes crashed with the original version of *Clouds*: Cratinus actually embraces Aristophanes' characterization of him as a drunkard and uncontrolled torrent (fr. 198 *PCG*), in contrast to the 'oversubtle, maxim-chasing, Euripidaristophanizing' poet (fr. 342 *PCG*).⁴³

It is difficult to tell whether there was actually anything distinctive enough about the language of Pericles, Cleon, and Cratinus to justify categorizing them along with Aeschylus as representatives of a grandiose, loud, and effusive style, in contrast to the more subtle and unspectacular style of Crates and Euripides. In the case of Pericles and Cleon, Aristophanes' jibes may only indicate that both of them had loud voices and a powerful delivery.⁴⁴ But the ease with which Aristophanes and Cratinus allude to these stylistically pregnant concepts even in plays that, unlike *Frogs*, are not centered around a literary contest suggests these stylistic dichotomies were not their invention. These oppositions do not surface even in as self-conscious a poet as Pindar, whose many reflections on what distinguishes him from his competitors focus more on inborn talent vs. mere learning, praise vs. blame, and encomiastic sufficiency vs. excess. That the same basic stylistic opposition we see in *Knights* and *Frogs* characterizes rhetorical criticism down to the time of Cicero and Dionysius of Halicarnassus suggests more specifically that a theory of rhetorical style must have already developed in Aristophanes' time. It is hardly credible that later rhetoricians would have been inspired by Aristophanes, but it is far more likely that Aristophanes applied to his analysis of dramatic authors' styles categories and concepts he had heard from contemporary analysts of an emerging art of oratory.

7 Speech Mechanics

C.T. Murphy has argued that the longer speeches in Aristophanes' plays display a familiarity with the traditional divisions of a forensic oration as outlined in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, which although about a century later is our earliest extant discussion of the formal organization of topics within a speech.⁴⁵ The preface to this treatise and other sources suggest that this standardization of sequence began with Tisias and Corax.⁴⁶ However, the premises and specific analyses on which critics applying these concepts to Aristophanes have relied do not withstand sharp critical scrutiny, since few if any of the speeches really feature both *diēgēsis* and *pisteis*, which constitute the two most important divisions in the traditional quadripartite scheme.⁴⁷

Critics may have made the mistake of looking for formal structure in the wrong places. Although many speeches in Aristophanes aim to persuade their audience, most are not, strictly speaking, forensic orations in which one would expect close point-by-point parody of the style and structure of a prosecution or defense speech. The one instance where we do have a formal forensic contest is in fact probably the most successful example, the trial of the dog Labes in *Wasps* (907–930, excerpted):

Cydathenian	You've heard the indictment that I've indicted
Hound:	Against this one here, O jurymen. The most terrible
	Of deeds has he done both to me and to the shiprowers' rabble.
	For running off to a corner, he insiculated the better part of
	The Big Cheese and filled up on it in the dark.
	<i>(Philocleon interrupts)</i>
	And he didn't share it with me when I asked him.
	Who can bring you benefit
	Unless he throws something to me, the Hound?
	<i>(Philocleon interrupts again)</i>
	Don't let him off, since he is by far
	The most monogluttonous man of all dogs,
	Who when he sailed round the mortar bowl,
	Ate off the rind from the cities.
	<i>(Philocleon interrupts again)</i>
	For these things punish him! As the saying goes,
	'One nest can't feed two thieves'.
	This way I won't have barked in a void.
	But if you don't do it, I'll bark nevermore!

Although I divide the speeches a bit differently than Murphy, we both see in brief compass the four major parts of a speech in the proper order: the summary of the charge and formulaic address to the jurors in Lines 907–909 are prooimial, 910–914 narrate the event in a succinct *diēgēsis*, and 915–925 give the proofs, consisting of the prosecutor's self-described value as a citizen and an attack on the defendant's character and earlier behavior, which are consistent with the present crime. Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1418a38–41) identifies the *pisteis* as the correct section in which to make arguments based on the moral character of the speaker and his opponent. *Wasps* 915–916

illustrate the other major component of the *pisteis*, what Aristotle would call an *enthymēmē*: since I need food to protect you and my protection benefits you, anyone's failure to share food with me will provide you with no benefit. The epilogue (927–930) reiterates the prosecutor's plea for conviction and warns of the future consequences of acquittal.⁴⁸

The defense speech follows the same pattern, except that the *diēgēsis* is omitted, since the fact of what happened is apparently uncontested (see the admission in *Wasps* 958–959). As Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1417a8–12), notes, *diēgēsis* is not necessary for defense speeches in such cases (*Wasps* 950–978, excerpted):

- Bdelycleon: It is difficult, O men, to give a response
On behalf of a slandered dog. But I'll speak all the same,
For he is a good dog and chases wolves.
- Philocleon: He's a thief and a conspirator!
- Bdelycleon: No, by Zeus, but he is the best of the dogs who now live,
The kind who could stand watch over much livestock.
- Philocleon: What use is that if he eats up the cheese?
- Bdelycleon: What use? He fights on your behalf and guards the door,
And in other respects is the best. If he took a little,
Forgive him! For he's never learned to play the cithara.
(*Philocleon interrupts again*)
- Listen, good sir, to my witnesses.
Step up to the stand, Mr. Cheese Grater, and speak out loud,
For you were Treasurer at the time. Answer clearly,
Whether you didn't grate out for the soldiers the cheese you received.
He says he did grate it out.
(*Philocleon interrupts again*)
- Good sir, have compassion for the unfortunate.
This Labes eats both table scraps and fishbones,
And never stays in the same spot.
But what a sort the other dog is! Homebound and nothing else,
He always stays there. Whatever someone brings in,
He demands his part. Otherwise, he bites.
(*Philocleon interrupts again*)
- Come, I beseech you. Father, pity him
And don't condemn him to ruin. Where are his children?
Step up to the stand, poor creatures, and whining
Seek and beseech and cry.

The first two lines (950–951) invoke the common prooimial *topos* of how difficult the speaker's task is.⁴⁹ The bulk of the speech consists of demonstrations (*pisteis*): a reminder of the defendant's services (952–958), an argument that unprivileged background mitigates his responsibility (958–959), calling of a witness to prove that no real loss was suffered from the act (962–966), and finally, as a rebuttal, proof that the defendant is of better character than his prosecutor (967–972).⁵⁰ The epilogue trots out the stereotypical display of the family in a plea for mercy (975–978).⁵¹ Every single one of these elements has clear parallels in forensic oratory.

Formal structure was certainly nothing new to comedy. Not only the epirrhematic *agôn*, but especially the parabasis follows a paradigmatic pattern based on variations in meter, voice, delivery, and rhetorical purpose. It would be a mistake to expect the poet's or chorus' self-defense in the parabasis to follow the same *dispositio* as forensic oratory, but many of the same rhetorical devices and functions play a role. Moreover, the parabasis was probably an innovation of Cratinus or other poets of his generation,⁵² so its development occurred during precisely the same period as that of the earliest teachings concerning the parts of oratory and the first paradigmatic collections of *prooimia*, epilogues, and other formulae. One critic has recently argued that these developments also coincide with Democritus' 'materialist poetics':⁵³

The atomist account of speech and poetry was consonant with the rhetorical in that for both, affective language was analyzed into its constituent basic elements, which were to be selected, combined, and arranged to give specific effects. But the scientists' way of looking at speech added something to the artisanal idea of the eloquent speaker or poet: it placed more emphasis on the intrinsic powers of the complex, constructed object.

It is therefore entirely appropriate to examine the parabases for the deployment of familiar rhetorical conventions and even see the form's evolution as primarily a rhetorical phenomenon.⁵⁴

Some parabases begin with a short lyric section called the *kommation*. But even the first anapestic lines share with the *kommation* a prooimial function which appeals to the audience's attention, sometimes with flattery of its cleverness (e.g., *Knights* 505–506, *Wasps* 1013–1014, *Clouds* 521), and announces the principal theme of the parabasis (*Acharnians* 626–632, *Knights* 498–509, *Wasps* 1009–1016, *Peace* 729–738, *Clouds* 518–526, *Birds* 676–689). In *Acharnians* 628–629, the poet admits his inexperience like a good many forensic speakers.⁵⁵ The bulk of the anapests consist of proofs of the poet's worthiness, through narration of his services to the state (*Acharnians* 633–651, *Wasps* 1018–1043, *Peace* 739–760, *Clouds* 528–550) or by contrast with his opponents (*Knights* 510–511, 519–540, *Wasps* 1030–1036, *Peace* 739–748, 752–759, *Clouds* 537–559). Every one of the five parabases from *Acharnians* to *Peace*, including the later second version of *Clouds*, fashions itself as the poet's self-defense either against attacks by his enemies or doubts of his audience. The anapestic tetrameters are often followed by dimeters called the *pnigos*. As with the prooimial *kommation*, the *pnigos* combines with the last few tetrameter lines to form an effective epilogue, addressing the audience (and dramatic jury) again, usually with some form of imperative, and using memorable expressions to ask for their future favor (*Acharnians* 652–664, *Knights* 544–550, *Wasps* 1051–1059, *Peace* 760–774, *Clouds* 560–562). This epilogue usually features some kind of summary formula as a transition: 'in response to these things' (*pro tauta*, *Acharnians* 659), 'on account of all these things' (*toutōn oun houneka pantōn*, *Knights* 544), 'on account of these things now' (*hōn houneka nuni*, *Peace* 760), 'whoever laughs at these things' (*hostis oun toutoisi gelai*, *Clouds* 560).⁵⁶ The three sections of each parabasis shift temporal focus from the phatic present (calling for the audience's attention) to a diegetic past (the poet's services and his opponents' disservices) to an optative future (wishing for victory and good reputation).⁵⁷

Earlier scholarship has been somewhat more successful in demonstrating Aristophanes' knowledge of specific rhetorical conventions, although these might have been gleaned from close attention to skilled forensic speakers just as readily as from published handbooks or formal rhetorical training.⁵⁸ These conventions may not yet have had the names assigned to them by fourth-century rhetorical treatises: nothing in Aristophanes compares with the compilation of jargon we find in Cratinus the Younger, fr. 7 *PCG*, unless *Knights* 1378–1380 (quoted in Section 3) preserves or distorts actual rhetorical terms of his era (e.g., *synertikos*, *perantikos*, *gnōmotypikos*, *katalēptikos*). He probably does refer to current rhetorical terms with *prooimia* (*Knights* 1343), *tekmērion* (*Knights* 33, 1209, *Birds* 482) and *hypotekmērion* (fr. 205 *PCG*), and *antithesis* (fr. 341 *PCG*, in reference to Agathon's style, characterized as Gorgianic by his speech in Plato's *Symposium*). That Aristophanes paid a great deal of attention to the niceties and finer details of oratory in his time can hardly be doubted.

Our examination of Aristophanes' corpus clearly concludes that he was familiar with at least some form of rhetorical theory and education. The speeches within his plays typically adapt their style and argumentative strategy to their specific audience, with the sole intent of persuading, not establishing objective truth. *Wasps* (in 422) attests intense public interest in oratory even on the part of common people. Starting with *Banqueters* in 427, Aristophanes refers to a new and highly effective style of public speaking common among the younger generation, characterized in part by the lexical *orthoepeia* for which teachers like Protagoras and Prodicus were known; the plot of *Clouds* (of 423) revolves around acquiring a sophistic education to succeed as such an orator. The trial scene in *Wasps* betrays knowledge of the canonical divisions of a forensic speech, as well as numerous other conventions. Finally, *Frogs* (of 405) presents a contest between two paradigmatic styles similar to those familiar from later rhetorical analysis. When the Euripides of that play says, 'there is no shrine of Peithō other than speech' (1391), he is surely not expressing a sentiment with which Aristophanes' earlier work was unfamiliar.

Bibliographical Essay

The two most systematic studies in this area are C.T. Murphy, 'Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric', *HSCP* 49 (1938), pp. 69–113 and W.E. Major, *Aristophanes, Enemy of Rhetoric* (Diss. Indiana: 1996). M. de Fatima de Sousa e Silva, 'Crítica à Retórica na Comédia de Aristófanes', *Humanitas* 39/40 (1987/88), pp. 43–104, examines the use of rhetoric as a tool of characterization in the comedies. R.M. Harriott, *Aristophanes Poet & Dramatist* (Baltimore: 1986), pp. 27–67, devotes two chapters to 'Aristophanes the Orator', examining various speeches in the plays as examples of forensic or epideictic oratory, but the commentary is very general in nature. On the epirrhetic *agōn*, which can be viewed as a rhetorical debate, see T. Gelzer, *Der epirrhetische Agon bei Aristophanes* (Munich: 1960), and on rhetoric in the parabasis, see R.M. Harriott, *Aristophanes Poet & Dramatist* (cited above) and T.K. Hubbard, *The Mask of Comedy: Aristophanes and the Intertextual Parabasis* (Ithaca: 1991). On the contest in *Frogs* and its relation to early stylistic theory, see N. O'Sullivan, *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginnings of Greek Stylistic Theory* (Stuttgart: 1992). For systematic treatment of Aristophanes' relation to the sophists, see E. de Carli, *Aristofane e la*

Sofistica (Florence: 1971). On rhetoric in *Clouds* in particular, see D.E. O'Regan, *Rhetoric, Comedy, and the Violence of Language* (New York: 1992). C.H. Whitman, *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero* (Cambridge, MA: 1964), pp. 167–199, reads *Birds* as a meditation on the power of rhetoric and manipulation of language; in the same vein, but with a post-structuralist bent, see G.W. Dobrov, 'Language, Fiction, and Utopia', in G.W. Dobrov (ed.), *The City as Comedy: Society and Representation in Athenian Drama* (Chapel Hill: 1997), pp. 95–132.

Notes

- 1 The unpublished dissertation of W.E. Major, *Aristophanes, Enemy of Rhetoric* (Indiana University: 1996), takes a largely negative view, closely following Schiappa's downdating (see n. 2 below).
- 2 E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999), pp. 14–23. His views were first sketched in more preliminary form eight years earlier in his *Protagoras and Logos* (Columbia, SC: 2003), to be cited henceforth in its second edition. But Aristophanes, *Knights* 1378–1380, notes the vogue for words ending in the *-ikos* suffix already in 424. In the same play, we also see the verb *rheō* used twice with reference to the power of speech (526–527), something Schiappa, *Beginnings*, p. 17, says we should have seen attested in Aristophanes if he really knew 'rhetoric' as a key term for public speaking. Schiappa is unaware that this metaphorical use of the word clearly is attested here.
- 3 Schiappa, *Beginnings*, p. 23.
- 4 T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991), pp. 8–14.
- 5 Cole, *Origins*, p. ix.
- 6 Cole, *Origins*, p. 13.
- 7 Cole, *Origins*, pp. ix and 72–73.
- 8 Cole, *Origins*, p. x and Schiappa, *Beginnings*, p. 32.
- 9 Cole, *Origins*, pp. 23–27 and 'Who Was Corax?', *ICS* 16 (1991), pp. 65–84, Schiappa, *Beginnings*, pp. 34–47.
- 10 G.A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: 1963), p. 58.
- 11 See especially K. Gaiser, *Protreptik und Paränese in den Dialogen Platons* (Stuttgart: 1955) and H.-G. Gadamer, *Dialogue and Dialectic*, trans. P.C. Smith (New Haven: 1980), pp. 124–255.
- 12 For comedy's origins, see F.M. Cornford, *The Origin of Attic Comedy*² (Gloucester, MA: 1968), pp. 5–6 and 27–39. On the formal characteristics of the *agōn*, see T. Gelzer, *Der epirrhematische Agon bei Aristophanes* (Munich: 1960) and P. Händel, *Formen und Darstellungsweisen in der aristophanischen Komödie* (Heidelberg: 1963), pp. 44–69.
- 13 On the particularly violent obscenity of this play, which is entirely homosexual or scatological in nature, see J. Henderson, *The Maculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy* (New Haven: 1975), pp. 66–70.
- 14 On *Frogs* as the drama of Dionysus' self-realization as the god of comedy, see C.P. Segal, 'The Character and Cults of Dionysus and the Unity of the *Frogs*', *HSCP* 65 (1961), pp. 207–242.
- 15 That the youths are specifically described as the kind who attend symposia and play *kottabos* (*methusokottaboi*, *Acharnians* 525) marks them as members of the leisured class.
- 16 *Scholiast* to *Clouds* 529a confirms this information. In addition to fr. 205 *PCG* (see n. 17 below), fr. 206 is clearly consistent with sophistic/rhetorical education as a central theme

of the play; it may be from an *agōn* between the two brothers. For the reconstruction of this lost play as a confrontation between two kinds of education, see the excellent commentary of A.C. Cassio, *Aristofane: Banchettanti* (Pisa: 1977), especially pp. 26–31; see also A. Croiset, *Aristophanes and the Political Parties at Athens*, trans. J. Loeb (London: 1909), pp. 30–35.

- 17 R. Kassel and C. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graeci* (Berlin: 1983–) – hereafter *PCG*.
- 18 See *Acharnians* 854–859, *Knights* 1266–1273, *Wasps* 787–795.
- 19 I.C. Storey, ‘Thrasymachus at Athens: Aristophanes fr. 205 (*Daitales*)’, *Phoenix* 42 (1988), pp. 212–218, has argued that 427 is too early for the rhetorician Thrasymachus of Chalcedon. However, even if we accept the evidence of Dion. Hal. *Lysias* 6 (= 85A3 in H. Diels and W. Kranz, *Die Fragmenta der Vorsokratiker* [Berlin: 1951] – hereafter D-K), who says that Thrasymachus was close to Lysias (born 459) in date, Thrasymachus would have been over 30 by 427, certainly old enough to be an intellectual figure of some notoriety, particularly in light of Aristophanes’ depiction of the new oratory as a phenomenon of the young. This is consistent with Aristotle’s chronology (= 85A2 D-K) placing Thrasymachus between Gorgias and Theodorus, and is certainly not inconsistent with the one clearly datable fragment of Thrasymachus (85B2 D-K), alluding to Archelaus of Macedon, who ruled from 411 to 399. A teaching career of 20–30 years is not unusual. Storey argues that ‘Thrasymachus’ (not a common name in Athens) must have been the name of a character in the play, since vocatives are seldom addressed to personages not in the drama, but some of Storey’s own examples, such as *Wasps* 83, 197 or *Frogs* 1451, show that there was no such convention limiting use of the vocative.
- 20 For *tekmerion*, see Ant. 1.10, 4.4.2–3, 6.30–31 with M. Gagarin, *Antiphon: The Speeches* (Cambridge: 1997), p. 112, Arist. *Rhet.* 1357b1–21, and C. Cooper, Chapter 14, p. 211.
- 21 This fragment is preserved by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1405b29–33), who quotes it as a paradigmatic example of *hypokorismos*. For discussion, see C.T. Murphy, ‘Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric’, *HSCP* 49 (1938), pp. 71–72.
- 22 Murphy, ‘Aristophanes’, p. 72, thinks this phrase refers to balanced cola and periodic sentences, but the later parallels, including fr. 488 *PCG*, apply the term not to Gorgias, Isocrates, or Demosthenes, but to authors like Euripides and Lysias, with a clear, fluid, unencumbered style. S.D. Olson, *Aristophanes: Acharnians* (Oxford: 2002), p. 248, is more on the right track in defining the term as ‘round’ and thus by extension ‘neatly conceived, terse’. See also N. O’Sullivan, *Alcidamas, Aristophanes and the Beginning of Greek Stylistic Theory* (Stuttgart: 1992), p. 139. The term’s original reference may have applied to euphonious combination.
- 23 Such is the conclusion of T. Morgan, Chapter 20, p. 305, who argues that the importance of public speaking within the Athenian democracy must have given rise to specialized instruction in the art even before this period. On the ‘new politicians’ of this generation, see W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton: 1971); cf. Ian Worthington, Chapter 17.
- 24 See M. Reinhold, ‘The Generation Gap in Antiquity’, in S. Bertram (ed.), *The Conflict of Generations in Ancient Greece and Rome* (Amsterdam: 1976), pp. 15–54 and B. Strauss, *Fathers and Sons in Athens: Ideology and Society in the Era of the Peloponnesian War* (Princeton: 1993), especially pp. 130–178. For my own treatment of the generational dynamics in Aristophanes, see ‘Old Men in the Youthful Plays of Aristophanes’, in T.M. Falkner and J. de Luce (eds.), *Old Age in Greek and Latin Literature* (Albany: 1989), pp. 90–113. See also C.H. Whitman, *Aristophanes and the Comic Hero* (Cambridge, MA: 1964), pp. 119–166.
- 25 See my discussion in *The Mask of Comedy: Aristophanes and the Intertextual Parabasis* (Ithaca: 1991), pp. 47–48 and 227–230.

- 26 Note especially the pathetic portrait of Cratinus as a drunken old man with a busted lyre in *Knights* 526–536, dazed and muttering, just like Thucydides and the other old men prosecuted by young orators in *Acharnians*.
- 27 On this dynamic as a fundamental feature of fourth-century oratory, see the important work of J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton: 1989).
- 28 For this phrase as a leitmotif in Cleon's rhetoric, see Connor, *New Politicians*, pp. 99–108. For its relation to Pericles and the broader ideological significance of the concept, see S.S. Monoson, 'Citizen as *Erastes*: Erotic Imagery and the Idea of Reciprocity in the Periclean Funeral Oration', *Political Theory* 22 (1994), pp. 253–276 and V. Wohl, *Love Among the Ruins: The Erotics of Democracy in Classical Athens* (Princeton: 2002), pp. 1–3 and 55–72.
- 29 Although highly sceptical of the testimonia concerning Tisias and Corax in other respects, Cole, *Origins*, pp. 82–83 and 'Who Was Corax?', pp. 73, 79–80, does credit the evidence of Plato (*Phaedrus* 273b–c) and Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1402a18–21) that they gave examples of *eikos*-argumentation. See also Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, pp. 30 and 60, M. Gagarin, Chapter 3 and C. Cooper, Chapter 14. Murphy, 'Aristophanes', p. 93, finds little evidence of *eikos*-argumentation in Aristophanes, but neglects the significance of this speech.
- 30 Schiappa, *Beginnings*, pp. 71–72.
- 31 Schiappa, *Protagoras*, p. 112. For a broader consideration of sophistic doctrine in this area, see C.J. Classen, 'The Study of Language Amongst Socrates' Contemporaries', in C.J. Classen (ed.), *Sophistik* (Darmstadt: 1976), pp. 215–247.
- 32 For the sophists' discussions of language as evidence for the development of 'philology' in this period, see Kennedy, *Art of Persuasion*, pp. 34–35 and Schiappa, *Beginnings*, p. 78.
- 33 On the difference between the two versions of *Clouds*, see Hubbard, *Mask of Comedy*, pp. 90–106, and specifically on the date, p. 90 n. 9. E.C. Kopff, 'The Date of Aristophanes, *Nubes* II', *AJP* 110 (1990), pp. 318–329, has argued for a later dating around 414, but his arguments have been countered effectively by I.C. Storey, 'The Dates of Aristophanes' *Clouds* II and Eupolis' *Baptai*: A Reply to E. C. Kopff', *AJP* 114 (1993), pp. 71–84.
- 34 For the most subtle treatment of the two Logoi as a thematic thread in this play, see P. Pucci, 'Saggio sulle Nuvole', *Maia* 12 (1960), pp. 5–31.
- 35 Schiappa, *Protagoras*, pp. 103–116.
- 36 Schiappa, *Protagoras*, pp. 184–187, lists various ancient texts that do attribute some form of rhetorical doctrine to Protagoras, but must discount these as well.
- 37 On the *anakrisis*, see A.R.W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens 2: Procedure*² (London: 1998), pp. 94–105 and D.M. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London: 1978), pp. 240–242.
- 38 O'Sullivan, *Greek Stylistic Theory*, especially pp. 1–22 and 106–150.
- 39 O'Sullivan, *Greek Stylistic Theory*, pp. 8–9, 109–112, 130–139.
- 40 O'Sullivan, *Greek Stylistic Theory*, pp. 107–121.
- 41 See my discussion of the stylistic imagery in this passage in *Mask of Comedy*, pp. 74–76.
- 42 M.G. Bonnano, *Studi su Cratete Comico* (Padua: 1972), pp. 36–39, argues that we should follow the *Scholia* in interpreting the rare word *krambotatos* as derived from 'cabbage' (*krambē*), commonly used as an antidote for intoxication. If correct, this passage would explicitly set Crates' sobriety in opposition to Cratinus' drunkenness, a stylistic contrast applied to oratory in *Knights* 347–355, where the Paphlagonian boasts that he gulps down neat wine, in contrast to his water-drinking opponent, the Sausage-seller. Cratinus adopts this idea in *The Bottle*, where he associates wine-drinking with poetic inspiration and water-drinking with dullness (fr. 203 PCG). See O'Sullivan, *Greek Stylistic Theory*, pp. 116–120, for further comic parallels. For the quarrel between the 'wine drinkers' and 'water drinkers' as a theme of Hellenistic poetics, with stylistic implications, see N.B. Crowther,

- 'Water and Wine as Symbols of Inspiration', *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979), pp. 1–11, P.E. Knox, 'Wine, Water and Callimachean Polemics', *HSCP* 89 (1985), pp. 107–119.
- 43 M. Runkel, *Cratini Veteris Comici Graeci Fragmenta* (Leipzig: 1827), p. 87, plausibly assigns this unattributed fragment of Cratinus to *The Bottle*. Since Aristophanes had not made his identity public prior to *Knights* (see n. 25 above), the joke would only have point after 424, and *The Bottle*, which we know on other grounds to be a response to *Knights*, is the only play of Cratinus we can with any certainty date later than 424. Aristophanes is at least credible in speaking of Cratinus as 'old'.
- 44 On Cleon's notoriously vehement style of delivery, see Ian Worthington, Chapter 17, pp. 261, 266. However, if he did benefit from rhetorical education, as Morgan argues (n. 23 above), the content and verbal style of his oratory may have also been part of his effectiveness.
- 45 Murphy, 'Aristophanes', pp. 81–110. On the work, see P. Chiron, Chapter 8.
- 46 For the most thorough examination of these sources, see Cole, 'Who Was Corax?', pp. 65–80, who is highly sceptical of the claim. However, even Schiappa, *Beginnings*, pp. 44–45, and M. Gagarin, Chapter 3, admit that analysis of the parts of the speech may have been Tisias' primary achievement. See also C. Cooper, Chapter 14, who believes some division of the parts of speech did exist in the late fifth-century. M. de Brauw, Chapter 13, inclines toward Isocrates as the inventor of the four-part division, but the highly complex scheme that Plato (*Phaedrus* 266d–267d) attributes to Theodorus suggests elaboration of a simpler system that must have already been well-accepted before Theodorus developed his more refined template.
- 47 Major, *Enemy of Rhetoric*, pp. 4–14. Even Murphy, 'Aristophanes', p. 82, admits that *diēgēsis* 'seldom occurs'. Major observes that Antiphon's speeches also tend to lack *diēgēsis* and therefore concludes that the canonical scheme did not yet exist in this period. However, inasmuch as Antiphon's speeches may have been intended as models of argument rather than as actual forensic speeches in real cases, it may not be surprising that he deemphasizes narration of the facts, which are not the basis of his disputation. Major, *Enemy of Rhetoric*, pp. 154–156, admits that *Ecclesiastusae* (of 392) does exhibit knowledge of the canonical speech divisions, in which case they do predate Plato; see M. de Brauw, Chapter 13, p. 190, on Lysias 3, also probably from the 390s.
- 48 See M. de Brauw, Chapter 13, for the epilogue as the place where the speaker emphasizes the consequences of the case for the community. Lysias 27.1 states that it was common for prosecutors to make threats against the well-being of the jurors themselves, such as loss of jury pay, if they fail to convict. *Wasps* 927–928 plays upon the maxim 'one nest can't feed two robins', quoted by the *Scholia*; see Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1394a19–1395b20, for the use of familiar maxims especially as a device supporting the speaker's *ēthos* and identity of values with those of the jury.
- 49 Cf. Lys. 7.1–2, 12.1–3, 22.1, 29.1, 31.3–4, as well as the examples listed in n. 55 below, which say that the speaker's task is difficult because of his oratorical inexperience.
- 50 As noted above, the *pisteis* appropriately include arguments based on *ēthos*. The Cheese-Grater proves that no real harm occurred as a result of Labes' theft of the cheese, since it had already grated out as much cheese as was needed by the troops; this demonstration conforms with (2) and (3) of the four topics of disputation that Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1417b21–27), lists as appropriate in the *pisteis*: (1) what happened, (2) whether it did harm, (3) how much harm, (4) whether it was done justly.
- 51 This convention of the epilogue was already a hackneyed *topos* by the time of Plato, *Apology* 34c, where Socrates pointedly refuses to do what is expected at this point in his defense; cf. Dem. 21.99, 186 and Aes. 2.179. See Murphy, 'Aristophanes', pp. 97–99, for such appeals to mercy.
- 52 See Hubbard, *Mask of Comedy*, pp. 24–27.
- 53 A. Ford, *The Origins of Criticism* (Princeton: 2002), p. 171.

- 54 Murphy's article ignored the parabasis. R.M. Harriott, *Aristophanes Poet & Dramatist* (Baltimore: 1986), pp. 33–36 and 52–67, was the first to call attention to the parabasis as rhetoric, analyzing the *Acharnians*' parabasis as a specimen of forensic oratory and several others as epideictic. In the remarks I make below, I am restricting my analysis to the first half of the parabases in the first five extant plays of Aristophanes. Harriott demonstrates that many of the same principles apply also to the epirrhematic syzygies and second parabases.
- 55 Murphy, 'Aristophanes', pp. 88–89, labels this trope *elattōsis* and cites several other Aristophanic examples. On this prooimial *topos* in Attic oratory, see M. de Brauw, Chapter 13. For good examples, cf. Ant. 1.1, 5.1–7, Lys. 17.1, 19.1–3, Pl. *Apology* 17b–18a.
- 56 For such transitional formulae elsewhere in Aristophanes and their parallels in oratorical usage, see Murphy, 'Aristophanes', pp. 83–85.
- 57 I have not included the parabasis of *Birds* in my remarks above, since it does not speak on the poet's behalf, but entirely in the persona of the Birds themselves. Nevertheless, it reveals the same basic progression from the present call to attention (676–692) to proofs of the Birds' status as gods, first through narration of their theogony (693–704) and then through enumeration of their benefits to mankind (705–722), and finally to an appeal in the *pnigos* for men to worship them in the future in return for more benefits they can confer (723–736).
- 58 Major, *Enemy of Rhetoric*, pp. 173–177, includes an appendix with an impressive catalogue of commonplaces or phrases in Aristophanes' plays with clear parallels in the extant work of the Attic orators. Although most of these parallels are later in the fourth century, they may have been common in the last quarter of the fifth century as well, if they truly are commonplaces. In addition to the formulae and tropes discussed in notes 48, 49, 55 and 56 above, Murphy, 'Aristophanes', p. 91, discusses *prokatalepsis*, or anticipation of an opponent's argument. Murphy, 'Aristophanes', p. 112, cites Cratinus, fr. 197 PCG, 'you perhaps know my opponents' plotting against me', as reflecting knowledge of a handbook of prologues, since virtually the same phrase begins speeches as diverse as Andoc. 1.1 and Aes. 3.1; cf. Lys., fr. 190 S. Such prologue/epilogue handbooks were attributed to both Antiphon and Demosthenes: see A. Rupprecht, 'Die demosthenische Prooemiumsamm- lung', *Philologus* 82 (1927), pp. 365–432 and G.A. Kennedy, 'The Earliest Rhetorical Handbooks', *AJP* 80 (1959), p. 170. Cicero (*Brutus* 46) attributes collections of rhet- orical commonplaces to Protagoras and Gorgias.

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE

Rhetoric and Lyric Poetry

William H. Race

The major portion of Greek lyric poetry was composed in the course of two centuries, beginning c. 650 with Archilochus and Alcman, and ending c. 440 with the deaths of Pindar and Bacchylides. For the purpose of this survey, I shall include iambic and elegiac poetry written during this time. Since this period precedes the era when the practice and theory of Greek rhetoric reached its maturity, beginning in the late fifth century with Gorgias and continuing in the fourth century and beyond, the use of rhetorical analysis to elucidate lyric poetry necessarily applies later theory and practice to previously composed poetry and must therefore be used judiciously and in full awareness of the anachronism.

This interaction between rhetoric and poetry works in two directions. The later rhetorical treatises look back to the epic and lyric traditions for examples of practice that preceded or prefigured the later theoretical formulations (examples from Homer are especially numerous in rhetorical treatises). At the same time, the later rhetorical formulations have provided modern scholars hermeneutic tools for interpreting the earlier lyric poetry.

1 Pindar and Bacchylides

It is understandable that, after the intense period of rhetorical study in the fourth century, ancient commentators would apply rhetorical models and categories to lyric poetry (as they also did to epic and drama). This is especially apparent in the rich scholiastic tradition that accompanies the Pindaric manuscripts – our main surviving corpus of Greek lyric poetry. In their efforts to understand the complicated structure and dense language of Pindar's 45 epinician odes celebrating victors in major athletic contests, ancient scholiasts, beginning in the Hellenistic era (c. 250), often employed concepts and terms derived from rhetorical analysis. Figures of thought cited in the Scholia include *allēgoria* (saying one thing and meaning another), *synkrisis* (comparison),

and *gnōmai* (maxims); figures of style include metaphor, *periphrasis* (circumlocution), and *hyperbaton* (unusual word order). The rhetorical commonplaces that became the staple of *progymnasmata* were also applied to Pindar's poetry: *diēgēma/diēgēsis* (narrative), *ekphrasis* (description), and *enkōmion/epainos* (praise).¹ An astute observation by one ancient commentator well describes Pindar's rhetorical procedure in the opening lines of *Nemean* 10, where he lists a number of legendary heroes of Argos (the victor's city) but says he cannot expatiate on them: 'He is doing this rhetorically: by seeming to refuse to speak in detail about the manly deeds of the Argives, he is secretly listing them'.²

During the sixteenth-century recovery of Greek literature and rhetoric, the strong influence of the *progymnasmata*, commonly used in the schools, and the currency of such theoretical works as J.C. Scaliger's 1561 *Poetices libri septem*, combined to encourage 'rhetorical' readings of Greek poets. A notable example is Erasmus Schmid's 1616 edition of Pindar, the important Renaissance critical text of Pindar's works that was unsurpassed until the nineteenth-century editions. Borrowing the terminology of Greek and Roman oratory, Schmid provided schemata of all the odes that analyzed their contents according to the parts of speeches. For example, his synopsis of *Olympian* 1 contains the following divisions:³

Exordium: The Olympic Games surpass all others.

This is illustrated by comparisons of

water among elements
gold among metals
the sun among the stars
Jupiter among the gods.

It is confirmed by the judgment of wise men.

Propositio: The Olympic victor Hieron must be praised.

Confirmatio:

1. because of his justice
2. because of his wealth and rule
3. because of his excellences
4. because of his appreciation of poetry
5. because of his hosting wise men
6. because of the victory he won with his horse Pherenicus, which he praises:

for its speed
for its strength
for its loyalty to its master

7. because of his seat of power, Syracuse
8. because of his passionate pursuit of warfare and the Olympic Games
9. because of the fame he won in the Peloponnesus through his Olympic victory.

Digressio on Pelops, in which he

1. briefly relates fabrications about Pelops
2. inveighs against idle tales
3. promises to tell truer things about Pelops
4. praises Pelops:
 1. for divine favor
 2. for his marriage
 3. for his piety in calling upon Neptune
 4. for his virtue in disdaining death
 5. for his achievement in defeating Oenomaos
 6. for his offspring
 7. for his tomb
 8. for his posthumous glory.

Epilogus, in which he returns to the praise of Hieron, relegates the cause to divine favor, and offers a prayer for Hieron and himself.

As rhetorical analysis, this is neatly inclusive, though hardly exhaustive or aesthetically satisfying. Every ode, for Schmid, has basically the same *propositio* (thesis to be proved): *hic victor est laudandus* ('this victor must be praised'). Mythical narratives, family histories, and other materials not directly connected to the victor are simply labeled digressions (*digressiones*), while most everything else in the ode falls under the confirmation (*confirmatio*) of the thesis (*propositio*) or the refutation (*refutatio*) of real or contrived objections – all constructed as if Pindar were pleading a case. In his widely circulated 1620 edition of Pindar, Johannes Benedictus,⁴ who otherwise drew heavily on Schmid's work, dropped the rhetorical synopses. They subsequently disappeared from serious consideration; indeed, in 1766 J.G. Meusel referred to them as 'those execrable charts of Schmid'.⁵

Schmid read the odes through the lens of forensic and deliberative rhetoric, where an argument is constructed to support a proposition. Another line of analysis followed the tradition that located poetry in the epideictic sphere of rhetoric. The first modern work to deal extensively with the epideictic context of Greek lyric poetry is the 1902 Chicago dissertation by T.C. Burgess, *Epideictic Literature*, which is still a very useful survey. Relying principally on the theoretical works of Aristotle, Cicero, Menander Rhetor, Pseudo-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and the *progymnasmata*, Burgess provided a detailed survey of the genre's theory and practice in both prose and poetry, and pointed out the rhetorical aspects of Greek poetry shared with the epideictic speeches and essays of Isocrates, Dio Chrysostom, Aelius Aristides, Libanius, Themistius, Himerius, and Julian. In particular, he demonstrated the close relationship between Pindar's odes to rulers and the instructions of Menander Rhetor (c. 300 AD) for composing a *basilikos logos* (speech in praise of a Roman emperor): 'many of the odes of Pindar are *basilikoi logoi*. The very composition, as well as the purpose of a Pindaric ode, involves some of the most essential features of a *basilikos logos*'.⁶ For example, *Olympian* 2 praises Theron of Acragas for his ancestry, which is traced in a myth. Pindar then praises 'wealth embellished with virtues' and, after a depiction of the afterlife awaiting heroes, declares that Theron is the most generous man of the century and that it would be impossible to express the multi-

tude of his benefactions. Similar are Bacchylides' *Odes* 3 and 5 to Hieron, which are part of a long tradition of poetic and prose encomia of rulers stretching from Homer and Hesiod to the end of the ancient world.

Encomium, whose very name derives from celebratory lyric poetry performed 'in the *kōmos*', was one of the exercises in the *progymnasmata* and constituted one of the earliest set-pieces of Greek prose rhetoric, Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen*. Aristotle treats the topics of encomium at *Rhetoric* 1.9 (cf. *Rhet. Alex.* 3, 35). Of particular importance is the concept of *auxēsis* (amplification) through the use of examples (*paradeigmata*), comparisons (*parabolai*), rhetorical arguments (*enthymēmata*), and maxims (*gnōmai*).

These two strands of rhetorical analysis came together in E.L. Bundy's landmark *Studia Pindarica*.⁷ Although Bundy employed the terms 'rhetorical conventions',⁸ 'rhetorical poses',⁹ and 'high rhetoric',¹⁰ to describe the features of epinician poetry he was analyzing, his emphasis was on 'conventions' and 'poses'. At that time rhetoric (usually understood as *mere* rhetoric) was a pejorative term when applied to poetry, as in Ezra Pound's notorious assessment of Pindar in 1915: "'Theban Eagle" be blowed. A damn'd rhetorician half the time'.¹¹ In the still dominant late-Romantic poetic theory, 'rhetoric' was thought to be studied and insincere, 'poetry' spontaneous, private, and genuine, as typified by the remark attributed to Yeats that out of our quarrels with others we make rhetoric; out of our quarrels with ourselves we make poetry.

On the whole, Bundy spoke in terms of 'genre' and the conventions it entailed: 'The study of Pindar must become a study of genre'.¹² This genre was essentially epideictic: 'Yet it should be evident that the Epinikion must adhere to those principles that have governed enkomia from Homer to Lincoln's *Gettysburg Address*'.¹³ Indeed, he argued that 'there is no passage in Pindar and Bakchylides [Bacchylides] that is not in its primary intent enkomastic'.¹⁴ He placed particular emphasis on Pindar's use of poetic and gnomic *topoi*, which he often illustrated from rhetoric and the Attic orators, especially Isocrates and Demosthenes.

Although for the most part he avoided the term 'rhetoric', Bundy was in essence adapting and extending Schmid's overly mechanical schemata to embrace a more fluid concept of the ode, one which presented a loosely evolving argument in support of the basic proposition: *hic victor est laudandus*, as implied in the terms he coined, 'laudandus' and 'laudator'. After his close analysis of *Isthmian* 1, he concluded: 'To follow the movement of the ode is not to follow the development of a thought that has a beginning, a middle, and an end, but to pursue the fulfillment of a single purpose through a complex orchestration of motives and themes that conduce to one end: the glorification, within the considerations of ethical, religious, social, and literary propriety, of Herodotus of Thebes, victor in the chariot race at the Isthmos'.¹⁵

Bundy's program of exploring the rhetorical nature of the odes by examining their generic conventions (poetic masks, shifting focus, standard rhetorical and ethical *topoi*, etc.) was intended to counteract two dominant trends in Pindaric scholarship, what H. Lloyd-Jones has called 'the fatal conjunction of nineteenth-century historicism with nineteenth-century Romanticism'.¹⁶ The former, already apparent in the Scholia, sought to find historical allusions in the odes, either by applying the first-person statements in a direct and literal fashion to Pindar of Thebes, or by using the rhetorical notion of *allēgoria* (saying one thing while meaning another) to find veiled allusions to historical events or persons. This 'historical allegory',¹⁷ already prominent in Boeckh's 1821 edition,¹⁸ culminated in Wilamowitz's 1922 *Pindaros*,¹⁹ though it continues

in many forms today. The Romantic strain regarded the first-person statements as expressions of Pindar's personal views and concentrated on the sublimity (and obscurity) of his expression, looked for symbols and imagery, and emphasized the waywardness of his poetic genius.

By demonstrating that many statements appearing to express Pindar's personal views were conventional *topoi* that served a rhetorical purpose within their odes, Bundy showed that almost all of the supposed historical information about the odes and Pindar's own life actually derived from a naïve, literalistic reading of conventional gestures that could be paralleled in other lyric poets, especially Bacchylides, and prose authors, especially the orators. An example is the ending of *Olympian* 2.86–100:

Wise is he who knows many things
by nature, whereas learners who are boisterous
and long-winded are like a pair of crows that cry in vain
against the divine bird of Zeus.
Now aim the bow at the mark, come my heart. At whom
do we shoot, and this time launch from a kindly spirit
our arrows of fame? Yes,
bending the bow at Acragas,
I will proclaim a statement on oath with a truthful mind,
that no city within a century has produced
a man more beneficent to his friends
in spirit and more generous of hand than
Theron. But enough: upon praise comes tedious excess,
which does not keep to just limits, but at the instigation
of greedy men is eager to prattle on and obscure
noble men's good
deeds; for grains of sand escape counting,
and all the joys which that man has wrought for others,
who could declare them?

The *Scholía* identified the crows as the poets Bacchylides and Simonides, and scholars have embellished this supposed rivalry. Bundy, however, interpreted the passage as a rhetorical preparation for the forthcoming praise and argued that the 'man who knows many things by nature' characterizes a laudator who (like an eagle) can deliver his assessment with clarity and force, unlike long-winded crows that are mere technicians. Then, after declaring Theron to be the most generous man of the century (90–95), Pindar refuses to list Theron's benefactions. The 'greedy men' are eulogists who would prattle on and actually detract from the high praise by obscuring it with too many details. Thus, the crows and greedy men represent *types* of eulogists who would be unequal to the task Pindar undertakes. By analyzing the passage as 'rhetorical', Bundy cleared up many misunderstandings that had long puzzled interpreters.

What emerges from Bundy's analysis of Pindar is a Panhellenic poet who occasionally interjects 'personal' concerns (e.g., *Olympian* 6.82–90, *Isthmian* 7.37–42), but only insofar as they further the poetic and rhetorical purpose of the ode: praising the victor – and, more broadly, praising his city and the Hellenic traditions. Thus, 'when Pindar speaks proudly in the first person this is less likely to be the personal Pindar of Thebes than the Pindar privileged to praise the worthiest of men'.²⁰

In his subsequent article on Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo*,²¹ Bundy showed in more detail how many Pindaric passages of apparent obscurity and ambiguity were sophisticated adaptations of rhetorical gestures and could be paralleled in the Attic orators and in archaic as well as Hellenistic poetry. These included many passages of feigned aporia or embarrassment on the part of the poet, and apologies of all sorts: 'there is too much for me to tell' (*Olympian* 13.43–46, *Pythian* 8.29–32, *Nemean* 4.69–72, 10.19–20), 'what I have said is incredible' (*Nemean* 9.33–34), 'the ode is late' (*Olympian* 10.1–8, *Nemean* 3.77–80), 'reject that story' (*Olympian* 1.52–53, 9.35–41), 'stop boasting' (*Isthmian* 5.51–53), 'may no one object if I praise Melesias' (*Olympian* 8.54–55), 'my heart, to what foreign headland are you diverting me?' (*Nemean* 3.26–27), 'why am I vaunting inappropriately?' (*Pythian* 10.4, Bacchylides 10.51–52), or 'I shrink from telling this' (*Nemean* 5.14–18, 8.19–22). By providing numerous parallels from other poets and from the orators, Bundy showed that such passages were carefully designed to enhance the speaker's *ēthos* and lend credibility to his praise.

Another puzzling aspect of Pindar's poetry is the introduction of seemingly irrelevant digressions. For example, in *Pythian* 11, after an account of Orestes' exile and eventual return to Amyclae to kill his mother Clytemnestra and her lover Aegisthus (17–37), the poet appears to confess that he has gotten lost (38–40): 'Can it be, O my friends, that I got confused where the way forked, when before I was going on the straight road? Or did some wind throw me off course, like a small boat at sea?' Taking their cue from the ancient Scholia ('Pindar upbraids himself for having employed an inappropriate digression'),²² many scholars have either lauded Pindar as a proto-Romantic poet breaking loose from the constraints of his dull assignments, or disparaged him for incompetence in not being able to stick to his subject. D.C. Young has shown, however, that Pindar uses the exemplum of Clytemnestra's adultery and murder to point up the *contrast* between the 'myth' (with its account of palace intrigue) and the praise of civic virtue (embodied in the victor) that follows.²³

Why does the poet build this enactment of confusion into his ode? One rhetorical purpose for pretending to have gotten carried away with the narrative in *Pythian* 11 is to add spontaneity to the discourse (cf. Hermogenes' treatment of unaffected spontaneity, *On Types of Style* 352–363). There may also be an additional purpose of making intellectual demands on the audience, as recommended by Theophrastus, quoted at Demetrius, *On Style* 89–97 (trans. Innes):

You should not elaborate on everything in punctilious detail but should omit some points for the listener to infer and work out for himself. For when he infers what you have omitted, he is not just listening to you but he becomes your witness and reacts more favourably to you. For he is made aware of his own intelligence through you, who have given him the opportunity to be intelligent.

Finally, the 'personal' remarks of the narrator who suddenly intervenes in a poem serve to highlight the impelling nature of the digression and effect a return (*epanodos*, *epibodos*) to the main narrative, a sophisticated rhetorical procedure of appearing to be 'carried away' that extends from Hesiod to late Greek prose authors.²⁴

Drawing on the work of F. Dornseiff²⁵ and W. Kröhling,²⁶ Bundy also called attention to Pindar's use of the priamel, a poetic focusing device that proceeds

from a summary statement or list of items to a specific object of interest in order to introduce a topic and highlight it.²⁷ There are some twenty-five priamels in Pindar's poems, perhaps the best known being the opening lines of *Olympian* 1:

Best is water, while gold, like fire blazing
in the night, shines preeminent amid lordly wealth.
But if you wish to sing
of athletic games, my heart,
look no further than the sun
for another star shining more warmly by day
through the empty sky,
nor let us proclaim a contest greater than Olympia.

In three rising clauses (water . . . gold . . . Olympic games) containing two comparisons (gold to fire in the night, Olympia to the sun by day), Pindar locates his subject of athletics amongst other desirable things in life. Priamels are by their nature rhetorical *exordia*; they introduce a topic by contextualizing and amplifying it.

In a series of articles inspired by Bundy's studies,²⁸ A.M. Miller has explored the rhetorical aspect of Pindar's odes as constructing arguments; indeed, he calls Pindar 'a master craftsman of encomiastic argument'.²⁹ On one level, all of Pindar's epinicia are designed to prove the proposition: *hic victor est laudandus*. In order to accomplish this, Pindar employs the kinds of proofs laid out by Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2.1 and 1.15, including *atechnic* proofs (presenting the 'facts' of the case, like the victor's name, event, city) and *entechnic* proofs (the *inventio* of examples, comparisons, maxims, narratives, and the like). These proofs must then be arranged (*dispositio*) into a train of thought (*Gedankengang*). Here Miller posits a crucial distinction between the 'I' who is speaking in the ode (a *persona* that appears to be spontaneously creating the poem, often jumping from one topic to another, sometimes correcting himself, expressing excitement, doubts, and hesitation – in short, the 'willful' Pindar of Romantic critics) and 'Pindar' the author/composer who is fashioning the whole ode and who employs rhetorical strategies to add liveliness, drama, and the appearance of spontaneity to his carefully composed poem. As Miller points out, this 'oral subterfuge'³⁰ is 'the fiction according to which the epinician ode is the spontaneously unfolding utterance of an extemporizing speaker (the 'I' of the poem) who exhibits the impulsiveness, the digressiveness, the false starts and self-corrections of ordinary unpremeditated speech'.³¹

Miller also distinguishes two ways in which the epinician genre itself is intrinsically susceptible to rhetorical analysis: 'On the one hand, praise-poetry is inherently "rhetorical" (i.e., directed toward persuasion) for the simple reason that praise, in order to attain its proper end and effectively *be* praise, must gain the assent of its audience. On the other hand, the epinician poet resembles the professional speech-writer or advocate in being hired to represent his client's "case" on a specific occasion'.³²

I have tried to show elsewhere the close connection between Isocrates' epideictic speeches and Pindar's praise poetry. An extended analysis of his *Evagoras*, for example, reveals large-scale adaptation into prose of motifs and commonplaces in Pindar's odes.³³ Isocrates' combination of epideictic, forensic, and deliberative

elements in his work finds its antecedent in Pindar as well. His letter to Philip is mainly deliberative and contains many counsels that Pindar proffers to the powerful men of his own time, Hieron, Theron, and Arcesilas. Isocrates too employs mythical digressions to make his point. His digressions on Agamemnon (12.74–90), Theseus (10.21–38), and Heracles (5.109–115) are fraught with *topoi* found in Pindar's odes. In sum, there is a strong 'resemblance between Pindar and Isokrates as they attempt to persuade – through examples, exhortations, and warnings – the great political and military leaders of their respective eras to use their power and wealth for the benefit of their fellow Greeks'.³⁴

Every poetic encomium entails aspects of all three branches of rhetoric. In one respect, the encomiastic poet plays the role of an advocate in court, who must prove that his client is worthy of praise. As such, he is obligated to provide concrete evidence of success: the 'facts' of the victory must be presented in every ode. These consist of basic information, such as the place of victory and type of event – sometimes in catalogues of victories, in which Pindar and Bacchylides take great pains to make showpieces of this factual information through various circumlocutions, allusions, and emphatic placement of important information. The odes are also full of 'testimony' in the form of expressions denoting witnesses, evidence, oaths, and records.

Conversely, the poet defends his 'clients' against unnamed detractors or more generally against *phthonos* (envious dislike). Many such passages which were previously deemed personal outbursts against real or imagined opponents are now seen to be part of a rhetorical strategy, deriving from forensic argumentation, meant to attest to the veracity of the evidence and forestall possible objections. For example, before praising the victor's trainer Melesias, Pindar declares (*Olympian* 8.54–55):

But if I recount in my hymn Melesias' glory
gained from young trainees,
let no ill will cast a rough stone at me.

Pindar goes on to announce that Melesias was himself an excellent athlete and that the victory of his young protégé marks his own thirtieth victory as a trainer. Historicist commentators have tried to read local anti-Athenian attitudes into Pindar's apologetic attitude (the trainer is assumed to be an Athenian), but the poet's feigned hesitation is actually a carefully designed rhetorical strategy to introduce the fullest praise of a trainer to be found in all the odes.

Pindar and Bacchylides often assume the role of advisor, employing the topics of deliberative rhetoric, in order to provide counsel. Here the considerable gnomic material in the odes (by my reckoning about 15% of the total lines) comes into play, as does the advice on conduct which they give to many addressees of the odes, whether young athletes or powerful kings. An astute observation of Aristotle clarifies the procedure (*Rhet.* 1.9 67b37–39): 'Praise and counsels have a common aspect; for what you would recommend in advising becomes encomium by a change of phrasing'. At *Pythian* 1.81–86, for example, Pindar hesitates before praising Hieron, because, he explains, excessive praise of an individual can bore listeners and arouse the envy of their fellow citizens. He decides, accordingly, to couch his praise in the form of counsel.³⁵

If you should speak to the point by combining the strands
 of many things in brief, less criticism follows from men,
 for cloying excess
 dulls eager expectations,
 and townsmen are grieved in their secret hearts
 especially when they hear of others' successes.
 But nevertheless, since envy is better than pity,
 do not pass over any noble things. Guide your people
 with a rudder of justice; on an anvil of truth
 forge your tongue ...

The Greek word translated 'to the point' is *kairos*, which became an important term in rhetoric, indicating speech of appropriate length and relevance to the topic. This passage is followed by advice to Hieron to rule justly, speak the truth, be a scrupulous custodian of all in his care, and be generous. By expressing his praise as exhortation, the speaker avoids the appearance of flattering his patron; and instead of arousing envy in the audience, he enlists them in his counsel as witnesses: 'You [Hieron] are the steward of many things; many are the sure witnesses for deeds good and bad' (88). The rhetorical sophistication of the speaking 'I' in epinician poetry is remarkable. Somewhat like the chorus of drama, it mediates between the material presented, the author, and the audience. It sometimes blurs all three together, as at *Isthmian* 7.37, 'I suffered grief beyond telling,' where it is impossible to separate out the voice of Pindar the Theban poet, the speaker of the ode, the chorus of men singing the poem, or the Theban audience – all of whom are affected by the loss of their fellow citizen in war and take comfort in his nephew's recent athletic success. At other times the 'I' is caught up in the drama of the unfolding ode, as at *Nemean* 8.19–52, where he appears to hesitate, discovers principles not before discerned, recoils from what he has just said, expresses inadequacy, and finally calls up his resolve to continue his praise.³⁶

Bundy drew upon German scholarship to discuss many of the rhetorical *topoi* employed by Pindar.³⁷ One example is the *Hindernismotiv*, whereby the poet/orator introduces an obstacle in the presentation of his material (there is too much to tell, time is too short, some listeners might be incredulous). Its counterpart is the *Bereitwilligkeitsmotiv* (the poet is eager and enthusiastic to present his material). Hesitation, feigned fear, imagined objections, and a host of other rhetorical poses reveal the close relationship between the poetic discourse of praise and the rhetoric of persuasion. For example, before praising Hieron, Bacchylides assumes the disposition of a soaring eagle, that relies on its powers to soar over mountain peaks and swelling seas, while lesser birds (i.e., poets) cower in fear (5.14–34). In a similar vein, Pindar prefaces his praise of Hieron by assuming the role of an athlete: 'In my eagerness to praise that man, I hope I may not, as it were, throw outside the lists the bronze-cheeked javelin ... but cast it far and surpass my competitors' (*Pythian* 1.42–45). *Praeteritio* (*paraleipsis*) (bypassing topics), sometimes combined with *aposiōpēsis* (stopping short of a full treatment), was frequently used in 'break-off passages' (e.g., *Olympian* 1.52–53, 2.83–90, 9. 11.9–11, *Pythian* 8.29–34, *Nemean* 6.53–57, *Isthmian* 5.46–54, Bacchylides 5.176–178, 10.51–52). In sum, Bundy's work demonstrated the rhetorical basis of poetic apology throughout the tradition of

hymns and encomia as aspects of the three proofs discussed by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.2 56a1–20), involving the *ēthos* of the speaker, the argument of the speech itself, and the emotional state of the listener.

In a recent important study of rhetoric and archaic poetry, J. Walker points to an interesting intersection of poetry and rhetoric that occurs in Plato's *Protagoras*, where Socrates and Protagoras analyze and dispute the meanings of statements and individual words in Simonides' poem to Scopas.³⁸ Although Socrates ultimately belittles the exercise of poetic analysis, the two men do take the argument of the poem seriously. The association of the poem with Protagoras, the representative of rhetoric, in contrast to Socrates' position as a philosophical dialectician, points up the essentially rhetorical argumentation of Simonides' poem. Indeed, Walker argues in his book that archaic lyric embodies an epideictic discourse which is the theoretical and historical forerunner of later rhetoric. By employing a definition of *enthymēmē* as argumentation intended to persuade the *thymos* (heart) of the listener, particularly in striking 'caps', he argues that Hesiod, Theognis, Pindar, Alcaeus, Sappho, and Solon (among others) employ a 'rhetorical transaction' that requires their audiences to make ethical and political judgments.

2 Rhetoric and Elegy³⁹

Elegiac poetry often employs rhetorical arguments. The lines of Archilochus (fr. 5) on abandoning his shield provide a good example:

Some Saian exults in my shield, which I left beside a bush –
a blameless piece of equipment – against my will.
But I saved myself. What do I care about that shield?
To hell with it! Another time I'll get one just as good.

Archilochus pointedly argues that one's shield (which can easily be replaced) is of lesser importance than one's own life – a direct challenge to the prevailing *ēthos* of hoplite warfare. In fr. 7 he draws upon consolatory *topoi* to persuade one Pericles (and other citizens) to bear up under the loss of their friends drowned at sea, by observing that grief comes and goes for all humans, and calls for endurance until it has moved on:

No citizen will enjoy the feast, Pericles, by blaming
the woeful sorrows – neither will the city:
such were the men the wave of the resounding sea
washed down, while our lungs are swollen
with grief. But the gods, my friend, have provided
steadfast endurance as a remedy for incurable
ills, which afflict different men at different times: now evil
has turned to us and we bemoan our bloody wound;
but in time it will change over to others. So, men,
quickly shake off this effeminate grief and endure!

Tyrtaeus, fr. 12 uses an elaborate priamel (1–9) to argue that the most important attribute for a good man is ‘furious valor’. The rest of the poem (10–44) consists of a *confirmatio* that details the honors a good warrior receives, whether he lives or dies fighting for his homeland. Of a similar structure is Xenophanes, fr. 2, in which the poet contrasts the overvalued fame and rewards of athletic success with the true benefits that the city derives from his own civic wisdom (*sophiē*):

But if someone should win a victory by the speed of his feet
or in the pentathlon, there in the precinct of Zeus
by Pisa’s stream at Olympia, or in wrestling
or in painful boxing
or in the savage contest they call the pancratium,
he would appear more renowned to his townsmen
and he would win a conspicuous front seat at the games,
and he would be fed at public expense
by the city, and would have an heirloom to treasure;
or if victorious with horses, he would gain all these things –
though not being as worthy as I, because better than strength
of men or of horses is my wisdom (*sophiē*).

Athletic prowess, he goes on to say, does nothing to advance the cause of the city’s good governance (*eunomiē*) or its prosperity.

Mimnermus, fr. 1 poses a thesis for debate: ‘What life is there, what pleasure without golden Aphrodite?’ The speaker then declares his answer: ‘Let me die when I no longer care for sex’. The remainder of the fragment is a *confirmatio* that expatiates on the horrors of old age that deprive men of beauty and sexual attractiveness.

Solon’s elegies also contain rhetorical arguments. In particular, fr. 4, which was quoted by Demosthenes (19.255), argues that Athens will never perish because of divine disfavor but because its citizens are greedy and unruly. His purpose is to teach (*didaxai*, 30) his compatriots that good governance (*eunomiē*) will lead to concord.

Theognis’ elegiac verses, like Hesiod’s counsels to his brother in the *Works and Days*, are didactic, addressed to his young friend and lover Cyrnus. They contain gnomic statements, exhortations to good behavior, warnings against keeping bad company, and analyses of the perceived corruption of society.⁴⁰

3 Rhetoric and Iambic and Trochaic Verse

In the incomplete fr. 19 of Archilochus, ‘I don’t care about rich Gyges’ wealth’, we do not know how the argument continued once the priamel was completed, but it is significant that Aristotle cited it in the *Rhetoric* (3.17.16) as a rhetorical device for preserving one’s own good *ēthos* by putting a statement in another person’s mouth. Semonides, fr. 1 is a fragmentary carpe-diem exhortation to a boy, warning him of the many misfortunes that life brings.⁴¹ Solon’s iambics and trochaics are rhetorical justifications of his policies with regard to the Athenians. Indeed, fr. 34 in trochaic tetrameter and fragments 36 and 37 in iambic trimeter read like persuasive speeches in meter.

4 Rhetoric and Aeolic Lyric

Longinus' rhetorical treatise, *On the Sublime*, cites Sappho, fr. 31 to illustrate her ability to select and combine intense feelings of love, while Demetrius' *On Style* cites many short passages as examples of hyperbole and charming vocabulary. There is, however, no attempt in these rhetorical treatises to analyze these poems as wholes. Indeed, Sappho's *Hymn to Aphrodite* (fr. 1), cited by Dionysius of Halicarnassus merely to illustrate her 'smooth' style, provides a sophisticated example of the rhetorical persuasion common to hymns, beginning with the invocation, in which the supplicant seeks to enlist divine assistance by defining the god in such a way as to induce her or him to carry out the request:

Immortal Aphrodite of the ornate throne,
 wile-weaving daughter of Zeus, I beg you,
 do not overwhelm my heart, mistress,
 with pain or anguish,

 but come here, if ever before
 you heard my cries from afar, and,
 heeding them, you left your father's
 golden house and came

 on your yoked chariot; beautiful swift sparrows,
 rapidly flapping their wings, carried you
 over the black earth down from heaven
 through the middle of the sky,

 and quickly arrived. And you, blessed one,
 with a smile on your immortal face,
 asked what was wrong this time and why
 this time I called,

 and what my insane heart most desired
 for me to have: 'Whom this time am I to
 persuade to take you back as a friend? Who
 is wronging you, Sappho?

 Tell me, for if she flees, she will soon pursue;
 and if she refuses gifts, she will soon be the one to give;
 if she does not love, she will soon be in love,
 even if she does not want to'.

 Come to me now again, free me from my
 bitter cares; bring about all that my heart
 desires to happen, and you yourself
 be my ally.

The epithet 'wile-weaving' (*doloploke*, 2) hints at Aphrodite's willingness to engage in intrigue, while the reminder of her previous responses to the speaker's calls for help in Lines 5–24, with its vivid description of her rapid descent from Olympus, her smiling face, and her dramatic speech, offers persuasive justification for the request to 'come to me now again' (25) and be her 'ally'. The rhetorical strategy in fr. 2, another

hymn/prayer, is to describe the festivity to which she summons the deity in such lovely terms that Aphrodite will be inclined to attend and even 'pour nectar' (15).⁴²

A different form of rhetorical argument is used in fr. 16, which opens with a priamel in which the speaker surveys what 'others' consider the most beautiful thing on earth and contrasts her own choice, 'that which one loves' (3–4):

Some say an array of cavalry, others of infantry,
and others of ships, is the most beautiful thing
on the black earth, but I say it is whatever
a person loves.

It is perfectly easy to make that understood
by everyone, for she who far surpassed humans
in beauty, Helen, abandoned her husband,
the best of men,

and went sailing off to Troy
and took no thought of her daughter
or dear parents, but . . . led her astray . . .

[which] now has reminded me of Anactoria,
who is not here.

I would rather see her lovely walk
and the bright sparkle of her face
than those Lydian chariots and armed
footsoldiers.

She then supports this assertion with an argument everyone can supposedly understand, by citing the *paradeigma* of Helen, who abandoned everyone dear to her in order to follow Paris to Troy. Returning to her own situation ('now'), the speaker declares that she would rather see her beloved Anactoria's 'lovely walk and the bright sparkle of her face' than any military displays. The philosophical proposition advanced in this poetic argument, aesthetic subjectivism, has been widely discussed, and has even been called an 'astonishing thesis . . . [that] contains the potentiality of overthrowing any absolute value'.⁴³

Alcaeus, Sappho's contemporary, also uses forms of argumentation in his poetry. In fr. 42, for example, he also employs the *paradeigma* of Helen, but arrives at a very different conclusion from that of Sappho. In these two poets we see selective uses of the Homeric tradition to construct opposing arguments. What Alcaeus highlights in his treatment of Helen is not her beauty but the destruction she inflicts on the Trojans who harbored her:

As the story goes, because of evil deeds bitter grief
came to Priam and his sons, Helen,
on account of you, and Zeus destroyed
holy Ilium with fire.

Not such was the tender maiden,
whom the noble Peleus, inviting all the blessed gods
to the wedding, married and led from the palace
of Nereus

to the home of Cheiron. He loosened the girdle
of the chaste maiden and the love of Peleus
and of the best of Nereus' daughters flourished,
and in a year
she bore a son, the best of the demigods,
blessed driver of shining steeds.
But the Trojans and Phrygians perished for Helen's sake,
along with their city.

The contrasting *paradeigma* ('not such was', 5), developed in Lines 5–14, emphasizes Thetis' proper marriage to Peleus, their love, and the birth of their son, Achilles. The argument rests on the contrasting examples, namely Helen's illicit love and 'evil deeds' (1) that resulted in wholesale destruction, and Thetis' marriage that produced a blessed demigod (13–14).

Alcaeus also uses an *exemplum a fortiori* in fr. 38A, a carpe-diem poem addressed to Melanippus:

Drink and get drunk with me, Melanippus. Why do you think
that once you have crossed the eddying Acheron
you will again see the clear light of the sun?
Come, then, do not aim for great things:
take note that King Sisyphus, Aeolus' son, who knew more
than any man, thought that he could overcome death,
but in spite of his intelligence fate made him twice
cross eddying Acheron and . . .
King Zeus, son of Cronus, made him toil
under the black earth. Come, then, do not hope for these things:
now, if ever, while we are young, [let us] endure
any of these sufferings the god may give.

If even Sisyphus, the cleverest of men, who contrived to come back from Hades, could not escape his doom in the end, how could we possibly hope to do so? Therefore Melanippus should join the speaker in getting drunk and accepting their lot while they are young. If we had more of Alcaeus' political poetry, we would undoubtedly find more evidence of rhetoric. Dionysius of Halicarnassus goes so far as to say (*On Imitation* 6.205): 'indeed, throughout his works, if one stripped away the meter, one would find political rhetoric'.⁴⁴

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CHAPTER THIRTY-FOUR

Rhetoric and the Novel: Sex, Lies and Sophistic

Ruth Webb

1 Introduction: Rhetoric and Romance

The development of prose fiction is one of the most remarkable phenomena in the history of post-classical Greek literature. The examples that have survived intact share many features in common. In the *Ephesian Tale* by Xenophon of Ephesus (second century AD?), *Chaereas and Callirhoe* by Chariton of Aphrodisias (first century AD?), *Cleitophon and Leucippe* by Achilles Tatius (second century AD?) and Heliodorus' monumental *Aethiopica* (third or fourth century AD) the young hero and heroine meet, fall in love, are separated by accident, and spend the greater part of the novel engaged in adventures around the Mediterranean before being reunited, returning home and getting married at the end.¹ Chariton's Callirhoe is sold by pirates, married to a local landowner in Asia Minor and has to fend off the advances of the King of Persia before she is reunited with her husband, Chaereas, now a war hero. Cleitophon, the hero of Achilles Tatius' novel, believes he sees his beloved Leucippe horribly murdered before his eyes not once but twice before their separation and eventual reunion. Pirates, storms at sea, war, bandits and sexual predators are all part of the challenges faced by hero and heroine on their journeys.

There are variations on the basic structure of the circular journey. In the *Aethiopica*, hero and heroine meet in Delphi but end up in Ethiopia, birthplace of the heroine, Charicleia. Her circular journey from the land of her birth and back contrasts with the movement of her lover, Theagenes, from the Greek realm to the ends of the world. Longus' pastoral romance, *Daphnis and Chloe* (second or third century AD), involves very little geographical movement but, in the absence of the travels that structure the action of the other novels, the rural setting allows for the depiction of the passing of the seasons so that time performs the function of space. In this novel, hero and heroine both return to their true homes in the city after their miniature adventures when it is revealed that they are in fact not peasants at all but the children of well-to-do urban families who were exposed at birth.

Speech is vitally important in these prose narratives as in the epic. Both the male and female characters are eloquent, particularly in lamenting the dramatic circumstances they frequently find themselves in. The characters also act as narrators: the whole of *Cleitophon and Leucippe* is a reported first person narration by Cleitophon and substantial parts of Heliodorus' novel are narrated by characters, particularly the Athenian Cnemon, who tells his own story-within-a-story, and the Egyptian sage Calasiris who fills in the background to the story of Theagenes and Charicleia after the perplexing opening *in medias res*. Heliodorus' use of internal narrators, following the model of the *Odyssey*, contributes significantly to the sophistication of his novel. While speeches and narrations by characters are by no means always 'rhetorical' in any formal sense, they often have a persuasive purpose and involve significant manipulations of the facts of the story. The plots also provide many occasions for more formal speeches by the characters. Assemblies or courtrooms feature in all of the extant novels, even disrupting the pastoral idyll of *Daphnis and Chloe*.

The burgeoning of the Greek novel coincided with the period of the 'Second Sophistic', with its intense interest in rhetorical theory, practice and performance. Philostratus, who coined the term 'Second Sophistic' in his *Lives of the Sophists*, provides a detailed and vivid account of the second and early third-century sophists like Aelius Aristides, Polemo and Herodes Atticus, who taught rhetoric throughout the eastern Empire and drew huge crowds to their virtuoso performances. These stars of the sophistic circuit embodied the ultimate in Greek *paideia* (education) encompassing ready eloquence, the ability to improvise complex speeches in the classicising Attic language, thorough familiarity with the classics and a range of general knowledge.² The 'big three' novels (those of Achilles Tatius, Longus and Heliodorus) are frequently described as 'sophistic'.³ But precisely how this 'sophistic' character is to be defined and how it is manifested in the novels is less than clear.

Various connections between the Second Sophistic and the novels have been suggested. One obvious link is in the narrative content. One of the prime activities of the sophists under the Empire was declamation, the composition and performance of practice speeches on imaginary judicial or deliberative themes.⁴ Originally a school exercise, declamation became a prestigious form of performance art in the Greek East during the Second Sophistic and beyond. The speeches often dealt with dramatic, violent and romantic situations that show distinct affinities with the subjects of the novels. Stories of abduction and of children exposed at birth feature in both, as do young love, sexual violence and family tensions between siblings or between parents and children. The characters of declamation and the novel were equally prone to dramatic shipwrecks, giving both declaimers and novelists the opportunity for detailed descriptions of storms at sea. Some of the stock characters who people the declamations also recur in the novels: boasting generals, arrogant and violent rich men, pirates, poisoners and wicked stepmothers (though it is important to note that many of these characters shared a common ancestry in the characters of New Comedy and its Imperial descendant, mime).⁵

Another common feature is the interest in the past. In their declamations on historical themes, which required them to impersonate characters from Classical Greek history, the declaimers focused exclusively on the period before the death of Alexander (323). Chariton's novel is firmly set in the time frame of the Greek declamations, since Callirhoe is daughter of Hermocrates, a historical figure who

plays an important role in Thucydides' account of the Athenian campaign in Sicily (e.g., 6.72, 7.73).⁶ If Chariton takes significant liberties with his depiction of historical events, so did the declaimers. Heliodorus likewise places his characters in an unspecified past where the Persians still rule over Egypt and Athens is still a democracy. Only Achilles Tatius, generally agreed to be the most sophistic of all, has a contemporary, or at least post-Alexander, setting for his novel.⁷ Above all, there is the language of the big three – the classicizing Attic dialect favoured by the sophists – their careful style, the taste for extended speeches by the characters, and the many passages where direct comparisons can be found in the corpus of other sophists. Descriptions of paintings are one case in point. The popularity of this type of composition among authors of the period, such as Lucian and the Philostrati, is well known and the novelists are no exception: Achilles Tatius and Longus both open their work with the viewing of a painting which, in Achilles' novel, is only one of a whole series. Heliodorus also includes descriptions of art objects, most notably an amethyst ring carved with pastoral scenes.⁸

The earliest modern studies of the novel combined an obsession with tracing the origins of this non-classical genre with a distinctly dismissive attitude towards the Second sophistic.⁹ Sophistic was considered at best as a form of 'belles lettres' in which style triumphed over content and in which the learned digression, the small scale, the absence of overall order and pattern were typical.¹⁰ At worst, it was seen as proof of the decadence and triviality of post-classical Greek culture. Not surprisingly, the impact of sophistic rhetoric on the novel was judged to be entirely negative, encouraging intrusive displays of learning and of technique in place of the exploration of human experience that was thought to be the true task of the novel. It is true that there are certain aspects of the novel and of Greek Imperial literary production that might at first sight appear to back up this negative assessment of the Second Sophistic and its impact. Digressions on natural history, comparable to Aelian's *Natural History*, abound in Achilles Tatius' novel, where we are treated to disquisitions on subjects like the source of purple dye (2.11), the phoenix (3.25) and the sex life of date palms (1.17). Comparable passages are also recommended by the third-century writer on epideictic, Menander Rhetor, for inclusion in various types of speech.¹¹ There is also the taste for paradox and for the macabre that certainly compares with some of the more sensational declamation themes.¹² Again, Achilles Tatius provides the most outstanding examples, with his detailed descriptions of the apparent murder of his heroine not once, but twice in the course of the couple's adventures (3.15, 5.7).

Recent reassessments of some of these 'digressions', particularly the descriptions of paintings and other works of art, have shown their organic connection to the plots and structure of the novels.¹³ New approaches to the Second Sophistic have also transformed our understanding of later Greek rhetorical practice, in particular bringing out the social and cultural implications of *paideia* as a vital element of the self-definition of the Greek elite in the Roman period.¹⁴ Translations and studies of the Greek theoretical works on declamation have also revealed the intellectual underpinnings of the Second Sophistic.¹⁵ It is hard to dismiss the art of declamation as the mere stringing together of striking miniatures after reading a work like Hermogenes' *On Issues* that reveals the degree of analytical training required by this art. From a philosophical perspective, B. Cassin has emphasised the importance of fiction as an intermediate domain between truth and lies to the Second Sophistic as a whole.¹⁶

I shall start this survey of rhetoric and novel by looking at some examples of speeches in individual novels and also at the cultural and social significance of speech within the world depicted in the novel. However, the impact of contemporary rhetorical practice is not confined to the speeches but can be seen throughout the novels. The rhetorical training dispensed by the schools provided practical experience in composition, in characterisation and in description – all practices that we would see as part of creative writing – as well as the more obviously rhetorical skills of analysis, disposition and argumentation. Indeed, in some later declamations, like those of Libanius in the fourth century AD and Choricus of Gaza in the sixth, the interest in character seems almost to dominate the speech. This is not to say that these declamations are devoid of argumentation, but the depiction of characters like the young man in conflict with his miserly father about his choice of bride or Libanius' morose man (*dyskolos*) married to an inveterate chatterbox plays a large part in the compositions as a whole.¹⁷

From their elementary rhetorical studies students also learned the art of presenting a coherent narrative (as important to declamation as it is to the novel) through the exercises of *muthos* (fable) and *diēgēma* (narration). As the students advanced, the requirements of the *diēgēma* became more sophisticated in ways that are relevant to the novel. Here, as elsewhere, the recommendations of Theon (first century AD?) are particularly rich.¹⁸ He suggests different ways in which a simple narrative can be presented, one of which is as a response to a request for information, precisely how the telling of Cleitophon's story is framed.¹⁹ Theon also points out to his readers that it is possible to rearrange the chronological elements of a story and to begin in the middle, as Homer does with the *Odyssey*. Theon further points out the masterful way in which Homer uses Odysseus' own narration to fill in the missing portion just as Heliodorus does in the *Aethiopica*.²⁰ Theon cannot 'explain' the brilliant and serpentine structure of Heliodorus' novel, but he does show us the qualities that educated readers were taught to value and illustrates how much of what we would consider 'literary' fell squarely into the domain of rhetoric in antiquity.

The study of declamation provided a training in the representation of character and of a complex fictional world, complete with relations between people and a developed social and cultural background. In addition, the elementary exercise (*progymnasma*) of *ēthopoia* that preceded the study of declamation gave a basic training in characterisation through speech. Similarly, the exercise of ekphrasis gave a training in the verbal representation of the visual.²¹ This exercise, as taught in the rhetorical schools, involved the evocation through words of any number of sights, situations, places, even happenings (all the extant handbooks include battles among the subjects of ekphrasis).²² This exercise is therefore relevant to all of the vivid re-creations of events in the novels. In fact the type of illusion of presence that ekphrasis specialised in lies at the heart of fictional discourse. Through its appeal to the imagination, ekphrasis invites us into the world that is created by the novelist and gives us an illusion of presence 'making listeners (as ancient readers were) into spectators'.²³

2 Speeches in the Novels

To begin with the speeches, the modern reader is struck by the sheer amount of talking done by the characters.²⁴ Indeed, in Chariton's novel, generally regarded as

less 'sophistic', we hear very little of the authorial voice as the action and characterisation are developed largely through the characters' discussions and speeches. The result is that the considerable psychological interest is depicted through monologues in which the character debates a course of action. The most memorable of these is Callirhoe's monologue in which she considers aborting the unborn child of her husband, Chaereas, now that she has been separated from him and finds herself alone in Miletus.²⁵ Like Euripides' Medea, to whom she refers, she presents both sides of the argument, envisaging the future outcomes of both paths, as befits a deliberative speech, and supplying the words of imaginary interlocutors. As she considers aborting the child she asks, 'am I to bear a child whose father no one knows? Perhaps some envious person will say, "Callirhoe became pregnant among the pirates!"' only to switch to the second person to remonstrate with herself, 'Are you planning to kill your child? Was ever woman so wicked! Are you mad? Are you reasoning like Medea? Why, people will think you yet more savage than that Scythian woman!'.²⁶ The result combines formal argumentation with a depiction of considerable psychological complexity.

As this passage shows, Chariton's novel is by no means devoid of rhetorical influence, hardly surprisingly for an author (or perhaps narrator) who identifies himself as clerk to a *rhētōr* (advocate). However, the use of rhetoric is subordinated to plot and character, freeing Chariton from the type of criticism that has been levelled at Achilles Tatius' novel. Achilles' characters are particularly prone to improvised speeches on all sorts of topics, like the appearance of the crocodile (4.19), the elephant (4.4) or the correct method for hunting the hippopotamus (4.3).²⁷ Most importantly, from our perspective, the whole novel is presented as a speech by the hero whom we see through the eyes of an anonymous narrator who encounters him in front of a painting of Europa and the bull. The story we read is this narrator's verbatim account of what he was told by Cleitophon in the studied simple style that was a characteristic of the Second Sophistic.²⁸ Large elements of the *Aethiopica* are also related by characters within the novel, most notably the long narration by the Egyptian sage Calasiris that fills in the events leading up to the novel's abrupt opening *in medias res*.²⁹ Although these narrations are not in themselves rhetorical, we may note the careful use of techniques such as the tactful omission of embarrassing details and *auxēsis* (amplification, i.e., the emphasis on certain aspects of the story). When Cleitophon quotes his own speech at the end of the novel (8.5) he is careful to note how he skated over some of his less creditable actions (in particular the consummation of his affair with Melite, the rich widow who turns out not to be a widow at all) and plays up Leucippe's chastity.³⁰ In the case of Calasiris' narration we have depictions of audience reaction in the enthusiastic and demanding responses of Cnemon, the recipient of his story, who has already told his own story to the hero and heroine.

The characters are well acquainted with the figures of rhetoric. Nowhere is this clearer than in the many speeches of lamentation that reflect the dramatic and dangerous situations faced by them.³¹ The repeated 'mock-death' (*Scheintod*) of Achilles Tatius' heroine, Leucippe, gives her lover, Cleitophon, many opportunities to lament, and the apparent death of Charicleia prompts Theagenes to pronounce a lament at the beginning of the *Aethiopica*.³² The lament has a complex relationship to the literary and rhetorical tradition since the rhetoricians themselves cited poetic examples. Menander Rhetor, for example, claims that Homer was the inventor of

the monody (a short, spontaneous lament) in the speeches of Andromache and others.³³ The laments in the novels are generally loosely composed, using short sentences without connecting particles to reflect the intense emotion (as advised by Menander Rhetor in his discussion of the monody) so that their rhetorical feel derives from the use of exclamation, apostrophe and anaphora. On apparently losing Leucippe for the third time Cleitophon laments: 'Which deity (*tis daimōn*) deceived me with a brief bout of joy? What god (*tis*) put Leucippe on display in this new plot of disasters? I did not even (*oute*) satisfy my eyes . . . I did not (*oute*) take my fill even of looking . . . Oh (*oimoi*) my Leucippe, how many times you have died on me!'³⁴ Some examples reflect more closely the advice given in rhetorical handbooks, like the speech uttered by the father of a minor character, Charicles, who is killed in a riding accident at the beginning of *Cleitophon and Leucippe* (1.13). As Menander Rhetor advises, he refers to past, present and future in his lament, comparing the son who set out with the lifeless body that has returned and lamenting the marriage that will never take place.

One particularly interesting lament occurs in Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe* after the cowherd, Lampis, a rival for Chloe's hand in marriage, destroys the garden that Daphnis' family look after for their master. On discovering the damage, Daphnis and his adoptive parents, Lamon and Myrtale, pronounce what the narrator describes as a 'new type of lament' (*kainon penthos*) for the flowers. Despite its brevity, it follows the formal pattern of reference to past, present and future: 'Oh, the bed of violets – how they've been trampled down! Oh, the hyacinths and narcissi that some evil man has dug up! Spring will come, and they will not flower . . . Lord Dionysus, didn't you feel sorry for these poor flowers? You used to live beside them and look at them'.³⁵ The rustic setting and content lend a paradoxical tone to the passage, as emphasised in the use of the word *kainon* with its undertones of 'strange' as well as 'new'. It is therefore comparable to paradoxical speeches of praise, like Lucian's *Encomium of a Fly*, or the mock poetic laments for pets.³⁶ But amusement at the thought of this horticultural oration is tempered by the narrator's reference to the very real fear felt by the characters at the thought of their master's anger when he discovers the damage and the threat of corporal punishment.

The events of the novels also provide more formal stages for oratory. Trial scenes are an important feature of both Chariton's and Achilles Tatius' novels and even the pastoral idyll of *Daphnis and Chloe* is interrupted by a trial when some visiting city-dwellers falsely accuse Daphnis of theft (2.15–16). In *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, the most prominent trial (to decide whose wife Callirhoe is) occurs half way through the novel and is an occasion for introducing further complexities in the plot as the Great King of Persia, instead of arbitrating the dispute, falls in love with the heroine himself.³⁷ The Assembly also plays an important part in Chariton's novel. It is there that the people of Syracuse (men and women together) call upon the two families to allow Chaereas and Callirhoe to enter into their ill-fated marriage (1.1). The Assembly also provides the setting for the couple's reintegration into Syracusan society after their adventures at the end of the novel. This time Chaereas speaks, giving a full but carefully edited version of the story that acts as a recapitulation for the readers of the novel (8.7–8). As this suggests, the speech does not follow any particular rhetorical rules, except for the general ethical requirement that embarrassing or shameful details be passed over.

G. Anderson has pointed out the contrast in style between Chariton's simple trial with its direct confrontation between the protagonists and the rhetorical spectacular that is the trial scene towards the end of Achilles Tatius' novel complete with verbatim accounts of entire speeches.³⁸ Achilles' trial scene is in fact a series of trials as the situation changes before the participants' eyes in a dizzying play of *peripeteia* and paradox. In jail awaiting trial for adultery with the pseudo-widow, Melite, Cleitophon hears a concocted story that Melite has had Leucippe murdered. His despair is such that, on his arrival in court, he hijacks his own trial and in an emotional speech accuses himself and Melite of murdering Leucippe (7.7). The manoeuvre is aimed at bringing about his own suicide by execution and implicating Melite, whom he believes to be responsible for Leucippe's death. But his cousin, Cleinias, immediately presents a careful refutation of Cleitophon's speech (7.9), pointing out the logical inconsistencies and the lack of confirmation of Leucippe's death. However, after a counter-attack from Melite's husband, Thersandrus, Cleitophon is duly condemned to death 'under a law which states that self-confessed murderers must die' (7.12).

This first set of speeches has many similarities to declamation. Paradoxical orations where the speaker accuses himself of a crime were a recognised category, and were termed *prosangelia* in the handbooks. The complex conundrums created by mainly imaginary laws, like the one that leads to Cleitophon's death sentence being upheld, are also a key feature of declamation.³⁹ In the next phase of Cleitophon's trial the affinity with declamation becomes clearer still as issues of definition come to the fore. First of all, Leucippe turns up alive but Cleitophon's prosecutor, Thersandrus, argues that the death sentence for murder is still valid: Cleitophon is a murderer by his own account, even if the alleged victim is alive and well! Thersandrus' advocate, Sopater, argues in a rhetorical *tour de force* that Cleitophon is guilty of adultery since Melite's husband is still alive (8.10). His style is reminiscent of the sophist Polemo, when he uses a series of apostrophes with anaphora to arouse outrage against the 'adulterer' Cleitophon: 'O, adultery shared between land and sea! O, adultery spread out between Egypt and Ionia'.⁴⁰ He continues with a series of brief, loosely connected sentences and rhetorical questions leading to a wonderful false syllogism that, for him, clinches the case: if Thersandrus had been dead there would have been no adultery between Cleitophon and Melite, but Thersandrus is alive, therefore there was an act of adultery (even though the physical relationship between Cleitophon and Melite has not been proven). His 'proof' is the presence of Melite's husband in court. This exchange of speeches is also peppered with lurid accusations about the various speakers' morals and private lives which are both entertaining within the context of the novel and reminiscent of Demosthenes' attacks on Aeschines' past (e.g., 18.258–264) and of Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchus* (1) with its accusations of male prostitution.

The trial scene revolves around a set of paradoxical situations worthy of the rhetorical schools: the 'murderer' whose 'victim' is alive and well, the 'widow' who turns out to be still married and the 'husband' who turns out to be an 'adulterer' when the first husband, Thersandrus who was believed to have died at sea, reappears to claim not just his wife but Leucippe too. But the affinities run far more deeply. By their very nature, such situations pose vital questions of definition, which is why they frequently form the heart of declamation exercises. One popular example, treated by both Lucian and Choricus, is the question of whether a man who merely provoked a

Tyrant to commit suicide, rather than killing him directly, is worthy of the title and privileges of the tyrannicide.⁴¹ Questions of this type are prominent in the novels themselves as the young couple adopt a series of different identities and statuses before completing their transition to sexual and social maturity. Within Achilles Tatius' novel, the trial highlights several of these issues and, above all, foregrounds the problem of knowing the qualities of persons and their actions both for the characters and for the reader.

3 The Significance of Speech and Rhetoric

The Greek novels are rich in representations of rhetoric in action. Indeed they are particularly interesting for their depiction not just of speeches but of response to speeches. The vivid account (ekphrasis) of the death of Charicles at the beginning of Achilles Tatius' novel (1.12), for example, has precisely the emotional effect on the listeners that is claimed for such speeches in rhetorical theory.⁴² In general, the population of the novels is avid for stories, a characteristic which we can interpret both as a reflection of the fundamentally oral culture which produced the novels and as a self-reflexive comment on the novels' own reception.⁴³ Calasiris' long narration in the *Aethiopica* has a particularly enthusiastic audience in the shape of Cnemon (who has himself provided a long narration of his own novelistic misfortunes earlier in the book). While J. Winkler has treated Cnemon as the embodiment of a naive kind of reading, inadequate to the complexities of the text, he also serves to represent the pleasure of listening to a live rhetorical performance that was an accepted – and expected – part of audience response.⁴⁴ Calasiris himself is portrayed as a consummate performer, as he shows when he describes to Cnemon how he behaved when he diagnosed Theagenes' mysterious illness as lovesickness: 'I paused a moment, performed some meaningless calculations on my fingers, tossed my hair around, and pretended that the spirit was on me'.⁴⁵

Rather than explaining all the depictions of rhetoric in the novel simply as an unconscious reflection of the training received by their authors, we can ask what significance the presence of rhetoric within the novels might have. To take the example of *Daphnis and Chloe* first, the contrast between city and country, urbane *paideia* and the roughness of country ways, pervades and structures the novel. The balance is far from equal since the narrator's urbane language places him, and his implied audience, firmly on the side of the city. However much we are invited to sympathise with the characters, they remain at a certain distance. This emerges most clearly when they attempt to make speeches of their own. In Chloe's monologue describing the symptoms of love that she cannot yet recognise, the narrator's elegant Attic Greek is at odds with the naive sentiments she expresses (e.g., 'I wish I were his goat so I could be led to graze by him!').⁴⁶ As F. Zeitlin has emphasised, the novel sets in motion a complex interplay between the rhetorical *paideia* of the narrator and reader and the erotic development of the main characters, who are finally reintegrated into the urban setting to which they too unknowingly belonged.⁴⁷

Control of speech can also function as a sign of Greekness within the world of the novel, as in the world of the sophists. Both Callirhoe and Charicleia are able to deceive non-Greek characters by their clever and persuasive use of language.⁴⁸ In

each case, they act to protect themselves from the advances of other men and thus their deception is positive in terms of the novel's structure and plot. However, Hellenic deception is potentially ambiguous, introducing a negative aspect to 'Greekness'. A similar complexity can be seen in *Daphnis and Chloe* where the contrast is between city and country, rather than Greek and Barbarian. The urban experts in oratory invariably introduce a discordant note into the pastoral world, embodied in the character of Astylus ('townie'), the son of Daphnis' master, and his hanger-on (*parasitos*), Gnathon. Here the reader's response is further complicated by the distancing effect of the narrator's style.

The gendered social role of rhetoric is also important to our understanding of the novels. Rhetorical *paideia* was, above all, a masculine domain so its use by characters is significant as a marker of masculinity or, in the case of female characters, of transgression. In Chariton's novel it is noticeable that Chaereas is silent during the first Assembly in Syracuse where the people speak on his behalf (1.1). After Callirhoe's apparent death he appears in court charged with her murder where he presents a brief, emotional speech of self-accusation begging to suffer the worst punishments possible (1.5). In contrast, his final appearance at the Assembly at the end of the novel, after he has proved his military prowess and leadership and regained possession of his wife, is a *tour de force* of coherent and carefully shaped narration (8.7–8). In this case, Chaereas' entry into manhood is marked by his entry into *logos*, and his public speech is in contrast with Callirhoe's decorous public silence at the end of the novel. Similarly, Daphnis' improvised trial (2.16), where he defends himself successfully against the city-dwellers' charges of theft, comes as his sexual awareness and experience grow. Though the alleged theft and the trial are described by the narrator as interrupting Daphnis and Chloe's sexual experimentation (2.11), the comparison with Chaereas shows the thematic connection between eloquence and manhood.

In the novels of adventure, characters who find themselves in a position of weakness as they travel without protection through strange lands are obliged to twist the truth to survive and are all pupils of Odysseus. It is noticeable that it is the female characters, particularly Callirhoe and Charicleia, who make most use of Odyssean tale-telling. Callirhoe comes of age through her sophisticated use of speech well before Chaereas does and is a mistress of improvisation in her adaptation to *kairos*, the demands of the moment. Above all, it is Heliodorus' heroine, Charicleia, who illustrates the rhetorical principles of female speech, as has been noted by Laurent Pernot.⁴⁹ Charicleia constantly manipulates the truth for her own ends; it is she who decides that she and Theagenes should present themselves as brother and sister, not lovers (1.22), a ploy that does not just convince the internal audience but potentially deceives the reader too. As Pernot notes, this verbal sophistication was felt to be too close to technical sophistic (*pros to sophistiketerōn*) by some Byzantine readers, according to the eleventh-century critic Michael Psellus, and Charicleia's manner of speaking condemned for being unbecoming to a lady (*mē gunaikeion mēde thēlu*).⁵⁰

Such rhetorical sophistication is shown in Achilles Tatius' novel not by its heroine, Leucippe, but by the older woman, Melite. She uses persuasive and erotic language to seduce Cleitophon, knows what to omit and, as a forerunner of Yseult in mediaeval French romance, knows precisely how to phrase an oath so as not to be caught out.⁵¹ Leucippe's relative reticence (which led the same Byzantine readers to approve of her over Charicleia, if Psellus is to be believed) is partly a result of the structure of the

novel since Cleitophon, the narrator, is separated from Leucippe for a large part of the time and is the recipient of Melite's persuasive speeches. But Melite's amorous eloquence also points up the connection between sexual maturity and rhetorical sophistication that we have already seen.

Zeitlin's analysis of *Daphnis and Chloe* brings out the close connection between *logos* and *erōs* that is evident throughout the corpus of novels and expressed most clearly in Achilles Tatius. His hero, Cleitophon, tells how he used a display of *paideia* as a means of seduction when he first met Leucippe, giving a series of speeches on desire in the plant and animal worlds to convey his erotic interest in her (1.16–18). The 'digressions' on kisses in this novel are extremely significant for their treatment of the lips as the source both of kisses and of speech, emphasising the connection between the two, 'for a kiss is a premier pleasure, love child of the mouth, and the mouth is the loveliest member of the body, for it is the organ of speech, and speech is a shadow of the soul' (2.8).⁵² Both Achilles Tatius (5.27) and Longus (2.16) portray erotic desire as a spur to eloquence and Cleitophon, the narrator, describes *Erōs* himself as teacher of rhetoric (*sophistēs*) and a consummate improviser (*autoschedios*) who 'teaches' lovers how to adapt to circumstance as well as any rhetorical performer. This identification of *erōs*, *logos* and *paideia* shows how deeply woven rhetoric is into the fabric of the novels. Not only is speech a source of pleasure to the characters but also it inspires and is inspired by sexual desire.

4 Achilles Tatius and the Techniques of Rhetoric

All these examples show how the characters of the novels make use of persuasive speech, and how the theme of rhetorical sophistication works within the novels. In the case of Achilles Tatius we see not just representations of speeches, with all their implications, but representations of the nuts and bolts of rhetorical training too. Several of the *progymnasmata* forms occur in this novel. There are mythical narratives of the type students learned to compose in the exercise of *diēgēma*.⁵³ More unusually, there is a series of *muthoi*, fables with a hidden meaning, in the exchange between two characters.⁵⁴ There is an example of *synkrisis* (comparison) in the explicit comparison of homosexual and heterosexual sex that contains enough graphic detail of both to raise a schoolmaster's eyebrow (2.35–28). In addition to the frequent examples of ekphraseis of paintings, there are ekphraseis of several other subjects (if we take the term in the broad sense in which it was used in antiquity).⁵⁵ There is a wonderfully hyperbolic ekphrasis of the storm that leaves Leucippe and Cleitophon stranded on the Egyptian coast (3.1–5), not to mention the ekphraseis of places (*topoi*) such as the garden (1.15), the Nile (4.12), Alexandria (5.1), of persons, like Leucippe herself (1.4), and animals, like the peacock (1.16), the hippopotamus (4.2), the crocodile (4.19), the phoenix (3.25) and the elephant (4.4), all recognised categories of subjects for ekphrasis in the rhetorical manuals.

This apparent 'cutting and pasting' of school exercises would seem to confirm some of the worst suspicions of the impact of rhetoric on the novel and to substantiate the caricature of sophistic writing as a stringing together of prepared passages with no regard for the whole. However, such blatant use of elements of composition was not the norm. The elementary exercises were above all a stage in rhetorical

education, a thorough training in techniques that could be seamlessly employed in large-scale compositions.⁵⁶ Of course there are exceptions, like the ekphraseis of peacocks that recur in different places in the sophistic corpus, but the norm is a far more subtle blend. The opening ekphrasis of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*, for example, with its riddling tableau of Charicleia and Theagenes seen through the eyes of Egyptian bandits, is a fine example of ekphrasis in practice, as is the account of the death of Charicles in *Cleitophon and Leucippe* (1.12).⁵⁷

Is Achilles Tatius' use of progymnastic forms simply the result of the author's technical incompetence and the dead hand of rhetorical training? Or is there more to it? One reason may be the characterisation of the narrator: Cleitophon's use of undigested exercises may be read as a sign of his youth and inexperience. But a further effect of the visible rhetorical nuts and bolts in Achilles Tatius' text is to make us aware of the artifice underpinning the narration. Technical rhetoric thus serves a self-reflexive purpose, not allowing us to forget that we are reading a verbal representation. The ekphraseis of exotic animals in *Cleitophon and Leucippe* may be particularly significant from this perspective since they are 'textbook' examples. Herodotus' descriptions of exotic beasts (2.67, 71, 73) are cited by Theon as models for the exercise of ekphrasis, with the result that Cleitophon's Egypt is an overtly rhetorical creation that derives not just from the rhetorical tradition but ultimately from the 'father of lies' himself. The universe we are presented with, for all its beguiling details, is a universe made of words.

It is interesting to consider Cleitophon's speech of self-accusation in this light. Such speeches were a special challenge in declamation. In one macabre example cited briefly by the fifth-century rhetorician, Sopater, a man mortally wounds a girl while attempting to rape her. She asks her father not to prosecute, but the attacker accuses himself, leading the father to argue against his conviction, in accordance with his daughter's wishes.⁵⁸ Sopater gives no comment on this example, but elsewhere he makes clear that such *prosangeliai* are a form of figured speech (*eschēmatismenos logos*) whose real purpose is different from the apparent purpose.⁵⁹ The speakers' aim is not to die but to create sympathy for themselves, despite their crime or error.

So a reader steeped in the techniques and habits of declamation might well be tempted to question Cleitophon's motivation in his first speech to the court at the end of Achilles Tatius' novel. Being written from a first-person perspective, the novel does not give us another view point from which to evaluate his actions and intentions. But one possible outcome of the speech might be to win sympathy for himself while firmly implicating Melite in the supposed murder of Leucippe. We may note the discrepancy that one of the other characters, Cleinias, points out between Cleitophon's past and present behaviour (7.6). This is not the first time that Leucippe has 'died', but on the earlier occasions Cleitophon survived after a little lamentation and even recovered sufficiently after six months to begin his relationship with Melite (5.8). Cleitophon's speech of self-accusation would probably have alerted the rhetorically literate reader at least to the possibility that our narrator may not be as reliable as he might have seemed.

The supreme irony of the trial scene is that, in the end, the declamatory arguments and counter-arguments establish nothing. Thersandrus breaks off the process he himself has initiated and proposes two semi-magical tests: a virginity test for Leucippe and the test of Melite's fidelity that she passes by sleight of tongue (8.11). As he

interrupts his own advocate he declares: 'There is no need for words'. The 'truth' is to be established by perceptible signs, the music emanating from the virginity-testing cave of Pan (a fabulous, hybrid character who falls outside the world of 'likeness to truth'). Words, in the end, cannot establish what really happened; they can only produce competing versions. But, while the characters within the novel have alternative means of establishing facts (or so they believe), we the readers have only words to rely on. Though it is technically inconclusive, Achilles' trial scene with its references to declamation serves the vital thematic purpose of underlining the difficulty of establishing the truth and of interpreting events, as D. Maeder has argued for the references to declamation in the Latin novels.⁶⁰

5 Rhetoric and Fiction

The mechanics of rhetorical theory may therefore have provided a language within which to express the complexities and paradoxes of fictional discourse. Rhetoric provided not just the tools for the verbal representation of action, character, time and place that is at the heart of the novel, but also for reflection on the nature of that representation. Perhaps the clearest example of this is in the long story of the meeting of Theagenes and Charicleia that Calasiris tells to Cnemon in the *Aethiopica* (2.25–5.1). Cnemon is notoriously avid for sensation. He demands that Calasiris not just narrate but 'show' him the procession at which the young couple first met (3.1). Calasiris' resulting ekphrasis is so effective that Cnemon recognises the couple from the description and cries out, 'it's them!' (3.4). Calasiris in turn interprets Cnemon's response to mean that the couple are actually present and have not simply been conjured up by his speech. The episode is an ironic comment on the rhetorical theory of *enargeia* with its claims to 'make absent things present', i.e., to create an illusion of presence that provokes an emotional and imaginative response in the audience through words alone.⁶¹ It is equally a comment on the nature of fiction, whose job is precisely to make us feel present at events that are 'like' reality but which are ultimately a creation of the word.

Like the novel, declamation conjures up people, places and situations that are 'like truth'.⁶² Both declamation and the novel use language – whether narration, direct speech by characters or description – to represent complex situations that belong to an intermediate domain of likeness, between truth and lies. The rhetorical theory and practice of the Roman period provided some of the tools that the writers of the novels could use but, far more importantly, it provided intensive practice in the creation of likeness to truth as well as the means to reflect on that practice. Declamation alone cannot explain the novels, any more than the *progymnasmata* can, but it is surely significant that the novel developed in a culture where intense effort and energy were spent on using language to create complex fictional situations and on reflecting on that creative project and on the ambiguities involved.

So, far from being an intrusion into the novel, rhetoric is deeply ingrained in the very existence of the genre. Rhetoric and its codes also constitute another level of meaning within the novel. Characters' use of speech serves to indicate their sexual, social and cultural development as they pass through the events of the novel. The trials and other explicit references to rhetoric, particularly those in *Cleitophon and Leucippe*, foreground

questions of identity, interpretation and the nature of knowledge as well as the ability of language to convey that knowledge. Above all, the rhetorical use of language affects the readers emotionally and intellectually and draws them into the text, just as Cnemon is drawn into Calasiris' narration, so that the readers share, through *logos*, in the experience of *erōs* that is at the centre of the narratives.

Bibliographical Essay

The earliest modern studies of the novel were interested in the genesis of the genre and discussed the role of rhetorical theory and practice from this perspective. K. Barwick, 'Die Gliederung der Narratio in der Rhetorischen Theorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Geschichte des antiken Romans', *Hermes* 63 (1928), pp. 261–287, took issue with the suggestion of E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig: 1914), that the preliminary rhetorical exercise (*progymnasma*) of narration (*diēgēma*) was a nascent form of novel writing. Barwick's article provides a valuable overview of the treatment of different forms of narration in Greek and Latin rhetorical theory, but the narrow terms in which the question of 'influence' was debated limit the interest of the article for students of the novel. After this, studies of the novels tended to focus on their literary qualities, and rhetoric was overshadowed until the work of G. Anderson, *Eros Sophistes: The Ancient Novelists at Play* (Chico, CA: 1982) and *Ancient Fiction* (London: 1984), together with B. Reardon, *Courants Littéraires Grecs des IIe et IIIe Siècles après J.-C.* (Paris: 1971), which put the novels back into the context of the Second Sophistic. More recently, the characters' use of speech in the novels has been reconsidered from a rhetorical perspective by J. Birchall, 'The Lament as a Rhetorical Feature in the Greek Novel', *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 7 (1996), pp. 1–17, R. Hock, 'The Rhetoric of Romance', in S.E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330B.C. – A.D.400* (Leiden: 1997), pp. 445–466, and L. Pernot, 'Chariclée la Sirène', in M.-F. Baslez *et al.* (eds.), *Le Monde du Roman Grec* (Paris: 1992), pp. 43–51. A broader and more flexible conception of 'rhetoric' has also allowed a reconsideration of the interaction between imperial rhetorical theory and practice and the novel that goes beyond questions of origins and influence. J. Morgan, 'Make-believe and Make Believe: The Fictionality of the Greek Novels', in C. Gill and T. Wiseman (eds.), *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World* (Exeter: 1993), pp. 175–229, analyses the discussions of types of narration in rhetorical theory within a broader investigation into ancient concepts of fiction. B. Cassin, *L'Effet Sophistique* (Paris: 1995), highlighted the central importance of fictional creation to the Second Sophistic in a discussion that is of great importance to the novels and their place in their contemporary culture.

Notes

- 1 On the dates of the extant novels, see B.P. Reardon (ed.), *Collected Ancient Greek Novels* (Berkeley: 1989), p. 5. The date of Heliodorus' *Aethiopica* has been the subject of debate: S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism and Power in the Greek World AD 50–250* (Oxford: 1996), pp. 423–425.

- 2 See G. Anderson, 'The *Pepaideumenos* in Action: Sophists and their Outlook in the Early Roman Empire', *ANRW*, II.33.1 (1989), pp. 79–208.
- 3 See, for example, G. Anderson, *The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire* (London: 1993), p. 158.
- 4 See D.A. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge: 1983), for an overview.
- 5 H. Borneque, *Les Déclamations et les Déclamateurs d'après Sénèque le Rhéteur* (Lille: 1902), p. 130 and E. Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (Leipzig: 1914), pp. 362–366, noted the similarities in theme. Borneque suggested that the novel was a direct descendent of declamation. Russell, *Greek Declamation*, Chapter 2, gives an entertaining overview of the themes of Greek declamations. See also R.A. Kaster, 'Controlling Reason: Declamation in Rhetorical Education at Rome', in Y.L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden: 2001), pp. 317–337.
- 6 The disastrous Sicilian campaign was the subject of a set of declamations by Aelius Aristides: see L. Pernot, *Les Discours Siciliens d'Aelius Aristide (Or. 5–6): Etude Littéraire et Paléographique, Edition et Traduction* (New York: 1981).
- 7 K. Plepelits, 'Achilles Tatius', in G. Schmeling (ed.), *The Novel in the Ancient World* (Leiden: 1996), pp. 408–411, suggests a mid first-century date for the action.
- 8 Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 5.13.3–5.14.4. On this description, see T. Whitmarsh, 'Written on the Body: Ekphrasis, Perception and Deception in Heliodorus' *Aethiopica*', *Ramus* 31 (2002), pp. 111–125.
- 9 See the excellent discussion in R. Hock, 'The Rhetoric of Romance', in S.E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330B.C. – A.D.400* (Leiden: 1997), pp. 450–453.
- 10 R. Barthes, 'L'Ancienne Rhétorique: Aide-mémoire', *Communications* 16 (1970), p. 180, for example, characterises Second Sophistic rhetoric as 'une suite lâche de morceaux brillants'.
- 11 See Menander Rhetor, *On Epideictic* in D.A. Russell and N.G. Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* (Oxford: 1981), p. 140 (402. 7–10) on the Epithalamium and p. 152 (408.15) on the 'Bedroom Speech'.
- 12 See A. Billaut, *La Création Romanesque dans la Littérature Grecque à l'Époque Impériale* (Paris: 1991), pp. 265–301.
- 13 E. Harlan, 'The Description of Paintings as a Literary Device and its Application in Achilles Tatius' (Diss. Columbia University: 1965) and S. Bartsch, *Decoding the Ancient Novel: The Reader and the Role of Description in Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius* (Princeton: 1989). See also D. Maeder, 'Au Seuil des Romains Grecs: Effets de Réel et Effets de Création', in *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 4 (1991), pp. 1–33 and, on the discussion of the phoenix in Achilles Tatius (3.25), H. Morales, 'The Taming of the View: Natural Curiosities in Leukippe and Kleitophon', in *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 6 (1995), pp. 39–50.
- 14 See, in particular, Swain *Hellenism and Empire*, *passim*, T. Schmitz, *Bildung und Macht: Zur sozialen und politischen Funktion der zweiten Sophistik in der griechischen Welt der Kaiserzeit* (Munich: 1997) and T. Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire* (Oxford: 2001), pp. 90–130.
- 15 See, for example, Russell, *Greek Declamation*, *passim*, L. Calboli Montefusco, *La Dottrina degli Status nella Retorica Greca e Romana* (Hildesheim: 1986) and *Exordium, Narratio, Epilogus: Studi sulla Teoria Retorica Greca e Romana delle Parti del Discorso* (Bologna: 1988), M. Patillon, *La Théorie du Discours chez Hermogène le Rhéteur: Essai sur les Structures Linguistiques de la Rhétorique Ancienne* (Paris: 1988), and M. Heath, *Hermogenes on Issues: Strategies of Argument in Later Greek Rhetoric* (Oxford: 1995).
- 16 B. Cassin, *L'Effet Sophistique* (Paris: 1995).
- 17 On Libanius' declamations, see B. Schouler, *La Tradition Hellénique chez Libanios* (Paris-Lille: 1984) and D.A. Russell, *Libanius: Imaginary Speeches* (London: 1996). On Chor-

- icius, see now B. Schouler, 'Choricus Déclamateur', in C. Saliou (ed.), *Gaza dans l'Antiquité Tardive: Archéologie, Rhétorique, Histoire* (Salerno: 2005), pp. 117–133 and R. Webb, 'Rhetorical and Theatrical Fictions in Chorikios of Gaza', in S. Johnson (ed.), *Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamics, Didacticism, Classicism* (Aldershot: 2006), pp. 107–124.
- 18 Theon has traditionally been dated to the first century, but M. Heath, 'Theon and the History of the *Progymnasmata*', *GRBS* 43 (2002), pp. 129–160, has argued for a date in the fifth century AD.
 - 19 M. Patillon, *Theon, Progymnasmata* (Paris: 1997), p. 53 (89.30–90.18).
 - 20 Patillon, *Theon, Progymnasmata*, pp. 48–49 (86.9–19).
 - 21 On the *Progymnasmata*, see J. Connolly, Chapter 11 and R. Webb, 'The *Progymnasmata* as Practice', in Y.L. Too (ed.), *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity* (Leiden: 2001), pp. 291–316.
 - 22 See, for example, Aphthonius, *Progymnasmata*, ed. H. Rabe (Leipzig: 1926), p. 36.
 - 23 On the often neglected importance of readerly imagination to the modern novel, see E.J. Esrock, *The Reader's Eye: Visual Imaging as Reader Response* (Baltimore: 1994).
 - 24 Aspects of the speeches have been addressed by J. Birchall, 'The Lament as a Rhetorical Feature in the Greek Novel', *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 7 (1996), pp. 1–17 and Hock, 'Rhetoric of Romance', pp. 445–466.
 - 25 Callirhoe's speech is an example of the 'interior monologue' – a literary phenomenon discussed by A. Mori, Chapter 30, p. 461.
 - 26 Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe*, 2.9, trans. Reardon, *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, p. 47.
 - 27 It seems to have been this type of passage that provoked Rohde, *Der griechische Roman*, p. 380, to lament the 'coldness' and 'emptiness' of the novels.
 - 28 See I. Rutherford, 'Inverting the Canon: Hermogenes on Literature', *HSCP* 94 (1992), pp. 355–378 and *Canons of Style in the Antonine Age* (Oxford: 1998).
 - 29 On Calasiris' narration, see J.J. Winkler, 'The Mendacity of Kalasiris and the Narrative Strategy of Heliodorus' *Aithiopika*', *YCS* 27 (1982), pp. 93–158.
 - 30 The omission of ambiguous or embarrassing details is frequently advised by Menander Rhetor, *On Epideictic*, see, for example, on the *basilikos logos* (Imperial Oration), in Russell and Wilson, *Menander Rhetor* p. 80 (370.30–371.3).
 - 31 Birchall, 'The Lament', *passim*.
 - 32 See, for example, Chariton 1.8, 1.14, Achilles Tatius, *Cleitophon and Leucippe* 3.16, 5.7, 7.5, Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 1.4.
 - 33 Menander Rhetor, *On Epideictic*, in Russell and Wilson, *Menander Rhetor*, p. 200 (434.11–15.). See Birchall, 'The Lament', p. 5 and R. Webb, 'Poetry and Rhetoric', in S.E. Porter (ed.), *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330B.C. – A.D. 400* (Leiden: 1997), p. 362.
 - 34 Achilles Tatius, *Cleitophon and Leucippe* 7.5, trans. Reardon, *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, p. 262.
 - 35 Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*, 4.9, trans. Reardon, *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, p. 336.
 - 36 The best known are Catullus 3, Ovid, *Amores* 2.6 and Statius, *Silvae* 2.4. But these existed in the Greek tradition as well, as shown by the mock epigrams in the *Greek Anthology* (9.189–216) and the lament for a cockerel in *P.Oxy.* 219: see D.L. Page (ed.), *Select Papyri* 3, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: 1941).
 - 37 Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe* 5.4–8. Hock, 'Rhetoric of Romance', pp. 462–464, gives an analysis of this trial; see also G. Anderson, *Eros Sophistes: The Ancient Novelists at Play* (Chico, CA: 1982), pp. 19–20.
 - 38 Anderson, *Second Sophistic*, pp. 158–160.

- 39 An example is the imaginary law that allows the hero or the tyrant-slayer to choose his reward. His choice may contravene another law, or be judged undesirable by another character, who then has to argue his case. See, for example, the pair of declamations by Choricus portraying the conflict between a young hero who has chosen marriage to a poor girl as his reward and his miserly father in R. Foerster (ed.), *Choricii Gazaei Opera* (Leipzig: 1929), pp. 224–280.
- 40 See the edition and translation of Polemo's declamations by W. Reader, *The Severed Hand and the Upright Corpse: The Declamations of Marcus Antonius Polemo* (Atlanta: 1996).
- 41 Lucian, *Tyrannicide* and Choricus, *Tyrannicide*, in Foerster and Richtsteig, *Choricus, Opera*, pp. 285–309. For a translation and analysis of Lucian's speech, see Heath, *Hermogenes On Issues*, pp. 175–189.
- 42 See R. Webb, 'Imagination and the Arousal of the Emotions', in S. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), *The Passions in Roman Literature and Thought* (Cambridge: 1997), pp. 112–127.
- 43 See for example, Achilles Tatius, *Cleitophon and Leucippe*, 1.2, 7.2, 8.4; Heliodorus, *Aethiopica*, 2.21.
- 44 Winkler, 'Mendacity of Kalasiris', pp. 138–146.
- 45 Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 3.17, trans. Reardon, *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, p. 422.
- 46 Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe* 1.14, trans. Reardon, *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, p. 294. Cf. Daphnis' speech comparing himself to a rival at 1.16 and his monologue describing the effect of Chloe's kiss at 1.18.
- 47 F.I. Zeitlin, 'Gardens of Desire in Longus's *Daphnis and Chloe*: Nature, Art, and Imitation', in J. Tatum (ed.), *The Search for the Ancient Novel* (Baltimore: 1994), pp. 148–170.
- 48 See, for example, Chariton, *Chaereas and Callirhoe* 6.5 (where Callirhoe is described as *pepaideumenē* and her Persian interlocutor explicitly labelled as *barbaros*) and Heliodorus, *Aethiopica* 1.21–22.
- 49 L. Pernot, 'Chariclée la Sirène', in M.-F. Baslez et al. (eds.), *Le Monde du Roman Grec* (Paris: 1992), pp. 43–51.
- 50 A.R. Dyck, *Michael Psellus, The Essays on Euripides and George of Pisidia and on Heliodorus and Achilles Tatius* (Vienna: 1986), p. 92, 1.36–42.
- 51 Achilles Tatius, *Leucippe and Cleitophon* 8.11. Thersandrus demands that Melite swear she has not had sex with Cleitophon during his absence; as the one occasion on which they made love was after his return, she can safely accept the challenge.
- 52 Trans. Reardon, *Collected Ancient Greek Novels*, p. 192.
- 53 Dionysus and the discovery of wine (2.2); the discovery of purple dye (2.11); Pan and Syrinx (8.6); Rhodopis (8.12).
- 54 The elephant and the gnat (2.21) and the gnat and the spider (2.22).
- 55 See R. Webb, 'Ekphrasis Ancient and Modern: The Invention of a Genre', *Word and Image* 15 (1999), pp. 7–18.
- 56 See Webb, 'Progymnasmata as Practice', *passim*.
- 57 J.R. Morgan, 'Reader and Audiences in the *Aithiopika* of Heliodoros', *Groningen Colloquia on the Novel* 4 (1991), pp. 85–104.
- 58 Sopater Rhetor, *Diaireseis Erötematōn*, in R.G. Walz, *Rhetores Graeci* 8 (Stuttgart: 1836), p. 309.
- 59 On figured speeches, see Russell, *Greek Declamation*, pp. 35–36.
- 60 D. van Mal-Maeder, 'La Mise en Scène Déclamatoire chez les Romanciers Latins', in S. Panayotakis et al. (eds.), *The Ancient Novel and Beyond* (Leiden: 2003), pp. 345–355.
- 61 See R. Webb, 'Mémoire et Imagination: Les Limites de l'*enargeia*', in C. Lévy and L. Pernot (eds.), *Dire l'évidence* (Paris: 1997), pp. 229–248.
- 62 Cassin, *L'Effet Sophistique*, pp. 449–460.

CHAPTER THIRTY-FIVE

Rhetoric and Historiography

Matthew Fox and Niall Livingstone

I

The discussion of the role of rhetoric in Greek Historiography must begin by confronting the question of the modern categorisation of academic disciplines. It was in Athens, with the rise of different philosophical schools during the fourth century, that rhetoric began to be treated as an academic discipline in its own right, and it acquired, with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (late fourth century), a distinct identity that continued to generate theoretical texts throughout the Hellenistic and Roman periods (see W.W. Fortenbaugh, Chapter 9). The disciplinary identity of history, however, was much less well defined; there are very few theoretical works that deal directly with historical writing, and these are comparatively late in date.¹ So while rhetoric has a clear identity as a subject that can be taught as part of a wider educational curriculum in a form that is recognisable from the fourth century down more or less to the present day, history only gained a similar disciplinary identity in the nineteenth century, becoming part of university curricula towards the end of that century. Thus, the main problem for discussing rhetoric's relationship with history is that we have much firmer ideas than the ancients about what history is, and those ideas have a more complicated connection with their ancient antecedents than our ideas about rhetoric; and while we may be interested in looking at how rhetoric and history intersected in Greek thought, those two terms refer differently to their Greek equivalents.

Ancient readers would indeed be puzzled by the existence of a chapter such as this one, since to a large extent the tension between rhetoric and history is the product of the institutionalisation of history as an academic discipline. Recapturing the harmony between rhetoric and history, which was taken for granted in antiquity, places considerable demands on modern critical faculties, since we will often encounter an unfamiliar world-view which leaves us searching for a stable foothold for criticism. For most of the twentieth century, critics dealt with this unfamiliarity by stressing the defectiveness of most ancient historians' attitudes to rhetoric; the situation has recently improved, but the modern prejudice against rhetoric in history continues to cause difficulties in understanding the ancient view of this area.

Rhetoric clearly did play an important part in ancient historical writing, most obviously since set speeches demonstrating their author's rhetorical skills were a characteristic of all Greek historical writing. Wars and political debates make up a substantial proportion of all historical texts; public speech-making can, along with battles, be seen as the main political event in classical antiquity. For that reason, historians reserved their greatest stylistic resources for the effective treatment of these two subjects. Ancient historiography is at its most obviously rhetorical where it makes direct speech itself into a tool for animating a particular historical event: the direct speech in history presupposes an audience that enjoys public oratory, and is attuned to appreciate the vivid persuasive qualities which speeches can produce. Battle narratives, too, clearly express the rhetorical training of their authors: narrative was an important part of most law-court speeches, and bringing historical events to life required much the same vividness, organisational skill, and appeal to the emotions as narrative in a legal setting. If ancient historiography can fairly be described as particularly rhetorical, it is because in the dominance of these two kinds of writing, political speeches and narrative (particularly perhaps battle narrative), the overlap between the position of rhetoric in ancient political culture, and the record of that culture in historical writing, is at its most evident.

At the same time, there are indications of an unease concerning the role of rhetoric in historical writing from Thucydides (c. 460–400) onwards; the modern sense that rhetoric is something that diverts historians and their readers from the real task of history does have an equivalent in Greek thought. It is essential therefore to find a way of negotiating the enormous difference in perspective between modern and ancient conceptions of historical writing, and of describing both the general integration of rhetoric within historiography, and those moments where a tension between them becomes apparent. This tension may be seen to have contributed to the later separation of historiography from rhetoric that characterises most modern thinking on the subject.

The modern prejudice against rhetoric rests on the idea that rhetoric encourages readers and writers to concentrate more on the form of words than on their actual meaning, and that historical truth is something that ought to exist in a place beyond the reach of rhetoric. Many modern philosophers of history have challenged this view, and it is not one which can be found in antiquity; for example, the mistrust of rhetoric associated with Plato (c. 428–349) does not appear to have had a significant effect on historians. Nevertheless, the manner in which Greek thinkers accommodated rhetoric within historical writing did vary, and if we focus on this variation, we gain considerable insight into the way Greek writers thought about their own past, and about the best way of writing about it.

For the vast majority of ancient historians and their readers, the interplay between rhetoric and history was unproblematic; on a theoretical level, it appears that there was felt to be no particular need to distinguish historiography as a separate branch of prose writing, which required different rules or conventions from those which governed the composition of other kinds of prose. The Roman orator and politician Cicero (106–43) is the first to suggest that Greek rhetorical theory had neglected history. In *de Oratore* 2, which was, of course, written with a Roman readership in mind, he explores the idea that historical writing might benefit from being treated as a special case when it came to stylistic theory. Only one author, Lucian (second

century AD; his highly idiosyncratic treatise *How to Write History* is discussed below) really thought that rhetoric exceeded its normal bounds when it took too dominant a part in historical writing. Rhetorical theory tended at first to ignore history, or later to treat it as simply another kind of writing capable of the same kind of stylistic analysis as speeches or philosophy. From another perspective, there was therefore no reason why the rules of literary composition that constituted the realm of rhetoric would not be perfectly appropriate as training for anyone writing history. So rhetoric forms as much a part of the background to the work of historical writers as their attitude to their sources or their relationship to predecessors: all provide useful angles from which to understand the writing itself.

2

Homer is an inevitable reference-point for this discussion, not only because of the extraordinary cultural prestige of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* but also because these epics are employed as models and points of origin both by writers of history and by teachers of rhetoric. In playful speeches such as Gorgias' *Helen* and *Palamedes*, Alcidas' *Odysseus* and Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, teachers of rhetoric of the fifth and fourth centuries use the battlefield of Troy as the setting for exemplary debates, and later theorists trace their system of rhetorical styles back to the famous scene in the *Iliad* where Antenor recalls the contrasting presence of Menelaus and Odysseus (3.203–224).² Even Plato, in the work where his scepticism about rhetoric is most eloquently explored, responds to the vogue for Homeric models when he has Socrates teasingly refer to contemporary rhetorical teachings as 'the techniques of Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote up in their spare time at Troy' (*Phaedrus* 261b).

Homer's role is even more evident when we come to consider historians. Herodotus' investigation of the origins of war between Greeks and non-Greeks is bound to position itself against Homer's poem of war between Greeks and Trojans; he pointedly displays his broader perspective by making Helen only the latest in a catalogue of intercontinental abductions, and then by citing Persian surprise at the Greeks' foolishness in going to war for the sake of a woman (1.3–4). Likewise Thucydides feels bound both to make the case for the relative smallness of ancient wars next to the Peloponnesian (1.1) and to incorporate the Trojan War into his background narrative (1.9–10). He also, in the same vein, makes great claims for the naval power of King Minos, redressing the excessive dominance of the Trojan myth in providing the historical origins of institutions: in this case, an organised navy capable of quelling piracy (1.4). Thus both Herodotus and Thucydides work non-Trojan material into a rationalised historical background in order to demarcate their own work from that of their main predecessor, Homer. The later trend in Greek historiography of supplementing the accounts of prominent predecessors must be seen as the continuation of these founding gestures of the genre; for example, Xenophon begins his *Hellenica* in the year 411/10, the point where Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War breaks off, and the *Roman Antiquities* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (late first century), ending with the First Punic War, serves as a prequel to the *Universal History* of Polybius (c. 200–118).

The epics are of course supreme models both of grand narrative and of speech-making, and their importance for the present discussion is above all to underline the point made above: if from our perspective reporting what happened is one thing, and presenting eloquent speeches is another, with no necessary connection between them, then that perspective is far removed from the Greek world. In Homer speech and action go hand-in-hand.³ *Iliad* and *Odyssey* together are made up more of direct speech than of narration by the poet,⁴ and the best hero, Achilles, is raised to be both a 'speaker of words and a doer of deeds' (*mythōn te rhētēr' emenai prēktēra te ergōn*, *Iliad* 9.443). The unfolding of each epic, and its hero, drives equally towards two resolutions, a climax of words and climax of action: Achilles' perilous place between human and super-human is revealed no less in his exchange of words, and tears, with Priam in Book 24 than in his killing of Hector (itself, of course, an occasion for highly significant speeches), and the greatness and human limitations of Odysseus are expressed both in the killing of the suitors and in the words and silences of his reunion with Penelope, where words reach their limit, and the master of verbal deception is at last dependent on a non-verbal proof, the 'powerful sign' (23.188) of the marriage-bed rooted in a living tree, to reveal his identity.

From this perspective, it is possible to argue that Homer presents an ambiguous picture of the boundaries of rhetoric. There are clearly some kinds of event (Achilles' encounter with Priam, Odysseus' with Penelope or his mother's wraith) where words fail, and the poet presents material objects (corpses, the bow, the marriage-bed) or raw expressions of emotion, most commonly the shedding of tears, as the solution to human dilemmas. When Odysseus at Alcinous' court is presented with episodes from his own story through the skill of the bard Demodocus – a scene which H. Arendt describes as the moment when 'what had been sheer occurrence now became "history"' – his reaction is complex and interesting. He weeps covertly at the song of his quarrel with Achilles (*Odyssey* 8.83–95). Later, he sends Demodocus a gift of meat, and then congratulates him: he has clearly been taught by a god, because he tells the story 'as if you had been there yourself, or heard from another' (*Odyssey* 8.491): witness, strikingly, becomes the touchstone for inspiration, and the roles of Demodocus the blind bard, and Odysseus, the real eye-witness who will shortly embark on his own story, are momentarily confused or superimposed. But when, at Odysseus' request, the bard sings of the fall of Troy, Odysseus 'melts' (*tēketo*, *Odyssey* 522), and cries openly, 'as a woman cries embracing her own husband, who has been killed defending his city and his people, as he tried to fend off the cruel day from his town and his children' (*Odyssey* 523–525). Odysseus' grief, re-enacting the grief of a victim of his own victory, represents the moment when the past becomes too real for words.

However, such episodes are few compared to the large number of small plot-lines where the main function is to bring two characters to the point where they launch into direct speech, and the bard can display his skill in impersonation and the construction of diverting arguments. This narrative technique is one that moves almost unchanged into historiography, and the speeches of Thucydides, just as much as those of Homer, demonstrate the effectiveness of rhetoric in creating a sense of drama which gives the audience or readers an encounter with characters and ideas unmediated by an intrusive narrator. When thinking about the evolution of historiography, it is useful to remember that in Homer we can perceive the

beginnings of a debate, a tension between a fascination with what speeches can add to a narrative in terms of insights and audience engagement, and the sense that there is a realm where words are a superfluous elaboration. But it is equally important to recall that it is only from a post-Platonic perspective that one can demarcate a realm beyond words in Homer; far more powerful is the sense that the narration of events and the production of characters who speak are all part of a single continuum, directed at both edification and entertainment of the audience, in a manner which continued to make Homeric material a fundamental resource for Greek rhetoric for centuries to come.

3

However powerful Homer's influence, and however high-minded or practical his insights were felt to be – we should not forget that the Augustan geographer Strabo was looking for scientific information in the Homeric epics six centuries after they were written down – historians did all need to establish a method of dealing with the past that was recognisably less poetic. Even so, in terms of rhetorical presentation, the most important influence on the emerging genre of historiography is epic. Herodotus' *Histories*, or, in his words, the 'display of his inquiry' (*historiēs apodexis*, 1.1) concerning the great actions of Greeks and non-Greeks and why they fought one another, is the inheritor of various traditions, but Homer is the most prominent. Like the Homeric poems, Herodotus represents a transitional point from oral to written transmission of stories, and it is highly likely that Herodotus himself gave live performances of parts of his work (the word *apodexis* ['display'] itself suggests performance). Unlike Homer's, Herodotus' work is explicit about its written status, indicated by the performative use of the verb *graphō* ('I write'),⁶ and it is characterised by a subtle and elusive fashioning of the relationship between the author and his audience. Where poets derived their inspiration from the Muse, Herodotus speaks on his own authority. His first words, which may be literally translated 'of Herodotus' from Halicarnassus inquiry this is the display' (*Hērodotou Halikarnēseos historiēs apodexis hēde*), begin this complex play: indicating authorial distance by referring to himself in the third person, asserting ownership and control of the work with the opening genitive case ('of Herodotus'), and at the same time creating a sense of direct presence with the deictic pronoun 'this'.⁷ Throughout the *Histories*, the authorial voice invites us into the text in a kind of hide-and-seek, insisting that we become involved in the process of historical inquiry.

Sometimes Herodotus seems as omniscient as the inspired bard: within ten chapters of the start of the work, we are in the bedroom of the Queen of Lydia, some eight generations before Herodotus' time, and there is no explanation of how he knows what happened there. At other times, though, he presents himself as simply 'writing down what has been said', leaving us to be the judge (e.g., 2.123.1, 7.152.3), or he analyses different theories and states his own preference between them (2.20–27, on the Nile floods, is the most extended and famous example). He may comment that he finds a particular story implausible (3.3) or again insist that something apparently unbelievable really is the case (3.80). Then there are the moments when his voice teasingly draws attention to itself by its silence, pointing to things Herodotus knows,

but for one reason or another will not say (e.g., 1.193.4, 2.123.3, 2.171.1–2, 3.125.3). The overall effect is of a complex of different stories orchestrated and introduced to us in various ways by the controlling authorial voice, and we are invited in turn to believe, disbelieve, compare, and judge for ourselves. According to their estimation of Herodotus' commitment to truth, modern scholars have seen his method as primarily literary, aiming to beguile and entertain, or primarily historical, modelling research in action; but either way – and perhaps more importantly – it is pre-eminently rhetorical, insisting that we reflect on what makes a *logos* persuasive.⁸

Herodotus' stories, like Homer's, are presented in a mixture of third-person narrative and direct speech, the latter including both private conversations and public orations. For him, unlike Thucydides, the inclusion of direct speech does not require special comment: speaking is part of life, and when representing personalities from the past it is natural to represent them as speaking. In order to understand this, it is necessary to set aside assumptions based on a documentary view of history, where actions are more likely to be recorded than conversations; for Herodotus, words and actions may equally be part of the transmitted story which he is retelling, and there is no reason to treat one element as more 'real' than the other. On the other hand, the proportion of reported as opposed to direct speech increases in the later books of the *Histories*, which deal with events closer to his own time. This may suggest that where Herodotus was working with some actual report of what was said, he was more likely to relay the report than to reconstruct the words themselves.⁹

Speeches are used to give depth to the *Histories* by exploring character and motivation, displaying, for instance, the unreflecting arrogance of autocrats, from Croesus to Xerxes, the enduring Spartan outlook of Demaratus, even when exiled and serving Xerxes (7.102), or the authority of Themistocles (8.57–62). They also serve to highlight important decisions (and point to the possibilities of what might have been), often with irony, as in the many cases where good advice is given and ignored.¹⁰ They provide political analysis, sometimes corroborating through 'another' voice what Herodotus says or implies in his own. A good example of this is Socleas' long speech at 5.92, a Corinthian's view of tyranny in Corinth (compare 5.78, Herodotus' famous pronouncement on the end of tyranny at Athens). The most elaborate set-piece of all is the debate among the Persian conspirators as to the form of government they should adopt after the overthrow of the Magus (3.80–83), an episode clearly designed to shock the assumptions of his Greek readers ('speeches were made which are unbelievable to some of the Greeks: but they *were* made'). Otanes, Megabyxus and Darius argue for democracy, oligarchy and monarchy respectively. Otanes, speaking first, makes the case against autocracy (3.80):

My opinion is that there should no longer be one man ruling over us: it is neither pleasant nor good. You saw the extent of Cambyses' tyranny,¹¹ and now you have experienced the tyranny of the Magus as well. How could monarchy be in order, when it can do as it likes without being held to account? Being put into this position of power would drive even the best of men out of his normal state of mind.

Megabyxus agrees with Otanes about monarchy, but criticises the rule of the many, and advocates oligarchy instead. Darius speaks last, and agrees with Megabyxus' criticisms of democracy, then takes a new tack to advocate monarchy (3.82):

If we take the three options before us and suppose each to be at its best – the best democracy, oligarchy and monarchy – I say that the last far surpasses the others. Nothing could be found that is better than the one best man. He will have the kind of understanding needed to manage the people irreproachably; and in this way our plans against our enemies will be kept as secret as possible.

Having spoken in favour of the *best* monarch, Darius goes on to resume criticism of oligarchy and democracy, but does not answer Otanes' points about past experience of tyranny or the effect absolute power is calculated to have even on 'the best man'. Darius goes on to win the vote; as so often in the *Histories*, the most important points are made, but go unheeded. Lateiner has argued convincingly that this debate encapsulates a theoretical approach to political history that pervades, and helps to structure, Herodotus' work.¹²

Speeches in Herodotus are generally conversational in tone: we are given a sense more of private access to the counsels of the great than of watching performers on the grand stage of history. Advisers need to demonstrate their sincerity (e.g., 7.237: Xerxes is still convinced of Demaratus' good faith even though he rejects his advice), and an Athenian envoy makes an emotional appeal to the Spartans based on Athens' status as the oldest city in Greece (6.106), but there is relatively little interest in the rhetorical situation as such: the establishment of the speaker's authority, the contest between speakers for ideological ground, and the gauging of the audience's response. Similarly, speakers may refer to and refute each other's arguments, but there is not very much in the way of self-conscious rhetorical artifice. Speeches provide additional voices in the *Histories*' display of competing versions of events, but in the end they point back to the organisational and interpretive power of Herodotus' own rhetoric, and the authorial voice itself.

4

In Thucydides, we observe a narrowing down of the rhetorical character of historical narrative. Compared to Homer and Herodotus, Thucydides has a more single-minded view of the responsibilities of the author/narrator, and the use of speeches in particular becomes much more tightly controlled. However, any desire to see in Thucydides the founder of 'modern scientific history' must be moderated by the fact that Thucydides' speeches, like his more lengthy narrative descriptions, appeal just as much to his audience's rhetorical sensibilities as Homer's or Herodotus'. Thucydides does, however, display an unease about rhetoric, and is the first author to confront explicitly the tension between an audience's interest in rhetorical display and the requirements of historiography. In his notorious chapter on his methodology for the inclusion of speeches in his history of the Peloponnesian war (1.22), Thucydides makes no mention of the rhetorical tradition on which he draws: he simply points out that he has included speeches as a record, reconstructed where necessary, of the political debates that took place on selected occasions throughout the war. He is concerned, in other words, not to justify the inclusion of large set speeches, but with the problem of how to do this in the absence of verbatim textual records. He excuses himself by saying that, when his information was not sufficient, he has made the speakers say what was required by the occasion.

All of this has led modern historians to speculate on his treatment of his sources, but rather less upon the rhetorical conventions which conditioned Thucydides' own sense of suitability. The startling fact for the modern reader is that Thucydides at no point explicitly refers to what his speeches in fact provide: an implicit commentary upon the political processes of various Hellenic *poleis*, a commentary that emphasises the detrimental effects of a rhetorical culture upon the political stability of those communities. The fact that, while criticising the excessive force of rhetoric within Athens in particular, Thucydides is himself able to make such powerful use of it, can be seen as ironic only from the modern perspective, which assumes some incompatibility between historical and rhetorical. In his own terms, Thucydides is pessimistic about the effects of rhetoric on the decision-making capacities of a democratic assembly. Even so, his statement about speeches makes it clear that the opposition between rhetoric and history is not highly developed. He fails to notice what to us seems like a very significant difference: between what is rhetorically fitting to a particular occasion, and what was probably said on that occasion, given the absence of a reliable record. Failing a reliable textual or verbal record, Thucydides' sense of what the speaker ought to have said in the circumstances will do as an indication at least of the general sense of what was in fact said. Modern notions of historical evidence recoil from such an absence of discrimination, but Thucydides is probably more careful than any other historian in even acknowledging that there is a difficulty in passing off reconstructed speeches as adequate, or at least valuable, records of what occurred.

Moving on from the speeches to a more general discussion of the methodology of his history, Thucydides makes the most important of his programmatic statements, one which does attempt to establish a distance between his own historiographical technique and the negative influence of rhetoric in public discourse. The passage is written in an extraordinarily harsh style, which is softened in most published translations:

For the audience, perhaps the unstorylike quality of my writing will make it appear less pleasurable. Whoever wishes to look into the clarity of what occurred and then again of what will occur in the future, which will be more or less the same in accordance with what is human, they will judge these aspects as a sufficient benefit. My writing is laid down as a possession for all time rather than an object of contest for immediate hearing.

Thucydides here is pre-empting accusations of writing an unpleasing kind of history. He envisages that his work will be unpopular with his readers, and there is a direct relationship between the kind of history that Thucydides imagines would be popular and his own attitude to rhetoric. The lack of story-like elements (*to muthōdes*) refers to the strong tradition in existing historical writing of including myths and legends; Herodotus is clearly one example, though other lost historians were probably more obvious; subsequent Greek historians continued, despite Thucydides, to accommodate quantities of mythical material in historical guise. Such writing, Thucydides supposes, is what makes history popular with its audience: and crucially, this audience is one that is accustomed to listening to history being read out loud, specifically in a context that is in some sense a competition (*agōnisma*).

Exactly what sort of competitive environment Thucydides has in mind here is unclear, but the most plausible explanation is that he has in general a low opinion of oral performance, and imagines that historical works will be judged inappropriately by the same criteria familiar from competitive rhetorical displays or even competing speeches made in the Assembly. He implements this programme, particularly in Books 1–3 of his work, by using speeches to develop his critique of rhetoric, and here at the outset he tries to detach the task of the historian from this entire area. In the Mytilenean debate in Book 3,¹³ rhetoric emerges as the product of an unhealthy competitive environment at Athens, one in which proper political decision-making is hampered by a fascination with captivating rhetorical display. At a point in time where the writing of extended texts and their reading was a new phenomenon, Thucydides takes the extraordinarily bold step of conjuring up an eternal audience dependent on the act of reading rather than listening, and he deliberately turns away from the audience of his own day, whose interests, he suggests, lie in evaluating writing not for the insights it grants into the nature of things but for the pleasure that it imparts. The universality of what it is to be human (*to anthrōpinon*) is a precondition for his argument: only if humans really are in some important sense always the same will the audience of eternity be able to learn from the experience of the Peloponnesian war. Here he defines historical writing as a tool in the analysis of humanity, and as something more high-minded than any interest in entertainment.

History, by virtue of being removed from the oral performance context of the *polis*, is taken to a different arena from the public one from which rhetoric derives its identity. The insights of the historian become private insights to be gleaned by reading and understanding, rather than by listening and being persuaded. Interestingly, Thucydides' model of understanding depends on visualisation (*skopein es to saphes*): as will be seen below, this idea is developed, particularly in Polybius but also in Lucian, so that the guarantee of the historian's reliability becomes 'autopsy', the idea that he simply records what he has seen for himself. In this light, Thucydides' own deliberate explanation of how he reconstructed speeches where he had no accurate record can be seen as a response to the high standards of evidence he has set himself, but also as an indication of the limits of those same notions of evidence. Speeches are such an essential part of his history that Thucydides would rather depend upon a sense of rhetorical appropriateness to provide a reconstruction, than sacrifice the opportunity offered by a speech for the greater insights into the character of individuals or political issues. The absence of any real evidence for speeches does not deter him from using them to act as the most sophisticated of his tools of historical analysis.

Although not given much theoretical elaboration, Thucydides' emphasis upon being an eye-witness, and recording what you yourself have seen, becomes a central element in the development of history's own discrete identity as a discipline. It is a process in which the role of rhetoric becomes seen as a contamination: historians will need, of course, to rely on other eye-witnesses or on earlier textual accounts, but Thucydides sets as a standard the ideal of the historian recording his own experiences. He is also, therefore, personally involved in the events which he describes. The rigorous tone of Thucydides' programmatic statement clearly did set a standard to which later historians felt they needed to respond. After Thucydides, it is therefore broadly-speaking possible to categorise Greek historians as falling into two camps; by far the larger group were those who took a more generous view of the potential of rhetoric in

historical writing, and who also refuted Thucydides' limiting insistence that the historian needed to be an observer in the events he described. The work of many Hellenistic historians (most of which did not survive past antiquity) continued to respond to the popularity of the history of early or even prehistoric periods, and for this, of course, the eye-witness standard was not applicable. Nevertheless there were clearly historians who followed Thucydides' strictures: Polybius and Josephus are good examples. Lucian, as the one theoretician of historical writing, unpacks the theoretical implications of Thucydides' programme, and also gives more anecdotal evidence of the trend in writing contemporary history. The relationship between rhetoric and history, however, can be more clearly understood in reading those historians whose work was more typical; writers like Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus (both first century), or Arrian (1st–2nd century AD), who, undeterred by the Thucydidean trend, continued to write works in which the role of rhetoric in providing compositional principles was a product both of their insistence on departing from contemporary subjects, but also of their own more integrative view of how rhetoric and history together could provide a particular way of conceiving of and representing Greek culture and its traditions.

5

Isocrates (436–338) plays an important role in this history,¹⁴ since it is he who rehabilitates rhetoric from Plato's anxieties about the disconnection between words and things, and provided a well-defined notion of 'philosophical rhetoric' that became a corner-stone in the defence of the educational function of all kinds of highly rhetorical texts, including histories. Isocrates might be surprised to find himself included in this discussion: he has limited interest in historical writing, nor does he see himself as a rhetorician. He describes his own activity as philosophy (though few modern philosophers acknowledge it as such). Isocrates' distinctive *philosophia* consists in the cultivation of highly elaborate, stylistically perfect political discourse (*logos politikos*) aimed at good ends, in particular the objective of unity of purpose (*homonoia*) among the Greeks which will lead to them fighting against non-Greeks, and not amongst themselves.

Unlike Plato, Isocrates does not see the identification of 'good ends' as problematic in itself.¹⁵ While he makes few explicit pronouncements on the subject, his position seems to be that the goal of certain knowledge (*epistēmē*) of right and wrong is chimerical; human opinion (*doxa*), however, tends to track what is best, and its ability to do so can be cultivated through practice.¹⁶ Both eloquence and ethical judgement depend above all on natural ability, and neither can be taught in any systematic way; but both can to some extent be *learned* by experience, and the best means to this end is the cultivation of political discourse.¹⁷ Isocrates' influence on subsequent historians comes from very positive rehabilitation of rhetoric as a force for social cohesion and in establishing a way of talking about rhetoric as the essential basis for any society or form of government to produce a consensus of right-minded citizens. Thucydides' idealised, but eternally distant, readership is brought back into contemporary reality by Isocrates' insistence upon the proper use of rhetoric for the right social purpose, and for this reason, he is a central figure in the reconciliation of rhetoric with historiography.

Isocrates rejects any opposition between plausibility and truth in rhetorical composition or between aiming for what is best and aiming to succeed. For him, it is common sense that these things go hand in hand. For instance, praising what is praiseworthy and denouncing what is bad will always be honest, convincing, and morally beneficial; the opposite will be merely absurd.¹⁸ There is only one genuinely worthwhile kind of writing, namely 'political and Hellenic' speeches (15.46), which give advice on what is best for the *polis* and for all the Greeks. Apart from some early forensic speeches and some works that display and advertise his view of education, Isocrates' oeuvre consists of polished examples of this *logos politikos*. Some are cast in the form of speeches to the Athenian Assembly (7 *Areopagiticus*, 8 *On the Peace*, 14 *Plataicus*) or at festivals (4 *Panegyricus*, 12 *Panathenaicus*); in 15 *Antidosis*, Isocrates imagines a forensic situation, with himself and his educational career on trial in the manner of the trial of Socrates. Others take the form of advice to foreign leaders (2 *To Nicocles*, 5 *Philip*, most of the *Letters*), while two (3 *Nicocles* and 6 *Archidamus*) are advice-speeches put into the mouths of foreign leaders themselves. All are clearly designed to be circulated in writing, studied and imitated. Closest to what we would call history is 9 *Evagoras*, praise for the deceased Cypriot king Evagoras offered to his son Nicocles, Isocrates' friend and pupil, as a tribute to the dead and an edifying example to the living. This work self-consciously identifies itself as transferring the convention of encomium from poetry to prose, and stands at the beginning of the tradition of Greek biography.¹⁹

Isocrates regularly contrasts his own works with speeches on private business, in other words forensic rhetoric, which he dismisses as trivial (e.g., 15.3), and with poetry, the shortcoming of which is that it depends for its success on providing entertainment (e.g., 2.42–49). On two occasions, at *Antidosis* 45–46 and *Panathenaicus* 1–2, he uses a priamel formulation to set his own superior prose discourse apart from the innumerable other kinds of prose *logos*.²⁰ In each case, historical writings ('[writers who] set out to compile events in time of war' and '[*logoi* which] narrate events in the Greek wars long ago') constitute one of the rejected categories. It is interesting, though, that in the later *Panathenaicus* passage history is singled out for qualified commendation: I have not chosen to write such *logoi*, Isocrates writes, 'even though I know they are deservedly praised'. Isocrates does not often commend literary activities other than his own; the discussion of poetry in *To Nicocles*, mentioned above, is far more grudging in its admiration. The reason for this rare exception is not hard to see: accounts of the 'Greek wars' (meaning the war against Persia; the primary reference may be to Herodotus) present an edifying example in line with Isocrates' own Panhellenic ideals.

Isocrates' use of the past in his own works conforms to this model of history as exemplary; see, for instance, the idealised picture of the old days of Athenian democracy in the *Areopagiticus*, or his own equally idealised account of the Persian wars at *Panegyricus* 86–98, where Athens and Sparta are presented as vying with each other to bear the brunt of the fighting (contrast the slightly different version, for different purposes, at 12.49–52). While fanciful stories are avoided (12.1), legendary and recent events are both equally serviceable (see the praise of Agamemnon at 12.76–83). A distinction is sometimes made, but is not accorded particular importance; thus the praise of Athens' benefactions to Greece at *Panegyricus* 28–50 begins with Demeter's gift of grain and the Mysteries, a story which, Isocrates says, it is

appropriate to tell, ‘even if it is of a legendary nature’ (*ei kai muthōdēs ho logos estin*, 28). At *Evagoras* 5–6, Isocrates criticises the way poets have dwelt on the distant periods such as the Trojan war, complaining that people would rather hear the praises of those ‘whom they do not know existed’ than of their own benefactors. But the point is simply that figures from the recent past, such as his present subject Evagoras, have been unjustly neglected. In all cases, the overriding criterion is what will serve the purposes of the speech by providing its readers with a good example. The key word in Greek is the verb *ōphelēin*, ‘do good to’ or ‘benefit (ethically)’. In the *Panathenaicus*, after describing the excellence of Athenian democracy in its earliest and purest form, Isocrates anticipates the objection that he did not witness the events he describes (149–150):

Perhaps some will say that I am eccentric – there is no reason, after all, not to interrupt my speech – in venturing to speak as if with precise knowledge about events at which I was not present when they took place. But I believe I am doing nothing unreasonable in this. If I were the only one who put trust in what is said about ancient times and in the writings handed down to us from that period, I could reasonably be criticised; but in reality, many sensible people can be seen to have the same attitude as myself. In any case, if I were put on the spot and required to justify myself, I could demonstrate that all human beings acquire more of their knowledge by hearing than by seeing, and that the actions they know of through having heard tell of them from others are greater and nobler than those they witness themselves.

The important thing is that the past events he describes are the subject of general agreement, and his account of them will therefore be persuasive; and the value of the past is that it gives us access to greater, nobler, more morally improving deeds than most of us will be lucky enough to witness in our own lifetime.²¹

Isocrates’ importance for the relationship between rhetoric and historiography is twofold. First is his perfection of a fluid, polished and dignified rhetorical prose with a powerful ethical flavour, a ‘philosophical rhetoric’ (though this phrase belongs to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, not Isocrates) which resists Plato’s negative characterisation of rhetoric and which will form the mainstay of Greek *paideia* for centuries to come. Second is his adumbration of an exemplary historiography rooted in the arts of praise and blame, and aiming at the moral edification of its readers. It is perhaps worth noting that two historians of the next generation, Ephorus of Cyme and Theopompus of Chios (both mid-to-late fourth century), are identified in the ancient scholarly tradition as pupils of Isocrates, though such claims should be treated with some scepticism (on the ethical character of Theopompus’ work, see Dion. Hal. *Letter to Pompeius Geminus* 6).

6

Polybius (c. 200–118) occupies an important place in the canon of Greek historians for modern scholars, even though his influence in antiquity seems to have been less great.²² Polybius was a universal historian (meaning that he treated a large number of different geographical areas, united under one overarching theme), writing about the entire Mediterranean world in forty books, many of which did not survive past

antiquity. His main purpose was to provide a context for the understanding of Rome's meteoric rise to power, but he also saw history as containing directly applicable lessons about the conduct of public affairs and military campaigns, and is not embarrassed to admit that he is aiming at a very narrow readership: those men who are likely to find themselves in a position of power where such practical lessons from the past can be applied. He can be seen as a successor to Thucydides in that he develops, to a remarkable extent, Thucydides' ideas about the usefulness of history, and he talks about them at much greater length.²³ Polybius is extremely rigorous in his insistence on the diligent gathering and processing of sources, and also about the inclusion only of events for which the best source material is available. He thus scorns the treatment of anything other than relatively recent or contemporary history, and places considerable emphasis upon the importance of the historian himself being present at events, or, as a second best, undertaking rigorous investigation of eye-witnesses. The introduction to Book 9 (1–2) is a particularly clear example, and the whole of Book 12 is devoted to an attack on Polybius' predecessor Timaeus, which lays out his own methods.

Polybius does include speeches in his history, but he is more explicit than Thucydides in setting up verbatim recording of these speeches as the best standard, even if it is one that, on occasion, he is not able to adhere to himself.²⁴ Of course, we are in a different world here from that of Thucydides, and it is perfectly possible that (in a tradition well established by the orator Demosthenes) speeches made by statesmen on critical occasions were in fact recorded and were available to Polybius to read and then transcribe. Even though he may himself on occasion resort to the same processes of rhetorical invention to which most Hellenistic historians were accustomed, he sets himself against this practice (e.g., 2.56, 12.25i). He writes in a deliberately simple, unadorned style, and criticises other historians for their excessively elaborate narrative devices that detract from the serious purpose of history. So without paying much attention to rhetoric in his theoretical utterances, he puts forward a clear case through his writing for historiography as a distinctly un-rhetorical genre, and reduces to a minimum the role played by style in conveying the significance of particular events. Interestingly, Polybius' plentiful comments on his own method (often praising his own work while condemning that of predecessors) mean that even small details of his sense of his own practice are explored. Most relevant here is the fact that he allows for historians to aim at producing in their readers only one particular kind of pleasure, one that is closely linked to a certain knowledge of the usefulness of the history they are reading (e.g., 1.4, 6.2, 9.1).²⁵ So Polybius sets himself against the more popular trend of histories aiming both to edify and to amuse a wider audience.

In the modern view of Greek historiography, therefore, Polybius stands out as an atypical figure of his age: he seems to repudiate rhetoric, and in the process he allows us to imagine those other Hellenistic historians whom he criticises, and whose work we can no longer read, as a band of irresponsible rhetoricians whose main interest in recording the past was to create a sensational effect, irrespective of the truth behind their stories. This is, of course, enormously distorting, but the idea of Hellenistic historiography as highly rhetorical in character is a well-established orthodoxy. Polybius' lack of interest in the rhetorical, his narrow conception of the utility of history, and his rigorous insistence upon the role of the historian himself in gathering his sources and being present at the events he describes, set a high standard for

subsequent historians to follow. As a rule, it seems, they did not rise to the challenge, and Polybius' successors (Diodorus of Sicily and Dionysius of Halicarnassus have both survived) returned to a rhetorical, if also self-consciously rational, form of historical writing, in which the function of both the historian and the historical work are more broadly conceived.²⁶ These later historians, just like Polybius' predecessors, give much more room for speculative enquiry and rational reconstruction, often of the mythical material that Polybius entirely rejects. However, in his consistent interest in visual metaphors, in comparing his work to painting, and in frequently adopting the perspective of the eye-witness in his narratives (particularly of battles), Polybius establishes the idea of autopsy firmly as an alternative to the more textual forms of composition which the rhetorical environment favoured.²⁷ In so doing, he may have helped Lucian define his ideas of the rhetorically-neutral history which he elaborates in his essay *On How to Write History* (see below).

7

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (late first century) is a particularly useful case-study, since as well as a lengthy surviving history of early Rome (*Roman Antiquities*), we are also able to read his rhetorical treatises.²⁸ Dionysius made his living as a teacher of rhetoric at Rome, and is a central figure in the creation of an idea of classical Greek language and culture. He sought to establish new norms in the production of a literary form of the Greek language which looked back to models of the language of Athens as recorded in the writings of Isocrates, Lysias, Demosthenes, and others, at a time when spoken Greek had already moved on quite significantly; the language of the New Testament, for instance, is a lot less elaborate than the conservative literary Greek which Dionysius himself wrote and which he also analysed and taught in his rhetorical writings. It was largely thanks to figures like Dionysius that the notion of a fixed Greek literary language became established, and, in the process, a set of ideals about Greek culture and identity which endured more or less until the twentieth century. Dionysius' rhetorical interests are inseparable from his cultural and political ones: the imitation of classical models of rhetoric was a means of perpetuating the political ideals elaborated most clearly by Isocrates, of a Greek world imbued with a sense of its own destiny, one founded upon philosophical ideals. It was in looking back to Isocrates, and by adapting his ideas about rhetoric to a different linguistic and cultural context, that Dionysius paved the way for the so-called Second Sophistic, a period when rhetorical performance once again flourished in the semi-autonomous *poleis* of the Greek world under Roman rule, where the language of classical rhetoric was used to explore the political and philosophical ramifications of Roman power in relation to Greek traditions.

Dionysius castigates historians like Polybius who limited history to the autopsy of the historian. He reappropriates mythological and geographical enquiry as central to a general knowledge of the world, and thus an essential part of the historian's task. In his own historical writings, Dionysius sets out to prove the thesis that Roman and Greek culture are essentially the same since the Romans themselves were, in ethnic origin, Greek. Latin itself was in fact a particularly distant dialect of Greek. Dionysius accordingly characterises the early Romans by making them speak an idealised Greek, and

deliver speeches that recall the models of rhetorical practice that he analyses in his rhetorical works. The whole thrust of Dionysius' history is thus rhetorical: it has an explicit agenda, viz., to persuade Greek readers of the logic of Roman rule and to encourage them to look favourably on it (an argument also put forward by Polybius, though in less extreme terms). It also uses overtly rhetorical means to do this: the lengthy speeches, heavily derived from the classics of Attic oratory, are demonstrations of the Hellenic quality of early Roman culture. Modern readers find it difficult to reconcile such an overtly rhetorical approach with any ideas about history: Dionysius' historical material seems not to be treated in accordance with any respect for the evidence, but instead to be the vehicle for a political programme. Dionysius' presentation seems quite free from any desire to actually research the character of the period he is interpreting. In this light, his high-minded assertions about the centrality of truth to historical writing appear disingenuous if not downright cynical. Such an interpretation, however, expresses perfectly the problems of disciplinary identity discussed above: modern expectations of historical research are not really relevant to Dionysius' practice. Even if they were, Dionysius can still be said to carry out research into his sources, both textual and archaeological. Of course, the desire to use mythical material as a resource for pre-history produces what looks to us like absurd rationalisations, but it was a central part of almost all Greek historiography, Thucydides included. We ought also to remember that Italian archaeologists recently claimed to have found the walls built in Rome by Romulus.²⁹ It is more useful to understand how Dionysius' own definition of rhetoric contributes to his historical method since it is in the historical dimensions of rhetoric that we can observe best how the two discourses intersect.

We can learn much from Dionysius' detailed criticisms of Thucydides (in his *On Thucydides*, but also his *Second Letter to Ammaeus* and the *Letter to Pompeius*), whom he treats as a model both for the aspiring historian and the would-be orator. Indeed, for Dionysius, these two figures can be identical, since in his articulation, rhetoric is simply the discourse of politics, in which a knowledge of history is just one aspect of an education based on the reading and imitation of the classic Greek orators. Writing history itself is another means for exercising that same sense of political purpose. Dionysius appreciates Thucydides' ability to write a vivid battle narrative (*On Thucydides* 27), and praises some of his speeches as worthy of imitation by future historians (*On Thucydides* 42). On the other hand, he generally finds the style for which Thucydides' speeches are best known awkward and unnatural, and therefore unsuitable as a model for the politically inspiring rhetoric which any fledgling orator of his own day would find useful. Specifically, he repeatedly accuses Thucydides of contravening his own criteria for the composition of the speeches (see above, pp. 548–549), and complains that the strange style of the speeches tells us more about Thucydides' own views than about what the historical figures are likely to have said. A good example is the Melian dialogue (Thuc. 5.85–113), which to modern readers is a powerful expression of Thucydides' desperation at the depths to which imperial politics have brought Athens. Dionysius cites the dialogue at length, and his detailed analysis culminates thus (*On Thucydides* 41):

In this [dialogue], the most intelligent of the Greeks bring out the most shameful arguments, and they express them in the most unpleasant language. It is possible that the historian, in his grudge against the city for condemning him, is showering such reproaches upon it that all men are bound to hate it.

The picture of Athens that emerges from the Melian dialogue is, for Dionysius, historically implausible: it makes Athens look like a tyranny, as well as crediting the Melians with an unjustifiable degree of moral fibre. He makes similar criticisms of the speech in which Pericles defends himself from the accusations of the Athenians (Thuc. 2.60–64), portions of which he also praises (*On Thucydides* 46):

As I said at the start, the historian is expressing his own opinion about the virtue of Pericles, and has said these words that are not appropriate. He should rather have made clear what he wanted to say concerning the man, but when putting words in his mouth at a time when he was in danger, he should have used words that were humble and likely to soothe anger.

Thucydides has, again, contravened his own criteria of appropriateness to the occasion, and in this instance, he made Pericles appear to antagonise the Assembly in a situation where he would surely have been more likely to want to conciliate it. In both of these passages, we can see that Dionysius has no sympathy with the idea that Thucydides might be using an ugly style to characterise the ugly rhetoric of Athenian imperialism, nor that awkward situations sometimes give rise to awkward thoughts or words. By extension, Dionysius is vigorous in his criticisms of those fans of Thucydides who see in his awkward style an elitist form of rhetoric (*On Thucydides* 49–51), one that only the educated can understand and make use of. Style cannot do its job properly if only an elite minority can appreciate it. It is the work of the historian to educate his readers about the past, and for this purpose, the rhetoric of speeches needs to be lucid and accessible; as such, it will also be realistic, in that it will reflect the function of rhetoric within the political arena as expressed in the historical events being narrated. Dionysius has no objection to Thucydides voicing his criticisms of Pericles in his own person, but he finds it unjustifiable that he uses examples of Pericles' own rhetoric to convey those views implicitly. By so doing, he spoils the potential of his history to do what it should do: provide an instructive, accurate, and essentially inspiring account of Athens, which will make subsequent readers aware of how to write good history themselves, as well as how the politicians of the past expressed themselves.

Such is Dionysius' way of bringing history and rhetoric together, and it is characteristic of most ancient historiography: rhetoric is the training-ground for the politician, and the political issues of the past and their discussion form the basis of the education of today's political elite. To be able to speak coherently in public involves mastery of a discourse that is essentially historical in character. Historiography is an activity that emerges out of this same arena; it is an extension of an involvement in public affairs. Dionysius criticises as historical errors on Thucydides' part those moments where he makes the Athenians look like tyrants or ruthless imperialists: these visions of Athens reflect Thucydides' own personal bias rather than the established historical character of the city. They are, therefore, historically misleading as well as being unsuitable rhetorical inspiration for future writers. Dionysius rejects Thucydides' scepticism about the role of rhetoric as much as he rejects his use of an awkward style. He sees rhetoric as a mechanism for better government, and a well-educated population is one that will live up to the ideals of the golden days of Attic oratory. Thucydides' own personal grudge against Athens has led him to produce a

picture of that city that is not only unflattering but also for Dionysius historically inaccurate. Dionysius represents the closest theoretical harmonisation of rhetoric within historiography. As a result, of course, his work as a historian has been almost universally derided.

Lucian's essay *On How to Write History* does provide a theoretical basis from which Dionysius' idealised vision of rhetoric can be attacked.³⁰ Lucian provides a unique, and unrepresentative, picture of rhetoric as an unnecessary intrusion into the work of real history. As such, this short satirical essay has been seized upon by modern readers eager to find ancient forerunners for modern ideas of historical objectivity and for an anti-rhetorical trend in approaching historiography. Lucian is, of course, a writer with his own very individual position with regard to rhetoric. Although recognisably belonging to the Second Sophistic, he can nevertheless be characterised as an anti-sophist, and a sceptical and satirical approach to rhetoric pervades much of his writing, even though that writing is itself highly rhetorical.³¹ His approach to history is similarly subversive; his collection of far-fetched tales given the title *True Stories* is the most obvious example, but more generally, his writings defy easy characterisation by genre, and he deliberately transgresses any boundary between satire, acute social observation, and absurd invention. Nevertheless, his vision of how history should be written is striking. Essentially he reinforces what we already find in Thucydides and Polybius: an emphasis on the usefulness of history and a disdain for pleasure, a contempt for partisan or eulogistic historical writing, and an insistence on the careful collection of first-hand evidence, preferably through autopsy. Most remarkable, perhaps, is the notion that history can be written best with only the most minimal attention to literary technique: literary style brings with it dangers (of bias, unnecessary elaboration, distortion), and it should be avoided as much as possible. Lucian praises a military memoir (*hypomnēma*) written in entirely everyday language (the language of the cross-roads), as an example of how little attention need be paid to style in effective historical writing (16). The historian becomes, in this analysis, merely the transmitter of the events onto the page. There must be some discussion of how to write, but the style that Lucian advocates is almost an anti-style, one characterised by the suppression of any instinct by the historian to intrude his own personality too obviously into his work.

An interesting characteristic of the work is its frequent use of comparisons taken from the world of the painting, sculpture, and even architecture (e.g., 10, paintings of Hercules and Omphale wearing each other's clothes; 27, the statue of Zeus at Olympia; and 33, where Lucian's theory of history is to be built on the ground that he has, up to this point, been clearing of thistles and brambles). At one particularly climactic point, Lucian brings together his sense that historical writing is essentially a visual, rather than a linguistic, matter when he distinguishes the work of the historian from that of the orator (51):

[The ideal historian] should make his mind like a limpid mirror, polished and sharp in its focal point. Whatever images of deeds he receives, he must display them just as they are, not distorted or faded or misshapen in any way. For they don't write like orators; rather, what is to be said exists, and will be spoken, since it has already happened. It is only necessary to put it in order and say it.

Visual imagery allows Lucian to imagine a process where the mechanisms normally necessary to the creation of a written account are entirely minimised: events will bring with them their own means of expression; anything further will count as distortion. And throughout the work, the source of this distortion is seen to be rhetoric: it is this that encourages historians to put the perpetuation of their own skill above their loyalty to the truth. Bad historians are repeatedly characterised as writing in order to achieve a particular aim of their own: popularity with the public or with those in power. By minimising style and focusing on the truth, the historian himself will be subordinating himself to history rather than using history to enhance his own reputation.

With Lucian, we find ourselves dealing more explicitly with the contrast detectable already in Homer between words and things. Lucian explicitly compares the ideal historian to the all seeing, all knowing, Homeric Zeus (49). The point of the image, like most of the images in his essay, is to find a means of extricating the historian from the normal process of human communication: competing *logoi* or the forms of elaboration which rhetorically-minded audiences demand from their literature. Lucian deliberately wants to make history into a different kind of literature, and his elevation of the status of the historian to someone almost god-like in mental capacity must, presumably, pick up on the ambitions of Thucydides to find a form of communication that is immune from the normal pressures of social communication that concern normal mortals. Historiography continues to regret, from time to time, the moment of its inception, when the historian's own voice replaced the voice of the omniscient Muse.

8 Conclusion

Historiography was a successful genre, and the status of the historian as a bearer of culture was high. For most Greek historians, this cultural status merged invisibly with the need for well-organised, attractively presented prose that was the aim of rhetoric. But looking back even to Homer, it is possible to perceive a different trend, one which was concerned about the potential of language to distort. In Thucydides, this becomes an active distrust of rhetoric's role in promoting the life of the *polis*. Isocrates reverses this mistrust, but historians after Thucydides display a tension between Thucydides' rigorous insistence on the primacy of the event and an interest in the capacity of historical writing to have a political effect (also, of course, one of Thucydides' aims). For most of them, that effect was achieved through a serious-minded rhetoric in the manner of Isocrates. However, Lucian's treatise also makes us aware that there were some for whom rhetoric was just elaboration, an elaboration inappropriate to the serious purpose of history.

Bibliographical Essay

The work that provides detailed guidance on the theoretical utterances of Greek historians is J. Marincola, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (Cambridge: 1997). For Greek historiography generally, see S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek*

Historiography (Oxford: 1994). A helpful analysis of Herodotus' historical rhetoric is provided by D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto: 1989). On Herodotus as a figure of the fifth-century 'enlightenment', to be seen alongside medical writers, political thinkers, and teachers of rhetoric, see R. Thomas, *Herodotus in Context: Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion* (Cambridge: 2000) and K. Raafaub, 'Philosophy, Science, Politics: Herodotus and the Intellectual Trends of his Time', in E.J. Bakker, I.J.F. de Jong and H. van Wees (eds.), *Brill's Companion to Herodotus* (Leiden: 2002), pp. 149–186; the latter collection also includes essays on Herodotus' relationship to Homer and the oral tradition, and on his construction of the authorial *persona* of the historian. C. Dewald and J. Marincola (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Herodotus* (Cambridge: 2006), had not appeared at time of writing. A controversial but powerful interpretation of Isocrates' textual rhetoric is provided by Y.L. Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates. Text, Power, Pedagogy* (Cambridge: 1999); for other perspectives, see the essays in T. Poulakos and D. Depew (eds.), *Isocrates and Civic Education* (Austin: 2004). On the role of rhetoric and the spread of ideals of Hellenic culture, particular under Rome, see S. Swain, *Hellenism and Empire* (Oxford: 1996), S. Goldhill, *Being Greek under Rome. Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire* (Cambridge: 2001) and T. Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire* (Oxford: 2004). On Polybius, we suggest A.M. Eckstein, *Moral Vision in the 'Histories' of Polybius* (Berkeley: 1999) and F.W. Walbank, *Polybius, Rome, and the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge: 2002). On Dionysius of Halicarnassus, see E. Gabba, *Dionysius and the History of Archaic Rome*, Sather Classical Lectures 56 (Berkeley: 1991).

Notes

- 1 Cicero laments the neglect of historiography in handbooks on rhetoric at *de Oratore* 2.15 (see below).
- 2 On Homer's proto-rhetoric, see H.M. Roisman, Chapter 28, pp. 429–430. with n. 7.
- 3 See H.M. Roisman, Chapter 28, for discussion of the *Iliad's* representation of persuasive speech.
- 4 See further, J. Griffin, 'The Speeches', in R. Fowler (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Homer* (Cambridge: 2004), pp. 156–167.
- 5 H. Arendt, 'The Concept of History: Ancient and Modern', in her *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (London: 1961), pp. 41–90 at p. 45. See also F. Hartog, 'The Invention of History: The Pre-History of a Concept from Homer to Herodotus', *History and Theory* 39 (2000), pp. 384–395, especially pp. 389–392.
- 6 For example, 2.70.3, 2.123.1. On Herodotus' attitude to writing, see F. Hartog, *The Mirror of Herodotus*, trans. J. Lloyd (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 1988), pp. 273–289. On the textual world of the Homeric poems, see K. Dowden, 'Homer's Sense of Text', *JHS* 116 (1996), pp. 47–61.
- 7 See further, F. Hartog and W.R. Hayes, 'Herodotus and the Historiographical Operation', *Diacritics* 22 (1991), pp. 83–93, especially pp. 89–90.
- 8 Literary: D. Fehling, *Herodotus and his 'Sources'*, trans. J.G. Howie (Leeds: 1988); historical: D. Lateiner, *The Historical Method of Herodotus* (Toronto: 1989).
- 9 Lateiner, *Historical Method*, p. 21.

- 10 The classic account (with list of examples) is R. Lattimore, 'The Wise Adviser in Herodotus', *CP* 34 (1939), pp. 24–35.
- 11 Greek *hubris*.
- 12 Lateiner, *Historical Method*, pp. 163–186.
- 13 On which, see Ian Worthington, Chapter 17 and Stephen Usher, Chapter 15.
- 14 For a fuller discussion of Isocrates' work, see T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6.
- 15 See further on rhetoric and ethics, J. Day, Chapter 25.
- 16 For example, 13.14–21, 15.180–185, 270–271; cf. T. Reinhardt, Chapter 24.
- 17 On Isocrates' conception of *logos politikos*, see T. Poulakos, *Speaking for the Polis: Isocrates' Rhetorical Education* (Columbia, SC: 1997), pp. 26–45, Y.L. Too, *The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates. Text, Power, Pedagogy* (Cambridge: 1998), pp. 10–35, and the essays in T. Poulakos and D. Depew (eds.), *Isocrates and Civic Education* (Austin: 2004).
- 18 See 11.4–5, with N. Livingstone, *A Commentary on Isocrates' Busiris* (Leiden: 2001), pp. 106–107.
- 19 9.8–11; A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge, MA: 1971), pp. 49–52.
- 20 See the discussion in Too, *Rhetoric of Identity*, pp. 19–25.
- 21 For further discussion of this passage, see J. Marincola, *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography* (Cambridge: 1997), pp. 276–279. Marincola rightly rejects the notion that Isocrates considers hearing to be *better* than seeing.
- 22 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, writing around a century after Polybius' death, lists him among authors whose works no-one can bear to read through to the end (*On the Arrangement of Words* 4). His ideas seem, however, to have influenced Lucian (see pp. 558–559).
- 23 K. Sacks, *Polybius on the Writing of History* (Berkeley: 1981), sifts out the many disparate comments on historical method, and reconciles them, in so far as is possible, into a coherent position.
- 24 See C. Wooten, 'The Speeches in Polybius: An Insight into the Nature of Hellenistic Oratory', *AJP* 95 (1974), pp. 235–251 and F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* 1 (Oxford: 1957), pp. 13–14.
- 25 See F.W. Walbank, 'Profit or Amusement: Some thoughts on the Motives of Hellenistic Historians', in his *Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge: 2002), pp. 231–241.
- 26 For a discussion of the extent and limits of rhetorical freedom in historiography of the imperial period, see A.B. Bosworth, 'Plus ça change: Ancient Historians and their Sources', *Cl.Antiq.* 22 (2003), pp. 167–198.
- 27 On visualisation in Polybius, see J. Davidson, 'The Gaze in Polybius' Histories', *JRS* 81 (1991), pp. 10–24, especially pp. 14 and 24.
- 28 Dionysius' works, both historical and rhetorical, are most readily accessible in the Loeb Classical Library edition.
- 29 See the interview with Andrea Carandini in the *New York Times*, Friday, 10 June 1988.
- 30 For a detailed comparison of the two approaches, see M.A. Fox, 'Dionysius, Lucian and the Prejudice against Rhetoric in History', *JRS* 91 (2001), pp. 76–93. *On How to Write History* has been edited with a translation in a selection of Lucian's essays edited by M.D. MacLeod: *Lucian: A Selection* (Warminster: 1991).
- 31 On Lucian, see T. Whitmarsh, *Greek Literature and the Roman Empire. The Politics of Imitation* (Oxford: 2001), Chapter 5.

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